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
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JANUARY, 1914

THE BIBLE AS THE TEXT-BOOK IN SOCIOLOGY

We are accustomed to regard the Bible as *the* text-book, because the authority, in dogmatics and ethics. Our "Confession of Faith" (Chap. i. 10) says: "The Supreme Judge, by whom all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men and private spirits are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture." Our "Longer Catechism", in response to the inquiry, "What is the Word of God?" replies: "The Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are the Word of God, the only rule of faith and obedience." Our "Shorter Catechism", in answer to the question, "What do the Scriptures principally teach?" says: "The Scriptures principally teach what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man." Our "Form of Government" obliges all our church officers, ministers, ruling-elders and deacons, to affirm that they "believe the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be the only infallible rule of faith and practice" (Chap. xiii. 4 and Chap. xv. 12). Our Book of Discipline says: "Nothing shall be the object of judicial process, which cannot be proved to be contrary to the Holy Scriptures, or to the regulation and practice of the Church founded thereon" (Chap. i. 4). Our "Directory for the Worship of God" in a footnote explanatory of its title is careful to state as follows: "The Scripture-warrant for what is specified in the various articles of this Directory, will be found at large in the Confession of Faith and Catechisms, in the places where the subjects are treated in a doctrinal form." These several

declarations have been interpreted to mean, as it would seem to be self-evident that they were meant to mean, that all that the Bible requires in dogmatics and ethics and, indeed, as regards their expression in religion, must be received and that nothing which it does not require in these spheres may be imposed.

The question before us is, Does all this apply, and apply in the same sense, in sociology? Is there a "divine order of human society"; and does the Bible, and the Bible alone, set forth this order? Is it true that with respect to the family, the nation, the church, the race, the kingdom of God, the great institutes which are the subjects of Christian sociology, the Bible gives us what we find nowhere else; and that all that it gives us in this field, as in that of dogmatics and ethics, is infallible and authoritative? Is it so that whatever the Bible requires in the case of these institutes is also the law and that nothing which it does not require may be made the law? This is the question to be considered.

None could be so pertinent or more evidently important. None could be so pertinent, because, as Prof. Francis Greenwood Peabody remarked in substance, "The problems of the social world are undoubtedly the problems of to-day. Social unrest is *the* fact of contemporary life. No institution of society—the family, the state, or the church—is too stable or too sacred to be assailed." So, too, no question could be more evidently important. If the Bible is *the* authority in sociology, then what our age needs most to know is the trend and the extent of this authority. Only thus can it answer the inquiry in which it is most interested, and which is most insistent, and yet it is from almost every source but this that most are now seeking the answer.

I. We assert, then, that the Bible is as truly the authority and so the text-book in sociology as it is in dogmatics and ethics, and we assert this for the following reasons:

(1) The Bible is *the* text-book in religion, and a pro-

gressive or even a permanent civil society or nation is impossible without religion. That the Bible is the great religious text-book, we have just seen: this is the fundamental presupposition of all our standards. That a progressive or even a permanent civil society is impossible without religion, this results from the nature of things and is also one of the clearest teachings of history. The institute of rights, an avowedly unmoral nation is a contradiction in terms; and, as Washington said in his Farewell Address, "Reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principles." We see the truth of this specially in connection with the most pressing and difficult social problems. As the Hon. Carroll D. Wright, U. S. Commissioner of Labor, remarked recently, "Religion is the only solution of the conflict between labor and capital. The Decalogue is a good platform. Religious education must bring about an alliance of ethics and economics in the welfare of mankind." Nay, we must go further. What has just been observed of the necessity of religion in general, must be affirmed of Christianity in particular. Says Prof. R. E. Thompson, "History is the biography of nations,—not of the whole body of mankind in all stages of arrested or of continuous development, but of those bodies politic, which have not stereotyped their institutions, which have contributed a share to the common wealth of civilization, and which have influenced each other for good. In modern times this group of nations is all but coincident with Christendom. It is only the Christian nation which has been able to garner the experience of the past—Hebraic and Hellenic, Roman and Teutonic—and to carry forward its development to still higher ends. It is within Christendom that history is not wasted and the past not barren for men, and this because we have learned to see in it the leading hand of the living God" (*The Divine Order of Human Society*, p. 121). In a word, it is only on a Christian foundation that society is truly progressive.

The reason for this should be plain. Religion has been described, not altogether inadequately, as "the sum of our relations to God". A truly religious man must, then, be conceived as a man who stands in right relations to God; and in like manner, a truly religious society must be regarded as a society that stands in right relations to God. Such a society will be one that acknowledges God, that obeys God, that draws its life from God, that glorifies God. This, however, is as important in the case of society as in that of the individual. That "we live and move and have our being" in God and that we "were created by Him and for Him",—all this is as true of men socially as it is of men individually. The government, "the powers that be", through which society develops itself, have been ordained of God. "By Him kings reign and princes decree justice." His benevolence is the source of all wealth. His law is the way of peace and happiness for nations and for communities as truly as for individuals. That "in His favor is life and His loving kindness is better than life,"—this applies to the social organism as such as really as to its members. Because of what God is and because of the relation of dependence in which society stands to Him, it must be that "righteousness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people". In emphasizing, therefore, authoritatively, the supreme importance of true religion, that is of right relations to God and, therefore, to Christ who is the revelation of God, the Bible, so far from being outside of the domain of sociology, is teaching just that which is most fundamental to it. Our religious relations underlie and ultimately determine our social relations. An utterly irreligious society would be hell.

(2) Sociology is implicated in, and is the result of, dogmatics and ethics.

Christian ethics is not an independent science. It is the consequence of the application, to and in individual human lives, of the facts of Christian dogmatics. The prophets of the Old Testament were great ethical teachers because of

Their intense realization of God, and their ethical teaching was uniquely high and pure because their conception of God was true. In affirming monotheism, therefore, they were teaching ethics. They were not only giving religious instruction, but they were giving the one kind of religious instruction on which a true ethics could be based.

It is the same in the New Testament. Right conduct is never set forth independently of right belief. The moral teaching of the closing chapters of the Romans is presented as the requirement of the plan of salvation as given in the body of the epistle. It is by the mercies of God, as we might say because of the mercies of God, which Paul has been expounding in the previous eleven chapters, that he beseeches us to present our bodies living sacrifices, holy, acceptable to God, which is our reasonable service, and then goes on to show in detail what such consecration involves. Who may say, consequently, that Paul's dogmatic teaching is without authority for ethics? On the contrary, it reveals the root and principle of Christian ethics.

Precisely this is the meaning of our Lord when He says, "This is the work of God that ye believe on Him whom He hath sent" (John vi. 29). The great thing that God would have us do is to believe on His Son. That is, faith in Christ is the primary, the germinal, and in that sense the all-comprehending virtue: Christian ethics is to appreciate and to appropriate Christian dogmatics. Indeed, we may be and should be more precise. It is to understand and to fulfill the divine plan. It is to do the works which "God afore prepared that we should walk in them". It must be, therefore, that the dogmatic portions of the Bible are of authority, are *the* authority, in Christian ethics. "The duty which God requires of man" is the result of, is involved in, and can be learned from, only "what we are to believe concerning God".

Can it, however, be otherwise in the case of sociology? Will it not in like manner be implicated in Christian ethics and so in Christian dogmatics? Certainly. Social ethics,

which discusses what society ought to be, to do, and to become, presupposes individual ethics, which treats of what the individual ought to be, to do, and to become. This is so because society presupposes, depends on, and is impossible without, its constituent members. While society is other than and more than the sum of the individuals that compose it, it is only in them and because of them, and as they, that it exists. An analogy is often pointed out in this respect between the social and the physical organism. Paul himself does so in 1 Corinthians xii. As the health and vigor of the body depend on the health and vigor of its members, so it is with the Christian society or church, "the body of Christ". "Whether one member suffereth, all the members suffer with it, or one member is honored, all the members rejoice with it." This analogy, however, while true, falls short of the whole truth. The physical body and the body politic are both organisms, but the latter is an ethical organism. That is, its members are ends in themselves. The foot must be honored, but it is for the sake of the body. The individual members of society, too, must be perfected; but this is not simply because the welfare of society depends on them; it is also because society realizes its end only in and through the perfection of its individual members. It exists for them rather than they for it. Social righteousness, therefore, presupposes and has its purpose in individual righteousness; and consequently, just because the Bible is the authority in and for individual ethics, it must be the authority, too, in social ethics. It cannot teach the former and not teach what is most essential in the latter.

And this is a truth that can scarcely be emphasized too much to-day. The trend of our age is toward the depreciation of the individual. Machinery has ruled out handicraft. The lecture has taken the place of private instruction. The shepherd of souls who knows his own sheep by name is giving way to the evangelist who converts sinners in the mass and who has no sheep of his own to know by name

or even by sight. Sociology is a more popular study than theology and the reason is that it puts its stress not on individual regeneration but on social reformation. In a word, what society does not want, but needs all the more urgently, is a renewed emphasis on the individual; and therefore, the Bible, which is dominated by the spirit of the question, "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" is not only, as we have seen, the authority in sociology, but the most pertinent authority. In affirming the individuality of each man's relation to God it affirms both what is most essential in the foundation of any true sociology, and also that which in our day most demands recognition.

So, too, like individual ethics, and through its relation to individual ethics, Christian sociology is implicated in the Christian religion. It is what and as it is because of the revelation which God has made of Himself in Christ. It is determined throughout by the great fact of redemption. This is cosmical as well as individual. There is a "divine order of human society". Hence what our ecclesiastical fathers used to call the "*amplitudo regni Dei*". They conceived of God as redeeming and so as regenerating and ruling over all right human relationships as well as the individual men and women who entered into these relationships. They conceived of Christ as Lord of the family and as King of the nation, as truly as Head of the church or the Life of the individual Christian. They taught that all philosophy and science and art and commerce—all legitimate human interests, must be "brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ"; and that the ideal society could be realized only as His will was done on earth as it is in heaven. Must not, then, the Bible, the infallible because inspired revelation of that will to us, be *the* authority in sociology? Because it is this for religion, and because sociology is implicated in religion as in ethics, it could not be otherwise.

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(3) The Bible contains much information and gives much instruction which is directly sociological. Dr. Crafts, in his *Practical Christian Sociology*, p. 30, says that "there is more material for Biblical sociology than for Biblical theology". I cannot agree with him. He has studied the Bible, as many do, from his own standpoint only. Nevertheless, there is ample ground for his taking his standpoint. Were he not to do so, he would be untrue to the Bible. And we should be equally untrue to it, were we not to do so. The social or sociological aspects of the Scriptures are so many and so important as to demand attention as such. Even a general and cursory study of the Word of God must reveal to every reader, not blinded by his own outlook, how large a portion of it is concerned with man in his collective capacity. As Samuel E. Keeble has said in his admirable book, *The Social Teaching of the Bible*, nations, tribes, cities, communities, classes, families, constantly come under the socio-religious regard of the sacred writers. "Their social relationships and their social morality, their social woes and their social sins, their whole collective life, receives careful, detailed, often passionate and always memorable attention."

This is conspicuously true of the Old Testament. "The Prophets, especially, are full of instruction on sociological problems." "As Professor Seeley says, 'their utterances are instinct with the sense of the national life, the national vocation, the continuity of the national history'." Read what Mr. J. S. Mill, in his work on *Representative Government*, declares of their function in carrying the development of national life in Judea to a point never reached by any other Oriental people, in dissociating the national religion from the blind conservatism which elsewhere stereotyped institutions, in making liberty and movement possible. But what is thus true of the Prophets in particular is as true of the Old Testament as a whole. As Prof. R. E. Thompson has written (*The Divine Order of Human Society*, p. 6), "Until we

perceive that the Hebrew nation is the type of all national life, and that its history is meant to illustrate the laws of that life, what shall we make of all this ado over kings and wars and revolutions? What else is the use of a great part of the Old Testament? Why is it included in the canon at all?" This reasoning is strengthened by the fact that the Old Testament is not an ordinary chronicle of the national evolution of the Hebrews. As the editor of the *Biblical World* for 1901 remarks, "it is the theistic interpretation of such evolution". As I would add, it is the supernatural and, consequently, infallible interpretation of it. In a word, the Old Testament, while primarily and chiefly the supernatural record of the divine preparation for the Messiah, is at the same time other than this; it is also God's text-book of national life.

When we come to the New Testament, we find the sociological element equally, although differently, prominent. In the words again of Prof. R. E. Thompson (*The Divine Order of Human Society*, p. 7), "The Baptist and our Lord both begin their mission by proclaiming, not a way of salvation for individuals, but a kingdom of heaven,—a new order of society, a holy and universal brotherhood transcending all national limitations, and embracing or aiming to embrace, the whole family of man. It is the laws of that kingdom, the conditions of life within it, that our Lord sets forth in His chief discourses. It is the nature of that kingdom and its relation to that of Tiberius Cæsar which are mooted at His trial before the Roman procurator. It is for the establishment of a kingdom that He sends forth His apostles to bring the old world to an end and the new to its birth. Through all their labors, their preachings, their epistles, they are concerned with the relations of men within this kingdom, this "city that hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God". And our canon closes with the vision of its coming down from heaven to earth to permeate and pervade all the families, fellowships, and nations of men with its divine principles.

Now, the questions which at once suggest themselves are, Can information and instruction which bulk so largely and so prominently in both testaments, be mere by-products? Can no more authority attach to the sociological utterances of the Bible than to its statements in the sphere of science, which statements, while always true in the sense in which they were intended, are not regarded by us as authoritative in the sense of final deliverances? On the contrary, is it not what we should expect, in view of the way in which and the degree to which social ethics is implicated in and determined by dogmatics and individual ethics—is it not just what we should expect that so much of God's Word would have a sociological character and purpose; and does not the fact that it has warrant the inference that its sociology is as authoritative as the dogmatic and ethical teaching that demands and determines it? Involved in them and having the same aim with them, it must be equal to them in authority, and how could this be emphasized more strongly than by the prominence which God Himself has given to it in His own Word?

(4) The Bible is the final revelation of the will of God for man in his present state of existence. This is either the direct or the implied teaching of each one of our standards. They all represent the Scriptures as giving the last word with regard to "faith and practice" as clearly as Paul teaches this when he says in Galatians 1:8, 9: "Through we, or an angel from heaven, should preach unto you any gospel other than that which we preached unto you, let him be anathema. As we have said before, so say I now again, if any man preacheth unto you any gospel other than that which ye received, let him be anathema." It follows, therefore, that, unless the Bible be the final and so ultimate authority in its sociology as in dogmatics and ethics, there is here no such authority in sociology. That is to say, we have no positive authority for social betterment, we have no sufficient basis for social realization, there is no firm

order of human society": and, consequently, there is, in the last analysis, nothing for us to do in the social sphere but to lie around, Micawberlike, and see what will turn up. It is not ours to determine in accordance with the divine plan the evolution of society; it is only ours to be evolved. The mere statement of this position should be its refutation.

Nowhere is it more important that there should be *an* authority than in sociology. The fact is that in the social sphere no more than in the individual one can we simply lie around and be evolved. Society is made up of men, not of stones, not even of beasts: and it is characteristic of men, it is *the* characteristic of men, that they are self-conscious; that they evolve themselves; that they themselves work out the plan of God for them, and that, consequently, they "live and move and have their being" in "the realm of ends", of ideals, of authority. To take the ground of the alarmingly popular naturalistic and mechanistic philosophy that, instead of determining and so evolving himself, man is merely determined and evolved—this is to shut your eyes to what man is, even more than if one were to deny that he is an animal and so must breathe. Man is the animal whose very nature it is, and, therefore, in the social sphere, as really as in the individual, to realize and to demand authority. This is the essence of his essence.

We may and should go further. It is not enough for man to have *an* authority. In social relations, specially, he needs an authority that is adequate because final. Legislation, which is merely to meet the need of the hour, of which at the present time we have so much, does not and cannot satisfy any thoughtful person. The doctrine that society should determine itself simply according to the requirements of each new age can not permanently win approval. Made by God and for God and in his image, man can realize himself only as he can aim at and determine himself according to the Eternal and Unchangeable. As he must have an authority on which to rest, so the only authority on which he can really rest will be absolute and thus final.

As has been remarked, this is not only true in the social sphere; it is conspicuously true in it. While we can not with William Temple, Headmaster of Repton, make the moral depend on the social and say that "The isolated individual may be wise or foolish; he can not be moral or immoral, and that an atheistic debaucher upon a desert island is not liable to moral censure", we do hold that the social is both the goal and the crown of the moral. Man was made for society and fully realizes himself only in society. But who understands society, its nature, its functions, its development? It is of all things the most complex, the most complicated. If no man can know himself thoroughly, still less can he know the society of which he himself is but one insignificant member. And, therefore, if man by the very constitution of his nature demands an absolute norm and so a final authority, much more does that most wonderful of all organisms, the social body which men constitute, and in which alone they can fully find themselves, demand it. That is, God Himself must reveal His kingdom from heaven, if we are ever to realize it on earth. A final authority in and for sociology would seem, consequently, to be specially demanded by the divine purpose. Indeed, the Bible would fall short of its own revealed end, if it were the final authority in dogmatics and ethics and not in sociology. It is precisely in the kingdom which it was revealed to introduce, the divine order of society which, while it is to be consummated in heaven, must be established on earth, that we see most clearly the absolute need of such an authority. On these four grounds, then, to adduce no others, we would seem to be justified in claiming the Bible as *the* authority and so *the* text-book in sociology as really as our standards affirm it to be so in dogmatics and ethics.

II. There are, however, many who admit the force of our reasoning and yet deny our conclusion. They make this denial on the following grounds:

(1) The Old Testament, while containing, as we have

seen, much sociological information and instruction, has been abrogated with the dispensation to which it belonged. Its sociological function, if not its dogmatic and ethical one, was vacated when Christ came. The text-book of national life before this, it can not be so since then. The kingdom which our Lord set up was not of this world.

This position, while plausible, is invalid.

(a) The dogmatic and ethical and sociological elements of the Old Testament are so implicated as to be inseparable. Not only does the dogmatic determine the ethical and do they together determine the sociological, but the sociological is given either as an implication of the dogmatic and the ethical or as the conditions which demand them. Its fate, therefore, is one with theirs. If it has been set aside, they, too, have been; and as we do not claim that the Old Testament is no longer a part of the "only infallible rule of faith and practice", for the individual, so neither may we claim that the New Dispensation in fulfilling the Old has abrogated its sociology.

(b) That it has not done so appears in the fact that some of the sociological teaching of the Old Testament is either reaffirmed in the New Testament, or is based on grounds which are permanent. Thus we could not be shown more clearly in the case of Saul and of David and of the kings generally that government is of God than it is asserted to be so by Paul in the thirteenth chapter of Romans. So, too, the obligation of capital punishment for wilful murder is made to rest on the fact that man was created in God's image (Gen. ix. 6); and this reason, from the nature of the case, is and must be as much in force to-day as ever.

(c) While it is true that most of the social enactments of the Jewish theocracy, such as the judicial or civil laws regulating the duties of husbands and wives, the distribution of property, the punishment of crimes, etc., inasmuch as they grew out of the temporary and peculiar conditions of the Old Dispensation, ceased to be binding with the ceas-

ing of that dispensation, it is not true that the principles which these economic or social provisions illustrated and enforced were also abrogated. Thus, the civil magistrate to-day neither ought to put, nor may put, the Sabbath-breaker or the adulterer to death. Yet these offenses, if viewed as sins against God rather than as crimes against the state, deserve death as much now as ever; and it is only as we look at the penalty to be imposed on them when state and church were united in the Jewish theocracy and crimes were punished as sins that we can appreciate or even perceive their real heinousness in God's sight. Thus, again, the land-laws of the Old Testament are not in force to-day. They could not be enforced if they were. How could we secure that every naturalized immigrant, be he Italian, Pole or Magyar, should have his own holding of land, and should dwell under his "own vine and fig tree"? Yet, who can successfully deny that in these land-laws we have a temporary and peculiar illustration of principles that are as wide and as permanent in their application as the human race? In England one out of every eleven of the people is a pauper. Has the fact that nine tenths of the land is held by one tenth of the citizens nothing to do with this? British sociologists say that it has much to do with it. The ideal is that property in land should be universal. This, however, was what the land laws of Israel required. Among ourselves the rich are growing richer and many of the poor, poorer. Is not this largely because no opportunity is afforded to the poor man to recover himself? Such opportunity, however, was to come to every poor Israelite with every return of the year of Jubilee. Are not even our most fertile lands being impoverished through uninterrupted cropping? This could never be, if the Sabbatic year were observed. We could multiply illustrations, but these are sufficient. The judicial and civil laws of the Old Dispensation bind us no longer, but they affirm sociological principles which are of divine authority. It is in this case as in dogmatics. The sacrificial system of the Old Testament was done away, when, "once

for all at the end of the ages," the Lamb of God offered up Himself. Yet, the great truth, the truth that men need most to heed and that we seem most likely to forget, the truth that without the "shedding of blood there is no remission of sins", this eternal truth was only reaffirmed and reemphasized when the temporary symbols of it were done away. And so it came to pass that even those portions of the Old Testament which were essentially and necessarily temporary in their surface teaching, are in their deeper meaning, whether sociological or ethical or dogmatic, of permanent authority; and this, as Illingworth, a recent Bampton lecturer has said, causes the Old Testament to stand, as it has always stood, "in lonely eminence, immeasurably superior to all else of its kind".

(2) The New Testament, whether as regards the sociological teaching which, as we have just seen, it must take over from the Old Testament, or as regards that which is distinctive of itself, cannot be of permanent validity because it was written under the influence of the end of the world.

That the New Testament as well as the Old contains abundant sociological material is, as we have observed, generally admitted.

It cannot, however, be material which has any application to ourselves. Dominated as it is by the thought of a great and imminent crisis, expecting as it does the almost immediate coming down from heaven of the new Jerusalem, what reference can it have to us who are saying, "Where is the promise of His coming? for, from the day that the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation? Paul might well write: "But this I say, brethren, the time is shortened, that henceforth both those that have wives may be as though they had none, and those that weep as though they wept not; and those that rejoice as though they rejoiced not; and those that buy as though they possessed not; and those that use the world as not abusing it: for the fashion of this world passeth away" (1 Cor. vii. 29-31). This, however, can not mean anything

for us. We have found that the fashion of this world does not pass away. We have found that the things of this world seem of all things the most real. A sociology, therefore, which emphasizes their impermanence, a sociology whose fundamental principle is that the world is passing away, such a sociology might do for the first century, but the twentieth can have no use for it.

This reasoning would have force if the facts were as assumed. If the teaching of the apostles, taken as a whole, were really that "the end of all things" was certainly at hand, or if our Lord merely believed that it was, perhaps an argument could be made for the eschatological objections under consideration. "There is," however, as Stalker has observed in his *Ethic of Jesus* (p. 25), "an opposite side of his consciousness, which is left entirely unexplained" by this theory. "It can be proved from his words that he foresaw and foretold a slow and gradual development of his cause such as history has actually exhibited; and nothing is more certain than that he expected to be put by his death into a new and world-wide relationship to men." This is well expressed by Harnack at the close of the third lecture in his *The Essence of Christianity*, and his words are all the more interesting because of his near kinship with the school just referred to. "He who would know," Harnack says, "what the kingdom of God and the coming of this kingdom mean in the preaching of Jesus must read and ponder his parables. Then it will dawn upon him what Jesus is thinking about. The kingdom comes when it comes to the individual, making entry to the soul which embraces it. The kingdom is the reign of God, no doubt; but it is the reign of the holy God in individual hearts, it is God Himself with His power. Everything dramatic in the external and historical sense here disappears, and the whole external hope of a future upon earth also sinks out of sight. Take any parable you please—that of the Sower, or that of the Pearl of Great Price, or that of the Treasure Hidden in the Field—and you

perceive that the Word of God, or rather God Himself, is the kingdom; and what you are reading about is not angels or devils, thrones or principalities, but God and the soul, the soul and its God."

Moreover, the eschatological conception is not, as the objector alleges, unfitted for our own day. On the contrary, it is the very conception needed to keep us from overusing and so from abusing the world. It is true for each one of us as individuals, that the "time is shortened" and that "the Lord is at hand". To make the most even of "the life that now is", we must be ever "looking for and hastening unto that blessed hope and the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ". The old Puritan lawgiver called for candles when sudden darkness led the convention to think that the Day of Judgment had come. It was just because he expected his Lord to appear that he wished to be found most diligent in his work. In like manner, to be the kind of citizen that the good of the nation demands, we must realize that we have here "no continuing city", we must appreciate that our own true citizenship is even now in heaven, we must look for "the city which hath the foundation whose builder and maker is God". In a word, it is precisely because the Bible does present an end-ethic, as it is called, and an end-sociology, that it can be *the* authority. To be faithful to what our Lord has given us to do here in the church, which is His body and in the world, which is His workmanship, that is, really to bring in His kingdom, we must expect His coming.

(3) There is the objection made years ago by Mill and Mazzini, and later by Frederic Harrison in his *New Year's Address for 1889*, and also by N. M. Salter in his *Ethical Religion*, and again and again repeated since—the objection that though the sociology of the Bible were not an end-sociology, still, it gives no guidance or help as regards the social problems of to-day. Thus it has nothing to say as to the development of art, as to pedagogy, as to trades-unions and

strikes, as to woman suffrage. How, then, can the Bible be any longer the authority in sociology? Even if it were so twenty centuries ago, it could not be so now. The questions now demanding solution are entirely different. Evolution has changed human nature and has introduced a new environment. Hence, as in the political sphere there are those who call, not for the carrying out of the Constitution, but for a new Constitution; so in the social sphere there are many who are demanding, not adherence to the Bible, not even to what is so fundamental in it as the Decalogue, but a radically new sociology, one adapted to the new conditions. For example, so eminent and so able a writer as Rauschenbusch, in his last book, *The Christianisation of the Social Order*, takes the ground that whenever private property ceases to contribute to human development, then the right of property is no more. As though any right guaranteed by the Decalogue could cease to contribute to such development as God intends and approves! This objection, then, is refuted in the first place by the view of God and of the Bible which it involves. God "knows the end from the beginning". He Himself is "the same yesterday and to-day and forever". It can not be, therefore, that what is fundamental in His Word will ever cease to be so. The Decalogue is the demand either of God's nature or of man's nature; and as God can not change Himself, so neither may we conceive of Him in the development of His plan as creating what was afterward to be set aside. His plan is eternal; His purpose is one: evolution, consequently, while it brings out the new, must be of the old; and, therefore, the old must regulate, while bringing in, the new. In a word, what the new social problems of to-day demand is not a new sociology, but a more prayerful and diligent study of the old text-book and a more fearless and consistent application of it to modern conditions. It will then appear, as many of us think that it has already appeared, that even when God has not told us in His Word

all that we need to know for the solution of the social questions of to-day, he has laid down principles and limitations of universal and perpetual obligation. Thus, sacred art is not the only true art, but any art to continue true must be moral; and to continue moral must be in spirit religious. Pedagogy has much to learn from psychology, and thus far it would seem to have learned very little; but all that psychology has to teach here is not so fundamental, even pedagogically, as that "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom". Even the Agnostic Huxley recognized in a letter to the rector of St. Mary's Church, London, that any education that did not begin with and rest on the Bible was worse than no education. It would not be possible to adjust all labor difficulties by an appeal to the Bible alone. There is need of much patient investigation and much careful legislation with regard to them. The most patient investigation and the most careful legislation will, however, be worse than fruitless, unless they assume and proceed on such old-fashioned biblical truths as, that "The laborer is worthy of his hire"; that "A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth"; that "My Father worketh hitherto and I work". The extension of the suffrage to women was certainly not before the mind of Christ or of His apostles. Nevertheless, the only basis on which this pressing question can be settled rightly is that of the New Testament teaching as to both the equality of and the radical distinction between the sexes. These illustrations are sufficient. Social evolution presents new problems, but these only emphasize the fundamental importance of the principles that underlie the old solutions.

(4) Were all these objections set aside, it would still be urged that Our Lord was anything rather than a political reformer or a teacher of sociology. "He never enters on the role of the statesman or of the political economist. He enacts no code. He leads no party. In an empire full of slaves he opens no crusade against slavery." He gives no

teaching as to the proper form of government for either church or state. He has nothing to say of woman's rights, or of popular suffrage, or of reform parties or measures. Though the greater social reforms resulted from Him, He does not appear in any sense as a social reformer. Not only does He not use sociological terminology; rarely does He, at least directly, discuss sociological themes. Nay, more than this. As Dr. W. Cunningham remarks in his *Christianity and Social Questions*, perhaps the soundest and sanest of the recent books on Sociology, *The Parable of the Tares* is a warning for all time against the mistake of looking on the kingdom of heaven as an earthly realm from which evil is to be eradicated. . . . No movement which begins with drastic effort to purify society, in the hope of removing contamination from individuals, is consistent with the teaching of this parable. Moreover, Our Lord's work in healing diseases and in satisfying hunger and other human needs—these miracles and the immediate relief which they afforded, as Dr. Cunningham adds, "were never done for their own sake; to our Lord's mind they were entirely subsidiary to the spiritual aims of his ministry" (p. 221).

Does his course, then, in this respect, indicate that he was indifferent to social reform and so that His teaching can not be the authority in sociology? Not at all. Rather does it declare authoritatively the true method of social reform. "The disciple is not above his Master"; as Dr. Cunningham continues, "we must beware of criticising Our Lord's mission as inadequate, and of claiming that we can supplement it by developing new activities in His name, when He Himself refused to sanction them. There may be much eager talk about Christianity and much activity by professing Christians that he will refuse to recognize as emanating from himself." In every sphere of life, political and social, as truly as religious, the individual Christian, as a Christian and because a Christian, has a part to play and a duty to

perform; but the Church in her organized capacity "can only exercise a wise influence on social problems by being true to her Master, and striving to carry on His work, as He saw it, and as He committed it to her charge". She is to seek the reformation of society through the regeneration of individuals. This is the great lesson of Our Lord's example, and teaching, and it is a lesson which needs the supreme, the unique, authority which only He could give.

III. It remains to close this too long discussion with the briefest statement possible of the more important conclusions:

(1) The authority of the Bible does not cover every sociological question. It is a great mistake to expect to settle all or many social problems off-hand with a "Thus saith the Lord". We can not do this in ethics. We can not do it even in dogmatics. In each one of these spheres, and especially in that of society, very much has been left to the reason of the age and of the individual. There is a large class of social questions, therefore, as to which the right of private judgment must be insisted on. The state ownership of public utilities, the regulation by the state of corporations and of rates—there is a right and a wrong in the case of these and of like issues, and it is highly important that it should be determined; but God's Word has not settled it and, consequently, the church may not presume to do so. Hence, the danger and the wrong of the so-called "Social Creed of the Churches", adopted in 1908, by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. It seeks the authority of the Church for judgments on many of which the Word of God has not passed and which, therefore, the church may not pass. It is a direct infringement of "the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free".

(2) There is, however, a "divine order of human society", and the Bible lays its foundations. These foundations cannot be insisted on too strenuously, and as to them we have no right of private judgment. That

can not be the true order which does injustice to church or state or family, or to the great institute which includes them all and in which each one realizes itself, even the kingdom of God. Thus that can not be a true order which subordinates, as in Erastianism, the church to the state. That can not be a true order which, as in the Papacy, denies the temporal power of the nation. That can not be a true order which, as the spirit of much of modern life, is inimical to the family. That can not be a true order which, as in Socialism, substitutes state-control for providence and puts society in the place of God. Against the principles which underlie every such scheme it is the duty of the Church, and specially of her ministers, most vigorously to protest. Let them do this positively as well as negatively, by laying the scriptural foundations as well as by overturning those of "the wisdom of this world". This is the minister's distinctive function as regards social reform. He is to insist on the supreme authority of the Bible with respect to it.

(3) He is to do other and more. His great work is not to agitate even for the social principles laid down in the Bible. His great work, the greatest of all works, the work which is incomparably the most efficient for social reform, is to strive for the regeneration and development of individual souls through the preaching in all its fulness of "the everlasting Gospel of the grace of God". This is the supreme and the most comprehensive lesson of the Bible regarded as *the* text-book in Sociology.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

AN EVANGELICAL VIEW OF CARDINAL NEWMAN

After years of waiting we now have Newman's Life, and it has been read with the intense interest that its great subject deserves. Mr. Wilfrid Ward has had a difficult task in steering between loyalty to his father and sympathy with Newman. But he has kept the balance very true, though it is not difficult to see that his decisions on the whole are with the Cardinal. These volumes are almost entirely concerned with Newman's Roman Catholic life, only one chapter being given to his Anglican days. The earlier period has already been dealt with adequately in former works. We follow the narrative from point to point with the keenest interest; indeed, it is difficult to lay the book down.

On the whole Mr. Ward has been frank and candid, but, it must be added that, as the *British Weekly* said,

"His tendency is to lower the lights when ugly and painful things appear. He softens everything, leaving out, as far as possible, the harsh and fierce expressions in controversy and the extravagances of wrath and faith. We cannot quarrel with him, for he always tries to write true history. But true history has to be more candid."

There is another side to much that is connected with Newman both in his Anglican and in his Roman Catholic days, which has not yet appeared in full though we have had hints in several volumes. To quote the *British Weekly* once again:

"The story of the Oxford Movement has yet to be written. Dean Church wrote the romance of the Oxford Movement. He told us what chivalry of belief and self-sacrifice there was in it, and there was much. But the scene and the actors are enveloped in a rosy mist. To know the truth, we must go back to the original documents."

And this "rosy mist" is not dispelled by Newman's Biography.

It is a remarkable story and one that gives rise to many conflicting ideas and opinions. Among the discussions to which the book has naturally given rise, room may perhaps

be found for some general impressions suggested in the light of that Evangelicalism which Newman claimed to experience at the commencement of his Christian life.

I. NEWMAN'S RELATION TO THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

It is curious to read that it was in 1839 while engaged in a study of the Monophysite controversy that misgivings came into Newman's mind as to the Anglican position. He saw an analogy between the Monophysites and the Anglicans. The Monophysites took their stand on antiquity and had their claim disallowed by the Church, which at the instigation of Pope Leo excluded them. This great power of the Pope deeply impressed Newman, and he could not adjust the story of the Monophysites to any view of a *Via Media*, such as he was vainly endeavouring to find in Anglicanism. It is hardly too much to say that this comparison between Monophysitism and Anglicanism is really absurd, because the two positions were in no true sense analogous. It would almost seem as though already Newman's wish was becoming parent to his thoughts. Soon afterwards we read that an article by Wiseman on the Donatist Schism deepened the impression made by the Monophysite controversy, shaking Newman's faith in his own position. As St. Augustine had replied to the claim of the Donatists, on the ground that they had adhered to antiquity, by the words, "*Securus judicat orbis terrarum*", so Newman was now haunted by this dictum, "the judgment of the whole world cannot go wrong". Yet here again we are conscious of an over-emphasis on imagination and a lack of concern for true historical fact. The *orbis terrarum* which Newman had in mind was after all only the Western Church, so that on any showing he was guilty of a glaring *non sequitur*. It was on such flimsy grounds that he felt led to question the foundations of his Anglicanism and eventually to leave that Church for Rome.

The same general tendency and attitude of mind is seen in his "Doctrine of Development" which signalised his

departure from the Anglican Church. He held that while the deposit of the Faith was once for all committed to the Church, yet Christians were not at once explicitly conscious of all its intellectual implications, and these had to be subsequently defined by authority.

"It was gradually brought home to me, in the course of my reading, so gradually, that I cannot trace the steps of my conviction, that the decrees of later councils, or what Anglicans call the Roman corruptions, were but instances of that very same doctrinal law which was to be found in the history of the early Church; and that in the sense in which the dogmatic truth of the prerogatives of the Blessed Virgin may be said, in the lapse of centuries, to have grown upon the consciousness of the faithful, in that same sense did, in the first age, the mystery of the Blessed Trinity also gradually shine out and manifest itself more and more completely before their minds."¹

It is surprising that Newman was able to say that this view of development was an answer to Anglican objections against Rome, and also a positive argument in its favor, for surely development must always be in strict accordance with the germ planted, and if there is no trace of the germ in the deposit of the Faith once for all committed to the Church, it is impossible that there can be any proper development. Thus, for example, to be able to accept the Roman doctrine of the Priesthood, we must be able to prove that the sacerdotal idea of the Ministry is found in germ in the New Testament, and this, as we know, it is impossible to do. So also the devotion paid to the Mother of our Lord in modern Romanism necessitates the existence of a germ of that devotion in the New Testament, though every reference therein to the Virgin Mary fails to give us this proof. The way in which Newman's Doctrine of Development was received in the Roman Church indicates the hesitation, if not the fear, with which most leading theologians regarded it, while the deliberate use of it made in America on behalf of Unitarianism as to the late development of the Doctrine of the Trinity was another instance of its dangerous two-edged power.

¹ Vol. i, p. 186.

It has always been a mystery that Newman should have remained for so long a period in the Church of England before going over to Rome while holding quite definitely Roman convictions. It was in 1839, as we have seen, that he received his first misgivings, and yet it was not until 1845 that he actually went over. Wiseman's article, read in 1839, had such an immediate and profound impression that within a month he confided to Henry Wilberforce that in the end he might possibly find it his duty to join the Roman Church.² He "never recovered from this blow". The isolation of the English Church thereupon possessed, not to say obsessed, him. He never returned to the *Via Media*. He could not answer W. G. Ward and his friends. His own anti-Roman position was broken, and yet we are told that "he maintained still in his letters the attitude of a vigorous champion of the Anglican Church".³ During this time, however, he felt it necessary to institute some changes in the character of the Oxford Movement. Up to 1838 the Anglican Church had been the main point of interest, but by 1841 the presumption was on the Roman side, and for this purpose "it was more than ever necessary to vindicate a Catholic interpretation for the Anglican formularies". It was essential "to show that they were not committed to the views of a Protestant sect, and that they still interpreted all formularies enjoined in the Church of England in the sixteenth century, according to the sense of the Catholic Church".⁴ This was the reason for the famous Tract 90 which saw the light in February, 1841, a year and a half after Newman had expressed his suspicion that possibly he might find it his duty to join the Church of Rome. The publication of this Tract naturally brought matters to a climax, and the weakening of Newman's position in the Church of England was more and more evident from this time forward. In 1842 he left Oxford for Littlemore; in 1843 he wrote definitely to a friend that he believed the Church

² Vol. i, p. 68.

³ Vol. i, p. 70.

⁴ Vol. i, p. 71.

of Rome to be the Church of the Apostles, that England was in schism. In the same year he retracted all his attacks on the Church of Rome, and the change of Communion was now only a question of time. Making every allowance for the gradualness of conviction, these facts about his long stay in the Church of England are at least difficult of interpretation.

Newman tried his best to give the Anglican Articles a "Catholic" meaning, but, as his friend W. G. Ward had to admit, the most that could be said was that they were "patient" of a Catholic interpretation. Dean Church adds, in referring to Ward:

"With characteristic boldness, inventing a phrase which has become famous, he wrote, 'Our Twelfth Article is, as plain as words can make it, on the Evangelical side; of course, I think its natural meaning may be explained away, for I subscribe it myself in a non-natural sense'."

And Newman himself eventually came to the same conclusion, for although in Tract 90 he had argued that the Anglican Article XXXI on the sacrifices of masses did not refer to the Sacrifice of the Mass, he was compelled to acknowledge the utter impossibility and untenableness of his position. In his *Via Media*, published in 1877, he wrote:

"There is no denying then that these audacious words ('blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits') apply to the doctrinal teaching as well as to the popular belief of Catholics. What was 'commonly said' was also formally enunciated by the Oecumenical Hierarchy in Council assembled." Again: "What then the Thirty-first Article repudiates is undeniably the central and most sacred doctrine of the Catholic religion; and so its wording has ever been read since it was drawn up."

To the same effect he wrote in a letter to Pusey admitting that

"the tract did not carry its object and conditions on its face, and necessarily lay open to interpretations very far from the true one. I considered that my interpretation of the Articles would stand, provided the parties imposing them allowed it. When, in the event, the bishops and public opinion did not allow it, I gave up my living, as having no right to retain it."

It is interesting to trace in the subsequent career of New-

man his views about the Church that he had left. This is the way in which he writes against what is sometimes called the "Three Branch Theory", the view that the Catholic Church is limited to the Greek, Roman, and Anglican Churches:

"And it is to me utterly marvellous how a person of your clear intellect can seduce himself into the notion that a portion of Christendom, which has lain disowned on all hands, by East as well as West, for three hundred years, and is a part of no existing communion whatever, but a whole in itself, is nevertheless a portion of some other existing visible body, nay of two other existing bodies, Greek and Latin. The Siamese twins are nothing to this portent; yet we commonly account them monsters and not men, but here you have two separate organized frames or persons having a limb in common, and that limb a part of neither, yet two bodies and separate limbs all together one and but one body; all which is a sort of bad dream, and recalls the specimens of extravagant Yankee humour which we see in Newspapers."⁸

In the same way he writes his friend Henry Wilberforce in connection with certain ritual changes in the Church of All Saints', Margaret Street:

"I have heard something about you which makes me sad—that you countenanced on November 1st the changes in Margaret Street which (if what I hear they are) I will not designate. What have you to do with Subdeacons and the like? I should have thought you far too sensible a fellow to go into such ways. While you stick to the old Church of England ways you are respectable—it is going by a sort of tradition—when you profess to *return* to lost Church of England ways, you are rational—but when you invent a *new* ceremonial, which never was, when you copy the Roman or other foreign rituals, you are neither respectable nor rational. It is sectarian. That is what I say of Pusey now—he does not *affect* to appeal to any authority but his own interpretation of the Fathers, and (to) the sanction of old Anglicans for *this* or *that*—but as a whole, he is not *reviving* anything that *ever* was anywhere for 1800 years. There is a tradition of High Church, and of Low Church—but none of what *now* is justly called *Puseyism*."⁹

This extract from the *Apologia* tells a similar story:

"I have felt all along that Bishop Bull's theology was the only theology on which the English Church could stand. I have felt that opposition to the Church of Rome was part of that theology;

⁸ Vol. i, p. 129.

⁹ Vol. i, p. 236.

and that he who could not protest against the Church of Rome was no true divine in the English Church. I have never said, nor attempted to say, that anyone in office in the English Church, whether bishop or incumbent, could be otherwise than in hostility to the Church of Rome."

These are striking testimonies to the view held by Evangelical Churchmen. While High Churchmanship, Broad Churchmanship, and Evangelicalism find their place in Anglican tradition from the Reformation, there never was any tradition of what Newman calls Puseyism up to the time of the Oxford Movement.

A similar result is seen in Newman's view on Reunion. He thinks that the possibility of the conversion of the Anglican Church as a corporate body is about as likely as a change in the course of the Thames through running into the sea at the Wash instead of the Nore. Of course such a change of direction might take place in a very long time without miracle, but Newman says he should not pray for it, and if he wished to divert the stream from London he would cut a canal at Eton or Twickenham, and so by forming a new bed by his own labor he might reasonably pray for the success of his project. Then comes this description of the Anglican Church:

"Now the Anglican Church is *sui generis*—it is not a collection of individuals—but it is a bed, a river bed, formed in the course of ages, depending on external facts, such as political, civil, and social arrangements. Viewed in its structure, it has never been more than partially Catholic. If its ritual has been mainly such, yet its articles are the historical offspring of Luther and Calvin. And its ecclesiastical organisation has ever been, in its fundamental principles, Erastian. To make that actual and visible, tangible body Catholic, would be simply to make a new creature—it would be to turn a panther into a hind. There are very great similarities between a panther and a hind. Still they are possessed of separate natures, and a change from one to the other would be a destruction and reproduction, not a process. It could be done without a miracle in a succession of ages, but in any assignable period, no".¹

He goes on to say that as there have always been three great parties in the Anglican Church, it would be necessary

¹ Vol. ii, p. 116.

for the Catholic Movement to absorb into itself the Evangelical and the Liberal parties, and then the Erastian party would have to begin to change itself, for in Newman's opinion all parties have ever been Erastian. All this, and much more, enters into his argument, and he ends as he began, by saying that he "cannot conceive the Establishment running into Catholicism, more than I can conceive the Thames running into the Wash".⁸

The account of his visit to Keble, and his meeting with him and Pusey for the first time after years of separation is at once touching and disappointing.

"After twenty years they meet together round a table, but without a common cause or free outspoken thought; kind indeed, but subdued and antagonistic in their language to each other, and all of them with broken prospects, yet each viewing in his own way the world in which those prospects lay."⁹

Perhaps the explanation of this is to be found in an utterance of Keble written a good many years after the departure of Newman for Rome, in the course of which he speaks of his deliverance from the fascination of the personality of his masterful friend, and of the freedom thereby gained to resume a more balanced and more sober Anglican tradition.

One other point of interest in Newman's attitude to the Church of England is seen in the way in which he protested against Dr. Littledale's *Plain Reasons against joining the Church of Rome* being circulated by "a respectable Society like the S. P. C. K.", and we are told that the result of his protest against what he regarded as an untruthful book was that it was struck off their list. He went as far as to call it "a shameful circulation", because the Society has sanctioned a controversial work without a careful revision. It would be interesting to know precisely what were the points in which Littledale's book was regarded as untruthful by Newman. Certainly from the Evangelical standpoint Littledale is very far to seek, because he very significantly

⁸ Vol. ii, p. 118.

⁹ Vol. ii, p. 96.

omits from the reasons against joining the Church of Rome the plainest reasons of all.

As we review Newman's early connection with the Church of England and his subsequent life in Rome, it is scarcely possible to avoid drawing the conclusion well expressed by a reviewer in the *New York Nation*, that

"say what one will, there was something in Newman's conversion of personal defection, a betrayal of the will, and, despite the fact that his greatest work is just the *Apologia* for his change, he was debarred by his surrender from taking the supreme place as an English author or as a religious leader which belonged to him by birthright."

To the same effect are the words of the Rev. A. W. Hutton, once a disciple of Newman in the Oratory at Birmingham, and afterward (till his death) a well-known clergyman of the English Church. He believes that Newman's idiosyncrasy is a sufficient explanation of his perversion to Rome. Submission to Rome was

"deliberately chosen by him, as a harbour of refuge, after that his vanity had been wounded by the discovery that Oxford friends, who had followed him for some years, now no longer, after Tract XC., trusted him. No one can understand Newman who does not appreciate the intensity of his belief in himself, in the importance of his personality and of his career."⁹

II. NEWMAN'S POSITION IN THE ROMAN CHURCH

From his early days Newman conceived his mission to be that of relentless opposition to "Liberalism" in thought, which he considered was breaking up Church and State and would eventually destroy religion. This possessed his mind during his Oxford days, and was in many respects the dominant thought in his teaching and attitude, and according to his own confession it was the failure and impossibility of Anglicanism to provide a breakwater against this flood of Liberalism that led him into the Roman Church. And yet the curious fact which impresses the reader of Newman's *Biography* at almost every turn, is that in spite of this mission against Liberalism Newman himself was suspected

⁹ *Churchman* (London), 1908, p. 588.

of sympathies with Liberalism for the greater part of his long life in the Roman Church. It was a striking nemesis that he who had protested in the strongest way against reason in relation to religion should himself be charged with an undue emphasis on reason by his Roman colleagues, and the consequence was that Newman was thwarted at almost every turn by the authorities in the Church. As a writer in the *Church of Ireland Gazette* aptly remarks:

"It is the irony of history that Newman, whose most cherished aim was to be a conservative, became, in spite of himself, a revolutionary. It is the irony of the appeal to authority in an age alike incredulous and full of competing religions, that it can only be made at the cost of generating the very spirit it desires to exorcise."

This twofold attitude of Newman in the Roman and Anglican Communions is well stated by the *Spectator* in its notice of the Life.

"As an Anglican he stood for the principle of medieval theology in a Church which was fermenting with the new thought of a scientific age; as a Roman he stood for the principle of making terms with scientific thought in a Church which maintained its medieval theology. He pointed, against the military methods of the Propaganda, back to the free debates in the medieval schools as a type of the lost liberty which he wished the Roman Church to regain; but it was that very freedom of debate in the schools of Oxford which had shocked him, and to which he had given the bad name of 'Liberalism'."

He was asked to undertake the formation of a Roman Catholic University in Ireland, only to be opposed and defeated by the Irish Bishops. He was invited to edit a translation of the Scriptures into the vernacular, but the scheme was abandoned owing to the apathy of Cardinal Wiseman. He endeavored to influence the thought of intellectual Roman Catholics by undertaking the editorship of the *Rambler*, but powerful opposition arose and he was asked to resign after his first number, and was delated to Rome for heresy after his second. Then came the project for an Oratory for Oxford in the hope of influencing the intellectual life of that place for Rome, but here Manning and W. G. Ward were too strong for him and the project came to an untimely

end. Last of all, when the question of the Vatican arose, Newman found himself in opposition to men like Manning and others who took the extreme Ultramontane view. It is beyond measure pitiable to think of this man of genius being hindered, opposed, and defeated by men who were intellectually and otherwise so far inferior to him. But already perhaps he was suffering the effects of his unwise, and certainly unfortunate, change of Communion. To quote from the *New York Nation*:

"It was as if the convert, by altering his direction, had suddenly brought himself face to face with a stone wall. To every plan he broached for new activity came the benumbing reply, *Non possumus*, if it was not *Non possis*."

"He was, as it were, hemmed in, barked at by opposition on every side, beaten down by exasperating distrust and envy."

For the greater part of his Roman days Newman spoke and wrote with manifest resentment of the treatment he was receiving. A few instances of this may be given as suggesting the necessity of some solution of a problem that weighs considerably with a great many people.

"At Rome they are especially jealous of any great power unless they can be quite sure of it. If they had perfect faith in us, they would do anything for us—but we are converts, partially untried—and one least fault will tell against us the more, as heavy bodies have the more dangerous falls."¹¹

"You cannot make men believe by force and repression. Were the Holy See as powerful in temporals as it was three centuries back, then you would have a secret infidelity instead of an avowed one—which seems the worse evil) unless you train the reason to defend the truth. Galileo subscribed what was asked of him, but is said to have murmured, 'E pur si muove'."¹²

"It has been my lot, since I was a Catholic, to find few hearts among my own friends to shew any kindness to me. . . . Our Bishop said to me that he considered I was under a 'dispensation of mortifications'—and in truth, since the Holy Father first in his kindness called me to Rome, I don't think I have had one single encouragement."¹³

"I went off to Rome at an enormous inconvenience, and had two interviews with the Holy Father *tête-a-tête*. He was most

¹¹ Vol. i, p. 229.

¹² Vol. ii, p. 49.

¹³ Vol. ii, p. 124.

kind, and acquitted me. But hardly was my back turned but my enemies (for so I must call them) *practically* got the upper hand. Our Bishop seems to think no great good comes of seeing the Pope, if it is only *once* seeing him. What chance have I against persons who are day by day at his elbow. . . . I trust I shall ever give a hearty obedience to Rome, but I never expect in my lifetime any recognition of it."¹⁴

"And now, alas, I fear that in one sense the iron has entered into my soul. I mean that confidence in any superiors whatever never can blossom again within me. I never shall feel easy with them. I shall, I feel, always think they will be taking some advantage of me,—that at length their way will lie across mine, and that my efforts will be displeasing to them."¹⁵

The problem arising out of these strong expressions of opinion is that side by side with them Newman was able to distinguish between the Roman Church as a whole and the men in authority during his time. When reports became current that he was dissatisfied with his Roman position and was likely to return to the Anglican Church, he wrote with severity and even bitterness that "Protestantism is the dreariest of possible religions", and he was always able somehow or other to rest content in the Roman Catholic Church in spite of the lack of sympathy and even opposition which he found at Headquarters. It is a curious state of mind, for it is surprising that Newman did not see that intellectual infallibility should have logically involved moral infallibility as well. As we review the judgments of the Roman Church since the promulgation of the Decree in 1870, we are compelled to ask what is the precise practical value of an infallibility which has not been used for over forty years?

The Oxford episode naturally bulks very largely in the story of Newman's life. When the proposal for an Oratory there was broached, everything for a time seemed to go without a hitch, though there were incidents in the negotiations with the Vatican which naturally depressed Newman. Thus Cardinal Reisach, who was personally known to him, came to England for the express purpose of finding out the general feeling on the Oxford question,

¹⁴ Vol. ii, p. 142.

¹⁵ Vol. ii, p. 201.

and yet Newman was not approached by him and never even made acquainted with his mission. Indeed, the Cardinal visited Oscott without letting Newman know that he was near Birmingham. The Cardinal's informants were carefully selected by Manning, and W. G. Ward was mentioned as the best representative of laymen. The new ground that Newman had bought at Oxford was actually inspected without any sign being given to its owner. No wonder that Newman deplored this incident, and complained that no opportunity was afforded him of giving Rome his view of the subject. But this was nothing compared with the sequel. When everything was in readiness for departure to Oxford and the portmanteau of Newman's friend and colleague, Father Neville, actually packed, a letter came from Newman's Bishop which plainly showed that he was not to go.

"Coupled with the formal permission for an Oratory at Oxford, Propaganda had sent a 'secret instruction' to Dr. Ullathorne, to the effect that, if Newman himself showed signs of intending to reside there, the Bishop was to do his best 'blandly and suavely' (*blande suaviterque*) to recall him."¹⁰

Newman never forgot that unfortunate "*blande suaviterque*".

One of the greatest difficulties felt by Newman was the opposition of a former friend, Mgr. Talbot, who was at the Pope's right hand and was all along the intimate and confidential correspondent of Manning, and the channel through which all English news reached the Pope. We can see more than once what Talbot thought of Newman.

"Dr. Newman is the most dangerous man in England, and you will see that he will make use of the laity against your Grace. You must not be afraid of him. It will require much prudence, but you must be firm, as the Holy Father still places confidence in you."¹¹

There is perhaps nothing so significant in its quiet severity as the reply of Newman to Talbot when he received an invitation to preach in the latter's Church in Rome.

"I have received your letter, inviting me to preach next Lent in your Church at Rome to 'an audience of Protestants more edu-

¹⁰ Vol. ii, p. 139.

¹¹ Vol. ii, p. 147.

cated than could ever be the case in England'. However, Birmingham people have souls; and I have neither taste nor talent for the sort of work which you cut out for me. And I beg to decline your offer."¹⁸

In the light of all these experiences within the Roman Church we find ourselves asking again and again whether Newman really found his true home and did his proper work there?

III. THE CHURCH OF ROME AND UNBELIEF

According to Newman the Catholic movement in the Church of England was "the only effective check on the advancing tide of unbelief",¹⁹ and when he discovered, as he believed, that Anglicanism offered no adequate check, he wrote during his last days at Littlemore that he had

"an increasing intellectual conviction that there is no medium between Pantheism and the Church of Rome".²⁰

We know that this opinion was due to the conviction that only by the presentation of a living authority, continuous through the ages, could unbelief be effectively met. But the question arises, as we review the last fifty years, whether Newman's opinion has proved in any sense accurate. Dr. Fairbairn seems to be much nearer the truth when he writes:

"Over against his charge, 'outside Catholicism things are tending to Atheism', I place this as the simple record of fact, verifiable by all who choose to pursue the necessary enquiries—inside Catholicism things have tended, and still, wherever mind is active, do tend, to the completest negation."²¹

The history of Roman Catholicism on the Continent during the last few years tends increasingly to the conclusion that Rome is responsible for more unbelief than any other Institution in the world. To quote again from the *Church of Ireland Gazette*:

"So far from leaving folk secure in their ancient faith, Newman by the force and depth with which he argued the thesis that you must either be an atheist or a Roman Catholic, or else commit

¹⁸ Vol. ii, p. 539.

¹⁹ Vol. i, p. 58.

²⁰ Vol. i, p. 81.

²¹ *Catholicism, Roman and Anglican*, p. 134.

intellectual suicide, succeeded in making a large number of his disciples very uncomfortable, and inducing a smaller number definitely to move on."

And the reason for this may be summed up in Dr. Fairbairn's striking words:

"He who places the rational nature of man on the side of Atheism, that he may the better defend a Church, saves the Church at the expense of religion and God."²²

As the *Times* review truly said, Newman

"never understood the antagonist he had challenged. . . . This is not the place to analyze his philosophy as concentrated in the *Grammar of Assent*. It is sufficient to say that Newman himself confessed that it is not calculated to convince anyone who is not already prepared to be convinced. . . . In short, those who do not accept the principles on which he bases his philosophy are 'infidels'. He has no understanding of the essentially religious character of the claim of the modern scientific spirit that no artificial barriers shall be erected across the path of human knowledge, and that no mortal shall dare to say to another, 'Thus far shalt thou go in inquiry and no further'."

IV. NEWMAN'S DOCTRINAL POSITION

From his Anglican days Newman's pronouncements on Doctrine, especially when related to history, are at once interesting and puzzling, for in the light of certain unquestioned facts of history it is perplexing to understand how so acute a mind could have adopted the attitude that he did on many fundamental and doctrinal questions. What, for instance, are we to make out of this?

"The general type of Christendom, and the relation of part with part, in early times and in the present is one and the same—that the Catholic Church and sects and heresies then, correspond to the Roman, Protestant, and other Communion now—and in particular that the Anglican Church corresponds to the Semi-Arian body, or the Nestorian, or the Monophysite."²³

Can any true historical student say that there is a real correspondence between the early centuries and the present day? Would it not again seem as though to Newman the wish were father to the thought?

²² *Catholicism, Roman and Anglican*, p. 140.

²³ Vol. i, p. 122.

It is also an unending puzzle to minds brought up on the New Testament to read Newman's statements about the presence of Christ in the Sacrament.

"I am writing next room to the Chapel. It is such an incomprehensible blessing to have Christ's bodily presence in one's house, within one's walls, as swallows up all other privileges and destroys, or should destroy, every pain. To know that He is close by—to be able again and through the day to go in to Him; and be sure, my dearest W., when I am thus in His presence you are not forgotten. It is *the* place for intercession surely, where the Blessed Sacrament is. Thus Abraham, our father, pleaded before his hidden Lord and God in the valley."²⁴

"It is really most wonderful to see the Divine Presence looking out almost into the open streets from the various Churches so that at St. Lawrence's we saw the people take off their hats from the other side of the street as they passed along; no one to guard it, but perhaps an old woman who sits at work before the Church door, or has some wares to sell."²⁵

To say nothing of the Divine Presence being circumscribed in this way, the whole conception seems to suggest a spiritual materialism and a failure to realize the true spirituality of the New Testament conception of the presence of God in Christ.

And of like manner are the references to relics, of which the following is a typical instance:

"And then to go into St. Ambrose's Church—where the body of the Saint lies—and to kneel at those relics, which have been so powerful, and whose possessor I have heard and read of more than any other saints from a boy."²⁶

It is hardly credible that a mind like that of Newman could have become so convinced of the power of these things.

The many allusions to the Mother of our Lord point in the same direction:

"What took us to Bologna was that we went round by Loretto. We went there to get the Blessed Virgin's blessing on us. I have ever been under her shadow, if I may say it. My College was St. Mary's and my own Church; and when I went to Littlemore, there, by my own previous disposition, our Blessed Lady

²⁴ Vol. i, p. 118.

²⁵ Vol. i, p. 139.

²⁶ Vol. i, p. 139.

was waiting for me. Nor did she do nothing for me in that low habitation, of which I always think with pleasure."²⁷

This is a characteristic expression, and the allusion to Littlemore, which was in his Anglican days, will not be overlooked or misunderstood. But side by side with this there is a curious incident that should be noticed. During the Achilli trial it was suggested that certain Dominican ladies should pray before the image of the Virgin for Newman's success in the Law Courts. Newman replied, expressing at once what Mr. Wilfred Ward calls his "simple faith", and also his "caution against over-confident hope for a visible interposition of providence". As the nuns did not like this caution and criticised Newman for his scepticism, he replied, pleading justification, saying that it was "taxing our Blessed Lady unfairly—not her power, but her willingness".

"What right have I, for the sake of my private ends, to put your Image on trial? It has done everything for you,—because you have asked what you ought to ask. Now you wish me to ask a *very hard* thing, and that (in a way) *selfishly*, and you make me say to Our Lady, 'Do it, under pain of your Image losing its repute'. Now I do want light thrown upon this. I assuredly have a simple faith in the omnipotence of her intercession—and I know well (not to say my Lord expressly tells me) that we can not ask too much, so that we are but importunate and unwearied in asking. Still it is just possible, and rather more than possible, that it is His blessed will that I should suffer—and though I don't think so quite so much as I did, yet somehow at first sight I do not like to be *unkind*, if I may use such a word to your Image. . . . If her Madonna gains my acquittal I will gladly come to Clifton, preach a sermon in her honour, and if it is consistent with your rules, carry her in procession."²⁸

There does not seem to be anything particularly masculine about these expressions of opinion. They appear to bear out the opinion expressed by so many about Newman, that there was a decidedly feminine strain in his character.

Newman's view of the Roman Church on its practical side is also worth observing:

²⁷ Vol. i, p. 193.

²⁸ Vol. i, p. 289.

"To know too that you are in the Communion of Saints, to know that you have cast your lot among all those Blessed Servants of God who are the choice fruit of His Passion, that you have their intercessions on high, that you may address them, and above all the Glorious Mother of God, what thoughts can be greater than these? And to feel yourself surrounded by all holy arms and defences, with the Sacraments week by week, with the Priests' Benedictions, with crucifixes and rosaries which have been blessed, with holy water, with places or with acts to which Indulgences have been attached, and the 'whole armour of God'—and to know that, when you die, you will not be forgotten, that you will be sent out of the world with the holy unctions upon you, and will be followed with masses and prayers; to know in short that the Atonement of Christ is not a thing at a distance."²⁹

The idea that all these descriptions of what Rome means are only another way of expressing the truth that "the Atonement of Christ is not a thing at a distance" is a striking but characteristic testimony to the inability of Newman, and indeed of Romanism, to rise to the height of a spiritual religion that links the Atoning Sacrifice to present personal needs by means of the Holy Spirit, instead of through these various and often puerile supports.

Newman's attitude on the question of Papal Infallibility is also noteworthy. In harmony with his own peculiar Doctrine of Development he is able to say that while our Lord set up a Church in the beginning, the present Roman Church is the continuation:

"Its early vague teaching is to be explained and commented on by its later and fuller; and as to Infallibility that, to say the least, there is nothing in its early teaching of a positive nature to hinder the interpretation of the early teaching on that point in the sense which is contained in its later teaching."³⁰

There is surely something lacking in the logic of a statement like this. Side by side with his high view of the Church is a very doubtful view of its rulers at a given time:

"Who is Propaganda? Virtually, one sharp man of business, who works day and night, and despatches his work quick off, to the East and the West; a high dignitary indeed, perhaps an Archbishop, but after all little more than a clerk, or (according to his name) a Secretary, and two or three clerks under him.

²⁹ Vol. i, p. 241.

³⁰ Vol. i, p. 441.

In this age at least, *Quantula sapientia regimur*. Well, if all this could be said of any human institution, I should feel very indignant, but it is the very sense and certainty I have of the Church being divine, which at once makes it easy to bear. All this will be over-ruled; it may lead to much temporary mischief, but it will be overruled."²¹

This distinction between the Church and those who are responsible for its utterances will not satisfy any except those who have given their adhesion to the Doctrine of Papal Infallibility. The same inconsistency is found all through the controversy connected with the Council of 1870. While fully accepting the infallibility of the Church he refuses to believe that such acceptance is incompatible with genuine reasoning on the part of a Roman Catholic. Those who, like Manning and Ward, much more logically set aside all reason and private judgment were strongly opposed by Newman, though at the evident expense of his logic. It is these men and others like them to whom he refers as "the aggressive and insolent faction" at the Vatican Council. It is again curious that Newman should have used this phrase, then should have forgotten that he had done so and denied the use, and afterwards, when he referred to a copy of the letter, be compelled to admit that the words were his. When the decision of the Council had been made known Newman accepted it in the following words written to Père Hyacinthe:

"The Church is the Mother of high and low, of the rulers as well as of the ruled. *Securus judicat orbis terrarum*. If she declares by her various voices that the Pope is infallible in certain matters, in those matters infallible he is. What Bishops and people say all over the earth, that is the truth, whatever complaint we may have against certain ecclesiastical proceedings. Let us not oppose ourselves to the universal voice."²²

On the other hand, as Mr. Wilfrid Ward points out, "Newman for months busied himself in explaining the definition to those who consulted him, as to show its reasonableness, and to distinguish it from the extreme opinions

²¹ Vol. i, p. 560.

²² Vol. ii, p. 376.

of some of its most zealous promoters".³³ Among other things he was able to say that,

"the dogma has been *acted on* by the Holy See for centuries—the only difference is that now it is actually *recognized*."³⁴

As for Döllinger, he condemned his action unequivocally.³⁵

It is an inexplicable enigma that a man of Newman's insight and power should have been able to rest content with the comparisons he instituted between the effects of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism among the nations of the earth. In his lectures on "The Difficulties of Anglicanism", lectures which seem to have made a surprising impression on Mr. R. H. Hutton of the *Spectator*, Newman's aim was to show the superior morality and spirituality of Roman Catholic countries as compared with Protestant. And this is how he vindicates his position:

"Vice does not involve a neglect of the external duties of religion. The crusaders had faith sufficient to bind them to a perilous pilgrimage and warfare; they kept the Friday's abstinence, and planted the tents of their mistresses within the shadow of the pavilion of the glorious St. Louis."³⁶

It is difficult for anyone who understands the true meaning of New Testament morality to harmonise these statements about vice and religious duties. It only goes to show, what is evident from many Roman Catholic authors, that faith in the Roman sense tends to become little more than intellectual orthodoxy with no necessary causal function in relation to ethical conduct.

Something similar to this was expressed by Mr. Justice Coleridge in his judgment on the occasion of the Achilli trial. Mr. Wilfrid Ward could hardly be expected, we suppose, to quote all that Coleridge said, but notwithstanding anything that might be felt about the character of the Judge, his words, looked at in themselves, can scarcely be set aside. This is how Coleridge described Newman's part:

³³ Vol. ii, p. 376.

³⁴ Vol. ii, p. 379.

³⁵ Vol. ii, p. 379.

³⁶ Quoted by Rigg, *Oxford High Anglicanism*, p. 154.

"The whole course of the pages which lies before me is conceived in the same way; partly in what may be called the ferocious merriment, partly in triumph, partly in exultation over the unhappy man whose foul offences you are producing before your hearers. Surely if you have felt yourself called upon to act as a judge and an executioner upon a man so foul, so wretched as you describe Dr. Achilli to be, you should have approached that task with feelings of sorrow and sadness, executed it with tenderness and consideration."⁷⁷

V. THE KINGSLEY EPISODE

It was natural that Mr. Wilfrid Ward should make the most of the controversy with Kingsley which led to the writing of the *Apologia*. No one now questions that on the purely personal side Kingsley was in the wrong, and yet it is equally evident that Newman rejoiced, not to say exulted, in the opportunity thereby given him of bringing himself once more into prominence with the English people and of rehabilitating himself in their eyes. There is evidently another side to the view of the *Apologia* taken by Mr. Ward, and it does not seem to be quite candid to refer to Prebendary Meyrick's pamphlet, *Is not Kingsley right after all?* only to speak of the testimony borne therein to "the wave of popular applause which the appearance of the *Apologia* brought with it". Even Canon Scott Holland amid all his enthusiasm for Newman is compelled to write as follows:

"Every word [of Newman's] seems to have in it a human gesture. And therefore it is that something of what poor Kingsley so crudely tried to say, retains a germ of truth. These words and sayings of Dr. Newman's can never detach themselves quite from the particular mood in which he is writing, and the particular situation in which he is involved. They never quite acquire a simple, direct, objective value of their own. You have to know why this or that was written just then, and what was the motive at work which made Dr. Newman so write."⁷⁸

The Rev. A. W. Hutton expresses the following opinion as to the *Apologia*:

⁷⁷ *British Weekly*, February 29, 1912.

⁷⁸ *Commonwealth*, March, 1912.

"It may be taken as certain that Newman would have taken no notice of Kingsley had his sentence in the review of Froude's 'History' in *Macmillan's Magazine* stopped short at the words, 'Truth for its own sake has never been a virtue with the Roman clergy'. It was the subsequent sentence, 'Father Newman informs us that it need not, and on the whole ought not to be', that roused him; and he saw instantly what an opportunity was here given him to vindicate his own career, since those precise words could not be anywhere quoted from his published works. So he worked up most dramatically an exhibition of indignation, which many read now with distress and reprobation, because it seems to them so profoundly unchristian in its tone; and so it would be, were it not for the fact, confessed by Newman himself many years later in a letter to Sir William Cope, that it was mainly affectation. It was the beating of the drum outside the booth to call in people to see the show; and, when attention had been aroused, he published what he had been preparing for publication at least two years previously—a vindication of himself exclusively. The calumny against the Roman clergy, that 'truth for its own sake has never been one of their virtues', was left out of the account, and was only half-heartedly repudiated in a subsequent note; while the book itself tells us, in wonderfully interesting detail, the story of Newman's own inner life—so much of it as he thought it wise to reveal; and its publication did undoubtedly effect its purpose: he was no longer forgotten or ignored by the people of England."²⁸

VI. NEWMAN AND MANNING

Ever since the publication of Purcell's *Life of Manning* we have been aware in a special degree of the relations between Newman and Manning. In the light of what happened in the later days of their association it is curious to read that Newman actually wanted Manning to be his Sub-Rector in the Roman Catholic Irish University. Influences, however, were at work which led to the severance of the two men, and now we have Newman's side of the controversy, which, though less detailed than Manning's, gives much the same impression as that left by Purcell. There seems to be no doubt that Manning together with W. G. Ward did his best to thwart Newman's projects from time to time. Their conception of the Roman Church, and in particular their views of papal infallibility were distinctly

²⁸ *Churchman*, October, 1908, p. 590.

different, and in some respects divergent, and Manning became convinced that Newman's line was prejudicial to the highest interests of the Ultramontaniam with which he had become enamoured. Newman fully believed that it was due to Manning's influence that the Oxford scheme was first thwarted and then destroyed. He speaks of Manning "acting on the poor Cardinal" (Wiseman) and also that he "was more set against my going to Oxford, than merely against Catholic youths going there."⁴⁰ This is another expression of Newman about his fellow-worker:

"I think this of him (Manning); he wishes me no ill, but he is determined to bend or break all opposition. He has an iron will and resolves to have his own way. On his promotion he wished to make me a Bishop *in partibus*. I declined. I wish to have my own true liberty; it would have been a very false step on my part to have accepted it. He wanted to gain me over. He has never offered me any place or office. The only one I am fit for, the only one I would accept, a place at Oxford, he is doing all he can to keep me from."⁴¹

The story of Newman's presence at Manning's consecration is all in the same direction. There was an outward politeness, of necessity, but the two men were inwardly at opposite poles of thought and feeling on many matters. What is especially puzzling is the way in which each expresses his purpose of saying Masses for the other with special "intention". The spirit in which these determinations are expressed raises serious questions as to the ethical value of the Masses themselves. It is perhaps difficult to apportion blame for this state of affairs when we remember that from different standpoints both men were masterful, proud, and determined. But it is pretty evident that Manning was jealous of Newman, and it was perhaps the consciousness that notwithstanding his position in the hierarchy, Newman was by far the greater influence in the Roman Church that led Manning to take the summary steps that he did from time to time. It is in any case a sad and sorry story, and speaks volumes to those who have ears to hear.

⁴⁰ Vol. ii, p. 273.

⁴¹ Vol. ii, p. 125.

VII. NEWMAN AND FAIRBAIRN

It was a coincidence that could hardly be overlooked that Dr. Fairbairn's death happened just about the time of the publication of these volumes on Newman, for it reminded many of the controversy between the two men in 1885. Fairbairn with his characteristically acute criticism attacked Newman as guilty of intellectual scepticism, with special reference to the *Apologia* and *Grammar of Assent*. Newman evidently realised that Fairbairn was not another Kingsley, for he gave special and continued attention to the articles. Acting on the advice of two friends, Newman did not continue the controversy in the *Contemporary Review*, especially as it was thought that two other replies in that publication made anything else from him unnecessary. He issued a pamphlet, however, printed for private circulation, in which Dr. Fairbairn's contention was further discussed. But as we review the controversy it is impossible to question the truth of Dr. Fairbairn's main contention. It was doubtless possible for Newman to say that he did not use the word "reason" in the sense attributed to him, but taking his writings all together, it is hardly possible to deny that his characteristic weakness was a distrust of man's reasoning powers which compelled him to take refuge in an infallible Church. Dr. Fairbairn's part of the controversy has since appeared in his book, *Catholicism, Roman and Anglican*, and a careful study of the chapters dealing with Newman cannot but impress readers with the essential truth of the writer's position and the acuteness of his criticism of Newman's attitude. Fairbairn points out that the time of the Oxford Movement was "a splendid moment for an Apologist built after the manner of Augustine",⁴² one who would have "recognised as Christian, and claimed for Christianity, the new spirit, with all its nobler truths, ideals, aims".⁴³ But Newman's attitude was of the entirely opposite kind. He felt a change in the air, and he feared and hated it:

⁴² P. 89.⁴³ P. 91.

"He idealized the *past*, he disliked the *present*, and he trembled for the *future*. His only hope was a return to the past, and to a past which had never existed save in the imagination of the romancer. What he hated and resisted he did not take the trouble to understand."⁴⁸

And so Fairbairn concludes that Newman

"succeeded wonderfully in making Roman Catholics of Anglicans; but he failed in the apologetic that saves the infidel, and baptizes the spirit of a rational and revolutionary age into the faith of Christ."⁴⁹

This attitude, which was true of Newman's Anglican days was essentially true of his position to the end. Newman always idealised the past, but he never loved reality sufficient to get behind idealizations, and so Fairbairn concludes in these words:

"The Freethinker sacrifices religion to reason in one way, by declaring that his individual mind is the measure of religious truth; the Catholic does it in another way, by declaring that unless religion come under the aegis of his Church, it will assuredly perish before the corrosive action of the intellect. Each position is an awful degradation of religion, but the latter is the greater; for the intellect will not, indeed cannot, cease to be active and critical, and what is declared incapable of resisting its criticism is handed over to death. There is surely a nobler Catholicism than this, one not of Rome, but of man, based, not on the excommunication of the reason, but on the reconciliation of the whole nature, intellect, conscience, heart, will, to God and His truth."⁵⁰

The more Fairbairn's masterly criticism is studied in the light of Newman's Life, and the more carefully his section on "Development" in his *Place of Christ in Modern Theology* is studied, the more clearly it will be seen that he has penetrated to the heart of Newman's position.

VIII. NEWMAN'S PERSONAL CHARACTER

When we endeavor to understand something of Newman's own personal life we are impressed with the many-sidedness of his character, and especially with what may be rightly called its elusiveness. That he was sincere is beyond

⁴⁸ P. 91.

⁴⁹ P. 131.

⁵⁰ P. 93.

all question; it cannot be doubted for a single instant. But side by side with this sincerity there were other elements which were, to say the least, perplexing to many inside the Roman Church as well as outside. There was a decided aloofness of attitude by reason of the subtlety of his mind, and no one seems to have been ever quite certain of what he might say or do. This is shown not only in the biography,⁴⁷ but also by the testimony of intimates like the Rev. A. W. Hutton.⁴⁸ It is always difficult for a Protestant to distinguish between sincerity and sophistry of the Roman Communion. Thus when lecturing on the Anglican controversy, he was afraid of being satirical in Church in the presence of the Blessed Sacrament, and he asks, apparently in all seriousness, whether it would be possible to have a curtain between the Altar and the body of the Church!⁴⁹ Again, we are told that when Pius IX addressed a Brief to the Archbishop of Munich, "Newman himself felt perfectly able to accept the Brief in its letter. But he spoke of his dread of the application of parts of the Brief."⁵⁰ This distinction is difficult of comprehension by ordinary people. Once again, in writing against Mr. Gladstone, we are told that in dealing with the subject Newman had one great difficulty in the opposition which he feared from W. G. Ward and the *Dublin Review*. And Mr. Wilfrid Ward says, "With extraordinary skill . . . he had so stated the case as apparently to leave W. G. Ward's main abstract principles intact . . . the result was that W. G. Ward . . . finding his own principle apparently conceded, was far from critical as to details".⁵¹ And yet, as we know from the story, Newman was entirely opposed to Ward's position on this subject. It is this marvellous intellectual power of distinction when it verges on moral questions that creates a feeling of suspicion in non-

⁴⁷ Vol. i, p. 18.

⁴⁸ Vol. i, p. 231.

⁴⁹ Vol. ii, p. 406.

⁵⁰ *Expositor*, 1890.

⁵¹ Vol. i, p. 565.

Roman minds, and tends to make them question the sincerity of men who can employ these weapons.

Newman has been charged by some writers with hypersensitiveness, and it undoubtedly seems true that his own position and influence bulked largely in the consideration of many of the leading questions of his life. The Rev. A. W. Hutton points this out when he says that

"throughout his active life Newman was always fighting for his own hand, or else was patiently waiting an advantageous occasion for so doing. Like other great men, it was his own career and the significance of it that he contemplated with intense interest."²⁸

This is seen in almost all the conflicts that he waged with the Roman authorities, and making every allowance for their intolerable action, Newman's attitude reveals a definite egotism that is uncommonly hard to reconcile with his many expressions of sincerity and humility. We have already noticed the feminine element in him, and side by side with this there was another aspect which has been rightly described as "feline", for nothing is plainer than the severity, heartlessness, and cruelty with which he dealt with opponents. We have seen something of this in the Kingsley episode, and the confession already quoted from Newman's letter to Sir William Cope is sufficient proof of this peculiar and saddening aspect of his character. Again, it is impossible to avoid noticing the abounding pleasure and childlike satisfaction which he expressed in connection with his appointment to the Cardinalate, when he burst forth with "the cloud is lifted from me for ever". We can only charitably attribute the remark to the forgetfulness of old age as it altogether overlooked the many earlier severe utterances to the effect that he could never trust the authorities again.

It is the paradox of various and apparently conflicting elements in Newman's character that makes him so great a puzzle and prevents us from thoroughly understanding him. As Dr. Sarolea in his striking Monograph has said:

²⁸ *Churchman*, October, 1908, p. 589.

"He is affectionate and reserved. He has the imagination of a mystic, and the corrosive intellect of a sceptic. He delights in intellectual difficulties and yearns for certainty. He is sincerity incarnate, and possessed of subtilty which the greatest casuist might have envied. He is disinterested to the verge of self-abdication; he has sacrificed everything to enter the Roman Church, and, having once entered it, he accepts twenty-five years of disgrace and suppression with admirable resignation; and at the same time he is egotistic, introspective, of an almost morbid subjectivity. He is timid and aggressive. He loves solitude, and yet no man in this century has drawn to himself so many hearts."

IX. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS

As we review the long life and career of this remarkable man we cannot help asking the question whether after all he found his right place in the Roman Church. It seems scarcely possible to resist the conclusion expressed by the reviewer in the *New York Nation*:

"The more deeply one considers his career, the more thoroughly is one convinced that the act of 1845 was something of a *gran rifiuto*; in succumbing to an authority which promised to allay the anguish of his intellect he rejected the great mission of the imagination that he might have fulfilled."

The Rev. A. W. Hutton expresses the same thought in these words:

"Some will reflect with sorrow on 'what might have been', if a man so peculiarly gifted, so keen intellectually, so attractive in his personality, and so profoundly and effectively converted at the age of sixteen that he never doubted of the fact through seventy years of controversy and much disillusioning—if such a man had resolutely turned his back on the temptation of sacerdotalism, and had worked with his splendid energy for the upbuilding of sane, Evangelical, Scriptural religion within the Church of his early years, the Church which seems to have before it, on account of its middle position, a future of the utmost importance in the healing of the divisions of Christendom. His own pen, endowed with almost magical power, has told us not only of his early conversion, but also of the happiness of his Anglican ordination, and of his work as a young clergyman at St. Clement's, Oxford. This part of Newman's career is now almost forgotten; but in some ways it was his best as well as his happiest time, for he was free from sophistry then. What better evidence can there be of the terrible overmastering power of the sacerdotal

idea than the fact that, when Newman came under its influence, these happy and useful years seemed to him as naught?"⁸³

We are led to this conclusion by many an incident in his Roman life, for as the *Spectator* said:

"There are a good many passages which said of the Church of Rome what in his last sermon as an Anglican he had said of the Church of England, 'O my mother! why dost thou leave us all the day idle in the market-place'?"⁸⁴

It is not unlikely that Newman's difficulties in the Roman Church were at least in part caused by his own words about Rome in his Anglican days. The *British Weekly* quotes the following passage, and rightly says that the terrific force of its denunciation can be realised only when the actual words are read. It was published in 1837, and republished in 1838:

"If we are induced to believe the professions of Rome, and make advance toward her, as if a sister or a mother Church, which in theory she is, we shall find too late that we are in the arms of a pitiless and unnatural relative, who will but triumph in the arts which have inveigled us within her reach. . . . Let us be sure she is our enemy and will do us mischief when she can. . . . We need not depart from Christian charity towards her. We must deal with her as we would towards a friend who is visited by derangement; in great affliction, with all affectionate, tender thoughts, with tearful regret, and a broken heart, but still with a steady eye, and a firm hand. For in truth she is a Church beside herself, abounding in noble gifts and rightful titles, but unable to use them religiously; crafty, obstinate, wilful, malicious, cruel, unnatural as madmen are. Or rather, she may be said to resemble a demoniac. . . . Thus she is her real self only in name, and till God vouchsafe to restore her, we must treat her as if she were that evil one which governs her."

Other similar references are these:

"The Roman Church I will not blame, but pity—she is, as I have said, spellbound, as if by an evil spirit; she is in thralldom. . . . Old Rome is still alive. In the corrupt Papal system we have the very cruelty, the craft, and the ambition of the republic."

Now while Newman retracted all his utterances against Rome, though curiously he did it anonymously and in an obscure journal, it is not difficult to imagine that Rome remembered them, and that they may have been instrumental

⁸³ *Churchman*, October, 1908, p. 593.

⁸⁴ March 2, 1912, p. 350.

in preventing their author from obtaining that position in the Roman Church to which he felt entitled. His own justification for using such language included among other things "a wish to repel the charge of Romanism". Under these circumstances it is easy to realise the force of the writer of the article in the *British Weekly* (presumably Sir W. Robertson Nicoll), that from the Roman point of view Newman had no reason to complain of his treatment in the Church of Rome.

The question of the unity and continuity of the Church was in some respects the dominant factor in Newman's life. From his Tractarian days he was possessed by the thought of the Apostolic Succession. He believed and taught that the unity of the Church was to be found in and through a visible organization, that from the time of the Apostles there had been a succession of Churches, or, at any rate, one Church in many branches, possessing the Catholic faith and guarded and guaranteed by a sacerdotal ministry lineally descended from the Apostles. Now it may at once be admitted that if we start with the Church as a visible organization the logical outcome is the Papacy. Long ago one of Newman's contemporaries at Oriel, the Rev. E. A. Litton (in his *Church of Christ*) showed conclusively that the necessary result and inevitable outcome of Cyprian's Doctrine of the Episcopate is the Roman Papacy. But the Evangelical view of unity and continuity starts quite differently and denies that the *esse* of the Church lies in organization. The New Testament teaches that the Church is an organism rather than an organization, and that, as Newman himself once admitted, it started as an idea rather than an institution. The true view of the Church is that of a community in living spiritual union with Christ though naturally expressing itself on the earthly and visible side in connection with visible organizations. But, as Hort says, the Church which is His Body does not consist of the aggregate of Churches but of individual members.⁵⁵ It is simply impossible for anyone

⁵⁵ *Christian Ecclesia*, p. 168.

to say *where* the Church is at any given time, because the visible and spiritual are not coterminous, but it is perfectly possible to say *what* the Church is, as "the blessed company of all faithful people". This view, though never regarded by Newman as of any account, and to-day spurned by Roman Catholics and extreme Anglicans, is nevertheless the New Testament conception of the Church, and by it Evangelical Christianity stands or falls.

This doctrine is clearly identical with that formulated by the English Church at the Reformation, as seen by the studiously broad statements of the Articles on the Church and Ministry; the absence of any reference to episcopacy, and the fellowship of Cranmer, Ridley, and their associates with Reformers of non-episcopal Churches. Even Bishop Gibson in his work on the Articles is compelled to recognise the significance of these documents:

"Certainly all that the actual terms of the Article now under consideration bind us to is this: that Episcopacy is not in itself superstitious or ungodly. This amounts to no more than saying that it is an allowable form of Church government, and leaves the question open whether it is the only one. This question is not decided for us elsewhere in the Articles; for even where we might have reasonably expected some light to be thrown upon it, we are met with a remarkable silence. Thus there is no mention of Episcopacy in the Article on the Church; and in that 'de vocatione ministrorum', as was pointed out in the remarks upon it, there is a singular vagueness in the description of those who 'have public authority given unto them in the congregation to call and send ministers into the Lord's vineyard'. The Articles, then, leave us without any real guidance on the question whether Episcopacy is to be regarded as necessary."⁸⁸

Nor does the Bishop's subsequent endeavor to turn the force of these admissions really detract from the significance of the admissions themselves. It is well known that the doctrine of Apostolic Succession did not come into the English Church from Rome, and was no part of any heritage from the Middle Ages. Indeed, it was not heard for some time after the days of Cranmer and Ridley. It was due to the necessity of controversy between High Churchmen and Puri-

⁸⁸ Gibson, *The Thirty-Nine Articles*, vol. ii, p. 744.

tans in the closing years of Elizabeth's reign. The late Dr. Pocock, a recognised High Church authority, wrote in the *Guardian* of November 23, 1892, that

"the belief in the Apostolic Succession in the Episcopate is not to be found in any of the writings of Elizabethan Bishops".

To the same effect is the well known statement of Keble in his preface to Hooker's *Works*:

"It might have been expected that the defenders of the English hierarchy against the first Puritans should take the highest ground and challenge for the Bishops the same unreserved submission on the same plea of exclusive Apostolic prerogative, which their adversaries feared not to insist on for their elders and deacons. It is notorious, however, that such was not in general the line, preferred by Jewel, Whitgift, Bishop Cooper, and others, to whom the management of that controversy was entrusted during the early part of Elizabeth's reign. . . . It is enough with them to show that the government by archbishops and bishops is ancient and allowable; they never venture to urge its *exclusive* claims, or to connect the succession with the validity of the Holy Sacraments."¹

Extreme Anglicans are fond of charging Evangelicals with low views of the Church, but in reality the low views come from themselves, for there is scarcely any view of the Church so essentially "low" and narrow as the ordinary so-called "Catholic" conception. Those who believe in the view of the Church as the Body of Christ taught by St. Paul in Ephesians can never have any but truly high views of that community of which Christ Himself is the Head, and no view that does not give special attention to the Ephesian aspect of the Church can rightly be called "Catholic". Dr. Hodgkin in his recent interesting volume of Essays (*The Trial of Our Faith*) calls attention to the way in which the word "Catholic" has become entirely changed, if not distorted, from its original beautiful universalism:

"This is surely true of the word Catholic in its real use in the present actual world in which we live, however different may be its ideal signification, that it is a term not of inclusion but of exclusion: that the chief charm of it, to most of those who use it lies in the fact that it does *not* connote a universal Christian

¹ Preface to Hooker's *Works*, p. 59.

Church: that it is as they conceive, their own special and peculiar heritage into which the multitude of heretics round them have no right to enter."⁵⁸

In opposition to all such narrow and exclusive ideas the Evangelical position is expressed in the words of Ignatius; "Where Christ is, there is the Catholic Church", and if it be asked, Where is Christ? the answer is as obvious as it can be: Where the Holy Spirit is. And if people persist in inquiring again, Where is the Holy Spirit? the reply is equally obvious: Where the fruit of the Holy Spirit is. Those who wish to know where are the individuals composing the true Church can easily discover this for themselves if they wish to do so. The Church is "the blessed company of all faithful people", and the words of Bishop Wilberforce, applied originally to R. W. Sibthorpe, are equally applicable to Newman, Pusey, and the other leaders of the extreme movement, for all of them "held the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* that unity is to be gained by members of the Church Catholic through union with one visible center".⁵⁹ As a simple matter of historical fact there never has been a unit of organization in the Christian Church from the moment that the earliest body of Christians left Jerusalem for other places. Unity is not dependent upon the unit of a visible center any more than it is on unanimity of doctrine, or uniformity of ritual or organization.

Another thought instinctively arises as to how far Newman's Christianity really represents the true Christianity of Christ and the New Testament. Although he found peace and satisfaction in his union with the Roman Church, and especially in his devotion to the Sacrament, it cannot be said that his life was happy, or that it expressed and recommended what the Bible calls "the joy of the Lord". "As years go on", he records in his diary, "I have less sensible devotion and inward life." He even notes a change in his own physical expression:

⁵⁸ P. 231.

⁵⁹ *Wilberforce's Life*, vol. i, p. 203.

"Till the affair of No. 90 and my going to Littlemore, I had my mouth half open, and commonly a smile on my face—and from that time onwards my mouth has been closed and contracted, and the muscles are so set now, that I cannot but look grave and forbidding."

In a very pathetic letter written to Keble in 1863 the closing words seem to betoken some great hidden sorrow:

"You are always with me a thought of reverence and love, and there is nothing I love better than you, and Isaac, and Copeland, and many others I could name, except Him Whom I ought to love best of all and supremely. May He Himself, Who is the overabundant compensation for all losses, give me His own presence, and then I shall want nothing and desiderate nothing, but none *but He can* make up for the loss of those old familiar faces which haunt me continually."

Canon Scott Holland notices this feature in the Biography:

"The hopeless incapacity of Rome to understand and use Dr. Newman gave him those thirty-five miserable years which the piteous photographs in the book make visible. The only thing I regret in the book is the publication of that pitiful picture of Dr. Newman seated in a chair with Father Ambrose St. John. It is too depressing, and serves to explain the overwhelming pathos of that sight at Littlemore, in 1868, recorded by Canon Irvine, who saw, leaning over the Lych Gate, sobbing as in deep trouble, the worn, broken figure of a poorly dressed old man, with the collar of his old grey coat pulled up to hide his face, and the flaps of his hat pulled down, so that Canon Irvine could not persuade himself that it was really Dr. Newman, there by the wall."¹⁰⁰

It is therefore impossible to avoid pressing home the question as to whether Rome provides that strong, assured, and really buoyant Christianity which we know is the predominant mark of the life depicted in the pages of the New Testament. In a recent book already quoted, there is a reference to Newman which is very much to the point:

"I cannot read the *Apologia*, I cannot look at his portrait, with the face so furrowed by anxiety and distress, without feeling that his predominant emotion was fear, fear lest after all his searchings and strivings the Almighty should cast him into Hell because he did not belong to the true Church. Looking at that face, I cannot feel that the Gospel was to him really 'Glad

¹⁰⁰ *Commonwealth*, March, 1912.

Tidings'. I am sure that he knew something of the Spirit of the Lord, but, owing to a certain morbidness of his nature, not to him did the Spirit of the Lord bring the rightful liberty."⁸¹

It is also necessary to ask how far Newman's influence can be said to have affected the Modernist Movement in the Roman Church. It is true that Mr. W. S. Lilly, in the *Nineteenth Century and After* for March, urges that Pope Pius X has settled this question by his letter expressive of sympathy with Newman. But in spite of this no one can doubt the close affinity between the Doctrine of Development as held by Loisy and the original idea as set forth by Newman. Very many are of the opinion that, as the *Times* review remarked,

"the seal set on Newman's work by Leo XIII has been roughly broken by the famous Encyclical *Pascendi*, directed in 1907 against the Modernists by Pope Pius X."

And this, to quote the same writer, "raises once more the whole question of Newman's position and work in the Roman Church". Most people will agree with Mr. A. W. Hutton who writes as follows:

"While it is true enough to say that Newman was no modernist, and, indeed, had none of the learning that might have enabled him to see the strength of the modernist position—while he would, in fact, have shuddered at the conclusions arrived at by Loisy and others—there are here and there in his Catholic writings modernist germs, and his *Grammar of Assent* is not at all on the orthodox lines which both Leo XIII and Pius X have insisted upon as indispensable. So that, while it is necessary just at present for the honour of Leo XIII and for the conciliation of many Catholics, both in England and elsewhere, who regard Newman as their spiritual father and the justifier of their remaining within the fold, to maintain his substantial orthodoxy, there is reason to anticipate that some years hence what is now the mystery of Newman will have become the tragedy of Newman, and that (as was the case with Rosmini, thirty-three years after his death) propositions from Newman's works will be formally condemned at Rome, and the dream of his being proclaimed a Doctor of the Church, and so the inaugurator of a new era for Catholicism will be at an end."⁸²

As we have read his biography we could not help asking

⁸¹ Hodgkin, *Trial of Our Faith*, p. 227.

⁸² *Churchman*, October, 1908, p. 592.

ourselves from time to time whether it was at all likely to bring converts to the Roman Church. We know how fruitful in this respect the *Apologia* was, and even those who are farthest removed from Rome feel the fascination and force of that most charming work. But our impression was that the picture of the sad and chequered life in this biography was not likely to be of any service to the Roman Communion, and we were particularly interested to find our own view confirmed by the writer in the *New York Nation*, who said that

"we know of no book composed by a Catholic which is more likely to deter sympathizers with the Church from entering the bondage of Rome".

One thought seems to stand out beyond all others as we recall the various incidents of Newman's life. It is all so pathetic. It is unspeakably sad to think that a man of his marvellous powers should have been almost entirely broken on the wheel of a hard Romanism when he might have been the magnificent champion of pure Christianity in an age which needed him and it beyond all else. The words of the leading article in the *Times* go to the heart of the matter :

"Touching and full of that sweetness which belonged to him beyond all men are many of the letters and details relating to his occupations at the Oratory. But readers of Mr. Ward's volumes will think sometimes of a prisoned giant who uses his strength no longer, though he has only to put out his hands to pull down the edifice in which he dwells. To be frank, we are not quite sure whether all the men about him fully understood the splendid captive whom they had made; whether some of them were not more puzzled than proud of their acquisition. The thinker, the searcher, the controversialist, the combatant against the errors of a generation uncongenial to him, was transformed into the passive saint; and the picture which we have of him as such is precious. But something, it may be, was lost, something perhaps left unsaid, by reason of this peaceful isolation. On the memorial slab upon his tomb were engraved at his own desire the words 'Ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem'. Could he have attained that end by other paths than those in which at last he found himself? Children fear to go into the dark and old men into the light—at least many do; was that his case also?"

And to quote Mr. Hutton once again :

"Surely he is a pathetic figure in the religious history of the nineteenth century—a victim of ecclesiasticism: first repudiating in his Tractarian days the simple Evangelical Protestantism in which he had been born and bred; next repudiating and laughing to scorn the Anglo-Catholicism of which he was himself largely the creator; and finally, as seems not unlikely, himself hereafter repudiated as unsound by the Roman Catholicism to which he clung so tenaciously."²

To those who know and love primitive Christianity as recorded in the New Testament the story of Newman is indeed a "tragedy". They will rise from the reading of these volumes with a deeper conviction than ever that only in full and constant adherence to the Apostolic Gospel is to be found the source, sustenance, and safeguard of the life, purity, and progress of the Christian Church.

Toronto.

W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS.

² *Churchman*, October, 1908, p. 593.

THE HYMNODY OF THE EVANGELICAL REVIVAL*

I

IN WHITEFIELD'S CIRCLE

The separation on doctrinal grounds of the Wesleys and George Whitefield in 1741 proved to be a permanent division of the XVIIIth century Revival forces into Methodists and Evangelicals. Whitefield, by reason of his flaming zeal and influence over men, must be regarded as the leader on the Calvinistic side, but he had nothing of Wesley's impulse and ability to organize his followers, and indeed no ambition beyond that of preaching the gospel far and wide. Contemporary observers and critics saw no distinction between Methodists and Evangelicals, even regarding Whitefield as the originator and leader of Methodism.¹ But by the participants themselves the line of theological demarcation was keenly felt from the beginning; and as the Revival progressed each party tended to develop its peculiar methods and even to make a separate sphere of operations. As the Revival extended into the Church of England, the Evangelical clergy came to resent the imputation of Methodism and to lament its nonconformity to parochial order.²

There was no one on the Evangelical side who shared to the full John Wesley's deep sense of the importance of the Hymn, his delight in Hymn singing, or his skill in administering it as a Christian ordinance; and certainly no one who equalled Charles Wesley in the facility and felicity of his Hymn writing. Nevertheless the Evangelical Revival

* Being the fifth of the lectures upon "The Hymnody of the English-speaking Churches", delivered on the L. P. Stone Foundation at Princeton Theological Seminary, in February, 1910. The sixth (and concluding) lecture has already appeared in this REVIEW, Vol. viii (1910), pp. 353-388.

¹ So Tindal described Whitefield in his *Continuation of Rapin's History of England*.

² Cf. J. H. Overton, *The Evangelical Revival in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. London, 1900, pp. 45 ff.

caught and retained something of the glow of Methodist Song, developed its own Hymn writers, and established the permanent lines of Evangelical Hymnody. Most of all, it exercised an influence on the general extension of Hymn singing more immediate and effective than that of Methodism itself.

Whitefield had shared in the use of Hymn singing by the Wesleys as an aid to evangelism. In his early ministry and preaching tours he made use of the metrical Psalms bound up with the Prayer Book, the *Psalms and Hymns* of Dr. Watts, or the Wesleyan Hymns, as one or the other type happened to be convenient or acceptable. It is not clear that he was a writer of Hymns, but he made some use of manuscript Hymns adapted to special themes or occasions.³ Like Wesley he encouraged also social Hymn singing as an act of devotion or even as a witness-bearing in unexpected places.⁴ The practical influence of Whitefield's preaching, wherever he went, outside of such parish churches as suffered him, was overwhelmingly in favor of the singing of Hymns as distinguished from metrical Psalms. This was not only from the force of his personal example in using Hymns freely, but because the evangelical fervor he aroused demanded an evangelical response from his auditors. His influence in this respect was widespread; and we have already noted its part in bringing about "The Era of Watts" in American Churches.

A number of the preachers associated with Whitefield became themselves Hymn writers. John Cennick, while still assisting him, published his *Hymns for the Children of God in the days of their pilgrimage*. By J. C. (in 3 parts. London, 1741-42); and *Sacred Hymns for the use of Religious Societies. Generally composed in dialogues* (Bristol, 1743). Many of these Hymns commended themselves to

³ See the hymn "for her Ladyship" in *The Life and Times of Selina Countess of Huntingdon*, ed London, 1844, vol. i, p. 117; and that in L. Tyerman, *Life of George Whitefield*, London, 1877, vol. ii, p. 241.

⁴ Tyerman, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 241.

Whitefield, and some are still widely known and sung.⁵ To the later collection, Joseph Humphreys, a co-worker, contributed six Hymns.⁶ Cennick also introduced into some of the societies classes for Hymn singing patterned after the "choirs" of the Moravians, to whom his heart already turned.⁷ In 1742 Robert Seagrave published his *Hymns for Christian worship: partly composed, and partly collected from various authors* (London: 4th ed., 1748); of which 45 were original. The first ("Now may the Spirit's holy Fire") Whitefield afterwards made the opening hymn of his own collection; but only "The Pilgrim's Song" ("Rise my Soul, and stretch thy Wings") can be said to have survived.⁸ Seagrave was in Anglican orders, and in his preface denies the divine prescription of Psalm singing. Just at the point of leaving Whitefield for the Moravians William Hammond published his *Psalms, Hymns, and Spiritual Songs* (London, 1745). His Hymns are of merit,⁹ and numerous versions of Latin Hymns anticipated by nearly a century the revival of Protestant interest in Latin Hymnody.

Seagrave's book was prepared for his congregation at Loriner's Hall, which he was Sunday evening lecturer for many years, but it was used more widely. It is likely that all these collections had more or less use in the societies, or at the temporary Tabernacle at Moorfields; but when the new Tabernacle was opened in 1753, Whitefield felt that he should have a hymn book of his own. It appeared as *Hymns for social worship, collected from various authors, and more particularly design'd for the use of the Tabernacle Congregation, in London. By George Whitefield,*

⁵ Among them, "Children of the heav'nly King", "Jesus, my All, to Heav'n is gone", "E'er I sleep, for ev'ry Favour", "We sing to Thee, Thou Son of God" and "Brethren let us join to bless".

⁶ Among them, "Blessed are the sons of God".

⁷ See Tyerman's *Whitefield*, vol. ii, p. 148.

⁸ Seagrave's Hymns are highly regarded by Josiah Milller, *Singers and Songs of the Church*, 2nd ed., London, 1869, pp. 152, 153, and have been reprinted by Daniel Sedgwick.

⁹ "Awake, and sing the song", and "Lord, we come before Thee now", are arranged from longer Hymns in this book.

*A.B., late of Pembroke College, Oxford, and Chaplain to the Rt. Hon. the Countess of Huntingdon. London: printed by William Strahan, and to be sold at the Tabernacle, near Moorfields. M DCC LIII.*¹⁰

The Countess of Huntingdon had 'turned Methodist' under the influence of her sister-in-law, Lady Margaret Hastings, who married Benjamin Ingham, one of Wesley's preachers; and became a member of the society meeting in Fetter Lane. She was especially moved by Whitefield's preaching. On his return from America in 1748, she exercised her right as a peeress to appoint him her chaplain, and opened her house in Park Lane that he might preach to semi-weekly gatherings of the aristocracy. She endeavored in vain the next year to reunite the Wesleys and Whitefield, and threw her influence on the side of Whitefield. It was his hope that Lady Huntingdon would assume charge of the societies he had founded, the management of which interfered with his freedom as an evangelist;¹¹ and it was largely through her encouragement that he undertook to erect the new and larger Tabernacle at Moorfields¹² for whose use his hymn book was prepared.

Whitefield's *Hymns* contained 132 "for public worship"; 38 "for Society and Persons meeting in Christian-Fellowship." It included Hymns by all four of his Hymn writing co-workers; notably of Cennick, the use of whose "Hymns in dialogue" was justified by a reference in the preface to the antiphonal singing of cathedral churches and of the "Celestial Choir".¹³ A score of the Hymns of the Wesleys were included, but the Hymns of Watts predominated. Whitefield aimed at a standard of Praise combining the

¹⁰The book is described in *The Athenaeum* for Nov. 14, 1903, as "the excessively rare first edition of Whitefield's 'Hymns'", and mention made of a copy that "has just changed hands at the price of 2000 guineas". But the 1st ed. is far from being "excessively rare". The copy at the 6th McKee sale in May 1902, brought \$4.50: the writer's copy was purchased from an experienced London dealer in 1896 at half a guinea.

¹¹*Life and Times of the Countess of Huntingdon*, vol. i, pp. 116, 117.

¹²*Ibid.*, pp. 202, 203.

¹³Preface.

doctrine and dignity of Watts with the evangelical fervor of Charles Wesley and his own colleagues. He thought Congregational Hymns "ought to abound much in Thanksgiving", and "be of such a Nature, that all who attend may join in them without being obliged to sing lies, or not sing at all". This was to confine his choice within what we have called Watts' "Common Ground", and to avoid the individualistic Wesleyan Hymns. It involved also some textual changes in the Wesleyan Hymns used; a freedom which Wesley bitterly resented.¹⁴

The actual use of Whitefield's hymn book by his own societies, and beyond them, was very large. Daniel Sedgwick has found thirty-six editions between 1753 and 1796.¹⁵ Through it a number of Hymns now familiar, were given circulation. Its greatest permanent importance lay in its influence with the early Evangelical clergy of the Church of England, which made it the forerunner and even the model of the earlier group of hymnals in the Church of England.

II

IN LADY HUNTINDON'S CONNEXION

Whitefield did not found a new denomination, nor did Lady Huntingdon assume the leadership of his societies, which were destined to disintegration. Her aim was rather to improve the Church of England. She claimed the right to build private chapels, and to furnish them with preachers by appointing clergymen as her domestic chaplains; and by so doing built up gradually a "connexion" within the bounds of the Church. But the opening of her chapel in Spa Fields in 1779 was opposed. She was obliged to take shelter under the Toleration Act, to register her ministers as dissenting ministers, and her chapels as dissenting places of worship.¹⁶ The parochial clergy among her chaplains (Romaine, Venn, Beveridge, and others) withdrew, and her work took shape as a new denomination, "Lady Huntingdon's Connexion".¹⁷

¹⁴ See his preface to the *Methodist Collection*, of 1780.

¹⁵ Tyerman's *Whitefield*, vol. ii, p. 294.

¹⁶ See her *Life and Times*, vol. ii, pp. 309 ff.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 490.

Lady Huntingdon shared the Methodist feeling for Hymns; and in the meetings at her different houses she made Hymn singing familiar in those aristocratic circles into which Methodism itself made no effort to penetrate. From her social influence, her headship of her many chapels, and her intimate relations with church and dissent, she was especially well situated to aid the extension of Hymn singing; and she was an influence behind the movement to introduce Hymns into the Church of England. She concerned herself with the development of an Evangelical Hymnody, combining evangelical fervor with Calvinistic doctrine, primarily for her own chapels but having wider bearings.

Whether or not Lady Huntingdon contributed Hymns of her own composition is uncertain. As early as 1748 Doddridge, writing after preaching at her house, confesses to his wife:¹⁸ "I have stolen a hymn, which I steadfastly believe to be written by good Lady Huntingdon." The opinion that she was a Hymn writer was shared by others, until it acquired the force of a tradition. Josiah Miller regarded it "as proved beyond doubt that she was the author of a few hymns of great excellence", and asserted that a known list of them was lost.¹⁹ But such a claim is not supported by actual evidence.

Lady Huntingdon's part in the preparation of hymn books for her chapels is much more certain, though not wholly defined. It is doubtful if full materials for a history of the Hymnody of her Connexion now exist. The earliest hymn book now known is *A Collection of Hymns*. London. Printed for William Lee at Lewes, in Sussex, MDCCLXIV. It is compiled from James Allen's *Kendal Hymn Book* of 1754 and other sources, and has a Moravian rather than a Calvinistic flavor. "Society Hymns" and "Congregational

¹⁸ *Correspondence and Diary of Philip Doddridge*, vol. v, London, 1831, p. 74.

¹⁹ *Singers and Songs of the Church*, London, 1869, p. 183. The only hymn he mentions as hers is the well-known "O when my righteous Judge shall come". For all really known of its history, see Julian, *Dictionary of Hymnology*, p. 854.

Hymns" are distinguished; and the preface is an earnest evangelistic appeal, which, according to Miller,²⁰ was written by the Countess herself. It was followed by a series of local hymn books which plainly had her approval and probably her supervision. The first was *The Collection of Hymns sung in the Countess of Huntingdon's Chapel, Bristol* (Bath, 1765, 3rd ed., 1770). The distinction between "Society" and "Congregational" Hymns was continued, but large use was here made of Watts, Charles Wesley, and current Calvinistic Hymn writers. Then came *A Collection of Hymns sung in the Countess of Huntingdon's Chapels in Sussex* (Edinburgh, n.d.; c. 1771). Then, next, *A Collection of Hymns sung in the Countess of Huntingdon's Chapels, Bath* (Bristol, c. 1774), in which the greater festivals are provided for, and there are fifty-one Hymns "for the Sacrament". There followed *The Collection of Psalms and Hymns, sung in the Countess of Huntingdon's Chapels, in Lincolnshire* (Gainsborough, 1778).

During these formative years Lady Huntingdon appears to have encouraged, or perhaps permitted, her ministers to make hymn books for their own use. Thomas Maxfield,²¹ one of the first of Wesley's lay preachers, later in Anglican orders, had revolted from Methodism, and brought a considerable following over to the Calvinistic side. He printed *A Collection of Psalms and Hymns: extracted from various authors: with some never published before. London: printed and sold at his chapel in Rope-maker's Alley, Little Moorfields, &c., MDCCLXVI* (2nd ed., 1768; 3rd ed., 1778). He aimed in this to emphasize his newly adopted Calvinism. Its "Collection of Hymns" (250) and "Collections of Psalms" (150) are followed by a series of independently numbered groups "for the Nativity", for "New Year's Day", &c., evidently in imitation of Wesley's hymn tracts. The Revs. Herbert Jones and William Taylor were the preachers of the new Spa Fields Chapel whose erection

²⁰ *Singers and Songs*, p. 182.

²¹ For Lady Huntingdon's relations with Maxfield, see her *Life and Times*, vol. i, pp. 33, 34.

occasioned Lady Huntingdon's withdrawal from the Church of England. They published for it in 1777 a *Collection* mostly compiled from the earlier books and from Whitefield's.²²

But the time had come, in Lady Huntingdon's judgment, for a common hymn book for her now very numerous chapels.²³ It would promote uniformity, and the profits on its sale would help to support the work.²⁴ She personally undertook the selection of the Hymns, relying upon the assistance of her cousin, the Hon. and Rev. Walter Shirley.²⁵ The new book appeared as *A select Collection of Hymns to be universally sung in all the Countess of Huntingdon's Chapels. Collected by her Ladyship. London MDCCLXXX*. Its 298 Hymns represent in the main her choice of the Hymns already used in her chapels; and comprise a compact devotional presentation of the Calvinistic interpretation of the gospel of grace.²⁶ This collection stood the test of use, and the maintenance of it in its integrity, became a matter of loyalty to the Countess. Supplements were added in 1796 and 1808, after her death; and in view of numerous "surreptitious editions", more or less incorrect, the book was copyrighted by her Trustees.²⁷ Some independent supplements followed: that of Thomas Young (*The Beauties of Dr. Watts, &c.*) in 1819; the *Psalms and Hymns* of Joseph Sartain in 1842; the Appendix of "G. H." of Worcester in 1848; and Thomas Haweis' *Carmina Christo* in 1792 and in later reprints. In 1854 a new hymn book appeared by order of the Conference as *The Countess of Huntingdon's*

²² *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 306.

²³ There were over 80 at the date of her death.

²⁴ Preface of 1808.

²⁵ *Her Life and Times*, vol. ii, p. 201, note.

²⁶ Nos. 62-64, "The Joy of Faith", from Toplady's *Psalms and Hymns* of 1776:

"How happy are we,
Our election who see,

And can venture our souls on Thy gracious decree"

is an anti-Wesleyan presentation of the grounds of evangelical joy, set forth in the Wesleyan rhythm.

²⁷ Preface of 1808.

Connexion Hymn Book, and this also has been supplemented by the now dwindling denomination (*The Connexion Hymn Book with Supplement*, 1865).

Lady Huntingdon was intimate with the Wesleys, the hostess of Zinzendorf, the friend of Watts and Doddridge, and the center of the group of Hymn writers developed on the Calvinistic side of the Revival, whether of Whitefield's following or her own, or remaining, like Toplady, in the established Church. Of her immediate circle, her cousin Walter Shirley contributed several Hymns to her *Collection*, and is still remembered for his "Sweet the moments rich in blessing", a recast of a hymn by James Allen, and appearing in the 1770 edition of the *Bristol* collection. A more copious writer was Thomas Haweis, whose Hymns appeared as *Carmina Christo; or Hymns to the Saviour* (Bath, 1792). This book of Haweis was regarded by many as a companion to her Ladyship's *Collection*, and was often bound up with it. From it come his familiar Hymns: "From the cross uplifted high", "Enthron'd on high, almighty Lord!", and "O Thou, from whom all goodness flows". Lady Huntingdon's concern for the Calvinistic Methodist movement in Wales brought her the friendship of William Williams, its chief Hymn writer. Williams had also printed in early life an attempt at Hymn writing in English, *Hosannah to the Son of David; or Hymns of Praise to God* (Bristol, 1759). It is claimed²⁸ that after seeing this book Lady Huntingdon induced him to prepare his *Gloria in Excelsis: or Hymns of Praise to God and the Lamb* (Carmarthen, 1772). It is certain that she included a number of Hymns from this book in her *Collection*, including "O'er those gloomy Hills of Darkness", a forerunner of the later Missionary Hymnody. His "Guide me, O Thou Great Jehovah" (first written in Welsh), was printed as a leaflet for use by the students of Lady Huntingdon's college and included in the *Collection* for Sussex (c. 1771); being thus started on its great career.

To develop and maintain an interest in Hymn singing,

²⁸ E. Morgan in Daniel Sedgwick's reprint of Williams' two publications as above, London, 1859, p. x.

on the Calvinistic as on the Methodist side of the Revival, demanded attention to its musical interests, if only to conquer the lethargy resulting from the degraded ideals and methods of Church of England Psalmody. Whitefield had no special gift for musical leadership, but Lady Huntingdon was interested in music and not satisfied merely to adopt the Wesleyan tune books. She knew most of the prominent musicians, including Handel, and included the words of the choruses of his *Messiah* in her *Collection*. This suggests her ambitions for her chapel services, but the withdrawal of these anthems from later editions indicates a conclusion that they were beyond the available musical resources. She engaged Giardini, the great violinist of her day, to compose some tunes for her chapels,²⁹ and secured others from Giordani, another Italian musician in London, with a very similar name. At her request, the younger Charles Wesley, whose musical career she had assisted, composed a tune for her favorite "In Christ my treasure's all contained".³⁰ Among her chaplains Thomas Haweis was the most musical, and composed tunes published after her death as *Original Music suited to the various metres*. The curious oblong shape assumed by the Connexion hymn books has not been explained, but may have been adopted as convenient for printing tunes to be bound up with them.

III

SOME BY-STREAMS OF HYMNODY

Several by-streams of Hymnody can be conveniently traced from this point.

Benjamin Ingham, Lady Huntingdon's brother-in-law, had been the Wesleys' fellow-voyager to Georgia, and on his return became an evangelist. He turned over to the Moravians many societies he founded in Yorkshire and

²⁹ "Is it true that Lady Rockingham is turned Methodist? It will be a great acquisition to the sect to have their hymns set by Giardini." Horace Walpole, June 25, 1768, in Toynbee ed. of his *Letters*, vol. vii, Oxford, 1904, p. 205.

³⁰ Her *Life and Times*, vol. i, p. 230.

adjacent counties, but ultimately organized his followers as a new sect (Inghamites), making a sort of bishop of himself and ordaining his preachers. He published for them *A Collection of Hymns for Societies*. Leeds: printed by James Lister, 1748. Of its 88 Hymns 15 are from Watts, 8 from the Wesleys, 5 from Cennick: his own share is undetermined. Later a group of his helpers put forth *A Selection of Hymns for the use of those that seek, and those that have redemption in the blood of Christ*. Kendal: printed by Tho. Ashburner. MDCCLVII (2nd ed. with appx., 1761). James Allen and Christopher Batty were the largest contributors, and the flavor of the whole is Moravian. Much of its contents is doggerel.³¹ A year later Ingham sent Batty and Allen northward to inquire into a movement inaugurated by John Glas. They returned as converts to the Glassite discipline and theology, and in the disputes and disruption that followed the Inghamite connexion was almost completely wrecked.

The Rev. John Glas had been deposed from the ministry of the Church of Scotland in 1728. He formed at Perth and elsewhere churches aiming to revive primitive discipline, with such ordinances as feet washing, the love feast and community of goods. In public worship they were Psalm singers, but for their fellowship meetings were composed *Christian Songs*, first appearing at Edinburgh, 1749. Its 38 songs increased in number with each new edition, the fifth (1775) having 95 songs and 11 "elegies". The eighth (1794) added a second part of 25 songs, enlarged to 114 in the fourteenth edition of 1872. An edition printed for the Edinburgh congregation in 1875 was little more than a reprint of the first part of the 1794 edition. Most of the songs were on themes already familiar, but many show more than the usual lyrical feeling and facility, and are

³¹ The book is known as *The Kendal Hymn Book*. Allen's "Glory to God on high" came into wide use: his "While my Jesus I'm possessing" was the basis of "Sweet the moments rich in blessing". Christopher and William Batty afterwards printed *A Publication of Hymns, in two parts* (4th ed., Nottingham, 1803). Christopher's "Captain of thy enlisted host" had some use,

referred to current Scottish and English song-tunes. Beside its long popularity in Glassite congregations, now become few and small, the *Christian Songs* is of some interest as the source of Hymns in various collections.³²

James Relly, a convert and afterward a preacher of Whitefield's, broke with him on doctrinal grounds, adopting very comfortable views of the union of the whole race with the Redeemer. His London society was probably the first attempt at organized Universalism, and kept its meeting house open till 1830.³³ He published at London in 1754 *Christian Hymns, Poems, and Spiritual Songs, sacred to the praise of God our Saviour*: the fifty-page poem and first book of Hymns by himself, the second by his brother John. It is easier to understand that these rude Hymns should support the charge of antinomianism brought against Relly, than that they should prove attractive in reading or worship. But they were reprinted in 1758, 1777, and 1791, and were associated with the Universalist movement in America. It was no doubt natural that each of these XVIIIth century sectarian movements should aim at having its own Hymnody.

As independent in spirit as these founders of sects, but in doctrine straitly Calvinistic, was Rowland Hill. At one in his views with Whitefield and Lady Huntingdon, an imitator of the former's methods and associated with the latter's work, he was as unwilling to become the colleague of either as unable to keep to the lines of the Church of England, of which he was an ordained clergyman. After an itinerant ministry of twelve years, he founded in London the famous Surrey Chapel. During a fifty years' ministry

³² These can be traced through Julian's *Dict. of Hymnology*, art. "Scottish Hymnology", pp. 1030 f. Glas' son-in-law Robert Sandeman came to Boston in 1764, and established churches known as Sandemanian in several towns. For their history see *The New England Magazine*, April, 1896, art. "Sandemanians". A hymn book for their use appeared as *Christian Songs; written by Mr. John Glas, and others. The seventh edition Perth, printed: Providence, reprinted. MDCCLXXXVII.*

³³ Richard Eddy, "The Universalists" in *American Church History Series*, vol. x, p. 349.

there, with some use of church formularies but without episcopal sanction, he exerted an influence in popularizing Hymn singing that was not unfelt in the Church itself. Hill had published at London in 1774 *A Collection of Psalms and Hymns, chiefly intended for the use of the poor*; and on opening Surrey Chapel in 1783 printed for it *A Collection of Psalms and Hymns, chiefly intended for public worship* (M. Pasham, 1783). He believed in the sacred use of popular melodies, and his organist, B. Jacob, coöperated with him, as appears from a *Collection of Hymn Tunes* (c. 1800). His hymn "When Jesus first, at Heav'n's command", set to "Rule Britannia", with which he stirred the hearts of the Volunteers during the Napoleonic wars, was long remembered.⁸⁴ An early Sunday school worker, Hill also popularized the ideal of a Children's Hymnody. Jacob prepared for him a tune book for Watts' *Divine and Moral Songs*, and Hill himself published *Divine Hymns attempted in easy language for the use of children* (and revised by Cowper: 1st ed., 1790); *A Collection of Hymns for children* (1808); and *Hymns for schools* (1832). As a Hymn writer, Hill was of Watts' school; and the prefaces of his various collections show that he contributed to them much more material than can now be identified. Of the Hymns that were new in one or other edition of the *Collection* of 1783, "Cast thy burden on the Lord", "We sing His love who once was slain", and "With heavenly power, O Lord, defend", are in common use to the present time.

IV

IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

I. INTRODUCTION OF HYMN SINGING BY THE EVANGELICALS

Both the Wesleys and Whitefield had proposed an evangelistic movement within the Church of England. It is difficult to conceive the reshaping of the Church that would have resulted, had they been allowed to fulfil their purpose.

⁸⁴ It is in William James, *Memoir of the Rev. Rowland Hill*, 3rd ed., London, 1845, p. 349.

In fact their gospel, their methods, and most of all their "enthusiasm", aroused general hostility, and closed the parish churches against the "New Light" and the new Song it inevitably awakened. There were nevertheless in the ranks of the clergy some minds open to evangelical impressions, and the actual effect of the Revival was to develop in the Church of England an Evangelical Party.

The early Evangelicals were Calvinists, in sympathy with Whitefield. They moved in Lady Huntingdon's circle, and were thus in direct contact with the new Hymnody. Some of them, like Beveridge of Everton, and Grimshaw of Harworth, had control of their own churches; but, in London especially, the Evangelicals were dependent upon Lady Huntingdon's house, the chapels she erected, the proprietary chapels others were allowed by the bishops to establish as the only form of church extension then practicable, and the endowed "lectureships" in various parish churches where the nomination of the lecturer was in the hands of the parishioners.³⁵ By means of these the opportunity was found to preach an evangelical gospel within the Church of England; and also to introduce Hymn singing into its services, without having to encounter the opposition inevitable in parish churches with long-established traditions in favor of Psalm singing.

The first of the Evangelical leaders was the excellent William Romaine, hustled from place to place in London before he could obtain a hearing. As it happened, he was a conscientious opponent of Hymn singing in general and of the Hymnody of the Revival in particular. He held the extreme Calvinistic position as to the exclusive use of inspired words in Praise, and was able to impose his views upon his own congregation. But he could not stay the rising tide of Hymn singing or make a breach between the Gospel and the Hymns of the Revival.

In Martin Madan the new Hymn singing found an effective sponsor. He and his friends had built the chapel in

³⁵ See G. R. Balleine, *A History of the Evangelical Party in the Church of England*, London, 1908, pp. 60-63.

connection with the Lock Hospital, near Hyde Park Corner, which introduced Evangelicalism into the West End. For its use he prepared and published *A Collection of Psalms and Hymns, extracted from various authors, and published by the Reverend Mr. Madan. London: printed by Henry Cock: and sold at the Lock Hospital, near Hyde Park, MDCCLX*. The book was plainly modelled on Whitefield's, and often uses his textual alterations. Its 170 Hymns were put together without arrangement, beyond a grouping of "Sacramental Hymns". There was nothing to distinguish it as being of the Church of England. Its choice of Hymns and bright and cheerful tone gave immediate satisfaction. For some six years it had the field to itself, reaching a second edition in 1763, a fourth in 1765, and a twelfth in 1787. Madan's knack in reconstructing the work of other hands made his book a permanent influence both for good and evil. A number of familiar Hymns still bear the marks of his editorial revision. Madan was a musician, and, to accompany his hymn book, printed *A Collection of Psalm and Hymn Tunes, never published before, 1769. Edited by M. Madan.*³⁶ It was reprinted both in England and America, and included 33 tunes from his own hand. These florid strains, then new, gained much vogue: "Helmsley" and "Huddersfield" still survive. The contempt expressed for these tunes by the modern Anglican school views them out of perspective. If they tickled the ear, it was with a view of arousing faculties that slept through the droned notes of parish Psalmody and of quickening the pace of the singing. And in this they were successful.

The humorous and sturdy John Berridge was as early on the field as Madan, but less effective. He published *A Collection of Divine Songs, designed chiefly for the Religious Societies of Churchmen in the neighbourhood of Everton, Bedfordshire* (1760). As may be inferred, Berridge was already a "Methodist", a field-preacher, and encourager of societies outside the parish churches. His

³⁶ Generally called "The Lock Collection".

collection is mostly Wesleyan, with some Hymns from Watts and some originals. With a change in doctrinal views Berridge became

"Not wholly satisfied with the collection [he] had published. The bells, indeed, had been chiefly cast in a celebrated Foundry, and in ringing were tunable enough, none more so, but a clear gospel tone was not found in them all. Human wisdom and strength, perfection and merit, give Sion's bells a Levitical twang, and drown the mellow tone of the gospel outright."⁸⁷

With such convictions Berridge attempted to suppress his *Divine Songs*, buying and destroying every copy he could secure. During a six months' illness in the early seventies he composed a large number of Hymns. A few of these appeared in *The Gospel Magazine*, or elsewhere: most were laid aside till in 1785 he printed the whole body of them as *Sion's Songs, or Hymns: composed for the use of them that love and follow the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity. By John Berridge, M.A., Vicar of Everton* (London). There were 342 Hymns of a homely type, without classification or even an index of first lines, but numbered as a hymn book. They were sung no doubt through the circuit of Berridge's preaching and societies, but made no marked impression on Evangelical Hymnody. New editions in 1805 and 1820 may have been as much designed for reading as for singing, as was J. C. Philpots' reprint of 1842.⁸⁸

Seven years after Madan's *Collection* and Berridge's earlier hymn book, Richard Conyers, Vicar of Helmsley in Yorkshire, published *A Collection of Psalms and Hymns, from various authors: for the use of serious and devout Christians of every denomination* (London, 1767). This is the third of the Church of England hymnals, revealing by its title how broad was the sympathy of the early Evangelicals. The printing of a fifth edition at York in 1788 shows

⁸⁷ Preface to *Sion's Songs*, 1785.

⁸⁸ There is a good account of Berridge and his Hymns in Thos. Wright, *Augustus M. Toplady, &c.*, London, 1911, pp. 252-60. Gadsby's *Memoirs of Hymn-Writers and Compilers* is fuller, but inaccurate. Berridge's best remembered Hymns are: "Jesus, cast a look on me", "O happy saints, who dwell in light", and "Since Jesus freely did appear" (in altered forms).

that it helped to extend and provide for Hymn singing at the North. Conyers followed Madan's lead and appropriated fully two thirds of the contents of Madan's *Collection*. He was however happy in getting his friend Cowper interested in his book and in securing contributions from that poet. His second edition of 1772 will always have a place as the original source of "There is a fountain filled with blood", and "O for a closer walk with God".

The fourth of the Evangelical series appeared in 1775. That was also the year of Romaine's philippic against the new Hymnody, in which he reveals the situation as he saw it:

"The hymn-makers . . . have supplied us with a vast variety, collection upon collection, and in use too, new hymns starting up daily—appendix added to appendix—sung in many congregations, yea admired by very high professors to such a degree, that the psalms are become quite obsolete, and the singing of them is now almost as despicable among the modern religious, as it was some time ago among the profane."²⁸

Romaine, no doubt, is speaking not of the Church at large, but of the small group of churches affected by the movement which he represented at London, and De Courcy (whose recent appointment by Lord Dartmouth as Vicar of St. Alkmund's, Shrewsbury, caused a great stir) represented at the West. The latter's *A Collection of Psalms and Hymns, extracted from different authors . . . with a preface by the Reverend Mr. De Courcy* (Shrewsbury, 1775: 2nd ed., 1782), might seem a defiance of Romaine; for its distinction lay in the increased number of authors from whom it drew, adding for their accommodation "appendix to appendix" in its later editions.

But in the project of widening the area of the Evangelical Hymnody these later editions had been preceded, and probably influenced, by another hymn book of greater importance: *Psalms and Hymns for public and private worship. Collected (for the most part), and published, by Augustus Toplady, A.B., Vicar of Broad Hembury. London: printed*

²⁸ *An Essay on Psalmody*, London, 1775, pp. 104, 105.

for E. and C. Dilly, 1776. "It ought," Toplady said, "to be the *best* that has yet appeared, considering the great number of volumes (no fewer than between forty and fifty), which have, more or less, contributed to this Compilation."⁴⁰ In its 418 Hymns many Nonconformists, beside Watts, were represented, some of them new to Church of England hymn books. The book was occasioned by Toplady's removal to London, and was made for the evening congregation he had gathered in the Huguenot Chapel in Orange Street. Toplady regarded Hymn singing as an ordinance of God, "which He designs eminently to bless at this present day", and dismissed Romaine's protest against Hymns, of the year before, with contempt.⁴¹

Toplady's book was more pronouncedly Calvinistic than its predecessors. Such titles as "Original Sin", "Election Unchangeable", "Electing Grace", "Efficacious Grace", "Imputed Righteousness", "Preserving Grace", and "Assurance of Faith", show that the "Five Points" were carefully illustrated. In 1770, and the years following, the Calvinistic Controversy had reached its crisis, and none had contributed more to its heat and bitterness than Toplady. The separation of the two parties was final, and his book expressed his conviction⁴² that the Church of England belonged on the Calvinistic side. In view of the extreme virulence of his attacks upon Wesley, Toplady's inclusion of a number of Wesleyan Hymns is noteworthy. Unlike most of his contemporaries, Toplady must have identified the authorship of these Hymns:⁴³ and it is to be added that

⁴⁰ Preface.

⁴¹ "What absurdity is there, for which some well-meaning people have not contended?" *Ibid.*

⁴² *Historic Proof of the doctrinal Calvinism of the Church of England* (1774).

⁴³ It is quite certain that the editor of Toplady's *Works* could not distinguish even Toplady's Hymns from those of the Wesleys. He prints "Christ whose glory fills the skies" and "Father, I want a thankful heart", as Toplady's (vol. vi [1794], pp. 420, 428). This act of Row's is the sole basis for the charge that Toplady appropriated as his own some of Charles Wesley's Hymns (David Creamer, *Methodist Hymnology*, N. Y., 1848, pp. 45-47). Row in his turn is accused of

he carefully altered the text of such as he used.⁴⁴ And here, for the first time in a hymn book, "Rock of Ages" and "Jesu, Lover of my soul", stand side by side.

Even more unexpected, in view of the history of the Evangelical Party, is the aesthetic motive in Toplady's book. "God," so the preface opens, "is the God of *Truth*, of *Holiness*, and of *Elegance*. Whoever, therefore, has the honor to compose, or to compile, anything that may constitute a part of his worship, should keep those three particulars, constantly, in view." If only these quaint words could have been taken to heart by the Evangelical Party, Toplady's hymn book would not only have put into circulation the greatest English Hymn, but would have prevented that perverse ignoring of the aesthetic side of human nature which proved so serious a barrier to the spread of evangelical religion, and palliated the excesses of the Oxford Revival in the century following.

Toplady did not live to reprint his hymn book. A second edition, somewhat modified, appeared in 1787, edited by his friend Walter Row. For this there continued a demand sufficient to keep it in print during the first quarter of the XIXth century.

Toplady included only six of his own Hymns⁴⁵ in his *Psalms and Hymns*, though he had been a Hymn writer from his youth.⁴⁶ The larger number of his Hymns appeared at Dublin in 1759 as *Poems on Sacred Subjects*, and portray the stress of thought and feeling that accompanied his transition to Calvinistic views. Long afterward he printed 26 Hymns in *The Gospel Magazine*,⁴⁷ and five

printing some of Toplady's Hymns as his own (Gadsby, *Hymn Writers*, 4th ed., 1870, p. 157).

⁴⁴ Eg. in "Blow ye the trumpet, blow", the Wesleyan "The all-atoning Lamb" becomes "The sin-atoning Lamb".

⁴⁵ They were "Holy Ghost, dispel our sadness"; "A debtor to Mercy alone"; "Thou fountain of bliss"; "Rock of Ages"; "What tho' my frail eye-lids refuse"; and "How happy are we".

⁴⁶ See Wright, *Augustus M. Toplady*, p. 23.

⁴⁷ In 1771, 1772, 1774, 1776. "Rock of Ages" appeared in March, 1776. There is a complete list in Wright, p. 100. *The Gospel Maga-*

others are traceable. Toplady's Hymns have been widely appreciated and largely used. In *Denham's Selection* (Baptist), a considerable body of them is still available, but on the whole the number in actual use is constantly diminishing. His polemic Hymns have died a natural death: his deep and sincere Hymns of Christian experience invite a sympathetic reading rather than a congregational employment: and the conviction can hardly be resisted that his poetic inspiration and even metrical method were borrowed from Charles Wesley. His "Rock of Ages" isolates itself from the body of his work in its impressiveness and usefulness, and maintains its place at the head of English Hymns.

Mention must also be made of the *Select Psalms and Hymns* of David Simpson (Macclesfield, 1776; 2nd ed., 1780; new ed. 1795). It was made for the great congregation in the church built for him at Macclesfield after the rector of the parish church had thrown him bodily out of his pulpit; and is chiefly notable for the new Hymns it introduced and for the inclusion of anthems.

We thus have before us the first group of Church of England hymn books. Their dates of publication cover only seventeen years, and they have much in common. Generally entitled *Psalms and Hymns* they show no concern with the old metrical Psalmody. They are collections of Hymns, gradually expanding from the 170 of Madan to the 600 and over of Simpson. The Hymns are thrown together without arrangement and without indications of their authorship, and there are no musical notes or suggestions. From the prefaces we may infer that Madan stood alone among the editors in giving attention to the musical side. In the body of Hymns also, there was much that was common to the books. Watts, and to a less degree the Wesleys and Joseph Hart, furnished a nucleus and a considerable share of their contents. Watts' followers, especially Doddridge and the new Baptist Hymn writers, were drawn upon; and also the group more or less affiliated with *White-*
zing, the source of so many evangelical Hymns, ran from 1766 to 1772, and was revived in 1774. Toplady became its editor at the end of 1775.

field or using *The Gospel Magazine* as their medium of publication. Of the editors themselves, only Toplady and Bertridge contributed Hymns of note, but Newton and Cowper offered their first-fruits.

The group of hymn books shows a very determined purpose to introduce Hymn singing and great activity in providing materials for it. They do not of course represent the Church but a small party within it. The new movement was an intrusion of the outside Revival forces. The Hymnody showed its revival origin and character in the evangelistic note, in its concern with experimental religion, and its warmth amid chilling surroundings; and once within the dikes, revealed it yet further by its obliviousness of principles and practices distinguishing church from dissent, and its subordination of the sacramental side of religion. Inspired as it was by a Calvinistic movement the Hymnody was inevitably consistent with Calvinism. This showed itself negatively in its omissions or alterations of Methodist Songs. Positively it was in general content to express a deep sense of sin, an entire dependence on God for deliverance and the discovery of his method in Scripture. With Toplady came more of the terminology and specific statements of Calvinism. It is from this adhesion to the principles of the Revival rather than of the Church of England that these early hymn books derive their larger import; for they helped to establish the foundations of an Evangelical Hymnody not only within but beyond the Church of England.

2. "OLNEY HYMNS": THE EVANGELICAL MANUAL

In line with the earlier Evangelical hymn books, but an event important enough to stand alone, came the publication in 1779 by John Newton, then curate of Olney, of 280 of his own Hymns and 68 of his friend William Cowper, under the title of *Olney Hymns, in three Books. Book I. On select texts of Scripture. Book II. On occasional subjects. Book III. On the progress and changes of the spirit-*

ual life (London: W. Oliver, 1779). Both men had contributed Hymns to *The Gospel Magazine*, and to one or other of the Evangelical hymn books. Newton had appended eighteen pages of "Hymns, &c." to his *Twenty-Six Letters on Religious Subjects* of 1774.⁴⁸ As early as 1771 Newton proposed to Cowper that they jointly compose a volume of Hymns, partly from "a desire of promoting the faith and comfort of sincere Christians", partly "as a monument to perpetuate the remembrance of an intimate and endeared friendship".⁴⁹ Before the work had proceeded far, Cowper was prostrated by brain trouble, and Newton ultimately completed it alone.

The Hymns were conceived in the very spirit of their time and surroundings. From them we could reconstruct the actual working of the Revival in an English parish under Evangelical leadership; and they may be regarded as bringing the Hymnody of the Evangelical Revival to a close. In them the offices of the Prayer Book yield to the sermon, the Church Year is superseded by the civil, the sacraments are subordinated, and the Revival method expresses itself in the evangelical theology, the strenuous activity in the sphere of individual emotion, the didactic element employed to instruct and edify the simple believer, and the expository dealings with Scripture. Many of the Hymns had been actually a part of the revival services at Olney, being written for special occasions, or to be sung after some special appeal from the pulpit, or to be made the theme of an exposition by Newton in the prayer meetings held at the Great House.⁵⁰

In the making of these Hymns Cowper, as long as he was able, wrought with the feeling and craftsmanship of a true poet, and clothed them with the tender charm of his own spirit. Newton poured into them the pulsing life of an intense and commanding personality, and proved himself

⁴⁸Including Cowper's "God moves in a mysterious way", and his own "While with ceaseless course" and "I asked the Lord".

⁴⁹Preface, p. vi.

⁵⁰Eg. (Diary, Dec. 6, 1772) "Expounded my new hymn at the Great House on the subject of a burdened sinner". Josiah Bull, *John Newton*, London, n.d., p. 183.

capable at his best of producing great Hymns. When his inspiration failed it was like him to have "done his best" to fill the spaces left by his friend's silence. And even when most prosaic and homiletical Newton's work has the quality of being alive and the gift of appealing to other minds. Indeed the *Olney Hymns* are to be taken as a whole,⁵¹ and measured by the unity of the impression they created. Their appeal was immediate, and to an unusual degree permanent. Even in our own day, Faber, the Roman Catholic Hymn writer, speaks of their "acting like a spell upon him for years, strong enough to be for long a counter-influence to very grave convictions, and even now to come back from time to time unbidden into the mind".⁵²

This influence of *Olney Hymns*, securing for it so many reprintings⁵³ and so wide a circulation, was much more than that of a hymn book. In form the book was available for congregational use (being arranged precisely as Watts' *Hymns* had been), though some of its materials were not suitable. To what extent it was so employed is not now discoverable. But it furnished many with their favorite songs and devotional reading. It played a part among Evangelicals akin to that of Wesley's *Collection* of the following year among Methodists. It became a people's manual of evangelical doctrine and an instrument of spiritual discipline.

But the place of its Hymns in Hymnody itself is a very considerable one. They were inevitably recognized as a very notable accession to the store available for Evangelical use. They began at once to furnish materials for the hymn books. The proportion of them that became familiar and endeared to various denominations is surprisingly large. In

⁵¹ The best study of the *Olney Hymns* is Montgomery's "Introductory Essay", written for Collins' Glasgow ed., and often reprinted. In his contentment with Cowper's poetic grace, Montgomery perhaps overlooks something of Newton's bluff virility.

⁵² Frederick Wm. Faber, *Hymns*, preface to ed. of 1861.

⁵³ 3rd ed., 1783; 9th, 1810. It was kept in print during most, if not all, of the XIXth century. The numerous American reprints seem to have begun in New York in 1787 (Evans' *American Bibliography*, vol. vii, item 20588).

the Church of England a number won a place from which even the reconstructions of the Oxford Revival have been unable to dislodge them.⁵⁴ At the lowest estimate six must be accorded a classical position: three of Cowper's—"Hark my soul! it is the Lord", "Oh! for a closer walk with God", "God moves in a mysterious way", and three of Newton's—"Come, my soul, thy suit prepare", "Glorious things of thee are spoken", "How sweet the Name of Jesus sounds".

The Hymns exercised also a decided influence upon the Evangelical ideal of the Hymn, not so much in the way of modifying as in the way of confirming and deepening it. Like Charles Wesley's it was an influence favoring the use of Hymns as an expression of the most private experience, and like his again, Newton's method was autobiographical. If indeed he intended all his Hymns for public use, he was careless of Whitefield's dictum that Congregational Hymns should confine themselves to sentiments common to the singers. This inward-looking of "the old blasphemer" begat intense remorse and measureless self-contempt, and made the Hymn of Experience an instrument of self-reproach. In the same way Cowper's dreadful depression, and Newton's sympathy with him, tinged the *Olney Hymns* at times with the shadow of the cloud hiding the divine Presence. It can hardly be denied that the indiscriminate use of such materials by congregations introduced an element of unreality and morbidness into Evangelical Hymnody, from which it was slow to recover. On the other hand, Newton's perfect faith in the salvation offered, his glorying in its efficacy, his wonder at its grace, the tender note of his love for the Saviour, the exultation of his triumphant faith;—all these things entered into the warp and woof of the Evangelical Hymnody, and Newton's close relating of personal experience with the truths and narratives of Scripture became preëminently the accepted method of that Hymnody.

⁵⁴ In the latest edition of *Hymns ancient and modern* there are six by Newton and seven by Cowper.

Any who were brought up in some one of the Evangelical churches, in the period after Watts' domination had passed, is likely to recall a number of Newton's Hymns, a few of Cowper's also, as inevitably associated with the gospel there proclaimed and the type of religion there practised.

3. MOVEMENTS TO INTRODUCE HYMNS IN THE MAIN BODY OF THE CHURCH

Olney Hymns marks a point of transition in Church of England Hymnody. It was the last of a group of books bringing the Evangelical Hymnody into the Church without remoulding or even rearranging it into accommodation with the Prayer Book system of parochial worship. It was to be followed by a group of books, still Evangelical, that aimed to adapt the new Hymnody to the methods and manners of the Church.

The point is thus a convenient one at which to turn from the small Evangelical Party to the main body of the Church where Psalm singing prevailed and the Prayer Book system was unimpaired by revival influences outside, in order to discover what progress had been made there in introducing the singing of Hymns.

In this main body there was no unity of feeling or purpose in regard to the use of Hymns in public worship.

(1) There were first the stand-fasts, who through the entire XVIIIth century maintained the position Bishop Beveridge had taken at its beginning, that the good estate of the Church was bound up with the continued use of the Sternhold and Hopkins version of the Psalms, and that the traditional method of singing them need not be disturbed. Outside of the Church Watts had successfully attacked the divine prescription of the Psalms, and the Hymns of himself and his school had largely displaced them in Non-conformist use. At the borders of the Church the Wesleys had disregarded Psalmody and instituted a popular Hymnody of feeling and experience. All these changes tended to strengthen the position of the metrical Psalm in the minds of the conservative and stiff churchmen, and led them to con-

stitute themselves special guardians of that metrical Psalm, originally the creation and the badge of Geneva. Psalmody had come to seem to them a characteristic part of the Prayer Book system and the Hymns a menace. The more widely Watts' Hymns spread, and the more fervid the Methodist Song grew, the more obvious it became that the Hymn was stamped with the hall-mark of dissent and, even worse, of "enthusiasm". The prejudice against Hymns in churchly circles grew very strong. Dr. Samuel Johnson plumed himself for having let it yield to a charitable impulse; writing of a poor girl he saw at Communion, "I gave her, privately, half a crown, though I saw Hart's Hymns in her hand".⁵⁵

(2) There were the less extreme conservatives, just as anxious to maintain the old Psalmody, but who lamented the prevailing apathy fallen on the ordinance, and saw the force of the demand for Hymns suitable for holy days and occasions. Bishop Gibson had suggested the remedy in his *Directions given to the clergy* (1724) on his translation to London. He urged the great need of a better and heartier musical performance and laid out a "Course of Singing Psalms" covering the Sundays, Christmas, Easter, Whitsunday, and some Church occasions. The expedient was a good one and somewhat widely adopted; but it was also quickly appropriated by the advocates of Hymns. In 1734 "R. W." printed at Nottingham *The excellent use of Psalmody, with a course of Singing Psalms for half a year*, adding an appendix of twenty-eight Hymns for the festivals, the Communion, morning and evening, midnight, and funerals. Still later the Rivingtons reissued *The excellent use*, bound up with their tractate of (12) *Divine Hymns and Hymns taken from the Supplement to Tate and Brady's Psalms*.

In this group of conservatives Romaine belonged, as has appeared, and although foremost in adopting the theology of the Revival, was more strenuous than most in resisting

⁵⁵ Quoted in Boyd Carpenter, *Popular History of the Church of England*, p. 478.

its Hymnody. His *A Collection out of the Book of Psalms, suited to every Sunday in the year* (London, 1775), shows by its title that he followed Bishop Gibson's lead, but he went a step farther by adding notes on the evangelical interpretation of various Psalms. To us who look back it seems very plain that the addition of evangelical annotations to the "Singing Psalms" could not stay the intrusion of a pronouncedly evangelical Hymnody, any more than the appropriation of Psalms to Christian festivals could illustrate their full significance.

(3) There were those, and perhaps Romaine had no quarrel with them, who were fully persuaded that Hymns had a real function in the Christian life, and favored their use provided only they were not introduced into the stated church services. As early as 1727 there appeared *A Collection of Psalms, and Divine Hymns, suited to the great festivals of the Church, for morning and evening, and other occasions* (London; J. Downing, 1727). It was in all respects a hymn book, with the Hymns numbered for use, and included "a Table of Psalms on practical subjects, which may be of use to Parish-Clarks".⁵⁶ Notwithstanding this suggestive reference (on the title-page) to parish clerks, the preface opens with the declaration: "I have no thought of proposing the Use of any Part of this *Collection* in the Publick Service." Of hymn books, however, as of greater ventures, it is true that man proposes and Providence disposes. And it is not unlikely that some Parish clerks who consulted the Table were tempted to line out the hymns. The few Psalms in this book were from Denham and Patrick. The Hymns constituting the majority of its forty-nine pieces "were collected from several Books, some of which are not easy to be met with".⁵⁷ The little book was published cheaply for general distribution and for binding

⁵⁶ This apparently unnoticed book preceded by ten years John Wesley's *Charlestown Collection*, which Dr. Julian calls "the first hymn-book compiled for use in the Church of England". *Dictionary of Hymnology*, p. 332.

⁵⁷ P. 8.

up with others of like size in a series printed by Downing "for promoting Christian knowledge and Practice". The practical effect of this book and others like it was undoubtedly to familiarize Hymn singing.

(4) There was also in the main body of the Church a constantly growing party of progress in Psalmody, whose plans for its improvement included some use of Hymns;⁵⁸ and whose efforts it will be convenient to distinguish as two parallel movements.

One of these was plainly suggested by the new and hearty Hymn singing of the Revival, and took shape in the cultivation of music in several of the charitable institutions of London. To furnish suitable tunes especially, a series of books was published in which "Psalms, Hymns and Anthems" were printed with equal freedom. Such an use of Hymns is partly explained by the 'Charity Hymns' and those written to grace special occasions in these institutions. In the case of the Lock Hospital, the musical movement coincided with the Evangelical. Its chapel was used not only by its inmates, but by a strongly contrasting West End Evangelical congregation who rented sittings.⁵⁹ The hymn book and tune book prepared for their common use by Martin Madan have already been noted.

At the "Asylum or House of Refuge for Female Orphans" at Westminster Bridge, the improvement of its music under William Riley took the form of antagonism to the tunes made popular by the Revival. His *Parochial Music Corrected* (1762) dwelt especially on the light fuguing tunes of the "Methodists", which were creeping into the Church through the "Lectureships" in parish churches that gave Evangelicals their opportunity. Nevertheless here as elsewhere the use of Hymns followed musical improvement. Riley's *Psalms, and Hymns for the Chapel of the Asylum or House of Refuge for Female Orphans* (n.d.; after 1762) included the words of the Hymns.⁶⁰ For the

⁵⁸ But not particularly the Hymns of the Evangelical movement.

⁵⁹ Balleine, *The Evangelical Party*, p. 61.

⁶⁰ Rev. Jacob Duché, the refugee rector of Christ Church, Philadelphia,

Foundling Hospital a series of books was published, beginning with *Psalms, Hymns and Anthems used in the Chapel of the Hospital for the Maintenance and Education of Exposed and Deserted Young Children* (1774). It contained sixteen Hymns, including some of Addison's, and which by 1796 had increased to twenty-two. One of the Foundling Hymns, often appearing as a leaflet pasted in at the end of the 1796 edition, was our familiar "Praise the Lord! ye heavens adore Him". For the Magdalen Hospital five separate collections were printed, beginning with *The Hymns Anthems and Tunes with the Ode used at the Magdalen Chapel* (n.d.). This contains twenty-seven Hymns by Ken, Addison, Doddridge and others, including a version of *Dies Irae*. This was followed by *A Second Collection of Psalms and Hymns*,⁶¹ *A Third*, and *A Fourth Collection of Hymns for the use of the Magdalen Chapel*. These were afterward republished as a single volume.

The singing of the inmates became a marked feature of the life of these institutions and something like a feature of London life itself; drawing the general public to the chapel services and to the united service held annually in one of the churches and later in St. Paul's. "Charity children" were, moreover, commonly distributed among the parish churches, to act as a choir, taking their Hymns with them. In this way they did much toward making Hymn singing familiar and popular; just as in our own day the Sunday schools, coming into the churches with their liturgical services, have so widely affected the ordinary worship of non-liturgical churches.

became chaplain of the Asylum in 1782 (C. Higham in *New Church Magazine*, London, Sept. 1896, p. 461). He is said to have edited the editions of 1785 and 1789 (W. T. Brooke in *Morning Light*, Nov. 16, 1895); and is credited with the authorship of three of the Asylum Hymns (*New Ch. Maga. ut supra*, pp. 464, 465). Duché preached Swedenborgian views, and one of these Hymns appears in New Church hymnals up to the present day (*Hymns for use of the New Church*, London, 1881, No. 575: "Come, love Divine! thy power impart".)

⁶¹ There is suggestiveness in the advertisement it carries of its publisher's shop: "Where also may be had, Six favourite Hymns used at the Tabernacles of the Rev. Mess. *Whitefield* and *Wesley*".

(5) The other section of the progressive element was less free in its ways. It was more or less interested in musical improvement: the desired improvement in the subject matter of Psalmody it had found by introducing Tate & Brady's *New Version* (1696) into its parish churches. It was not interested in the Revival Hymnody nor in the hymn books of the Evangelicals, but favored supplementing the Psalms with a few Hymns for festivals and other church occasions. We have already described⁶² the early embodiment of such desire in the *Supplement to the New Version*, first printed in 1700, with its paraphrases of canticles and six other Hymns increased to nine in 1708.

In 1741 John Arnold of Great Warley, Essex, printed a setting of the Psalms, in the Playford fashion, as *The Compleat Psalmist*. In four books; the fourth being "A Select Number of Divine Hymns on various occasions", mostly the festivals and Good Friday. He included one each from Ken and Watts and two from the Tate and Brady *Supplement*, and sixteen less familiar. Most of the Hymns were *de trop*, and were dropped out of later editions, but one, "Jesus Christ is ris'n to-day" (partly taken, like its stirring tune, from the earlier *Lyra Davidica* of 1708), ultimately attached itself to the *New Version*.

The *Supplement* itself was kept in print, and copies of Tate and Brady bearing dates up to the middle of the century occur with the *Supplement* bound in. Its Hymns were not therefore lost to sight; but the usual surviving copies of like dates have no Hymns. We may infer that many parishes using Tate and Brady grew disposed to rest satisfied with the good qualities of the Psalms themselves.

During the last quarter of the century there came some change in the situation. A disposition showed itself in what we may call Tate and Brady circles to make more use of the Hymns in the *Supplement*, and to facilitate such use by attaching them to the printed Psalters. The Rivingtons issued in 1779 a small tractate entitled *Hymns taken from*

⁶² See chap. ii.

the *Supplement to Tate and Brady's Psalter*, and an undated copy of the same has turned up which is thought to be earlier.⁶³ This tractate was intended to be inserted or bound in current copies of Tate and Brady. In a London trade edition of Tate and Brady of 1780, four Hymns selected from the *Supplement* appear printed at the end of the Psalms, following the Gloria Patri, with separate pagination, and headed simply as HYMNS. They are:

Come, Holy Ghost, Creator, come.
While Shepherds watch'd their flocks by Night.
Since Christ, our Passover, is slain.
Christ from the Dead is rais'd, and made.

In a Cambridge Press edition of 1782 a new selection of Hymns is printed at the end of the Psalms, reflecting something of the current Hymnody, and including only one hymn from the *Supplement*. They are:

High let us swell our tuneful notes (Doddridge).
Hark! the herald angels sing (Wesley).
Christ from the dead is rais'd, and made (Tate and Brady).
My God, and is thy table spread (Doddridge).
Awake, my soul, and with the sun (Ken).

In London trade editions of 1790 and 1792 all the above Hymns are printed, except "While Shepherds watch'd". In another London trade edition of 1790 are the four Hymns of 1780, with Ken's Morning and Evening Hymns on printed slips pasted in. The latter, and the Easter Hymn, "Jesus Christ is ris'n to-day", also appear on printed slips pasted in University Press editions. Thenceforward it became the rule to print a group of Hymns after the Psalms as though a constituent part of the Psalter, and this continued so long as the *New Version* was kept in print. By the beginning of the XIXth century the Clarendon Press had its distinctive selection consisting of fifteen of the sixteen Hymns⁶⁴ and metrical canticles of the *Supplement* of 1700, with "O Lord, turn not Thy face away" from the Appendix to the *Old Version*, and the four Hymns from the

⁶³ Catalogue of Charles Higham & Son, London, No. 503, October, 1911, item 1950.

⁶⁴ The Commandments, "God spake these words", being omitted.

Cambridge edition of 1782. The Cambridge Press selection differed by including all sixteen of the *Supplement* Hymns, and by adding (from about 1816) "Jesus Christ is ris'n to-day" and Ken's Evening Hymn; but some copies from the Cambridge Press had a smaller selection.

These facts and dates are fitted to correct some current impressions of the Hymns appended to Tate and Brady's *New Version*. It has been a sort of fashion to regard them as something negligible in the history of Church of England Hymnody. It is assumed that they owe their place to the mere whim of the printer, and that their consequent introduction into worship was quite fortuitous and even humorous. This familiar assumption appears to find its only support in a surmise of Charles B. Pearson, who, in an essay on "Hymns and Hymn-writers", says:

"The introduction of hymns for Christian seasons in particular services is due, probably, to 'the stationers' before the Revolution, and to the University printers in modern times, more particularly to one of the latter about half a century back, who, being a Dissenter, thought fit to fill up the blank leaves at the end of the Prayer-book with hymns suggested by himself,—a liberty to which, apparently, no objection was raised by the authorities of the Church at that day, and thus 'factum valet'."¹⁰

What the actual evidence seems to show is that the Hymns were added neither by dissenters nor by Evangelicals, but by the Prayer Book party itself, and that they were printed in the Psalters because they were already being used in the services, and with a view of avoiding the necessity of inserting the little booklets and printed slips containing them. Indeed their significance seems to lie in their direct connection with the original *Supplement* of 1700, as showing how the continuous demand of the churchly yet progressive element for a few liturgical Hymns to supplement the Psalms kept open a channel of its own digging for the introduction of Hymn singing into the Church of England.

It thus appears that in its own way and within its defined limits the Prayer Book party co-operated with the freer movements that were making a Hymn singing Church. Its

¹⁰ *Oxford Essays*, 1858.

special contribution was in getting its Hymns printed in the Psalters as though a part of the authorized Psalmody. From this position they were never dislodged. And as the Psalters were ordinarily bound up with the Prayer Books, the Hymns became for all practical purposes a part of the Prayer Books themselves, even those distributed by the "S. P. C. K." Whatever the legal niceties as to authorization may have been, henceforward the opponents of Hymn singing—and they were many and bitter—were handicapped by the presence of the Hymns within the sacred covers of the Prayer Book itself.

4. THE PERIOD OF COMPROMISE: "PSALMS AND HYMNS" IN PARISH CHURCHES

We now take up the Hymnody and hymn book making of the Evangelical Party from the date of *Olney Hymns* (1779). It was, as has been said, the last of the earlier series that had little to distinguish them from the hymn books of dissent; and the conservatives were justified if they regarded it as a somewhat extreme example of that type. Just how the Evangelical leaders regarded it is difficult to estimate. Most of them probably welcomed it for its Hymns; none certainly as the model for a church hymn book.⁶⁶ The series of hymn books immediately following might seem to indicate a reaction from the unchurchly tendencies of *Olney Hymns*. But their altered complexion in reality reflected the change passing over the Evangelical movement itself. Like Methodism it had begun within the Church but apart from the parochial order and worship. Its beginnings had been extra-parochial, and even to the end of the XVIIIth century its strength lay in proprietary chapels, endowed lectureships and other centres of influence that had a measure of freedom. But with the waning of the century the movement began to draw established parishes

⁶⁶ Its publication probably seems more notable to us who look back than it did to the Evangelical leaders of the time. Richard Cecil, in his authorized *Memoir of the Rev. John Newton* (ed. H. T. Warren, Finsbury, n.d., p. 26), makes only incidental mention of it.

within its control and to influence parishes not to be accounted Evangelical. The Evangelicals themselves moderated their views, sought a closer conformity to the order and manners of their Church, and became disposed to affiliate more with the moderate element of the Prayer Book party.

These changes favored first of all the extension of Hymn singing into the regular services of parish churches, and consequently a compromise with the accustomed order of Psalm singing in those churches, by which both Psalms and Hymns should have equal recognition and use in parochial "Psalmody". To provide for this the new series of Evangelical hymn books became not only in name but in reality collections of "Psalms and Hymns".

From *Olney Hymns* we pass at once to *Psalms and Hymns, collected by William Bromley Cadogan* (1st ed., 1785: 4th, 1803), rector at Chelsea and also at Reading. It contains a complete metrical Psalter, with 150 Hymns chosen and arranged in the earlier manner. There is a similar provision of Psalms in the *Psalms and Hymns* of John Venn (London, 1785) and in Basil Woodd's book of 1794, hereafter to be described. And, it may be added, Church of England hymn books continued to be "Psalms and Hymns" down to the Oxford Revival. These Evangelical leaders took as much pains as Romaine himself to provide Psalm versions that should maintain or revive an interest in Psalm Singing. One of them indeed, Richard Cecil, followed Romaine for a while. His *Psalms of David* (1785) is confined to canonical Psalms, the versions drawn from the best available sources, including Addison and Milton. Not until 1806 did he add *Hymns for the principal festivals of the Church of England*. His collection had reached a thirty-second edition by 1840. Thomas Robinson, in the hymn book made for his church at Leicester (before 1790) included nothing from either the *Old* or *New Version* of the Psalms. He may have been moved by associations of them with his unwelcomed coming to Leicester,

"when the choir bellowed the most unsuitable psalms instead of those which he instructed the clerk to announce".⁶⁷

The conjunction of Psalms and Hymns in parish worship did something to bring more closely together the two main agencies of Hymn singing—the Evangelicals, who cared most for Hymns, and the moderate Prayer Book element, which wished to retain Psalmody supplemented by Hymns for holy days and occasions. It remained for Basil Woodd, an Evangelical leader of the second generation,—not a rector but preacher and indeed proprietor of Bentinck Chapel, Marylebone,—to take a further step, and bring the two parties to something very like the unity of a common ground in Hymnody. His project was to adapt Hymnody to the Prayer Book system itself. He conceived the ideal of a hymn book that should be "the companion to the Book of Common Prayer".

The book in which Woodd embodied his ideal appeared at London in 1794 as *The Psalms of David, and other portions of the Sacred Scriptures, arranged according to the order of the Church of England, for every Sunday in the year; also for the Saints' Days, Holy Communion, and other services*. The promise of the title was scrupulously fulfilled. Under the heading of each Sunday and holy day of the Christian year a metrical Psalm was designated to serve as the Introit provided for in the rubrics of the first Prayer Book of Edward VI. Then followed one or more Hymns, adapted to the Epistle or Gospel or subject of the day. The whole was followed by selections of Hymns for Communion, Baptism and other church offices and occasions, and a few for general use in public worship. The selection of Hymns, from all the materials then available, was good, and in later editions some originals were added.

In a word this interesting book stamped Hymnody with the mark of the Church rather than of a party. It pointed the way of making Hymns a constituent part of the liturgical order rather than a formless body of song intruded from without under the Revival impulse. It was Woodd in 1794,

⁶⁷ Balleine, *The Evangelical Party*, p. 121.

and not Heber in 1826, who worked out the ideal of "A Hymnal Companion to the Prayer Book", and thus anticipated the form in which ultimately Hymnody came to be accepted by the straitest school of churchmanship as an enrichment of the service.

This is not to say that Woodd set up a model at once followed by succeeding editors. On the contrary the editor next succeeding was that uncompromising Evangelical, Charles Simeon of Cambridge, who trained so many evangelical preachers and by deed of trust constituted Evangelicalism as a distinct denomination within the bounds of the Church. Simeon sought every occasion to vindicate his "regard for the Liturgy and Services of our Church".⁶⁸ His real concern was for the sermon and for a Hymnody that would illustrate its doctrine and enforce its appeals. He published in 1795 *A Collection of Psalms and Hymns*. It contained a much abridged selection of Psalms. Otherwise the book affiliates in contents and manner with the earlier Evangelical group. Its Hymns follow the subject of discourse, its "Time and Seasons" are Morning, Evening, Spring, Summer, Harvest, and so forth. Even Easter and Christmas appear only in the table of contents, and in this way: "*Christmas-Day. See Incarnation*". As more than a hundred scattered parishes came to be included in "The Simeon Trust", the use of his *Collection* was widespread and long continued.⁶⁹ It thus kept alive in these and doubtless other parishes a distinctively Evangelical Hymnody, in no way differing from that of dissenting bodies holding similar convictions.

The general trend was, however, otherwise. The influence of Woodd's more churchly conception, even in his own party appears, for example, in Biddulph's *Selection of Hymns accommodated to the service of the Church of England* (2nd ed., 1804); in Cecil's similar *Appendix* of 1806, already referred to; and in John Venn's *Appendix* of the

⁶⁸ Cf. Wm. Carus, *Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. Charles Simeon*, chap. xii, 3rd ed., London, 1848, pp. 210 ff.

⁶⁹ The 13th edition appeared in 1837.

same year *Containing Hymns for the principal festivals of the Church of England; and for family and private use*. Venn's book was decidedly evangelical under its churchly frame work and its transparent expedient of "private" Hymns. He represented the famous "Chapham sect", the new missionary society and *The Christian Observer*; and his inexpensive little book introduced Hymns into many of the "country congregations" for whose use it was designed. In extending Hymn singing beyond the Evangelical pale, Woodd's book played a greater part.

But, in general, those concerned for the integrity of the Prayer Book system were not yet converted to the latter day Hymnody. They saw with dismay Hymn singing spreading from parish to parish, and new hymn books appearing on every side. Of these, during the first two decades of the XIXth century there were not less than fifty.⁷⁰ A number of them were designed for use in a single parish. Of those of more general type, the most important, not already mentioned, were: J. Fawcett's *A Collection of Psalms and Hymns from various Authors* (Carlisle, 1802; 4th ed., 1811); J. Kempthorne's *Select portions of Psalms and Hymns from various authors* (London, 1810); Thos. Cotterill's *A Selection of Psalms and Hymns for public and private use* (Newcastle, 1810; 8th ed., Sheffield, 1819); and G. T. Noel's *A Selection of Psalms and Hymns from the New Version of the Church of England and others* (London, c. 1811).⁷¹

⁷⁰ The fullest, though incomplete, list is in Julian's *Dictionary*, pp. 333, 334.

⁷¹ The hymn books of this period introduced a few new Hymn writers. To Kempthorne's book Joseph Dacre Carlyle contributed his Hymns including "Lord, when we bend before Thy throne". Cotterill wrote many for the various editions of his *Selection*, and they attained considerable use. To its 9th edition, John Cawood contributed, among others, "Hark! what mean those holy voices?" and "Almighty God, Thy word is cast". The most voluminous writer was William Hurn, who, while vicar of Debenham, published *Psalms and Hymns, the greater part original* (Ipswich, 1813), containing more than 250 of his own. Their number was greatly increased in his *Hymns and Spiritual Songs* (Woodbridge, 1824), after he had seceded from the church. During this

It seemed to the conservatives that a purely voluntary system of worship was intruding into, if not threatening to supplant, the Prayer Book system. "The importance which, in many places, attaches to the Hymn Book," said Bishop Marsh, "is equal, if not superior, to the importance ascribed to the Prayer Book."⁷² The objections urged against the Hymn Book were mainly two: It may tend to introduce false doctrines or to undermine Church doctrine in the minds of those using it; or it may (as in some instances already) offend against reverence in worship by the "flippancy and vulgarity" of its contents.

There were, doubtless, elements of disorder, and even of danger, in this unchecked zeal for hymnal making. But the opposition took deeper ground and aimed at the total suppression of Hymn singing itself as introduced and practised without even the shadow of authority. Woodd, in his preface, had cited the uniformity statute of Edward VI, authorizing the use of "any Psalm or Prayer taken out of the Bible at any due time", and Queen Elizabeth's Injunctions of 1559, permitting "an hymn or such-like song" "in the beginning or in the end of common prayer". He claimed also that the prose Hymns and *Veni Creator* in the Prayer Book involved an authorization of the singing of Hymns. Some of his successors endeavored to strengthen their cause by securing permission to dedicate their collections to some friendly prelate.⁷³

Some bishops, on the other hand, were so confident that nothing but the *Old* or *New Version* of the Psalms was authorized for use that they warmly protested against, or even period also Sir Robert Grant was publishing Hymns in *The Christian Observer* (1806-1815) and Reginald Heber printed his in the same periodical (1811-1816).

⁷² *A Charge delivered at the primary visitation of Herbert, Lord Bishop of Peterborough, in July 1820; with an Appendix, containing some remarks on the modern custom of singing in our churches unauthorized Psalms and Hymns.* London, 1820.

⁷³ The editors of *Psalms and Hymns, selected for the Churches of Buckden* (1815) dedicate it by permission to Bishop Tomline (of Lincoln); and in the 2nd ed. (1820) state it to be "sanctioned by the authority of that distinguished prelate".

prohibited, the employment of Hymns within their dioceses. We find Simeon in 1814 writing to an Evangelical friend to "put aside Hymns" rather than to continue his unseemly contest with his bishop.⁷⁴ The Bishop of Exeter is said to have prohibited the use of Ken's Morning and Evening Hymns within his diocese.⁷⁵

The opposition was brought to a head by the publication in 1819 of an eighth and enlarged edition of Thomas Cotterill's *A Selection of Psalms and Hymns for public and private use, adapted to the services of the Church of England*. Sheffield: printed for the Editor, by J. Montgomery at the Iris-office. 1819: and his attempt to enforce its use upon his congregation at St. Paul's, Sheffield. This caused much disturbance in the congregation, of which some outside opponents of Hymns took advantage; and suit was brought against Cotterill in the Consistory Court of the Archbishop of York. The Chancellor decided that Hymn singing was an irregularity without due authority, but he assumed that none could wish to attack a practice that had become so general and was so edifying. He refused costs and postponed sentence upon Cotterill for his irregularity, virtually reducing the issue before him to a question of the merits of Cotterill's book, which "certainly contained a great many excellent Psalms and Hymns to which there could be no reasonable objection".⁷⁶ He intimated that the interests of religion required a compromise of the suit, and offered the services of the Archbishop as mediator. In the end the compromise was effected. Cotterill's book was withdrawn, and a new one,⁷⁷ smaller and less markedly évangélical, was prepared under the eye of Archbishop Harcourt and at his expense, and the Sheffield church was supplied with a sufficiency of copies, each bear-

⁷⁴ *Memoirs*, ed. cited, p. 272.

⁷⁵ *The Christian Observer*, July 1822, p. 435, n.

⁷⁶ For the legal proceedings, see *An Inquiry into historical facts relative to parochial Psalmody* [by J. Gray], York, 1821, pp. 46 ff.

⁷⁷ *A Selection of Psalms and Hymns for public worship*, London, T. Cadell, 1820 (29th ed., 1840).

ing the inscription: "The gift of his Grace the Lord Archbishop of York".⁷⁸

These curious proceedings, from which no appeal was taken, did not change the irregular status of Hymnody, but they certainly discouraged further legal contests. In 1822 H. J. Todd, of the York diocese, published a pamphlet,⁷⁹ urging the sole authority of the old Psalmody; in 1820 the Bishop of Peterborough charged against the liberty exercised by parishes in introducing hymn books,⁸⁰ in which he was followed by the Bishop of Killaloe, Ireland, in 1821.⁸¹ But in general the ground was regarded as cleared of practical obstructions, and the making of new hymn books proceeded apace in the years following the York settlement.

In these books the influence of Cotterill's, in spite of its suppression, is very marked. Though somewhat on earlier lines, it was a fresh selection, at which the poet Montgomery assisted. And it had the distinction of introducing into church use some fifty of his Hymns, thus contributing to the permanent enrichment of Hymnody. In the interests, real or supposed, of the "good taste" at which Cotterill aimed, Montgomery also altered freely the texts of his predecessors. As Cotterill's *Selection* served as a source book for numerous succeeding compilers, it happened that these tinkered texts frequently remained the standard till very recent times, in some cases to the present day.

We may now regard Hymn singing in the Church of England as having passed the stage of intrusion and even of toleration, and to have reached that of substantial recognition. It had not superseded the singing of metrical Psalms but had reduced the Psalter to a selection of Psalms, with which Hymns were incorporated on equal footing. As to its prevalence we have the testimony of the editors of the Buckden *Selection*: "There are, perhaps, not many large

⁷⁸ *An Inquiry*, &c., pp. 74, 75.

⁷⁹ *Observations upon the metrical version of the Psalms*, London, F. C. & J. Rivington, 1822.

⁸⁰ See note no. 72.

⁸¹ Fully quoted in Todd, *op. cit.*, pp. 22 ff.

congregations in our national Church, where some Psalms, different from the old and new versions, and some Hymns, founded upon the history and doctrines of the Gospel, have not been admitted." More authoritative was the assumption of the Chancellor at York that no one having the interests of religion at heart would wish to disturb "the prevalent usage", "so edifying and acceptable to congregations".

This change had found its opportunity here, as elsewhere, in the decadence and indifference into which the old Psalmody had fallen. It had been brought about, first by the desire of musical improvement and for the recognition of church festivals and fasts, but mainly by the "enthusiasm" of the Evangelical Revival, and the persistence of the Evangelical Party within the Church.⁸² The practice of Hymn singing had passed beyond the limits of party, but had not as yet brought itself into close relation with the Prayer Book system. The supply of hymn books was copious, and their very diversity had already suggested the need (not yet filled) of a collection of Hymns compiled and issued under competent authority.⁸³ The Hymnody itself bore the marks (never yet obliterated) of its Evangelical origin in its general non-sectarian character, its dealings with individual experience, and its mingling together of the work of churchman and dissenter.

Philadelphia.

LOUIS F. BENSON.

⁸² The valuable introduction to *Hymns Ancient and Modern, Historical Edition*, 1909, appears to the present writer to ignore the main agency of the Evangelicals within the Church in introducing Hymnody, and to transfer it to the musical development of London Charities.

⁸³ See Todd, *op. cit.*, pp. 28, 29.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

An Introduction to Philosophy. By ORLIN OTTMAN FLETCHER, Professor of Philosophy in Furman University. New York: The Macmillan Company. 8vo; pp. xxii, 420. 1913.

It is often said that the present age is too practical to have any taste for metaphysical inquiry. Such, however, can hardly be the case in view of the number and the quality of the works on metaphysics and closely related subjects that are being published. Of this trend in modern thought a striking illustration is the fact that the Macmillan Company have issued very recently no fewer than five such volumes, *The World We Live In*, by George Stuart Fullerton, *A First Book in Metaphysics*, by Walter Marvin, *A Brief History of Modern Philosophy*, by Harold Höffding, *The New Realism*, by six prominent professors, and *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, by Mary Whiton Calkins, all of which, taken together, would seem to indicate that the age is becoming so truly practical as to appreciate the unique importance of the foundations of its intellectual life. And now a sixth, the book under review, is added to the above list.

Nor is it the least as well as the last of the works referred to. Like them, it is characterized by fullness of information, by definiteness of aim, and by clearness and felicity of style. In these respects, if not in all others, the new metaphysics marks a great advance on the old. Like Professor Marvin, Professor Fletcher has "a philosophical doctrine, and that doctrine determines the treatment given the questions and opinions which are considered". His "point of view is that of Objective Idealism". He holds that appearances are reality as we see it. He conceives of reality in its epistemological relation as "being with meaning"; in its ontological relation as "active being". In a word, he regards reality as "cognizable and immanently active". He also distinguishes between a "totality" and a "true whole". A totality, being an aggregation, lacks the oneness which is essential to a unitary whole. In dealing with the categories, he follows a "pedagogical order"; but he appreciates the reason which may be advanced in favor of presenting them in the logical order of their development. The reviewer finds himself in substantial agreement with Professor Fletcher. Indeed, the latter's "Objective Idealism" does not in the least suggest Schelling to him; but on the contrary, it does strongly remind him of what he learned from his old preceptor, Dr. McCosh, under the name of "Natural Realism". Not the least of the merits of Professor Fletcher's book is its outspoken theism. Its closing words are: "The acceptance of the reality of the one God, personal and supreme, a God with whom

man may have communion, is a demand of the religious consciousness. Hence, we retain as an article of philosophic faith, our belief that God, the Perfect Personality, the Absolute Individual, is, and is the ground of being and activity. 'In Him we live and move and have our being.'"

There are only two points at which the reviewer cares to raise a question:

1. Is Professor Fletcher correct in his understanding of the Absolute of Hegel? He denies that it is pure thought and would make it include willing and feeling. We are inclined to the belief, however, that Weber is right when he says that, "according to Hegel, the Absolute is idea, thought, reason, and *nothing but that*" (Hist. of Phil., p. 534).

2. While the ablest chapters in the book seem to us to be those on "Human Freedom," we can not agree with Professor Fletcher in what we take to be his doctrine of the self-determination of the will. We recognize in it a great improvement on the old doctrine of the indifference of the will, but we feel that it still falls short of the truth. The fact is that while the choices of the will confirm character, the character determines the will in the sense that it reveals itself in it. In a word, character and will, as also our author claims, must not be separated. The will is the expression of the character: the character is the soul of the will. The *person*, as consisting of character and will, determines himself. We do not form or "organize" our character out of the self: the will or self is the character expressing itself in choice. We are free because we are not determined from outside but are determined by ourselves.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Philosophy of the Future. By S. S. HEBBERD, Author of "Philosophy of History", "The Secret of Christianity", "The Science of Thought", etc. New York: Maspeth Publishing House, 77 Milton Street, Borough of Queens. 1911. Pp. 251.

Mr. Hebbard's volume is an antidote to Prof. K. Pearson's *Grammar of Science*, published simultaneously (Pt. I., 3rd ed.). *The Philosophy of the Future*, which has cost the author "more than half a century of toil", is a stout defense of the principle of Causation both against the philosophical scientists who, following Hume, would reduce cause to customary sequence among our sense-impressions, and against the subordination by many writers on logic of the notion of cause to that of reason or ground. To cancel causality is to efface all distinction between truth and falsehood. *Scientia est cognoscere causas*. "The sole essential function of all thinking is to discriminate between cause and effect." "There is no known form of thought which is not ultimately reducible into an assertion of cause and effect." From the vantage ground of this theorem, with its corollary that "a cause cannot be known except through its effects, or an effect apart from its cause", Mr. Hebbard trains his guns upon the systems of Hume, Kant, Hegel, Mill, and other logical writers. He reviews successively Space, Time, the Concept, Judgment, and finally In-

duction, defined as "the discovery of causal processes by means of physical and mental experiment"; in the attempt to show that all categories are but species and derivative forms under the supreme and all-embracing category of causality.

The logical discussion is followed by chapters on God, Freedom and the Soul, in which the metaphysical application of his principles is made. The causal concept is utilized to strengthen the ontological argument. "The conception of a sufficient cause, fully understood, is identical with the theistic conception of God." This conception of a sufficient cause involves unity, infinitude, freedom and love (if an infinite being acts at all, or causes any changes, it must be for the sake of others). The fact again that the causal nexus is "a reality imperceptible to the senses" discredits materialism and positivism, and is used in demonstration of the existence and immortality of the soul.

Mr. Hebbard attempts no exact definition of cause, but this, as he says in the appendix, is because he regards it as incapable of ordinary definition, "there being no wider genus under which it can be ranged as a species" (p. 214). He omits also any discussion of the origin of the causal concept. While frequently inveighing against innate ideas and Kantian apriorities, and rejecting impartially "the Scottish philosophy of 'common sense', with its short and easy method of 'intuitions', the French and English empiricism, the Teutonic illusionism" (p. 95), he yet declares: "Man does come into the world equipped, not with intuitions, but with the means of attaining to an assured knowledge of the world as the workmanship of an infinite and benevolent Being. For he comes endowed with the prerogative of thought; but to think is to affirm causality" (p. 157). What is this but intuitionism?

Mr. Hebbard's work, it will be seen, is a discussion at once ambitious and concise of the deepest problems of logic and metaphysics. His book, in our judgment, is well worth the attention of the philosophical reader, who cannot but enjoy its incisive style, its trenchant criticisms, its wide outlook upon philosophic thought, and its original insights into its problems.

Lincoln University, Pa.

WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

Comparative Religion. By F. B. JEVONS, Litt.D., Professor of Philosophy in the University of Durham. Cambridge: at the University Press. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1913. 12mo.; pp. vii, 154.

One of the *Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature*, this little book does not aim to be more than a primer of Comparative Religion; but, as might be supposed from the author's previous works in this general department, *An Introduction to the History of Religion*, most favorably reviewed in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, Vol. ix, No. 33, and *An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion*, as

favorably noticed in this Review, Vol. vii, No. 2, it is a most admirable primer. This little book is characterized by all the excellences which we remarked in the author's earlier and larger works—the same command of facts, the same fairness in interpreting them, the same skill in inductive reasoning, the same caution and reserve in the statement of conclusions; and yet, as we observed in our review of Dr. Jevon's second book, "we think that we detect, as would not be unlikely in this latest effort, an even firmer grasp of principles and an even more confident mastery of his position".

It is not a primer of comparative theology, like Dr. Kellogg's *Handbook of Comparative Religion*, that he has given us. He deals not only with the doctrinal resemblances and differences of the religions, but takes up such expressions of religion as Magic, Sacrifice, etc. While he does not, as Dr. Kellogg did, write as an ardent Christian missionary, his conclusions point toward the uniqueness and supernaturalness of the Christian religion. In a recent lecture by Louis Henry Jordan, B.D., on *Comparative Religion, Its Origin and Outlook*, he has been criticized for "busying himself with the problems of the anthropologist" and for "introducing a purely speculative element". We cannot concur in this criticism. To us he would seem to enter Anthropology only when its problems emerge in Comparative Religion; and his conclusions impress us, not as speculation, but as just and necessary inferences from facts.

Princeton

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Comparative Religion. Its Origin and Outlook. A Lecture by LOUIS HENRY JORDAN, B.D., Member of the Institut Ethnographique International, Paris, Author of 'Comparative Religion: Its Genesis and Growth', etc., etc. Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press: London, New York, Toronto, Melbourne and Bombay. 1913. Pamph., pp. 16. 1s. net.

This lecture has been called forth by the publication within the brief space of ten days in England of two books bearing "the simple title '*Comparative Religion*'". These books are *Comparative Religion* by Frank B. Jevons (*The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature*) Cambridge, 1913, and *Comparative Religion* by J. Estlin Carpenter (*The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge*). London, 1913. These "primers", for such they aim to be and are, Mr. Jordan criticizes on the ground that "they are found continually busying themselves with the problems of the anthropologist; nor are they blameless of the charge that they sometimes indulge a fondness for sudden excursions into the realm of purely conjectural criticism". At the same time Mr. Jordan holds that "both of these 'primers' are noteworthy in an eminent degree, and are really far more important than either their size or price serves to indicate". He thinks that they are doomed to be superseded; but he believes that it is not too much to say that "the results they are destined to effect will give them a permanent place in the early literature of the subject."

This lecture is characterized by Mr. Jordan's well known knowledge of the literature of Comparative Religion, his zeal to define its boundaries more exactly and sharply than seems to us always possible, and his tendency to deny, as we maintain unwarrantably, the exclusiveness of Christianity.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Mysticism. A Study in the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness. By EVELYN UNDERHILL, Author of "The Grey World", "The Column of Dust", etc. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd. [1911.] 8vo; pp. xv, 600. Bibliography: Index.

The Mystic Way. A Psychological Study of Christian Origins. By EVELYN UNDERHILL, Author of "Mysticism", etc. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. 1913. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Crown 8vo; pp. xiv, 395. Bibliography: Index.

Immanence. A Book of Verses. By EVELYN UNDERHILL. London: J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. [1912.] 12mo; pp. x, 83.

The Miracles of Our Lady Saint Mary, brought out of divers tongues and newly set forth in English. By EVELYN UNDERHILL. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1906. 12mo; xxviii, 308. Short Bibliography. Plate.

The primary object of this notice is to give some account of Miss Underhill's *Mystic Way*, in which she formally presents her views of the origin and nature of Christianity. We have associated with this book in the heading, however, the titles of such others of Miss Underhill's publications that have come into our hands as are serious in form, in order that *The Mystic Way* may be seen in its setting. We should not like to suggest that Miss Underhill's novels by which she has been previously known—*The Grey World*, 1904, *The Lost Word*, 1907, *The Column of Dust*, 1909—were written without serious purpose or are without significance as disclosures of her mind and of the direction of her studies. On the contrary they already reveal to us the intensity of her engagement with what is loosely called the mystical aspects of life, and no doubt embody, in an imaginative form, much of what she would consider symbolically at least wholesome instruction for our sense-preoccupied world. In *The Grey World* we are told how the neurotic son of a London tailor, dying in a hospital, catches a glimpse, as he passes through it to his next incarnation, of that "grey world" which lies behind this, and lived in consequence throughout his next earthly life with the curtain which hides that world from our view worn rather thin. It is a Dean's son, who is the hero of *The Lost Word*; and we are shown in it how, brought into intimate contact from his earliest years with the symbolism and mysterious romance of a great cathedral, he found his way, despite the insistent pull of earthly passion, into dimly apprehended relations with an unseen permanent existence where he held communion with the great artistic spirits of the past. In *The Column of Dust* we learn how a bookseller's clerk in London summons a spirit, who,

however, refusing to be used by her, uses her rather, and how out of it all sacrificial love comes to its rights. In all three alike Miss Underhill seeks her inspiration in praeter-natural themes, and manifests a profound preoccupation with the supernatural, not to say the morbid, phases of life. From these novels alone we might assure ourselves that here is a writer who is ready to insist seriously that there are more things, not in heaven merely but here on earth, than are dreamed of in our starveling five-senses philosophy: and indeed that the most real things which surround us are not those which we touch with our clumsy fingers and gaze at with our dull eyes and taste with our gross tongues. It is not a matter of surprise that such a writer should come forward at length as a serious eulogist of mysticism.

Among Miss Underhill's serious writings we need not delay long over her little volume of verses. In the greater number of the pieces included in it an attempt is made to give expression to mystical moods. These do not seem to us the most successful. Strange to say Miss Underhill's muse does not appear to move easily in such moods. We quickly gain the impression also that verse is not her most happy medium of expression. There are some lofty conceptions; there is much fine language; here and there a well-turned phrase meets us; we can smile at a conceit like that embodied in "The Idol"; we can respond to the stirring counsel of "Memento, Homo"; we can thrill with the grim lesson of "The Backward Glance". But the volume leaves us cold—and uninstructed. Little more need be said of the collection of *The Miracles of Our Lady Saint Mary*. For all that appears on the surface, a purely literary motive might have presided over its production. Here is a by-way of mediaeval literature but little trodden by recent feet. Not merely students but amateurs "of mediaeval manners and Christian mythology" may find interest in exploring it. Certainly Miss Underhill has done her work well and made this sufficiently dreary series of folk-stories and hagiographs as attractive as possible. There is a sentence near the close of the brief but competent Introduction, however, which may suggest that she may have had a deeper than a merely literary purpose in seeking to give new life to the Mary-legends. Speaking of the mediaeval attitude towards the Virgin she remarks upon "the simple and familiar friendship, mystical adoration, and unfailing trust" which were given to "Goddess Mother and ours" by those who, as she phrases it, "were in every sense her children". And then she adds that it is "the aim of this book", "to drag back", not only the "literary expression" of this sentiment "from the shadowland to which it has retreated", but the "sentiment" itself. May we infer that Miss Underhill has had, then, a directly religious motive in seeking to revive the knowledge of the Mary-legends?

It is not altogether easy to make quite sure of Miss Underhill's precise religious standpoint. On the basis of her two solid works on Mysticism alone—which embrace her professed contribution to religious discussion—we might readily think of her as a Modernist

Romanist. We do not suppose we do her injustice at any rate in imagining her in congenial society when in the company of, say, Friedrich von Hügel or George Tyrrell. Many of their points of view she certainly holds in common with them; some of their suggestions she works out in detail; and, if we mistake not, the ultimate issue of her religious thought is very much theirs—perhaps, we may add, in somewhat extreme expression. The whole argument of the work which is more especially in our mind as we write—*The Mystic Way*—might be represented as the detailed explication of a tendency apparent in von Hügel (it is no doubt present in more or less strength in all Mystical writers) to which Söderblom calls sharp attention—the tendency, we mean, to think of Jesus as only a high-point in the religious development of humanity, which attracts the eye of men and to which we must also aspire, while there is withheld from Him all truly creative effects on the religious life of the world. Perhaps it is not right to hold George Tyrrell too closely to everything he wrote in even the last years of his singularly ununified career. But he seems to have seriously meant it when in the early days of the last year of his life he declared: "Houtin and Loisy are right, the Christianity of the future will consist of mysticism and charity, and possibly the Eucharist in its primitive form as the outward bond: I desire no better". Perhaps even Mysticism no doubt seemed to him something less than solid ground: "Mystics think they touch the divine," he explains in one of his moods of scepticism, "when they have only blurred the human form with a cloud of words." The precise effect of Miss Underhill's discussion of *The Mystic Way*, in any event, is to place her in the same category with Houtin and Loisy and Tyrrell as here expounded. She reduces Christianity to simple Mysticism.

The background of the volume called *The Mystic Way* is provided by Miss Underhill's *magnum opus*, the elaborate volume on *Mysticism*. This volume is brilliantly written. All the resources of a trained literary art are expended upon it, and its pages are not only illuminated with numerous well-chosen extracts from the Mystical writers who are thus permitted to tell in their own quaint and often singularly impressive language exactly what they are, but are also gemmed with vivid phrases caught from the Mystics and used by Miss Underhill in her own composition with exquisite skill. Above all it is written with a verve and enthusiasm which impart to it an *élan* (as Miss Underhill would call it, in deference to Bergson) that sweeps the reader well-nigh off his feet. It is divided into two parts, called respectively "The Mystic Fact" and "The Mystic Way", in the former of which an attempt is made to tell what Mysticism is in contrast with other tendencies, while in the latter the several steps and stages of the Mystical process are described in detail. The effect is that we have what Mysticism is elaborately explained to us twice over, and one would think it must be the reader's own fault if he rises from the book without a clear conception of exactly what it is that Miss Underhill at least would have him think Mysticism to be. It is an indication of the fluidity of the notion—perhaps also of the almost incurable ambiguities

of the current usages of the term—that one requires, even so, to pause and consider before he is quite sure of the precise limits of the sense in which Miss Underhill employs it.

Formal definition of the term begins for us already in the Preface. "Broadly speaking," we read there (p. x), "I understand it to be the expression of the innate tendency of the human spirit towards complete harmony with the transcendental order; whatever be the theological formula under which that order is understood." This is "broadly speaking" indeed. By the final clause, Mysticism is at once separated from all "positive religions" whatever; and (as we are immediately told) it is made matter of indifference to the experience of "mystic union" in which it "attains its end", whether that union is conceived to be with "the God of Christianity, the World-Soul of Pantheism, the Absolute of Philosophy" (p. x). "Attempts to limit mystical truth—the direct apprehension of the Divine Substance—to the formulae of any one religion," we are accordingly told later (p. 115), "are as futile as attempts to identify a precious metal with the die which converts it into current coin." It is upon the little word "innate", however, that the hinge of the definition turns. Mysticism is "the expression of the *innate* tendency of the human spirit towards complete harmony with the transcendental order". In other words it is "natural" religion; and it is therefore that it is quite independent of all possible conceptions of that "only Reality", which is here called "the transcendental order". Let philosophers call it "the Absolute"; let theologians call it "God"; think of it as Personal Spirit, think of it as the impersonal ground of Being, think of it how you choose: the human spirit moves by its own intrinsic gravitation towards it, and this gravitation towards it is Mysticism. Obviously "Mysticism" is used here as but a name for the inherent native religiosity of the human spirit.

Subsequent formal definitions advance us but little beyond this. Thus, for example, when at a later point Miss Underhill is again (as in the Preface) animadverting upon the loosenesses of the current usages of the term, she emerges with this crisp assertion (p. 86): "Mysticism, in its pure form, is the science of ultimates, the science of union with the Absolute, and nothing else." She does indeed go on to declare that "the mystic is the person who attains to that union, not the person who talks about it"; that it is not a matter of "knowing about" but "Being" (she spells it with a big B); but she seems already to have closed that question by defining it as "science"—for "science" is "knowing about" *ex vi verbi*. When, among sciences, she declares Mysticism to be this particular science, namely, "the science of ultimates", she seems to identify it with what we are accustomed to call Metaphysics; but that she can scarcely mean this is manifest from the parallel phrase which she immediately adjoins: "the science of union with the Absolute"—for certainly Metaphysics is not that. What is apparently meant to be asserted is that Mysticism is the systematized knowledge of "union with the Absolute"; or, since the emphasis is thrown on the practical side, perhaps we may say (as we speak of

"pugilistic science") that Mysticism is expertness, acquired skill in attaining "union with the Absolute".

Accordingly as this discussion approaches its end Miss Underhill reformulates her definitions thus (p. 97): "Mysticism, then, is not an opinion; it is not a philosophy. It has nothing in common with the pursuit of occult knowledge. It is not merely the power of contemplating Eternity. It is the name of that organic process which involves the perfect consummation of the Love of God: the achievement here and now of the immortal heritage of man. Or, if you like it better—for this means exactly the same thing—it is the art of establishing his conscious relation with the Absolute." What was formerly declared to be a "science" has now become explicitly an "art": but in varying the term we do not escape from the thing—behind the "art" the "science" necessarily lies. Miss Underhill says the Mystic is the man who has attained to union with the Absolute. Let us be more modest and say that the Mystic is the man who professes, or supposes himself, to have attained to union with the Absolute. Then Mysticism surely may be fairly described as that congeries of notions which are presupposed or implicated in this profession; or, if we choose, in the practice of the art by which this end is supposed to be attained. It would seem, therefore, that it must inevitably embrace a doctrine of the Absolute; a doctrine of the relation of the human spirit to this Absolute; a doctrine of the possibility of the human spirit attaining "union with the Absolute"; a doctrine of the nature of this "union with the Absolute" which the human spirit may attain. Here certainly there is "an opinion", or rather a body of opinions; and certainly there is here "a philosophy", and, we are afraid we shall have to add, what, despite the vagueness which may be allowed to cling to the several notions involved, looks very much like that specific philosophy which we know as Pantheism. It is notorious that in the history of religious thought the types which it has been commonly agreed to speak of as Mystical have ordinarily been associated with Pantheistic or at least Pantheising conceptions: the very language of Mysticism has been dictated to it by Pantheism, and it is therefore in any event difficult for the Mystic to express himself without at least seeming to declare himself a Pantheist. Miss Underhill has reduced this Pantheising implication to a minimum in her formal definitions. Therefore in the one now before us she avoids even declaring that Mysticism is the "science of union with the Absolute". Instead, she says that it is the process by which man enters into the conscious enjoyment of the love of God—by which, she truly says, he "achieves" "his immortal heritage": and in the alternative clause she explains that what Mysticism seeks is the establishment of "conscious relation with the Absolute". Obviously these are carefully chosen phrases. If we were to abide by the breadth of their suggestion Mysticism would be what indeed Miss Underhill calls it (p. x), just "the science or art of the Spiritual life". Every "other-worldly-minded" man would be a Mystic.

Clearly Mysticism however is not defined by merely declaring that it is the "art of establishing conscious relation with the Absolute".

Its peculiarity resides rather in the nature of the process by which it seeks this end and the nature of the condition in which, when it is achieved, it finds this end accomplished. There are other views proposed to us of what "the immortal heritage of man" consists in, and of how it may be achieved. There is, to go no further, Christianity, which thinks that it can point the way to the enjoyment of "the perfect consummation of the Love of God", and finds the Way in Christ. Mysticism is not sufficiently defined by simply declaring that it differs from all these by—"doing the trick". Many have essayed to penetrate to "the Reality behind the veil", says Miss Underhill (p. 4): "but if we may trust the report of the mystics—and their reports are given with a strange accent of certainty and good faith—they have succeeded where all these others have failed, in establishing immediate communication between the spirit of man, entangled as they declare among material things, and that 'only Reality', that immaterial and final Being, which some philosophers call the Absolute, and most theologians call God." It is a great claim—if only it can be substantiated. Its substantiation is, however, the last thing the Mystic seems to think of. "We have seen," writes Wilhelm Fresenius (*Mystik und Geschichte*, 1912, p. 82) "how the Mystic has never posited the question of the substantiation of religion, has never made inquiry into its moral right, into its truth, but his soul has been filled with the search after the experience of the Eternal. And when he has found this Eternal, when he has felt this Imperishable, then he is content, the fact of this feeling establishes for him its right. Why does the question not now spring forth of the 'How' of this feeling, the investigation into whether this feeling may not rest on illusion,—that is, in the forum of the moral judgment?" So soon, however, as the substantiation of its great claims is seriously attempted Mysticism, it is evident, must emerge from vague phrases and define itself sharply in its method and aim. It is unfortunate, then, that in her definitions Miss Underhill falls into the very common habit of using to describe it terms so wide that they provide no differentiation at all. How persistently this bad method is followed by writers on the subject may be illustrated by the definition given by O. C. Quick in two recent articles in the *Journal for Theological Studies*. "Mysticism," he says, "is the claim made by the soul to the apprehension of a wider reality in no sense mediated by the data of sense-perception" (vol. xiv, p. 2; cf. xiii, p. 164). If that were an adequate definition, Mysticism would be merely spiritual apprehension: and all who believe in the accessibility of spirit to spirit would be Mystics. Even William James' well known definition (*Varieties*, p. 508) is better—for at least it is discriminating. He finds the "nucleus of agreement" among all Mystics in the feeling of the subject that his higher self is "conterminous and continuous with a More of the same quality which is operative in the universe outside of him and which he can keep in working touch with and in a fashion get on board of and save himself when all his lower being has gone to pieces in the wreck". Clearly on this conception, Mysticism is fundamentally Pantheistic and therefore Quick

criticises it. It is not inclusive, he says, of Christian Mysticism through which there runs a profound feeling of "infinite otherness" from God; and he goes on to insist that Mysticism embraces every and "any direct consciousness of God's presence and nature" (*JthS.* xiii, 192 p. 172). By thus broadening the skirts of Mysticism to enclose all "sense" of God, we may of course rid it of its Pantheistic stamp; but the question is whether we are not merely merging it thus into a wider category. What it concerns us to take note of here, however, is merely that this is Miss Underhill's method. To her the typical form of Mysticism is Christian Mysticism, as manifested especially in the great Mediaeval Saints. She is therefore careful to define it so as to make it include them; and she then proceeds to expound it from them as its purest examples.* This seems to stand the whole matter upon its head. It is not in virtue of their Christianity that the Christian Mystics are Mystics: Miss Underhill, as we have seen, herself allows that their Mysticism is quite independent of their Christianity. We might better say that it is in despite of their Christianity; and that therefore Mysticism in them is modified by their Christianity just so far as their thought and practice is determined by their Christianity. They are Mystics not by virtue of what they have in common with other Christians, but by virtue with what they have in common with other Mystics,—with Al Ghazzali, say, for instance, or with 'Attar and Sadi and Jelalu'd Din, or to sum it all up in one word, say, with Plotinus. And what they have in common with these other Mystics is precisely Pantheising tendencies of thought. Miss Underhill would have us believe that Mysticism appears always in the train of great periods of abounding culture; it is the consummate flower of human culture (p. 541). We think it truer to say that it appears always in the train of periods of the dominance of a Pantheising philosophy: it is the effect in the religious mind of prevalent Pantheising thought.

Miss Underhill allows (though this is far from all that she allows) that the Mystics at least speak the language of Plotinus (p. 544). So true is this, that even she, though set upon cleansing the idea of Mysticism from the smudge of Pantheism (e.g., pp. 38, 119), yet herself speaks the language of Plotinus, if indeed she stops with that. Though she may on occasion therefor insist that in his achieved "union with the Absolute", the Mystic does not lose his identity in

* Perhaps G. Siedel, *Die Mystik Taulers nebst eine Erörterung über der Begriff der Mystik*, 1911, has fallen into the same trap. "Tauler's Mysticism," he tells us, "is the assurance, obtained through a particular discipline, that the Divine Subject has entered into the human subject, expressed philosophically by means of the Thomist-scholastic doctrine of the vision of the essence of God, experienced in a Christian way as the assumption of man into the intertrinitarian life of God." Assuming Tauler to be the purest example of a Mystic he then asserts that the universal "formula of the only right and possible idea of Mysticism" is "the revival (*Aufleben*) of another subject in man."

God, but "in the Mystic this union is conscious, personal thought"; and even indeed that what the Mystic "calls 'Union with God' is only his utter identification with the interests of the spiritual life"—she naturally cannot maintain this point of view, and everywhere lapses into language with quite other implications. For, as Fresenius (*op. cit.* pp. 50-1) reminds us, it is of the very essence of Mysticism to maintain the immediate presence of the divine in man, needing only to be recognized and felt; and it is therefore that it is by the way of "Contemplation" that the Mystic bids us seek and find God. Miss Underhill herself tells us that "the whole claim of the Mystics ultimately depends on man's possession of pure being in 'the spark of the soul'" (p. 119 note)—"pure being" being but a synonym for the Absolute. Accordingly she tells us that there is a point "where Subject and Object, desirous and desired, are *one*" (p. 86). Or more elaborately: "That there is an extreme point at which man's nature touches the Absolute: that his ground or substance, his true being, is conterminous with the Divine Life which constitutes the underlying reality of things; this is the basis on which the whole Mystic claim of possible union with God must rest" (p. 66). And again: "The Mystics find the basis of their method not in logic but in life: in the existence of a discoverable 'real', a spark of true being, within the seeking subject which can, in that ineffable experience which they call the 'act of union', fuse itself with and thus apprehend the reality of the sought Object. In theological language, their theory of knowledge is that the spirit of man, itself essentially divine, is capable of immediate communion with God, the One Reality" (p. 28).

That in this "ineffable experience" called "the act of union", something more is achieved than merely the identification of ourselves "with the interests of the spiritual life"—something very much like the identification of ourselves with God—emerges from such statements as the following. "All pleasurable and exalted states of Mystic consciousness in which the sense of I-hood persists, in which there is a loving and joyous relation between the Absolute as object and the self as subject, fall under the head of Illumination"—(p. 282). "The real distinction between the Illuminative and the Unitive life is that in Illumination the individuality of the subject,—however profound his spiritual consciousness, however close his communion with the Infinite—remains separate and intact" (p. 295). "No doubt there were hours in which St. Catherine's experience, as it were, ran ahead; and she felt herself not merely lit up by the Indwelling Light, but temporally [temporarily?] merged in it. . . . Her normal condition of consciousness, however, was clearly not yet that which Julian of Norwich calls being 'oned with bliss'; but rather an intense and continuous communion with an objective Reality which she still felt to be distinct from herself. . . . Catherine, then, is still a spectator of the Absolute, does not feel herself to be *one* with it" (p. 297). Clearly, then, when the "Unitive Life" itself is attained it is no longer a mere "communion" with the Absolute, but in some more intimate sense a

"union" with it, by virtue of which the "oneness" of the two is experienced as a fact.

That the achievement of this union with the Absolute should be represented by some Mystics at least (p. 496) as "deification" can occasion no surprise. These Mystics certainly do not bate their breath when they speak of it: Miss Underhill herself calls their language with respect to it "blunt and positive" (p. 501). "If we are to allow," she writes, however, "that the Mystics have ever attained the object of their quest, I think we must allow that such attainment involves the transmutation of the self to that state which they call, for want of exact language, 'deified'. The necessity of such transmutation is an implicit of their first position; the law that 'we behold that which we are, and are that which we behold'. Eckhart, in whom the language of deification assumes its most extreme form, justifies it upon this necessity: 'If, he says, 'I am to know God directly, I must become completely He and He I; so that this He and this I become and are one I'." (p. 502). It is easy to point out that these same Mystics nevertheless protest that by this transmutation the creature does not really become God; and that others prefer the figure of marriage with God to that of deification to express the "mystic union" which they seek in common. But this is only to say that they are Christians as well as Mystics, and that their Christianity modifies their Mysticism: it does not throw doubt upon but rather establishes the fact that the truly—unmodified—Mystical doctrine involves the identification of the creature with the deity. And that for a much deeper reason than the merely epistemological one pointed out by Miss Underhill in the passage just quoted from her (p. 502), or even then that general one adduced by E. Lehmann in the following instructive passage (*Mystik im Heidentum und Christentum*, in *Aus Natur und Geschichte*, No. 217, pp. 4 ff; E.T. p. 7): "What constitutes the main distinction between mysticism and other piety is that the ordinary pious man has above everything an eye for that which distinguishes him from God: for his insignificance in contrast with God's greatness, for his finiteness in contrast with God's infinity and eternity, for his sinfulness in contrast with God's holiness. In their feeling of this distinction men remain clearly conscious of their humanity and look upon their God as something peculiar, different from themselves. Of this distinguishableness of God, however, the Mystic will know nothing. God is to him indistinguishable as He is incomprehensible, invisible and infinite and therefore all-embracing. No one is in a position to draw a sharp line between humanity and deity; and therefore this line is capable of being crossed and man accordingly can attain this union." Behind this somewhat negative attitude there lies the positive conviction of the Mystic that there exists in himself a native spark of "pure Being" which is in and of itself divine, and that it is his part to blow this spark into a flame that he may become truly himself in the consciousness that he is really God. "The achievement of reality, and deification," says Miss Underhill (p. 503) "are then one and the same thing; necessarily so, since we know that only the divine

is the real." Accordingly "the Mystic Way" begins "by the awakening within the self of a new and embryonic consciousness; a consciousness of divine reality, as opposed to the illusory sense-world in which she was immersed" (p. 536). There is nothing more fundamental to the whole Mystical consciousness than the conviction that what we shall see when we retreat into the "cell of self-knowledge" is just that Reality which stands to it for God.

One of the natural results of thus conceiving oneself is inevitably a certain intellectual and spiritual pride. The Mystic has a hearty contempt for his fellowmen, who are still shut in by "the hard crust of surface-consciousness", and who know only "the machine-made universe presented by the cinematograph of sense", from which he has escaped (pp. 536-7). For himself—he has been made aware of Reality and has come from out of the cave of illusion, to live hereafter on the supersensual plane (p. 147). According to Miss Underhill the whole external world in which we live is not only of our own creation but is miscreated by us—being but the product of our deceiving senses: nay, each man creates an exclusive world for himself, since the senses of no two men act precisely alike; or rather, each man creates successively a series of exclusive worlds of his own, since his senses never function twice precisely alike; and we have only to imagine what would happen if our senses "were arranged on a different plan" (p. 7)—if for example, as William James suggests, we heard colors and saw sounds—or if "human consciousness changed or transcended its rhythm" (p. 37), to understand in how illusory a world it is that the ordinary man lives. Quite so: if our senses were radically different and "the rhythm of our human consciousness" were radically changed, we should undoubtedly be in a different world—for our senses could not be different nor could the "rhythm of our consciousness" be changed unless we were in a different world. We may find it a pleasant exercise to speculate on what kind of a world would be involved if we had radically different senses or the world-movement proceeded in a radically different rhythm: as we may work out, for example, the nature of a world in which two and two would make five and in which space would have only two or as many as four dimensions. So, holding a key in our hands, we may find a diversion in mentally picturing the changes that would be involved in the wards of the lock by radical differences in the notches on the bit of the key. Meanwhile our senses, the stream of our consciousness, are thus and not otherwise; and that means that the world of which we are a part, and correlated to which we are by means of our senses, and of the movement of which we are aware in the "rhythm of our consciousness", is thus and not otherwise. We may as well "accept the universe": for it is this universe that is; and to be out of harmony with it is only to be intellectually morally, and spiritually mad. It is the condemnation of Mysticism that it must begin by declaring that the world of appearance is illusion and that the rhythm of normal consciousness is a mere jangling, out of tune with reality.

But the Mystic has no more contempt for the man in the street

who persists in accepting the world for what he knows it to be, than for what he calls "popular Christianity", as a religion fit only for the man who "lives in the world of sense". For himself he lays claim to a higher plane of religious functioning. "Thus," we read, "in spite of persistent efforts to the contrary, there will always be an inner and an outer Church: the inner Church of the Mystics who *know*, the outer Church which, operating beneficially it is true, but—roughly speaking—upon the magical plane, only *knows about*" (p. 199). The Mystic has got beyond "prayer" for instance, "as understood by the multitude, with all its implications of conventional piety, formality, detailed petition—a definite something asked for, and a definite duty done, by means of extemporary or traditional allocutions addressed to the anthropomorphic Deity of popular religion" (p. 366). He has also got beyond the great redemptive acts of God by which God has intervened in the world to lay an objective basis for the salvation of sinners: each and every one of these—the Incarnation, the Atonement and the rest—is seen by him to be a symbol of a subjective experience which takes place in his own soul. "The one secret, the greatest of all" Coventry Patmore is quoted as saying (p. 141) "is the doctrine of the Incarnation, regarded not as an historical event which occurred two thousand years ago, but as an event which is renewed in the body of every one who is in the way to the fulfilment of his original destiny." The Mystic, Miss Underhill explains, does not so much deny that the Incarnation is an historical event, as merely looks by preference upon it as a symbol of inward experience. And "thus", she adds (p. 142), "the Catholic priest in the Christmas Mass gives thanks, not for the setting in hand of any commercial process of redemption, but for a revelation of reality"—citing in support a passage from the Roman Missal which certainly only in isolation can be pressed into her meaning. Similarly, we read in a little Mystical manual which has come into our hands written quite in Miss Underhill's spirit (*The Path of Eternal Wisdom: A Mystical Commentary on the Way of the Cross*, by John Cordelier (manifestly a pseudonym). London, John M. Watkins, 1911.): "The Cross-bearer of the Universe as He passes in our midst does not act *for* us but *in* us: by an enhancement of our energies, a call to us to use our vitality in greater or less self-regarding efforts" (p. 63).

There is probably nothing in the treatment of Christianity by the Mystical writers which is more offensive than this sublimation of the great constitutive facts—in which the very heart of Christianity is to be found—into symbols of subjective transactions. An unusually inoffensive statement of what is attempted is given in the following explanation by a recent writer (H. Erskine Hill, *The Expositor*. August 1913, p. 192):—"To most men the transitory is the real world, and hence its events and facts assume an absolutely exaggerated importance. To the mystic, on the other hand, the real world is the spiritual, and nothing that happens under conditions of time and space can be anything but reflections. For example, he would not say that the salvation of the world depended on what happened on

Calvary, but that what happened on Calvary made manifest once for all the Eternal Sacrifice on which the salvation of the world depends. He does not think of the Virgin Birth at Bethlehem as the coming of the eternal Christ into the world, but as the manifestation to the world that He is there all the time." It may be, as we are told, that this is "the lifting up of the Son of Man 'out of the earth' which will draw all men unto Him". It is abolishing the scandal of the Cross and removing the offense of the Incarnation by the simple expedient of pushing them both out of sight. He who thinks that the importance of the Incarnation and the Atoning Sacrifice as transactions in time and space is capable of "absurd exaggeration", or doubts that the Eternal Christ came into the world through the Virgin's womb, thus assuming flesh for our redemption, or that the salvation of the world depends absolutely on what happened at Calvary, has assuredly lost all sense of Christian values. He may remain a Mystic, but he has ceased to be in any intelligible sense a Christian.

We have no intention of following Miss Underhill further into the intricacies of her rich and closely packed discussion. We have thought it worth while, at the cost of whatever space it might require, to attempt to get a somewhat clear conception of precisely what she represents Mysticism to be, because thus the significance of her volume entitled *The Mystic Way*, with which we are now more immediately concerned, may be most easily and clearly displayed. For, having thus expounded Mysticism in its nature in the one book she simply turns in the other and says, It is just this Mysticism which what we know as Christianity really is. *The Mystic Way* is, in other words, nothing but an elaborate attempt to explain Christianity as natural religion; and as that particular variety of natural religion which is known as Mysticism, the nature of which Miss Underhill has even more elaborately expounded in her work called *Mysticism*. *The Mystic Way* is indefinitely the thinner work of the two. It gives no such impression as *Mysticism* does of being the fruit of long and loving absorption in its subject. It seems rather to be the product of an impulse; to have been somewhat hastily composed; and to resemble a lawyer's brief got up for an occasion and betraying no very large-minded survey or deep consideration of its subject. There is a certain extremity in its contentions, a certain pressure put on the facts which are adduced, a certain over-anxiety to make out a case, a certain—to speak frankly,—appearance of special pleading combined with insufficient familiarity with the subject-matter, which are at least not so apparent in the other volume. We cannot quite say the volume reads like an afterthought, for all that is said here lies implicitly in the earlier volume and there are not lacking hints in it of what was to come; but the explication of the implications as to Christianity of the earlier volume in the later one has proved a task for which Miss Underhill was not quite prepared and indeed has brought her sharply up against a barrier which is to be removed only by an act of supreme violence. To this extent the second volume, while intended as a corollary to the first, is in actual fact a refutation of it.

The thesis sustained in *The Mystic Way* is, as we have just said, that what we know as Christianity is simply a great irruption of Mysticism. What it sets out to prove is accordingly that Jesus was only a Mystic of exceptional purity and energy; that Paul, John, all the great leaders of early Christianity were just so many outstanding Mystics; and that all the phenomena which accompanied the origin of Christianity and have been thought to be supernatural in character, are just Mystical phenomena, and may be paralleled in the experiences of other Mystics and thus shown to be natural,—natural, that is, to Mystics. In the elaboration of this proof the Synoptical record of the life and teaching of Jesus is subjected to a detailed examination with a view to the explanation of all the phenomena as Mystical; and then the teaching of Paul and of "the Fourth Evangelist" is poured into the same molds. This is followed by some account of "three of the special forms taken by the Mystical impulse in the early Church", with an appendix on "St. Macarius the Great of Egypt". And finally, an attempt is made to show that the whole underlying spirit of the liturgy of the Mass is Mysticism. The point of view and method of the discussion are given expression in the Preface in the following words: "The examination of Christian origins from the psychological point of view suggests that Christianity began as a mystical movement of the purest kind; that its Founder and those who succeeded Him possessed the characteristically Mystical consciousness, and passed through the normal stages of Mystical growth. Hence its nature is best understood by comparison with those lesser Mystical movements in which life has again and again asserted her unconquerable instinct for transcendence; and the heroic personalities through whom the Christian vision of reality was first expressed, are most likely to yield up the secret of their 'more abundant life' when studied by the help of those psychological principles which have been deduced from the general investigation of the Mystical type" (p. viii). It is important to observe that what is proposed here is an essay in comparative religion; that Christianity is defined as just a mystical movement; and that it is placed in its proper position among mystical movements as only one of the class, so that its explanation may properly be sought from the general characteristics of its class.

We say it is important to observe this. For there is an odd suggestion made here and there, that Christian Mysticism may be set off in a class by itself, and separated by a great gulf from other Mysticism—a gulf so wide that one might think that there could be no bridge of inferences cast over it from one to the other. "We are still too often told", we read on the page immediately preceding that from which we have just quoted, "that Christian Mysticism is no integral part of Christianity; sometimes, even, that it represents an opposition to the primitive Christian ideal. Sometimes we are asked to believe that it originated from Neoplatonic influence; that Pagan blood runs in its veins, and that its genealogy goes back to Plotinus. Far from this being the case, all the doctrines and all the experiences character-

istic of genuine Christian mysticism can be found in the New Testament; and I believe that its emergence as a definite type of spiritual life coincides with the emergence of Christianity itself, in the person of its Founder" (p. vii). Accordingly, exaggerating beyond all recognition the very natural differentiation of Christian Mysticism from other types of Mysticism made by James Leuba and Henri Delacroix, as they confine their study for the moment to this particular class of Mystics, Miss Underhill is ready to proclaim that "the Christian Mystic" "represents, so far as the psychical nature of man is concerned, a genuine species apart" (p. vii), "constitutes a true variation of the human species" (p. xi). This is not figurative language. Miss Underhill really wishes us to greet in the Christian Mystic the actual super-man. As in the age-long process of evolution the emergence of intelligence introduced a new kind of being and set the factors of evolution on a new plane, she explains, so the emergence of the Christian Mystic has again introduced in evolving humanity a new kind of being and raised humanity to yet a new plane. Miss Underhill is never tired of telling us therefore that the Christian Mystic is not merely morally or religiously different from other men, but is in the strictest sense a new "biological species". "Here we see, in fact," she asserts (p. 11) "creative evolution at work; engaged in the production of species as sharply marked off from normal humanity as 'normal' humanity supposes itself to be marked off from the higher apes. The *élan vital* here takes a new direction, producing profound modifications which, though they are for the most part psychical rather than physical, yet also entail a turning of the physical machinery of thought and perception to fresh uses—a cutting of fresh paths of discharge, a modification of the normal human balance of intuition and intelligence" (p. 11). "If this be so", she remarks again (p. 6), "the spiritual evolution of humanity, the unfolding of its tendency towards the Transcendental Order, becomes as much a part of biology as the evolution of its stomach or its sense".

This "fortunate variation" which has befallen humanity as the ultimate (so far) outcome of a process which has been "continuous from the first travail of creation even until now", it must be carefully observed, has come to it only at the advent of Jesus Christ. "And I believe," we read, "that its occurrence as a definite type of spiritual life coincides with the emergence of Christianity itself, in the person of its Founder" (p. vii). Again: "The first full and perfect manifestation of *this* life, this peculiar psychological growth, in which human personality in its wholeness moves to new levels and lives at a tension hitherto unknown—establishes itself in the independent spiritual sphere—seems to coincide with the historical beginnings of Christianity. In Jesus of Nazareth it found its perfect thoroughfare, rose at once to its classic expression; and the movement which He initiated, the rare human type which He created, is in essence a genuinely biological rather than merely credal or intellectual development of the race. In it we see life exercising her sovereign

power of spontaneous creation: breaking out on new paths" (p. 34). And still again: "More and more as we proceed, the peculiar originality of the true Christian mystic becomes clear to us. We are led towards the conclusion—a conclusion which rests on historical rather than religious grounds—that the first person to exhibit in their wholeness the spiritual possibilities of man was the historic Christ; and to the corollary, that the great family of the Christian Mystics—that is to say, all those individuals in whom an equivalent life-process is set going and an equivalent growth takes place—represents to us the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen, in respect of the upward movement of the racial consciousness. This family constitutes a true variation of the human species . . ." (p. 41). If these and such deliverances mean anything, they mean that with Jesus Christ something new came into the world, something so new that all that had been in the world before it is inadequate to its explanation. And yet Miss Underhill proposes to treat it as only an instance of "the Mystical type", and on the ground that it manifests "the characteristically mystical consciousness" to explain it from general Mysticism of which it is obviously only a specific manifestation!

The expedient by which Miss Underhill escapes from the *impasse* into which she has brought herself by her isolation of Christian Mysticism as a new creation in the world, is as remarkable as the exaggerations by which she has brought herself into it. Having separated Christian Mysticism off from all other so-called Mysticism as something (in the "biological" sense) specifically different, she cheerfully proceeds at once to mix it up again with them all. Here is the passage in which she does it (p. 42). "This new form of life, as it is lived by the members of this species, the peculiar psychic changes to which they must all submit, whatever the historic religion to which they belong, may reasonably be called Christian, since its classic expression is seen only in the Founder of Christianity. But this is not to limit it to those who have accepted the theological system called by His name. 'There is', says Law, 'but one salvation for all mankind, and that is the Life of God in the soul. God has but one design or intent towards mankind, and that is to introduce or generate His own Life, Light, and Spirit in them. . . . There is but one possible way for man to attain this salvation, or Life of God in the soul. There is not one for the Jew, another for a Christian, and a third for a Heathen. No; God is one, human nature is one, salvation is one, and the way to it is one.' We may, however, define the Christian life and the Christian growth as a movement towards the attainment of this Life of Reality; this spiritual consciousness. It is a phase of the cosmic struggle of spirit with recalcitrant matter, of mind with the conditions that hem it in. More abundant life, said the great Mystic of Fourth Gospel, is its goal; and it sums up and makes effective all the isolated struggles toward such life and such liberty which earlier ages had produced." If we understand this paragraph (in which Christ ceases to be the first to become only the classic expression of Christian Mysticism)

it amounts to saying that we may fairly call by the name of Christian Mysticism, any spiritual movement in which we may discover those characteristics which we have discovered in the movement which we have designated by that name. And this would seem to amount to nothing less than saying that the element common to all Mystical movements is not their Mysticism but their Christianity! It is a complete *bouleversement* of values. Something was originated by Christ. We will say it was Mysticism. But Mysticism obviously was not originated by Christ; it exists apart from Him, it existed before Him. But that can be remedied by recognizing all Mysticism by virtue of our agreement that Mysticism was originated by Christ, as Christian! If Christianity is just Mysticism, why of course Mysticism is Christianity and Christianity, since Mysticism has nothing to do with Him, has nothing to do with Christ.

We do not intend to enter into the details of Miss Underhill's elaborate explaining away of the whole supernatural element of Christianity in her effort to transmute it into just Mysticism, to her reduction of the prophet to "a spiritual genius", of Paul's mighty works to "a growth of automatic powers", of the Son of Man to "the forward-marching spirit of humanity". There is nothing distinctive about the processes she employs or the conclusions she reaches. We may briefly allude only to her dealing with what she calls "the confused poem of the resurrection" as an instance in point. The only fact that emerges clear from it, she tells us, is that "a personal and continuous *life* was veritably recognized and experienced; recognized as belonging to Jesus though raised to 'another beauty, power, glory', experienced as a vivifying force of enormous potency which played upon those 'still in the flesh'" (p. 149). This cannot be accounted for, she thinks, on purely subjective lines. The thing seized upon was "the indestructibility and completeness of the new, transfigured humanity; the finished citizen of the Kingdom of God" (p. 150). The vision then was "of a *whole man*, body, soul and spirit, transmuted and glorified—a veritable 'New Adam' who came from heaven" (p. 151). And it was of course by the intuition, not the senses, that he was 'seen' (p. 152). Certainly, no such "whole man" existed as the Jesus that was seen. As the Ascended Christ (p. 233), so naturally the Resurrected Christ was "discarnate". All this, of course, we have heard before: Miss Underhill's rationalism is certainly of the commonest garden variety. Take this amazing specimen (p. 219, note 2), relatively to the employment of "John" to designate the author of the Fourth Gospel: "I retain for convenience sake this traditional name, which may well be that of the actual author: 'John' was a common name in Christian circles." Surely enough there are five hundred and ninety-five "Johns" listed in Smith and Wace. But what made "John" so favorite a name "in Christian circles"? And how does Miss Underhill know that "John" was a common name in Christian circles at about the time the Fourth Gospel was written, say at the turning-point of the first and second centuries? None of Smith and Wace's five hundred and ninety-

five "Johns" belong to that period except one ("The Presbyter John")—and he was not invented until later. The irruption of "Johns" in Christian circles means an earlier date by a generation for the Gospel of John; for it is not allusions to John in other books but the writings attributed to him which have made the name of John precious to Christians.

That there are elements—fortunately extensive, even dominating elements—in that historical phenomenon which we know as "Christian Mysticism" that derive from Christ and what He brought into the world, of course no one will deny. It is these elements which constitute this Mysticism that particular variety of Mysticism which we call Christian Mysticism, and which justify, or rather require, that it should be studied apart, as Henri Delacroix has done in his excellent volume on *Les Grandes Mystiques Crétiennes* (1908) which Miss Underhill misquotes in her efforts to make Christian Mysticism out to be a wholly new creation in the world. We shall all approve of Delacroix's going to the great Christian Mystics by preference to learn what Christian Mysticism is, lest, as he says, he should see only the lower characteristics of it and so miss the greatness of these great men. And we shall all approve also of his going rather to those of them who have lived and practiced Mysticism than to those who have merely written about it. But we shall not doubt any more than he doubts that a doctrine underlies the practice of even these practical Mystics, or that this doctrine by virtue of which they are Mystics derives not from Christ but from Plotinus. "No doubt," he writes,—“and we shall show it in this book—doctrine intervenes in experience, and there is, to speak it out, no great Mystic who has not grounded his experience in a doctrine and who has not up to a certain point made doctrinal preoccupations intervene in the constitution of his experience. . . . We have shown that throughout the whole course of Christianity there has been an almost continuous mystical doctrine deriving from Neoplatonism. . . . We shall find it again as a substructure and an implicit theory in the Mysticism of experience” (p. iv). In a sense the source of all of Miss Underhill's woes is her determination that Christian Mysticism, as it is Mysticism, shall find its starting point in Christ and not in Plotinus. "Above all," she writes, "we shall be in conflict with those who . . . consider the Mystical element in Christianity to be fundamentally unchristian and ultimately descended from the Neoplatonists" (p. 58). Nevertheless it was she herself who when not so deeply intoxicated with this theory, told us that "Christian philosophy, especially that Neoplatonic theology which, taking up and harmonizing all that was best in the spiritual intuitions of Greece, India and Egypt, was developed by the great doctors of the early and mediaeval Church, supports and elucidates the revelations of the individual mystic as no other system of thought has been able to do" (*Mysticism*, p. 125); that "we owe . . . above all to Dionysius the Areopagite, the great Christian contemporary of Proclus, the preservation of that mighty system of scaffolding which enabled the Catholic Mystics to build up the towers and bulwarks of the City of God" (p. 125).

Least of all can any one deny that there is a sense, a wide sense, a sense too wide for the historical meaning of the term Mysticism, in which Christianity is mysticism. It is of the very essence of Christianity that God has immediate access to the human soul and that the Christian enjoys direct communion with God: it is of the very essence of Christianity that it is in Christ that every Christian lives and that it is Christ who lives in every Christian. If there is nothing that shocks the Christian more in Mysticism than its tendency to seek God apart from Christ—as W. Herrmann says “to leave Christ behind” (*Communion*, E. T. p. 30), he is equally shocked when Herrmann on his own part declares: “There can be no such thing as communion with the exalted Christ” (p. 291). We shall not turn our backs on Mysticism therefore to throw ourselves into the arms of that Ritschlianism in which Miss Underhill, perhaps rightly, sees the most determined modern enemy of all mysticism. But neither need we in revolt from Ritschlianism cast ourselves into the arms of that Mystical individualism which would throw man back on what we have seen Miss Underhill speaking of as the “revelations of the individual” (*Mysticism*, p. 125). There are some words of Herrmann’s which, deeply vitiated though they are by his inadequate view of the person and work of our Lord, and of the relation of the Christian to Him, may yet bring us a needed warning here. “The Christian,” says he (p. 193), “can never even wish that God should specially appear to him or speak down to him from heaven. He receives the revelation of God in the living relationships of the Christian brotherhood, and its essential contents are that personal life of Jesus which is visible in the Gospel and which is experienced in the lives of the redeemed.” It certainly is not merely in the communion of saints that we have communion with God; it is not only in and through the community of Christian men that we receive the impression of the living Christ; “the personal life of Christ”, that is, the aroma of His holy personality lingering behind Him in the world, does not constitute the essential contents of the revelation of God; the whole conception of the work of Christ and of the substance of the Gospel here outlined is in direct contradiction with what the Gospel itself proclaims. But it is true that the Christian ought to be, and will be, satisfied with the revelation of God in Christ, and cannot crave special and particular revelations, each one for himself. The one revelation of His grace which God has given to His people in His Son is enough for the needs of all and floods the souls of all with a sense of its completeness and its all-sufficiency. As Dr. A. Kuyper beautifully expresses it, God the Lord does not feed His people each by Himself but spreads a common table of the abundant supply of which He invites His whole family to partake. But just because the common supply is enough for all, He gives in it personal communion with Him, the Master of the feast, to each and all; and in that communion abundance of life. “Humanity,” says A. H. Strong (*Philosophy of Religion*, pp 220-2) finally “is a dead and shattered vine, plucked up from its roots in God, and fit only

for the fire. But in Christ, God has planted a new vine, a vine full of His own divine life, a vine into which it is His purpose one by one to graft these dead and withered branches so that they may once more have the life of God flowing through them and may bear the fruits of heaven." "It is a supernatural and not a natural process," he adds. And it is only "in Christ", we may add with the utmost emphasis.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Eternal Life: A Study of Its Implications and Applications. By Baron FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL, Member of the Cambridge Philological Society, Author of "The Mystical Element of Religion, as studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and her Friends". Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. Elaborate Contents and Index. 8vo; pp. 1, 443.

It is important to understand from the outset that this book was prepared originally as an article for Dr. Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, and has been published in book-form rather than as an encyclopaedia article only because it had grown too big for its original destination. There are characteristics of the mode of treatment of its theme which can be explained only from this circumstance. On the other hand it must be said that there probably never was an encyclopaedia article not merely more diffusely written but more diffusely thought. There are few subjects connected with religious philosophy and especially with the recent history of religious philosophy which do not receive as full discussion in it as "eternal life". Indeed it is doubtful if it can be accurately said that Baron von Hügel ever comes to the serious discussion of his proper subject, and we are not sure that the average reader will not lay the book down without having learned anything of importance about it. What the book really is, is a survey of recent religious philosophy, in connection with its historical antecedents, with some, apparently incidental, application to the problem of eternal life. This survey is admirably done and the reader as he passes through the book forms a high opinion of the acuteness, sobriety and balance of Baron von Hügel's own thought. Penetrating expositions and criticisms meet us on every page and occasionally exceedingly felicitous summaries of Baron von Hügel's own views are interjected, which quite illuminate the subject which happens to be in hand. Meanwhile it is only by a hint here and there that the reader is kept reminded that the professed subject of the book is "eternal life".

It is in recent philosophy that Baron von Hügel shows himself most at home. The least satisfactory portions of the discussion are those which deal with the Biblical material. Here Baron von Hügel has fallen into the hands of the Philistines: he orders his material under the direction of the radical critics and he accepts for its exposition the guidance of its least sympathetic interpreters. He who commits himself to the leading of Wellhausen and H. J. Holtzmann can never hope to understand either the Prophets of Jehovah or the

Apostles of the Christ. How little Baron von Hügel has to bring from his own study of the sacred text to the correction of his ill-chosen guides may be estimated from the confusion into which he falls (pp. 50 *e.g.*) of the Kingdom of God and the Parousia in his account of the teaching of the Synoptical Jesus and the sad results it works in his exposition. We learn, however, in passing that Dan. xii. 2 is the only passage in the Old Testament where "everlasting" or "eternal" life is spoken of explicitly, and that neither in the Old Testament nor in the New is the conception of eternity as simultaneity much insisted on. Indeed we have dropped into our lap this valuable remark (p. 50): "It is important, however, clearly to realize that simultaneity of itself is as little spiritually qualitative a conception as is succession by itself; and to note how again in these passages [of the later Old Testament, along with the Apocrypha] it is God, His purity and power, who centrally occupies the soul; intercourse with, proximity to Him—this is eternal life". Which being interpreted, we may understand that the Old Testament conception already was not far from that enunciated in John xvii. 3: "And this is life eternal, that they should know thee, the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, Jesus Christ."

In his occasional direct references to "eternal life", Baron von Hügel is perhaps preoccupied with its metaphysical side. He here and there lets drop valuable pieces of information as to the conceptions of the philosophers as to Time and Eternity. Parmenides, we learn, for instance, was the first to draw a quite plain and precise discrimination between an Eternal Now and all Succession (p. 31). But he has had to wait for Bergson to teach him precisely how to conceive of the relation of "eternal life" to time (p. 232 note, 298-9). The main point which under this guidance he labors is that we need here not two but three notions to cover the ground—Succession, Duration, Simultaneity; and that the essence of the idea of Duration lies not in change but in Permanence. "However real, however simply ultimate (for man) may be Duration (and this book strongly holds that Duration is indeed thus real and ultimate), Duration is, surely, at its highest, not in its element of Change, but in its element of Permanence" (p. 298). Man, then, possessing Duration, has "a relative Abidingness, a quasi-eternity". It is not in this quasi-eternity, however, Baron von Hügel sees, that man's "eternal life" consists. It consists, he tells us, in the sense that, though "we ourselves shall never, either here or hereafter, be more than quasi-eternal, durational", we are indeed actually touched, penetrated and supported by the purely Eternal" (p. 366). It consists "in the most real of relations between the most living of realities—the human spirit and the Eternal Spirit, God" (p. 378). Baron von Hügel adds: "and in the keen sense of His Perfection, Simultaneity and Prevenience, as against our imperfection, successiveness and dependence". But this does not seem to us an adequate account of the actual relation. We rise from the book, therefore, feeling that with all its excellences, and they are many and great—it does not help us much at the center of things.

And we fear that the source of our disappointment lies pretty deep. It is not the philosophers who can teach us what "eternal life" is; but only the Scriptures. And Mystics do not care as much for what the Scriptures teach as they very profitably might.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Principle of Authority, in Relation to Certainty, Sancity and Society. An Essay in the Philosophy of Experimental Religion. Lectures by B. T. FORSYTH, M.A., D.D. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1913. Pp. x + 475.

It is not an easy task to read this large book. Dr. Forsyth shows no pity to the readers of a busy age. Like many of the moderns in music, art and letters, he ignores the time-honored rules of composition. His paragraphs lack both topic sentences and summaries. His thoughts follow a psychological rather than a logical order, being grouped in similar masses instead of developing in logical sequence. Add to this the singularly oracular tone of the book, the numberless assertions supported neither by proof nor citation of authority, its unrestrained joy of utterance, the absence of an index,—surely a combination of qualities calculated to daunt the stoutest-hearted reader.

Nevertheless Dr. Forsyth says many things in an impressive and striking manner. Witness the remarks on "The Real as the Redemptive" pp. 201 seq.; "The Integration of Christ into a Redemptive System" p. 309; "The Great Church" pp. 240 seq. and a host of others we might mention not only interesting but very suggestive. The main topic is the Principle of Authority, and the immediate reason for its discussion is the growing disrespect paid to it. There is, says Dr. Forsyth, an increasing ferment among the workmen; the woman movement threatens the very foundations of society, and we are in danger of a spiritual catastrophe. The imperative question of the day is that of Authority, and how wide this question reaches is to be seen in the fact that its consideration carries Dr. Forsyth into a discussion of nearly every subject now before the church.

According to the Reformers, authority was the first property of Scripture—a property which resulted directly from its inspiration. In the opinion of many, however, critical research has invalidated the old doctrine both of inspiration and Scripture. Obviously then, if the principle of authority is retained, it must attach to something else than Scripture. Dr. Forsyth apparently no longer holds to the old view of Scripture. To quote: "for that age (sc. the Reformation) the whole Bible was equally inspired. . . . But now we do not so read the Bible, now . . . we distinguish in the Bible much that belongs only to knowledge or imagination from much that belongs to personal faith, much that is outgrown from the things that cannot change" p. 320. More clearly perhaps in an article in *The Hibbert Journal* for October, 1911, on "Revelation and Bible" we have a statement that gives Dr. Forsyth's view of Scripture and that to which he attaches authority. "God does not save men by authorship, by dropping a book from the sky, by dictating a work of more than genius. That might be the

way of Mohammedanism, or Mormonism, but it is not the way of the Gospel. God does not save us even by inspiring a book. He did something which in its turn inspired the book. Christ wrote nothing, He commanded nothing to be written. And for both prophets and apostles, for Old Testament and New Testament, the writing was an afterthought." Dr. Forsyth then, if we grasp his thought correctly, discards the book in favor of a Redeeming act of God in Jesus Christ which comes home to the consciousness of every man who comes to know it. This Redeeming Act has authority and in the present work Dr. Forsyth traces its application through all the manifold phases of human experience.

This view offers at first glance a twofold advantage. It enables one to effect a combination of the cold science of modern criticism and the warmth of old evangelicalism, and further it transforms our old "static" concepts, with their annoying questions of truth and falsehood, into the new "dynamic" concepts about which one does not need to worry, because of each, to use Dr. Forsyth's words, it may be said *solvitur ambulando*.

Further reflection however suggests some disquieting thoughts. To make the book an afterthought and still retain the Redeeming Act—is it not to discredit the testimony for a fact and still try to retain the fact? Perhaps this is an exaggeration of Dr. Forsyth's view but at any rate there seems to be an inconsistency somewhere in a method which attributes authority to God's Act but refuses it to God's Word, unless indeed what the Church all through the centuries of her history has received as the Word of God has now finally turned out to be the word of man.

Dr. Forsyth's "dynamic concepts" may be illustrated as follows: "Revelation is an act, not an exhibition of God" p. 206; "Christ is not merely the historic fact but the divine act" p. 48. Knowledge is no longer "our knowing God but God knowing us". Faith becomes an act of will or obedience. The advantage of this way of thinking is that "the soul's life is not now arrested by central doubt" p. 20. He tells us "The vital sciences, and especially history, have altered the whole complexion given to truth by the mechanical sciences. They have turned the divine reality from being the world's first cause to be its living ground, and from its ground to be both its Saviour and its God". "Christian certainty . . . is therefore soul certainty and not rational certainty; a certainty which is a state of the soul and not a truth held by it;" p. 46. Many other statements to the same purport may be found in Dr. Forsyth's article on "Intellectualism and Faith" in *The Hibbert Journal*, January, 1913. The only value of such views is as a criticism of one sided intellectualism—they become equally one sided when they seek to replace it. Let us recall the words of the Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist: "Then the philosopher, who has the truest reverence for Being, cannot possibly accept the notion of those who say that the whole is not rest, either in one or many forms; and he will be equally deaf to those who assert universal motion, but according to the children's prayer about all things movable and im-

movable, he would like to have both of them: Being and the all would be affirmed by him to consist of both." To which weighty statement Theætetus answered, "Most true".

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GEORGE JOHNSON.

Immanence: Essai critique sur la doctrine de M. Maurice Blondel.
Par JOSEPH DE TONQUÉDEC. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne. 1913.
Pp. xv + 307.

Maurice Blondel, Professor of Philosophy in the Université d' Aix-Marseille, with Ollé-Laprune, Laberthonnière and Edouard le Roy, has put forth a philosophy of religion which, as part of the Modernist movement so-called, is causing no small stir in the French Roman Catholic Church. These thinkers differ in details, but common to all is the adverse criticism of intellectualism in all its forms and the adherence to pragmatism, not so much as a system, but rather as that attitude of mind which leaves verification to the practical outcome.

The present volume is a carefully considered attack on M. Blondel's system, called Immanence after its chief notion. "L' immanence, c'est l'interiorité", means that beings interpenetrate one another. Transcendence, the opposite of immanence, means that beings are isolated the one from the other. M. Blondel does not deny transcendence in the sense that God must be recognized as a reality other than our own; but, since in the universe all things are mutually interrelated while all are in process of change, the principle of immanence must be considered constitutive for thought and being. The task of the philosopher is thus the study of action.

Assuming the correctness of his position, M. Blondel proceeds to combat two errors. Extrinsicism, supposing that reality is composed of parts exterior the one to the other, results in a multitude of errors: in philosophy, that the mental organism is composed of distinct parts; in theology, that a God of nature and a God of the supernatural are juxtaposed; in apologetics, that sense can demonstrate the miraculous, reason the divine, revelation the supernatural; in sociology, that post-mortem examinations of the social and moral order will yield certain results. The error of intellectualism consists in holding that reality is exactly as we conceive it, and that we are therefore warranted in asserting the primacy of reason.

M. Blondel changes the *in esse* into an *in fieri*, and so truth becomes not a correspondence of thought with its object but the accord of mind with life, or in words perhaps a little less obscure, the striving of truth becomes the effort of the interior life of each to get into possession of itself by actualizing all its relationships. Truth ceases thus to be a "Gabe" and becomes an "Aufgabe".

Evidently the theory of immanence must have destructive effects on those notions of Roman orthodoxy which presuppose the notion of transcendence. All speculative demonstration of the existence of God it considers superfluous; it makes it difficult to define the supernatural; a divine intervention becomes inconceivable. If, however, the old way of certainty is gone, M. Blondel has a new way which he

recommends as just as good. It is Action, meaning by this the whole of life, not a phase of it, not opposed to thought but comprehending it. "Agir . . . c'est chercher l'accord du connaître, du vouloir et de l'être. "The individual knows God by action since life reveals in each an ego that is not identical with his own. It is God. The apologetic of immanentism aims therefore not to prove an extrinsic reality but to make each recognize what takes place in his own soul. Church dogmas M. Blondel treats after the same manner, as hypotheses to be verified by experience, or as formulas whose correctness can only be known by practice.

We thus see that M. Blondel presents us with an interesting variation of the fashionable present-day note in philosophy. M. Tonquédec's method of refutation is to call attention to the vagueness of the notions employed by the "Philosophy of Action". He also notes that in order to get anywhere it must use, implicitly or explicitly, notions borrowed from the systems it condemns. He then examines in detail the points in which M. Blondel differs from Roman Catholic orthodoxy, and endeavors to work out a solution which, in not a few cases, is highly ingenious. The attentive reader will probably rise from the perusal of this work with two impressions: that "immanentism", if properly corrected, may serve to enrich our views, and that Roman Catholic theology is more flexible than it is often given credit for being.

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GEORGE JOHNSON.

The Belief In Personal Immortality. By E. S. P. HAYNES. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1913. \$1.00.

Certain unkind, not to say unjust, insinuations found in the preface make it somewhat difficult to follow our author with a ready mind. The author confesses so much prejudice that he may well be deemed incapable of being impartial. The atmosphere of the book may be interpreted as indicating that when we become sufficiently intellectualized the thought of personal Immortality will not appeal to us and the belief in the Supernatural will be eliminated.

The subject is pursued through eight chapters with varying interest. In the introduction Mr. Haynes addresses himself to a two fold question concerning Immortality. "Would (1) the moral foundations of society, and (2) all human happiness be destroyed by an universal disappearance of the belief?" This question is not much discussed but furnishes an opportunity to assert that the first part is scarcely an issue because Immortality can be related to the Moral Foundations only through the belief in future rewards and punishments, and that this, especially the belief in punishment, is dying a natural death except in the Anglican and Roman Catholic circles. The author's substitute for belief in Personal Immortality is that of Influence in the memory of friends. Under the second part of the question the lament of the Rationalists is centered in the "vast sums of money at present spent in propagating effete superstitions". The superstitions in mind are Immortality and the Supernatural which are regarded as complements of each other.

The first four chapters are given to an historical survey. In the First and Second chapters the doctrine of the soul is traced through the Religions of the Savages and through the Religions of Egypt, Greece, and Rome. The most extreme Animism is accepted and some zeal is shown in the warm commendation of the conclusions of Bertrand Russell's *Problems of Philosophy*. In the third chapter—Christian Europe Up to Kant—in the short paragraph devoted to Duns Scotus the fundamental presupposition of the book is uncovered in the "will to believe". The Fourth chapter, which is a survey of "The Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century" relative to the subject in hand, is the most interesting of all but even here we are confronted with the inability of the writer to distinguish between the flickerings of the flame of the "hell-fire" sermons and the abandonment of the Christian Doctrine of Immortality. There is manifest comfort in the effort to destroy the validity and minimize the significance of consciousness. The chapter accomplishes only this personal confession with which it closes: "What I do feel is that there is a strong presupposition against the belief in personal immortality; and apart from some belief in Christianity or Theism, I fail to see that there can be any strong presumption for it".

With the close of the Fourth Chapter interest wanes. The Fifth Chapter "The Bearing of Science" must have been a disappointment even to the writer. Consciousness is conjectured to be the "Inward personal experience of certain molecular changes in the brain". We are led through much of scientific statement and metaphysical inquiry to the conclusion, as far as the chapter has one, that the difficulties require us to abolish sex, and that Spiritualism and Psychical Research offer the only haven for those who believe in Personal Immortality. Mr. Haynes seems quite assured that the cycle of the religious begins in Animism and ends in Spiritualism. The chapter on Psychical Research and Spiritualism presents nothing startling except the conclusion which is, "That those who really want to be convinced resort to the Spiritualist more than to the Priest and thereby get a better run for the money". If the positive element in the Current Argument were no stronger than is to be inferred from the chapter on the subject the contention would not be worth while. On the other hand, however, there is little in the chapter which would distress even the weaker brother. The Ethical Conclusion deals chiefly with rewards and punishments. The conclusion of the whole matter is in support of that "sort of immortality" which "belongs passively to everything".

In a word the futile effort of the book stands as its own refutation. The book bears no evidence of marked scholarship. Its chief commendation lies in its array of negative material. The whole treatment is vitiated by the constant insinuation and sometimes open charge of insincerity of all those alike,—whether philosopher, theologian, or intelligent Christian—who believe in Personal Immortality. Only the ignorant may sincerely hold to Personal Immortality is the author's position.

Princeton.

C. M. CANTRALL.

Evolution and the Need of Atonement. By STEWART A. McDOWALL, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge; Assistant Master at Winchester College. Cambridge: At the University Press. 1912.

Some years ago it was feared that Evolution, with its explanation of the method by which the earth came to be as it is, made entirely unnecessary the concept of a Creator of all. The early writers confused an explanation of method with a statement of source. Since then we have come to realize that evolution originates nothing; that it only greatly increases the need of a Creator since it implies above all else the working out of a great and exceedingly complex purpose through very many and very marvelous means. Unless an evolutionist deliberately refuses to think he is confronted by the inevitable questions as to the source of the evolution which he sees and as to its ending. If all the confusing voices that at one time deafened the ear of the scientific inquirer are now to be brought into harmony through this great doctrine their very harmony demands an adequate explanation. Mechanism demands a mechanic and the greater and more perfect the mechanism the greater and more pressing must be the demand for an adequate explanation. Thus the Christian Theologian can well see in the general acceptance of evolution by men of the scientific mind a splendid foundation on which he can build in interpreting to them the truths that lie above and behind the processes that appear in nature.

A great difficulty has however arisen. If we grant that God made the world and that He planned it and finally when the time was right brought forth man, it then seems logical to regard all man's progress since his creation as a steady march God-wards and therefore to deny the older view of the effect of sin on the race and of the need of the Atonement. Many evolutionary theologians therefore have come to regard sin as a necessary evil appearing during the progress of mankind. They argue that it will be outgrown in time. Manifestly the need of the Atonement is denied and the work of Jesus becomes that of a Teacher and not of a Saviour. It is this situation that Mr. McDowall's book seeks to meet. How well he succeeds can only be realized by those who read it.

It would not be fair to the author to try to outline his argument in the short space of this review. But it is so clear, so scientific, and so satisfying that it is worthy of careful thought and study. His definition of sin at first sounds strange to one brought up on the Shorter Catechism but upon analysis it is found to be identical with the earlier definition. His view of evolution is inspiring and his conclusion as to the need of the Atonement seems sound.

Perhaps to some the force of the argument may be impaired by the author's manifest sympathy with Bergson's philosophy, yet its effectiveness really does not depend on this. It is also rather unfortunate that a chapter on the "Christian Thought on the Atonement" breaks in so sharply on the course of the argument. This chapter accomplishes little and seems to weaken the final conclusion.

Mr. McDowall does not claim to understand *how* the Atonement

works. He is only concerned in showing its need. That he does so is the opinion of the reviewer.

Cranford, N. J.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

The Book Without A Name. Chiefly on Naturism, or the Religion of Science. Compiled in Dixieland. By ORAN CATELLEU. London, E. C.: C. W. Daniel, Ltd., 3 Amen Corner. 1913.

"God made men upright; but they have sought out many inventions." This volume is one of them and one of the most foolish. It is possible to present Pantheism logically and to treat it as a religion in a natural manner. Here we have Pantheism but no real knowledge of Science and no logical argument. In place of argument is arrogant dogmatism. The book is full of bitter criticisms of Christianity, which continually reveal a shallow knowledge of what Christianity really is and the possession by the so-called "seeker" of a mortal grudge against the church and against all ministers. It claims to have been written in a little town in the South and reflects just such a bigoted spirit in its hatred of all things Northern.

It will do no one any good to read it. It can also do no harm to any one who is able to think seriously.

Cranford, N. J.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

Jesus of Nazareth in the Light of To-day. By ELBERT RUSSELL, Professor in Earlham College. Author of "The Parables of Jesus". Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Company. 1909. Pp. 111. 60 cents net.

Our attention was directed to this book by seeing it on the library table of a parishioner's home. The title was certainly captivating. "Jesus of Nazareth,—in the light of to-day". It was precisely the Jesus many were curious to see. We wondered what this twentieth century Nazarene would be like. In the preface the author says his aim is "to show Jesus in his saving truth and power to those who may be alienated from the Christ of past generations" (p. 4). It is "the twentieth century Christ" for "the twentieth century man", and the twentieth century man is the man "who thinks in terms of the evolutionary philosophy, who presupposes the commonly accepted results of the historical and literary criticism of the Bible" (pp. 9-10).

While the treatment is in some respects helpful, we have found it for the most part disappointing. Not the least defect is its brevity. A book with such a pretentious title surely deserves a more thorough and self-defensible discussion. Whoever would give the Christ of the twentieth century thinker will have to devote more space and development to his portraiture than Professor Russell has done, or he will face the peril of misrepresenting both the thinker and the thinker's Christ.

The bulwark of Christ's mission was His teaching (Ch. 6). To this is applied the evolutionary test of the survival of the true: in His view of the kingdom of God ("the universal family"), the historic Israël, His ability to convince, to satisfy permanent human needs.

Chapter XI passes on to His personality. The Jesus of the modern thinker is a religious genius (Ch. 2), sinless (p. 14), original (Ch. 3), an intellectual giant (p. 88), the human manifestation of God (p. 110). The soteriological aspect of Jesus has not received the attention one could wish. At the close Professor Russell assures us that "any adequate explanation of Jesus must be virtually the explanation of his first interpreters" (p. 110).

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

The Crown of Hinduism. By J. N. FARQUHAR, M.A. Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford. 1913. Pp. 469. \$2.50 net.

This is an unusual book showing great range of research and is patiently wrought. It evidences a voluminous knowledge of Hindu history, teaching, and philosophy and a first hand penetrating appreciation of the Hindu mind. The author does not assume, let us say, that the occidental reader has any knowledge of Hinduism nor that the Hindu has any considerable knowledge of Christian teaching. This makes the book unnecessarily full and, because of the arrangement of the material some descriptions and arguments are repeated. From the viewpoint of American and European readers much of New Testament quotation and Christian teaching might well have been omitted. From the viewpoint of the Hindu much of the discussion of Hinduism might better have been left out. Presumably the purpose of the volume is apologetic and is intended for the educated Hindu reader. It is calculated to confirm the faith of the Christian Indian and to present an unanswerable argument to the Hindu. It is an attempt to discover and define the relation subsisting between Hinduism and Christianity. The line of approach is that of similarity rather than that of contrast. It is just at this point and in this particular that one hesitates to approve the method of the book. It ill becomes one who is not cognizant, from personal experience, with the Hindu mind to pronounce against the method for it may be the best to use. The conciliatory approach no doubt receives the first if not the most lasting consideration.

One thing is evident, Mr. Farquhar always has in mind Hinduism as a practical religion. To the Hindu willing to read such a book it ought to prove itself a fascinating study of the similarities to be found in the two religions. One must confess, however, that there will not be a considerable fascination for the occidental reader. On page 55 of the Introduction one sees for the first time just what is in the author's mind and that discovery lodges the suggestion of a suspicion which persists. To have Christianity presented as "The Crown of Hinduism" is not a specially pleasing thought. To present Christianity as if it were made to order to specially fit at once the highest eminences and the darkest defects of Hinduism surely weakens the claims of Christianity. It is not only highly distasteful but a distinct failure to grasp his essential dignity to speak of Jesus as studiously avoiding this or that inconsistency. Why not say of Christianity "Here is a religion of strength and power as contrasted with the

weakness of Hinduism, a religion of life and light as over against the darkness and endless deaths of Hinduism. Jesus Christ hath abolished death and brought life and immortality to light. He has robbed service of its servility and death of its sting."

The method of the book as expressed in the title and pursued throughout is its one glaring defect. If by "The Crown of Hinduism" it is intended merely that Christianity gives the only answer to the cry of the Hindu soul, then there can be no serious objection to the use of the title in such connection, since religions of all kinds and degrees of merit, and much that is scarcely recognized as religion at all, may be regarded as the cry of the soul after God. Surely we all believe Jesus Christ is the only answer alike for Hindu and Hottentot as well as for the most finished product of the highest civilization. But if the title is to be taken in this broad view it loses all special fitness and ceases to be adequate, and we feel the need of the material being organized under another head. Christianity is not the "Crown of Hinduism" in any such sense as the New Testament is the Crown of the Old Testament. There is no seed in Hinduism with all its hard injustices and its intellectual absurdities which could produce the results of Christianity. Hinduism's only possible attitude toward Christianity is that of the suppliant seeking a spiritual salvation—the freedom and liberty which is in Christ. It may not be questioned whether it is best to present Christianity merely as something to be introduced into Hinduism. Such a view does not inspire confidence. Christianity is always, and of necessity, revolutionary both in its message and in its method.

What can there be in common between Christianity and a religion in which there is confusion of substance in an identity of self with God, and which says (p. 223) "I am Brahman"? Men stumble over the way in which Jesus identified Himself with the Father. How much more difficult is the attained deity of Hinduism. It is very different from Paul's "Christ liveth in me", which utterance, as if for fear of its being misunderstood, Paul hastens to define more carefully thus, "the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God who loved me and gave Himself for me". But we are also told (p. 420) that "in all the sects man's spirit is no longer the supreme Spirit whole and undivided but an *amsa* or portion of God". This newer view may save personality to God but it leaves no room for man's personality, and the problem is as inexplicable as before. This is surely a far cry from the Christian doctrine.

We find (p. 247) some working definitions. "Austerity is the endurance of pain in order to gain pleasure, power, or some other material end." "Asceticism on the other hand is the endurance of pain or the giving up of comforts in order to gain moral or spiritual ends." Quite acceptable definitions, but when later (p. 537) it is asserted that "Jesus fulfils the Indian ascetic ideal" one's sense of fitness revolts. Mr. Farquhar doubtless appreciated this; for he immediately qualifies the statement by showing that Jesus was unlike the monk in that the suffering was not self-inflicted. This does not fully satisfy for it puts

Jesus into the category of one merely smitten by the misfortunes of war. Jesus never put himself into that classification. A study of certain verses in the second chapter of Phillipians where the exercise of the sovereign right of self-renunciation is set forth, and in the eighteenth chapter of John, "to this end was I born and for this cause came I into the world", would have helped to the vital point of distinction which seems to have escaped the author in its entirety, at least in this connection. The distinction lies not in the manner of the infliction of suffering but in the purpose. Surely Jesus suffered neither for his own moral discipline nor for spiritual advantage, so he was not an ascetic at all but a Saviour whose suffering was vicarious, yes, and efficacious. It is due the author, however, to say that he does have a paragraph toward the close of the book in which is asserted the Saviorship of Jesus; but its recognition does not permeate the book, and even in the paragraph referred to it is put forth almost as if it were but the fulfilment of Hindu thought. "Manilla Vachakar and Tulsi Das realized the Incarnate One in His compassion and love would suffer for the sake of men: Jesus fulfilled their thought on the Cross of Calvary." In another connection (p. 425) we find this "Jesus, whose teaching so wonderfully crowns the ideas of Hinduism, is needed to give stability and reality to the Hindu belief in incarnations". Was such the purpose of His mission or is He become merely an ornament of Hinduism?

We are told somewhere in the book that Hinduism must die unto Christianity, but it nowhere rises to a passion. The whole matter of the relation of the two religions seems to be looked upon as a matter of adjustment. Almost every Christian doctrine is shown to have a counterpart in Hinduism and one comes to feel that for the Hindu to become Christianized it is but necessary for him to build up his accepted doctrine at one point and dress it down at another. Christ is "lifted up" but is he so lifted up that the drawing power will be manifested? There is much in the book which seems to savor of an attempt to build Christianity on Hinduism. The folly of such an attempt ought to be manifest from the author's own statement that, (p. 455) "Twenty-five years ago no educated Hindu dreamt of defending Idolatry and the grosser features of caste and Hindu life, to-day almost every type of revivalist defends the whole of Hinduism".

Notwithstanding the age and the organization of Hinduism, the terrible blight of its dread Karma, and all the efforts of the revivalists, together with all their misguided allies, the Theosophists and some others who seek to tone down Christianity so it may become an easy adjunct to Hinduism,—notwithstanding all this, pessimism, which is of the genius of Hinduism, is slowly but most surely being replaced by an optimism which is the child of western civilization and Christian teaching. Our author (p. 422) is authority for saying that the Hindu has suddenly become very modern in that his philosophy of religion now embraces all the great religions inasmuch as their founders are regarded as incarnations. The product of Hinduism in its palmy days was useless, for its ideals were not worth achieving. But a new

nationalism is rising through the revolutionizing influence of western civilization and through the ministries of the church in the name of Christ. The leaven is working from both extremes of society. The dissolution of caste has begun in that (p. 177) "the religious basis of caste has faded out of the minds of educated Hindus". The power of Christian ministries is well certified by the Hindus (p. 277-281).

The book has many worthy qualities. It will be much consulted by students of comparative religion. There is within its pages a certain system of Christian teaching which has some apologetic value; but the lines of symmetry of the system fit the frame of Hinduism, and the apologetic value is greatly vitiated by the fact that the product is not Christianity pure and simple, but a composite of certain presumed religious value everywhere presenting the flower and fruit of Christianity but always with something of the fragrance and flavor of Hinduism. It is not enough to say in next to the last conclusion of the book, "the Indian patriot must choose between tradition and the health of his country", nor is it sufficient to say in the language of the last conclusion, "In Him (Jesus) is focused every ray of light that shines in Hinduism".

Princeton.

C. M. CANTRALL.

Spirit and Power. By D. M. M'INTYRE. London: James Clark & Co. 1913.

It is a great pleasure to review a book written by a friend when the matter is fully approved and when the personality of the author is so manifest that as you read you all but see his face and hear his voice. Mr. M'Intyre is a son-in-law of Andrew Bonar and his successor in the pulpit of the Finnieston church which for two generations has been the church of most fervent piety in the city of Glasgow. While this book was on the press its author was elected president of the Christian Institute which is a training school for Christian workers and has a great variety of ministries.

The material of this book is largely the substance of a series of addresses delivered in conferences, intersynodical, synodical and presbyterial, arranged for the purpose of strengthening the desire for a spiritual awakening in Scotland. The questions discussed relate chiefly to ministerial service. With characteristic modesty Mr. M'Intyre trusts the book may be of some service to *young* ministers and other Christian workers. The subjects discussed are varied and treat of much pertaining to ministerial fitness and function. Every page bears the banner of God's goodness. There is much of the vision of the prophet and there is everywhere the breath of prayer.

The following analysis of the seventeen chapters is not altogether amiss. What may be considered the first section—chapters one to four—opens with a sweep of the field and discusses its needs and possibilities. It has a chapter on the "Joy of the ministry", and closes with a challenge to the minister. In chapters five to ten "Revival" is the great subject. Its need and its scriptural authority are set forth. The power of the Cross and the unbroken supply of the spirit of

Jesus are discussed. It rises in intense personal penetration with the declaration, "The life of the preacher the soul of his preaching". Chapters eleven to fourteen discuss the pastoral office and methods, culminating with the minister's identification of himself with the desire of the Master. The concluding chapters emphasize the gift which is faith and the testing of truth by its relation to the Deity of Jesus. The book closes with a setting forth of the glory of love in God and in the Christian.

Princeton.

C. M. CANTRALL.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

The Early Poetry of Israel in Its Physical and Social Origins. By GEORGE ADAM SMITH, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D., Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Aberdeen. Being the Schweich Lectures for 1910. London: Published for the British Academy by Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press. 1912. Pp. xi, 102, with index. 3s. net.

The distinguished author, whose three lectures before the British Academy are recorded in a fuller form in this volume, expressly reserves to himself in his preface the right to "use the contents of these lectures in a larger work on Hebrew poetry", that he hopes some day to publish. What is given us here is therefore an intermediate sketch—something between the brevity of a three-hour course of lectures and the comprehensiveness of a major work—forming an interesting and suggestive contribution to the already rich literature on Biblical poetry. It is suggestive, mainly because of its author's enthusiasm in the elucidation of ancient literary impulses and methods through comparison with those prevailing in what he regards as similar circles in much later times. And it is interesting, chiefly because of his genius for seizing the center of each problem and holding it up for picturesque treatment, to the neglect of such details as fill up the ordinary scientific treatise.

This style of Principal Smith's is peculiarly suitable to his theme in this book. There is pervasively a poetic touch even in his handling of the poetry. Such a style keeps the reader in sympathetic humor with the writer and maintains the interest at places where it might otherwise flag.

The first lecture deals with the form of Israel's early poetry, the second and third handle its substance and spirit. The significant fact in Principal Smith's treatment of poetic form is that he commits himself definitely to the cautious attitude of those who reject the theory of absolute metrical uniformity. "The zeal," he says, "manifest in many recent reconstructions of Hebrew verse, to reduce the lines to strict metre and the parallelism to absolute symmetry, seems to me, in the light of what we do know about Semitic and other poetries, to be unscientific, and in the shadow of what we do not yet know, to be very precarious. I cannot follow the Symmetrians" (pp. 19 f).

Perhaps the happiest feature of his discussion of the spirit of Hebrew poetry, is his striking statement of the four paradoxes that he perceives in the Semitic character. These are the following: 1) "strong sensual grossness, combined with equally strong reverence and worship"; 2) "a marvelous capacity for endurance and resignation broken by fits of ferocity"; 3) "a versatile subtilty of mind, devoid of originality and power of sustained argument"; 4) "a distinct subjectiveness in the Semite's attitude to the phenomena of nature and of history, combined with as distinct an objectiveness or realism in describing these phenomena" (p. 33). It requires no long argument to make every lover of Old Testament poetry feel that in these concise statements there are gathered up real and conspicuous qualities of the authors of the Psalms, of Job, of Ecclesiastes, of the Song of Solomon. Dr. Smith is not the first to have observed any one of these paradoxes. But he has expressed, arranged and illustrated them in a way that stamps his thought permanently upon the memory of his readers. With all that may be fanciful in his tracing of analogies, his service to scholarship is unquestionable, and it is a pleasure to note that again and again he is led to plead for the early date and genuineness of poetic passages, which by a less sympathetic, penetrative criticism than his own have been relegated to a later age and an artificial impulse. For him a prime reason for maintaining the genuineness of the Song of Moses, Exodus xv., is his conviction, from the comparative study of primitive peoples and their poetry, that "to them poetry is not merely the arrangement in regular measures of vivid, musical words; nor is the composition of it left to the professional poet. Early peoples expected in poetry . . . that it shall be the product of experience rather than of imagination; that no strange heart or voice is sufficient for it, but that the very head, hands and limbs which have done the actions celebrated shall spring, warm and rhythmical, from the doing of the things to the singing of them. Of such poetry we may say that it is just the peroration of life; and that after all must be the vividdest poetry" (p. 54). Verily, the old Book receives confirmation from the most varied sources. Principal Smith has just added one more to the already long array, in estimating its earliest poetry by criteria derived from a comparative study of primitive poetics.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

The Literature of the Old Testament. By GEORGE FOOT MOORE, Harvard University. New York: Henry Holt and Co. London: Williams and Norgate. 1913. Pp. vi, 256. With index. 50 cents net.

Helps of all sizes and sorts are to be had from our publishers, designed to popularize and advertise the radical views of the Old Testament long familiar in academic circles. This little book is one of that character, and belongs to the "Philosophy and Religion" series of the "Home University Library of Modern Knowledge". Written by Professor Moore, it is just what might be expected of such an author:

a reliable presentation of the views of the Wellhausen school as to the origin and character of the Old Testament books. It is clearly written, quite succinct and yet full enough to furnish the reader a substantial grasp on the main features of the subject. For one who does not care to use so large a work as Professor Fowler's recent volume (Macmillans', 1912), and yet hardly enjoys the obtrusively text-book flavor of Professor Kent's numerous publications, this small book by Dr. Moore will prove satisfactory.

Books of this kind, designed to give general impressions and suppressing all detail, are better fitted to produce conviction of the truth of their assertions, than the other and laborious type of argument. Weak points are easily avoided, divergences among individual members of the school need not emerge, and general considerations can be presented so skilfully that the reader, unless cautioned, will scarcely realize that there can be any other side to the question. For instance, Dr. Moore in distinguishing the documents of Genesis moves lightly over the ominous raveling out of the symbols J E D P into minor "strands, each having a consistency and continuity of its own", which appears also "in subsequent parts of the history from Genesis to Samuel" (p. 42). From all that appears in such a book as this, not a suspicion would be roused of that cumbrous mass of incredibly complicated analysis which one finds, *e.g.*, in Carpenter and Harford-Battersby. Again, Dr. Moore's view of the origin of the priestly legislation (pp. 55 f) is presented in brief outline, that hardly suggests the significant contradiction between it and the views commonly urged by Pentateuchal critics of his school. The author commits himself (p. 63) to that view of Deuteronomy which sees in it a document produced expressly to "bring about a revolution such as actually followed its well-timed discovery", and "written in the second half of the seventh century", *i.e.*, in the reign of Josiah. So far from intimating the hopeless disagreement of critics on the questions of authorship involved here, Dr. Moore adds immediately, "this is now the opinion of almost all who admit that the common principles of historical criticism are applicable to Biblical literature". This!—when all that is needed to answer, *e.g.*, the arguments of a Kautzsch on this subject is to read Kuenen, and *vice versa*. Finally, as an illustration of the ease with which in such a brief and general discussion contradictions inherent in the author's theories may be covered up, we quote, first from p. 56: "the things that Ezra and Nehemiah were most zealous about . . . do not stand out in the so-called Priests' Code as they do in other parts of the law"; and now from p. 64: "it was only in the Persian period . . . that the conditions implied in P arose". If one of these assertions is right, the other is wrong. As a matter of fact, the former is true; the latter is false. The "uncertainty" of the documentary analysis in the latter half of Joshua is conceded, without the admission fairly due that it amounts in fact to a breakdown. And so on. The booklet, however, has only the defects of the critical principles of its writer. As a compact exposition of those principles it is admirable.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

Les Prophéties d'Éséchiel contre l'Égypte (xxix.-xxxii.). By JOSEPH PLESSIS, priest of the diocese of Nantes. Paris: Letouzey et Ané. 1912. Pp. viii, 119.

Les Prophéties d'Éséchiel contre Tyr (xxvi.-xxviii. 19). By P. CHEMINANT, priest of the diocese of Rennes. Same publisher and date. Pp. x, 129.

These two theses, presented to the theological faculty of Angers by candidates for the doctorate, are noteworthy achievements of modern Catholic scholarship. That priests, presumably in the constant exercise of their parochial tasks, should be able and willing to delve into the historical and literary problems of the Old Testament, and the literature that has accumulated about them, as deeply as these writers have done, speaks loudly in praise of the educators to whose influence and encouragement they frankly acknowledge their indebtedness. Mgr. A. Legendre and M. L. Gry are to be congratulated on such pupils. Their work is comprehensive, yet ordered with characteristic Gallican facility; it is down-to-date, yet conservative. In each study, after the translation and notes follow chapters on the literary and historical questions involved in the whole section, and, in the case of the Tyrian oracles, a version of the poetical passages metrically arranged.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

The Wisdom of Jesus, the Son of Sirach, or Ecclesiasticus, with Introduction and Notes. By W. O. E. OESTERLEY, D.D., Jesus College, Cambridge. University Press. 1912. Pp. civ, 367. (Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.)

The Book of Wisdom, with Introduction and notes. Edited by the Rev. A. T. S. GOODRICK, M.A. London: Rivingtons. 1913. Pp. xii, 437. (The Oxford Church Bible Commentary.)

These are two thoroughly scholarly commentaries on two of the apocryphal books most consulted by students of both Old and New Testaments. Dr. Oesterley is already known for his studies on the synagogue and on eschatology, and Mr. Goodrick shows himself equally at home in the literature of the subjects discussed. No revolutionary views are here propounded. A sane criticism is manifest in the introductions. The former work is much the clearer, as well as the more concise, of the two. Indeed the notes on Wisdom are overburdened with quotations and citations that add little to the reader's understanding of the text, and the effect is both heavy and confusing. However, the work itself ("The Wisdom of Solomon") is admittedly difficult to interpret.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

The Life and Teachings of Jesus according to the Earliest Records.

By CHARLES FOSTER KENT, Ph.D., Litt.D., Woolsey Professor of Biblical Literature in Yale University. With Map and Chart. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. xiii, 337. \$1.25 net.

This is volume v in the Historical Bible series edited by Dr. Kent.

It is intended, as its preface states, to guide "in the quest of the real Jesus" by "distinguishing and separating in the sources which reflect the earliest impressions of Jesus' personality the oldest records from the later variant accounts which blur the original portrait". The Jesus that is here sought and portrayed, the "real" Jesus, is not the Jesus of the Gospels; he is not even the Jesus of the sources supposed to lie back of the Gospels, but the Jesus of subjective construction from whose portrait the transcendent and supernatural elements have been eliminated. The epithet "divine" remains but only within the limits of humanity. The "master builder" and "teacher" is also the "savior" but only by his teaching and example. He wrought cures of diseases that were curable. The great majority of his miracles "when thrown into the crucible of historical criticism emerge unscathed" but only by ceasing to be miracles. The conservative position which insists upon the truly miraculous character of the miracles "is worthy of the utmost sympathy and respect" but "more progressive thinkers, on the other hand, believe that the moral grandeur of Jesus is obscured by certain of the nature miracles popularly attributed to him". He accepted certain erroneous ideas of his time; the biblical testimony concerning the manner of his birth is inconclusive; his resurrection must be interpreted not physically or naturalistically but spiritually. The processes by which these results are reached follow the usual regressive course from John to the Synoptic Gospels, then to the sources of the Synoptic Gospels—Mk and Q, and from the sources to the "real" or "historical" Jesus. In expounding the teaching of Jesus sympathy is shown especially for its social significance but without adequate appreciation of the profound significance of human sin or due recognition of the vital relation which Jesus' death sustains to its permanent relief.

Dr. Kent's book thus takes its place in the "liberal" Life of Jesus literature. It does not however meet the difficulties with which this view is confronted. Its fundamental defect lies in its principal attitude toward the supernatural in history and the consequent subjectivity in its treatment of historical evidence. Schweitzer has characterized a certain type of this literature as a futile attempt to "Germanize"—which may be generalized into "modernize"—Jesus and has formulated the alternative "historical or mythical". The "real" Jesus is the "historical" Jesus, and the "historical" Jesus is the Jesus of the Gospels—the Jesus of primitive Christian faith as set forth in the documentary evidence. Being historical He not only resists modern transformation but, by virtue of what He was and is, He transcends historical limitations, including those of "consistent eschatology", and acts immediately in the present as Lord and Saviour.

In certain matters of detail opinions may reasonably differ; in others agreement ought to be possible. Whatever scheme of chronology be adopted for the Apostolic Age Paul can scarcely have "completed his work and probably sealed it by martyrdom at Rome" "before the close of the first quarter century following the death of Jesus" (p. 8). The saying in Mk. ii. 27 is not "lacking in one of the most

important texts (B)" (p. 91), but is omitted in D and certain other authorities (*cf.* von Soden). In Lk. xxiii. 15 the fact that "Herod sent Jesus back to them [the high priests]" is urged as evidence that "verse 10 which states that they pled their case before Herod is an interpolation from Mk. xv. 3" (p. 287); but the textual evidence does not justify the premise upon which this inference is based. The best text has ἡμᾶς which can only refer to Pilate. The reading ἐμᾶς is weakly supported—by the Ferrar group—and is characterised by Merx as "thöricht". It affords a possible but not a probable alternative text only with a variant in the verb which makes Pilate and not Herod the subject or with an inversion by which ἐμᾶς rather than αὐτόν becomes the object.

Errors of printing are few: p. 295, 18 from bottom, 33 for 36; p. 303, 1.4-5, "spiritualize"; p. 303, 1.7, "*Trad.*" for "*Tral.*"; p. 324, 1.6 from bottom, "Marcion's" for "Tatian's".

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

Die Briefe Petri und Judä völlig neu bearbeitet von D. RUD. KNOPF, Professor d. Theol. zu Wien. Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament begründet von Heinr. Aug. Wilh. Meyer. Zwölfte Abteilung—7. Auflage. Göttingen. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1912. Pp. 329. 6.40 M.

In the recent literature devoted to the interpretation of the New Testament the revision of Meyer's Commentary holds an important place. Like the latest revisions such as J. Weiss on 1 Corinthians and von Dobschütz on the Thessalonian Epistles, Knopf's work is new. The older editions thus retain their value and the new bring their own independent contributions. This edition takes its place with the work of Gunkel, Windisch, and Perdelwitz in German and with that of Hort, Bigg, and Mayor in English. Knopf does not accept the genuineness of any of the three Epistles which he expounds. He does not think well of Harnack's view that 1 Peter was originally an anonymous homily to which the introductory verses and the conclusion were added later, but holds that the author was an unknown man of post-Pauline times who wrote under the name of Peter, most probably in the ninth decade of the first century (81-90). Those addressed were Gentile Christians, and the persecutions to which they were subject did not proceed from the State. The Epistle of Jude is likewise pseudonymous, belongs to the period 80-100, and is addressed to Christians either of Syria or Asia Minor. 2 Peter also is pseudonymous and shows dependence on Jude and probably on the Apocalypse of Peter. It thus falls in the second century, nearer the middle or end than the beginning, about 150-180. The work of interpretation is carefully done and is suggestive and instructive. The style is clear and concise. The exposition has the advantage in 1 Peter of sound premises in regard to the readers and their circumstances. Occasional excursions are added on particular matters. The πνεύματα ἐν φυλακῇ in 1 Peter iii. 19 are understood of the angels imprisoned and kept in the under-world that figure in Enoch and Jubilees, the whole passage

concerning the *descensus ad inferos* being simply a piece of nature myth but having this significance that it expresses the idea of the universal intent and scope of Christianity and embodies the expectation of a final apokatastasis.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

Paul and His Interpreters. A Critical History. By ALBERT SCHWEITZER. Privatdozent in New Testament Studies in the University of Strassburg. Author of "The Quest of the Historical Jesus". Translated by W. MONTGOMERY, B.A., B.D. London: Adam and Charles Black. 1912. Pp. xi, 253. New York Publishers: The Macmillan Company, 66 Fifth Avenue. Price \$2.75 net.

As the preface tells us, this work is a continuation of the author's "*Von Reimarus zu Wrede*" of the English Translation of which, published under the title "The Quest of the Historical Jesus", a review appeared in our January number for 1911. The method of procedure is in both works the same; to a historico-critical survey of the previous discussions of the subject there is subjoined a positive construction in which the preceding critique is turned to account to reach a theory which shall avoid the mistakes and failures of the past. Of the work on Paul, however, we receive for the present only the historico-critical instalment. The positive half is to appear later as a separate publication. But sufficient indications are scattered through the volume and enough advance information is afforded in the concluding chapter to warrant the prediction, that to the explanation of Paul, as well as to that of Jesus, the author expects to apply the principle of "thoroughgoing eschatologism", and that the adjective "thoroughgoing" will be found equally pertinent in both cases. In fact the principle reigns so supreme that one might easily fancy it to have affected the author's subjective attitude of mind towards his material. There is a pronounced eschatological atmosphere about the criticism of the previous literature; in its incisiveness and comprehensiveness and finality it appears like a great judgment transaction. On the whole, however, it cannot be denied that the judgment is fair and well-reasoned, so that the tone of sovereignty characterizing it, is in part justified by the author's extraordinary command of the subject. As concerns the positive side of the matter, here our remembrance of what the principle produced by way of interpretation of the life of Jesus cannot but cause serious misgivings. It should be kept in mind, however, that there must be from the nature of the case considerable difference between the thoroughgoing-eschatological treatment as applied to Jesus and as applied to Paul. In his book about Jesus the author set himself the task to show how the eschatological force produced a life-tragedy. In the present work he merely undertakes to show how it produced a system of belief. It is evident that this difference must work to the advantage of the discussion foreshadowed in our volume. There is every reason to expect that the results in point of sanity and plausibility will be far less open to criticism. A great deal of the unnaturalness of Schweitzer's construction of the

career of Jesus was due to the fact that a purely abstract scheme of eschatological belief was here represented as having been translated into a concrete conduct of life, every step being explained as consciously predetermined in the mind of Jesus from purely doctrinaire premises. With Paul, on the other hand, we have arrived within the region of doctrine and here the predominance of the theoretical doctrinaire point of view will seem less out of place.

The great problem of the history of dogma is, according to Schweitzer, the development of the religion of Jesus into the Christianity of the Hellenic world. It involves in reality three problems, one connected with the transition from Jesus to primitive Christianity, another connected with the relation of Paul to primitive Christianity, a third touching the origin of Hellenic Christianity either in dependence on or independently of Paul. Baur was the last to attack this great complex problem in its entirety and to attempt a comprehensive solution. Since his days, and beginning with Ritschl, the problem has, if not in form, at any rate in substance, been evaded and glossed over, a procedure facilitated by the conventional division of the territory to be explored into the three separate provinces Life of Jesus, Apostolic Age, History of Dogma. At the same time Baur's solution, even after his critical edifice has fallen, still continues to cast a spell on the interpretation of Paulinism. The striving of Baur and the old Tübingen school was to solve the problem, how a purely Hellenic system of belief could have grown up out of Jewish antecedents, on the principle of carrying back as much as possible of the Hellenic substance into the first origins of the process, in other words by virtually Hellenizing Paul. The Tübingen view took for granted that the principles of universalism and law-freedom were already symptoms of the process of Hellenisation. Thus the way was opened up towards applying the same explanation to those elements in the Pauline teaching, which, in contradistinction to the forensic circle of ideas, may be conveniently grouped together as the physico-mystical trains of thought, such as the antithesis between flesh and Spirit, the subjective process of redemption, the Christ-mysticism, the Pneuma-doctrine. Since Lüdemann's investigation of this subject in his work on the Pauline Anthropology (1872) it has become fashionable to distinguish a Judaistic and a Hellenic element in Paul in the sense indicated. Pfeiderer in the first edition of his *Urchristenthum* (1887) and Holtzmann in his *New Testament Theology* (1st ed. 1897) are the classical exponents of this critical consensus about the presence of a Hellenic strand in Paulinism. But the same assumption underlies equally much the theorizing of the ultra-Tübingians of more recent date of the Dutch school and others, who propose to explain the Pauline epistles in toto as products of the second century, for here it is again the correct perception, that a movement of thought which is essentially Greek cannot have sprung up in the mind of a Jewish man by a sudden aberration, but requires for its rise and maturing an actual Hellenic environment and a considerable lapse of time. And once more the case is not different with regard to the still more recent

'*religionsgeschichtliche*' interpretation of Paul on the basis of the Hellenistic syncretism, and in particular of the mystery-religions. This theory also starts with the supposition that those elements in which it discovers parallels to contemporary syncretistic or Hellenistic religious ideas, and which it accordingly proposes to explain and illustrate on the principle of derivation from this or at least from a common source, are actually Hellenic.

It is this widespread assumption of a Hellenic ferment in the mind of Paul which Schweitzer challenges and attacks. He pursues it relentlessly in its variegated forms through the successive chapters of this book. No one will be able to read the criticism without receiving a profound impression of the inherent weakness of the theory and being struck with wonder at the long and almost undisputed supremacy it has been able to maintain in the circles of liberal criticism. On the credit side of the theory, as originally conceived, stood only the dualism of flesh and Spirit, and that only in a general superficial way. In the particular aspects of the doctrine no influence of Greek conceptions has ever been pointed out. Many more, and more weighty, considerations stand on the debit side. An incredible capacity is ascribed to the Apostle for combining contradictions after the most naïve fashion. The inclusiveness of his mind far exceeds the limits not merely of the logically but also of the psychologically conceivable. Then there is the need in which the advocates of the theory find themselves of over-spiritualizing Paul's statements in order to make them approach the Platonic conceptions. A serious obstacle is further encountered in the self-evident primitive-Christian, eschatological background of Paul's doctrine of the Spirit, as soon as this is viewed in its broader aspects and not with one-sided reference to the antithesis between flesh and Spirit. Still further account must be taken of the strange phenomenon that the original Apostles never suspected anything Hellenic in Paul's teaching. But the crowning argument is furnished by the observation that the representatives of the later Hellenizing development in Christian theology, Justin, Ignatius and the others, do not recognize Paul as the one who had made a beginning of Hellenizing the Gospel. They do not appeal to him nor make use of him to authenticate their conceptions as genuinely Christian. Schweitzer very cogently and pointedly puts this argument by saying that in case modern criticism were right in professing to find Greek elements in Paul, it would have to be credited with an acuter instinct for what is Hellenic than the very men who Hellenized Christianity. The argument may also be made to work in the opposite direction, because Paul, no matter whether he borrowed from Hellenism or not, was at any rate unconscious of doing so. Therefore the same anomaly would return here: modern criticism would have shown a better instinct for the provenience of this factor in Paul's thought than the man who himself introduced it.

The element of truth in the theory Schweitzer would find in this that the Pauline mysticism bears a certain analogy of form to the Greek mysticism. It externally has the air of being a twin-formation

to it. But this applies only to the later Hellenistic form of Greek religious thought not to the Hellenic philosophical thinking in its older more general character with which the earlier critics used to reckon. The presently prevailing phase of the theory, which asserts a dependence of Paul on the Greek-Oriental syncretism of his time, specifically on the mystery-religions is in so far better off than the older form. It can actually point to a common fund of religious expression between Paul and these contemporary systems of religion, and is able to offer concrete evidence in support of its position. But so far as identity of substance between Paul and Hellenism is concerned the new theory of the "*religionsgeschichtler*" makes out no better case than the earlier critics did. The preliminary objection to be raised to it is this, that Paul is obviously Judaistic through and through, and that, whatever influence from the quarter named might have been exerted upon him, would have had to come indirectly through its previous absorption by Judaism. "The suggestion that apart from this he might be personally and directly affected by Oriental influences calls for very cautious consideration. In particular we ought to be very careful to guard against raising the possibility to a certainty by general considerations regarding all that the child of the Diaspora might have seen, heard and read." What might be conceived and has to be recognized in the case of large collective developments spread over considerable periods of time, cannot without more be transferred and made a principle of explanation in the case of an individual. And, if the question be put on this broader basis of a possible infiltration of syncretism into the later Judaism and through it into Paul, the inherent implausibility of assuming such a thing immediately springs into view and much more clearly obtrudes itself, than where the whole issue is staked on the possible influences which Paul the individual might have or might not have absorbed. Of course this objection is only preliminary. Ultimately the question is a question of fact. The two points at issue are whether there is substantial identity between the syncretism and the mysteries on the one hand and Paul's religion on the other hand, and whether the substance of Paul's religious thought can be explained in no other way than through derivation from that extra-Jewish source. Both these questions the author answers in the negative. His examination of the alleged identity between the two systems is not only very searching, but also possesses the merit of bringing together what from various sides has been advanced against the hypothesis in question, so that an easy survey of the controversy in its present stage of development may here be obtained. Schweitzer strenuously insists upon it that in putting the question Paul's views shall not be confounded with those of the Johannine theology and, on the basis of the correspondence of the latter to the ideas of syncretism, a similar correspondence affirmed with regard to Paul. Thus it is not permissible to compare with the terminology of the mystery-religions the conception of a "rebirth", as occurring in Paul, for it is precisely characteristic of Paul that he does not currently avail himself of this representation, but speaks instead of a "dying and rising

with Christ". Generalizing this the author makes the striking observation that "the Paulinism which the students of Comparative Religion have in view is mainly an artificial product which has previously been treated with the acids and reagents of Greek theology". It is further urged with great force that Paul cannot have known the mystery-religions in their later more spiritualized form, filled with the yearning for redemption, but only in their cruder earlier form, which would be much less likely to appeal to him than the other form. Another point on which stress is laid is that the mystery-religions lack the figure of a Redeemer-God, who could be placed over against the Messianic figure of Christ in Paul's religion. The question of identity in regard to sacramentalism is carefully investigated, and the conclusion reached, that the apparent analogies discovered are not as a matter of fact obtained by any direct information about the sacramental elements in the mystery-religions, concerning whose character and *modus operandi* there is admittedly little exact knowledge, but through the unwarranted approximation of the mystery-religions to the primitive nature-religions. The idea of an eating and incorporation of the deity on the part of the worshiper is thus first imported into the mysteries on the principle that these involved a survival or revival of religious ideas belonging to the lowest strata, and then on the basis of this it is asserted that Paul might have derived his sacramental conception from that source. Directly it cannot be proven that the idea of eating the deity entered into the mystery-religions, and the circumstance that its natural correlate, the sacrificial feast, plays no rôle in these cults, rather tells against its occurrence there. If analogies are to be pressed it were much better for this reason to go to the ancient cults as such. Even here, however, Schweitzer refuses to acknowledge a real analogy. He does so on the ground that Paul knows nothing of the eating and drinking of the body and blood of the Lord, but only of the eating and drinking of the bread and the cup. This is quite true so far as a literal Capernaïtic eating of the body and blood is concerned, which is, of course, excluded by the fact that on Paul's premises the exalted Christ no longer possesses flesh and blood, but it is incorrect if meant to eliminate the conception of an assimilation of the Person of Christ described in terms of eating and drinking His body and blood, for that this conception was actually present to Paul his quotation of the words of the institution, which cannot have been to him an empty formula, clearly proves. In our opinion there is actually here a conscious recurrence for the explanation of the supper upon the ancient (Old Testament) idea of the sacrificial meal, as the reference to Israel after the flesh, who eat the sacrifices and so have communion with the altar in 1 Cor. x. 18 also shows. Schweitzer's position on this point is not, however, to be explained from a mere desire to pursue the Mystery-hypothesis into its last recesses, but he thinks to have reasons for believing that the primitive Church, as little as Paul, knew of a partaking of the body and blood of Christ in the Supper, that the words of institution did not form part of the service, and that no consecration of the elements

took place.³ In regard to the other sacrament, that of baptism, a similar line of argumentation is followed with the same result. In the Mystery-religions the idea of purification nowhere definitely passes over into that of renewal. Nothing is known in them of a baptism in the name of the deity. The name-magic does not appear connected with the rite of purification. Nor is the Pneuma-endowment associated with it as is the case in Paul. When Schweitzer further urges as a characteristic distinction, that, whereas in the Mysteries the sacramental idea is the logical outcome of the symbolism, with Paul the sacrament is irrational, because there is no inherent symbolic connection between contact with the water and the dying and rising with Christ, he seems to overlook that such a connection is actually traced by Paul when he represents baptism as a burial with Christ and a coming to life again. To be sure for the advocates of the theory in question this yields no advantage, for it implies a symbolism of which the mysteries know nothing.

Last of all the author comes to close quarters with Reitzenstein in discussing the question how far Paul's "physical mysticism" as such, apart from his doctrine of the sacraments, which is supposed to be only mechanically attached to the former, coincides with the Mystery-religions. The concession that the terminology of which the Apostle avails himself was derived from the religions of the Greek Orient is readily, perhaps too readily, made. But Reitzenstein's chief sin is that he neglects the study of the Jewish Apocalypses, and refuses to consider a possible explanation of the Pauline mysticism from that source. In the very doubtful myths about the god Anthropos Schweitzer does not place much faith. The eschatological scheme of the two ages with their two Adams as their representatives accomplishes everything that this figure stands for and accomplishes it far more naturally. Similarly the dual personality in Paul is an essentially eschatological phenomenon, appearing before Paul in Jesus and the disciples, and therefore something far more primitive than anything found in Hellenistic Mysticism. There is no need of explaining it from the deification of the believer. It means nothing else than that the two worlds struggle together for existence in the same man. Less to the point appears to us the criticism that in the mysteries there is a God-Mysticism, while Paul teaches a Christ-Mysticism, for this rests on the professed view that the Pauline Christ is not God, only a heavenly being, a view which seems to us contrary to the facts. A real

³ In this connection we notice a slip on page 206, where the author finds the symbolism of the Supper in its eschatological reference obscure, because he does not see "how by eating and drinking the dying and return of the Lord can be shown forth?" Paul does not say that the eating and drinking show forth the return of the Lord; the showing forth is confined to the dying; the Apostle's words are: "Proclaim the Lord's death till He come". The eschatological reference, while undoubtedly present in the sacrament, is not expressed in the symbolism, at least not so far as the Parousia is concerned.

point of difference is noted in the process by which in each case the transformation takes place: in Paulinism this is objective, a world-movement from without draws the believer within its sweep; in the Mysteries it is subjective brought about by the vision and gnosis of God. Hence Reitzenstein, in order to make out a true parallelism with the Mystery-ideas, is led into subjectivizing the conception of dying and rising with Christ occurring in Rom. vi. and elsewhere, as if it described voluntary action on the believer's part. For all these reasons Schweitzer concludes that in this central matter as little as in the more peripheral question of the sacraments does any real resemblance or any real connection exist. If, he adds, a true dependence of Paulinism on the Mystery-cults were proven, this would only result in raising once more with renewed urgency the question of the ultra-Tübingians, whether it is possible at all to explain Paulinism within the limits of primitive Christianity. The only logical view to take on such premises is that primitive Christianity itself was already a syncretistic product and with this we have arrived at the position of Gunkel and Maurenbrecher, from which there is but one step to Drews and W. B. Smith. In that case no explanation of Paulinism is required, for the simple reason that Paul added nothing new.

In the above review of Schweitzer's critique upon his predecessors it is not difficult to discover the lines along which his positive construction will move. Undoubtedly it may be expected to shed valuable light on the Pauline world of thought in some of its most mysterious regions. Certainly the eschatological factor was a strong motive-power in the Apostle's mind. And as in the case of Jesus the recognition of this cannot fail to do much towards a rehabilitation of the essential ingredients of the old orthodox interpretation of Paul. Consistent eschatology is bound to stand for supernaturalism, the objectivity of redemption, the predestinarianism of the application of redemption. That to Schweitzer's view these are purely exegetical and historical matters which do not represent any dogmatic conviction, we are, of course, well aware, but this does not detract from their importance to those who are willing to accept the exegetically and historically ascertained faith of Paul as authoritative for themselves. The only thing to be feared is, that the eschatologically-explained Paul will turn out to be too one-sidedly a product of theological reasoning after the manner of the Paul of Holsten half a century ago. Schweitzer has done a good work in protesting vigorously against the modern vogue of discounting the theologian in Paul and making overmuch of the prophet, the missionary, the organizer, the religious enthusiast, a fault so conspicuous in the works of Deissmann and Weinel and other writers of this type. The protest is also in place against the tendency of an earlier date, but which still survives, of making the whole content of the Apostle's teaching spring out of the experience of the Damascus-vision, by means of psychological evolution. There is, however, danger of running into the opposite extreme, that of deriving the system of the Apostle from a purely intellectual source and detaching it from his religious life-

experience. Both extremes to our mind are in conflict with the Apostle's own statements. To name but one instance, in view of Gal. ii. 19, 20 we should not like to subscribe to the author's statement (p. 105) that Paul always treats the abolition of the law as a logical conclusion, not as a psychological experience. It is much more natural to assume that in Paul, as always, the logic of doctrinal thinking and the experience of practical religion have gone hand in hand and mutually fructified each other. And back of both these stood that from which Paul himself derived his whole Gospel as from its ultimate source, the objective revelation from God—a factor with which, we are sorry to say, Schweitzer does not reckon at all.

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GEERHARDUS VOS.

The International Critical Commentary. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Johannine Epistles. By Rev. A. E. BROOKE, B.D., Fellow, Dean and Divinity Lecturer, King's College, Cambridge. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. Pp. xc, 242.

Students of the Johannine Epistles who have been accustomed to rely mainly upon Westcott (or Rothe in German), will now wish to see what is said by Mr. R. Law in his *Tests of Life*, 1909, and by Mr. Brooke in his volume in the International Critical series. Both Mr. Law and Mr. Brooke, who follows Häring's analysis, find the key to the interpretation and analysis of the First Epistle in the criteria it supplies of true spiritual life or fellowship with God. "These things write I unto you, that ye may know that ye have eternal life." Mr. Law's lectures on the Epistle are a rich mine of homiletical suggestion, while in Mr. Brooke's commentary scholarship and spiritual insight are happily blended.

Mr. Brooke discusses the critical questions growing out of the Epistles (except one) with exemplary thoroughness. He makes an exhaustive, if rather superfluous, argument, *contra* Holtzmann, for identity of authorship of the Gospel and Epistle; discusses the "three heavenly witnesses" in a valuable note; and in an appendix attempts to reconstruct the Old Latin text of the Epistles. Mr. Brooke deliberately avoids the question of authorship which he thinks belongs to the discussion of the Fourth Gospel. He hints, however, his agreement with Harnack in attributing the authorship of both writings to John the "Elder", who lived in Asia Minor and was a pupil of the Apostle John, and in some sense a disciple of the Lord (p. lxxvii). The hypothesis of the two Johns rests upon the Papias fragment, as interpreted by Eusebius, but Eusebius, while suggesting that the "Elder" might have written the Apocalypse, indicated no doubt of the apostolic authorship of the Epistle. We are not convinced that the view of authorship "which leaves the fewest difficulties unsolved" is that which substitutes for the Apostle his mysterious *alter ego* of the same name, who was with him alike in Palestine and in Asia Minor, shared in a degree his authority and published the substance of his teaching, and yet merged his personality in that of the Apostle so completely that while hiding in a sense behind the latter he never

mentioned his name. A fuller discussion of the subject would have been welcomed.

Mr. Brooke needs to make no apology for the prominence he gives, in spite of the limitation of a critical commentary, to matters of edification. He believes that no other method of interpreting the Johannine Epistles is scientific or even possible. It is unfortunate that the general plan of the New Testament volumes of the International Critical Commentary did not include the printing of the Greek text.

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A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians. By JAMES EVERETT FRAME, Professor of Biblical Theology, Union Theological Seminary, New York. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. Pp. ix, 326.

Four important commentaries on the Thessalonian Epistles have appeared within the last six years: the commentaries of Milligan in Great Britain (1908), of von Dobschütz (1909) and Dibelius (1911) in Germany, and finally the present work of Professor Frame in America. Scarcely any portion of the New Testament has received more attention from the commentators. But despite the labors of others, Professor Frame has undoubtedly brought a real enrichment of the exegetical literature. His commentary, it is true, lacks the special interest which attaches to the work of Professor Milligan, which, as was pointed out in *PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, vol. vii, 1909, pp. 126-131, represented the first systematic attempt to apply the new knowledge derived from papyri and inscriptions to the exegesis of a continuous portion of the New Testament. Professor Frame is fully aware of the value of the new materials, and employs them with good effect. But for the most part, he is dependent in this field upon the researches of Deissmann and others. His use of the papyri, therefore, though thoroughly adequate, does not constitute a distinctive feature of his work. But, if a paradox may be permitted, it is just the absence of distinctive features that constitutes the peculiar excellence of the present commentary. Professor Frame has no particular thesis to defend, and just for that reason has been able to employ the available materials with the greater fairness and circumspection.

In accordance with the general tendency of recent investigation, Professor Frame defends both epistles as genuine works of Paul. The first epistle no longer requires elaborate defence. With regard to the second epistle, Professor Frame classifies the chief difficulties under two heads: (1) the alleged contradiction between the eschatology of the second epistle and the eschatology of the first, and (2) the close literary relation between the two epistles. Like most investigators since Wrede, Professor Frame regards the second of these two difficulties as the more serious. After an instructive review of the progress of criticism (pp. 40-43), he discusses the two difficulties

separately, and then proceeds (pp. 51-53) to point out (admirably) the counter difficulties which beset the hypothesis of forgery.

In discussing the occasion of the epistles, Professor Frame distinguishes three classes among the Thessalonian Christians: (1) "the weak", who had not quite abandoned definitely enough their former pagan conception of sexual immorality as a matter of indifference, (2) "the faint-hearted", "who were anxious not only about the death of their friends but also about their own salvation", and (3) "the idle brethren". All three classes are admonished in the first epistle; in the second, only the last two classes appear. With regard to this classification, as applied in detail to the material of the epistles, the reviewer must confess some of the doubt which besets any attempt at precise reconstruction of circumstances simply from the epistles to which they gave rise. But the observations of Professor Frame are both acute and cautious.

The discussion of the eschatological passage in 2 Thessalonians is characterized by a wise caution. The political interpretation of the *ἄνθρωπος* is rejected, but on the other hand the commentator is not yet prepared to accept without question the views of Bousset with regard to the traditional origin of the Pauline eschatology.

The details of exegesis allow room for many differences of opinion. But with regard to the present commentary the differences of opinion can only rarely amount to definite contradiction. Such a rare case is to be found in connection with 2 Thess. i. 11. There Professor Frame interprets the *καί* before *προσευχόμεθα* as joining the writer of the epistle with the recipients—"we too as well as you pray". That interpretation may fairly be pronounced linguistically impossible. It would be correct only if an *ἡμεῖς* stood after *καί* as in 1 Thess. ii. 13 (a passage which Professor Frame compares). Such lapses are in the present commentary extraordinarily rare.

With the background of Professor Frame's thinking with regard to Paul, the reviewer is in certain important respects in disagreement—for example, with regard to the authorship of the Pastoral Epistles and with regard to the character of the early Christian expectation of the Parousia. But these questions emerge for the most part only incidentally, and do not affect the admirable sanity of the strictly exegetical work. The method of the commentary is deserving of especial praise. The author has succeeded in combining unusual richness of reference to the exegetical literature with satisfactory clearness in the expression of his own opinions. No careful student of Professor Frame's commentary can fail to receive genuine instruction.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

The Christian Doctrine of Man. By H. WHEELER ROBINSON, M.A.,
Tutor in Rawdon College, Sometime Senior Kennicott Scholar in

the University of Oxford. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1911. Post 8vo; pp. x, 365. Indexes.

The task which Mr. Robinson has set before himself, put briefly, is the restatement in modern terms of the essential features of Christian anthropology. He occupies, however, the very modern standpoint which conceives everything as in a flux. What the Christian doctrine of man is, is therefore not a fixed thing but an ever changing—perhaps Mr. Robinson would prefer to say, an ever developing—quantity. It must be conceived as process, and studied as history. Even "its statement in terms of to-day can be no more than a cross-section of this continuous development" (p. 2). There is no way of stopping the flow and obtaining once for all a precipitate. We can tell what Christian men used to think about man,—what the writers of the New Testament thought, and how, standing on the shoulders of the writers of the Old Testament, they came to think it; what the Christian men of any subsequent age thought and how, standing on the shoulders of the preceding ages, they came to think it. We can tell what the Christian men of to-day think, and how, in the midst of the influences which play upon them they have come to think it. But who can tell what the Christian man of to-morrow will think? And above all who can isolate from the steadily flowing stream, we will not merely say the constant elements, the elements which, up to to-day, have remained characteristic of Christian thought, but the permanent elements, the elements which will always remain characteristic of Christian thought? The weakness of the genetic method to which Mr. Robinson commits himself is revealed in such questions. We may speak of the Christian doctrine of man "beginning historically with the life and teaching of Jesus Christ"; we may represent the whole subsequent historical development as but "the record of the germination and growth of the seed sown by Jesus Christ"; we may declare that it has never "lost its vital continuity with Him who is its source"; we may praise it for its power to slough off what is outworn and to assimilate new elements which in the enlarging knowledge of the increasing years present themselves to it. But what we cannot gloze is that we have on this ground lost all right to speak of any such thing as the Christian doctrine of man. There have already been many doctrines of man held temporarily by Christians, and for aught we know there will be many more. Unless we can lay our hands upon a continuous teaching characteristic of all who are Christians, bearing the mark not only of constancy so far, but of permanency for ever, it is idle to talk about "the Christian doctrine of man". There is no such thing.

What is needed to give us a really Christian doctrine of man is obviously an authoritative standard of Christian doctrine. And Mr. Robinson has no such authoritative standard of Christian doctrine. The only authority which he ultimately recognizes is just his own personal decisions as to what were right and fitting (pp. 273-4). If we say, with our fathers, that the Scriptures are authoritative, clearly their authority rests on the inspiration of their writers, and the inspira-

tion of their writers is reducible to "the Christian experience created in them by the Spirit of God". But we have Christian experience as well as they and from the same source. "The potential authority of the Scriptures becomes actual over us only through the continuity of this experience within us, as mediated by the historic society." That is to say, we company with Christians; by our association with them a Christian experience is begotten in us which we refer to the Spirit of God; we see this same Christian experiences reflected in the Scriptures; and so far, but only so far, we recognize them as authoritative. This, Mr. Robinson speaks of as a "unity of the historical and individual consciousness" which "goes back", he declares, "at last to the Spirit of God, on which both depend". Thus he transmutes the "Schriftprinzip" of the fathers into a "Geistprinzip", but a "Geistprinzip" which reduces at last to a mere "Selbstprinzip". For he proceeds: "This is the religious expression of what is more than a pragmatic appeal to consciousness; we may put it philosophically by saying that the only rational appeal to authority is ultimately an appeal to intrinsic truth". Whatever manifests itself to us as intrinsically true we accept as true. It is its self-evidencing quality which authenticates it to us. This is the language of Lessing and the old Rationalism. Only, by it, they reduced what could be accepted as true to rational axioms. Mr. Robinson does not wish to do that. "We appeal," he says, "to the intrinsic truth, the self-evidencing credibility of the experience which runs through Bible, and Church, and the life of the Christian man to-day." There is something else, in his view, in man, the source of sound convictions of truth, besides the bare rational faculty: but there is no other source of sound convictions of truth than what is in man. We accept as true only what evinces itself to us, being what we are, as true on intrinsic grounds: only what is self-evident to us. The Scriptures have no authority to us; their contents are accepted by us only so far as they accredit themselves to us on intrinsic grounds. Even the testimony of Jesus is without authority to us. This does not mean that we have no reverence for Jesus or fail to recognize His uniqueness among men. "We may emphasize as we may, and ought, the closeness of His relation to the ideals of Israel, the intimate interweaving of His thought as well as His life with all the tendencies of His time, we may recognize the limitations to His power in the defeat of His hopes for Israel, and the limitations to His knowledge, as in the eschatological outlook of some at least of the discourses ascribed to Him in the Synoptic Gospels; the fact remains that there is a uniqueness in His own consciousness of Himself, in the historic presentation of His personality in the New Testament, and in His influence on the subsequent centuries of human life, that forbids us to regard Him as simply one of ourselves" (p. 279). It only means that whatever we think of Him, we cannot always think well of what He teaches us, and therefore cannot accept His deliverances as authoritative enunciations of truth. "Not only did the Light of the World shine first on Semitic faces, and flash its glory to us from the jewels of Oriental parable

and paradox, but in the humility of the Incarnation, the divine Thought was moulded to the pattern of Jewish conceptions. In particular, the eschatology of the Gospels is distinctively Jewish, and its influence on Christian thought has been out of all proportion to the worth of its forms. Scientific conceptions of the world and of the limits of its material destiny have replaced the panorama of Jewish apocalypse in the modern man's imaginative forecasts; the ultimate questions lie beyond both modern and ancient forms" (p. 80). We may manage perhaps to believe in Jesus; we cannot always believe Him. We have no authoritative guide to truth except our own personal judgment, depending, as Mr. Robinson would add, on the Spirit of God.

When Mr. Robinson begins his book on *The Christian Doctrine of Man* with two chapters on "The Old Testament Doctrine of Man" and "The New Testament Doctrine of Man" respectively, we must understand, therefore, that he is not seeking and finding in the Old and New Testaments a doctrine of man which shall be normative for Christian thought, but only writing the first two chapters of the history of Christian thought concerning man,—tracing its roots in Hebrew soil, observing its first blades as they shoot up from that soil in the teaching of Jesus and His first disciples. He is even at pains to warn us in the opening words of the former of these chapters not to fancy we can get authoritative guidance for our thinking from the data with which it deals. "The object of this chapter," he says, (p. 4), "is to collect and interpret the evidence afforded by the Old Testament as to the ideas of human personality current amongst the Hebrew (or Jewish) people. It is customary to refer to the result as 'The Old Testament Doctrine of Man', and the custom is here retained for the sake of convenience; but it must not be supposed that any formal statement of belief on these matters is contained in the literature itself, much less that the title is intended to suggest that the results of our inquiry are necessarily binding for Christian faith". A much greater wrong is done to the Old Testament, however, by this method of approaching it than merely voiding it of its authority. It does not profess to be a record of the ideas current among the Hebrew (or Jewish) people. It professes to contain a revelation from God to the Hebrew (or Jewish) people. And though of course much can be learned from it of the ideas current among the Hebrew (or Jewish) people, this is from its own point of view merely incidental, while its main communications are from quite another source. To lump both elements of its contents together as ideas current among the Hebrew (or Jewish) people is already to discredit the Old Testament in its most fundamental assertions. Mr. Robinson does it, however, an even greater wrong than this. He insists, not only on interpreting it "on the plane of 'natural' development", but actually on assimilating its teaching (against its own loudest protest, since Israel proclaims itself a unique nation in contrast with heathen nations) to that of ethnic thought. The euphemistic way in which he expresses this fell purpose to stifle all that is unique in the Old Testament is this: "The Bible is

here studied simply as ancient literature, and simply in the light of ancient thought." The meaning of this is that the start is taken from "primitive thought" as that thought is ascertained by the anthropologists in their study of so-called "primitive peoples", and the Old Testament is forced into its grooves. Thus, if the Old Testament tells us that God, having formed man of the dust of the ground, "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life and man became a living soul", we are at once told that we have here "the common idea of the breath-soul which is so frequent in animistic thought, and indeed provides a name for animism (Latin, *anima*)" (p. 15). If the solidarity of the human race is assumed in the Old Testament, we are told that we meet here only that idea of "corporate personality" which is so widespread an item of "primitive psychology" (pp. 8.27 etc.). If the Old Testament proclaims the great fact that the Spirit of God acts immediately upon the spirit of man, we are reminded of "the ancient conception of the accessibility of personality to all manner of external influences, not exercised through the natural sense organs", and are asked to think of "telepathic powers" ascribed to all, of "the phenomena of fetishism and totemism, demonology and witchcraft, of a vast world of possible outside influences extending (for the Hebrew) right up to the Spirit of God" (p. 7; cf. p. 10). The interpretation of the Old Testament, in this sense, "simply in the light of ancient thought" means nothing less than the degradation of the Old Testament; and we cannot wonder that when after such evisceration of its teaching the contributions of the Old Testament to dogmatic thought come to be summed up (pp. 54-60) little is left but to deny that it supplies any basis for the doctrines of the universality of sin, inborn sinfulness or a racial fall.

The New Testament is as little authoritative for Mr. Robinson as the Old Testament. But he shows himself, nevertheless, deeply interested in its correct exegesis, and expounds its teaching under the three rubrics of the Synoptic Gospels, the Pauline Epistles, and the Johannine writings, far beyond the direct needs of his special topic. With many of his exegetical findings we find ourselves in full accord: many of them seem to us, on the other hand, perverse and the outgrowth of zeal, say, to be rid of such doctrines as those of the fall of the race in Adam, original sin, and what Mr. Robinson calls "total depravity", under the impression apparently that by that term man is declared to be as bad as he can be. "Jesus," he tells us, "has no concern in tracing sin back beyond the will of the individual, but short of that He will in no case stop" (p. 94). He does not mean that Jesus finds sin only in the actual volition, as distinguished from the disposition of the heart: he recognizes that Jesus always carries sin "back past the external act to the inward disposition". He only means that Jesus says nothing of a fall in Adam. He does not even admit that Paul does. Speaking of Rom. v. 12-21, he remarks: "The present passage certainly supplies no clear proof that he did, or exegetes would not be so divided as they are on this crucial point of exegesis" (p. 119). Paul, he strongly contends, teaches in Rom. vii. 7-5 the "doctrine of the fall of

each man through the weakness of his physical nature", and takes "no account of the pseudo-historic Adam other than is implied in the fact that he was the first to fall in this way". Making thus every man the Adam of his own soul, we can hardly suppose him to ascribe in Rom. 5:12-21 any further direct influence of "Adam's act upon racial sin than belongs externally to the example and unique place in history of that act" (p. 120). The exegesis of this latter passage is very sinuous; and as a result Paul is made out a pure Pelagian. At least, however, he is allowed to teach the universality of sin as is Jesus before him; and that should have protected Mr. Robinson from certain remarks on Lk. xiii. 1-5: "Jesus expressly refuses to allow any inference to be drawn from a calamity to the guilt of the sufferer" (p. 95); and Jno. ix. 2-3: "It should be noted that Christ explicitly rejects the view that present suffering is necessarily the punishment of sin" (p. 139); generalized on another and equally mistaken basis: "Suffering, as the Book of Job has taught us, does not necessarily imply sin; but sin must necessarily imply suffering" (p. 310). The truth is that what we are taught by these passages is only that it is not possible for us to point out the particular ground of any particular instance of suffering: that sin does not underlie all suffering they do not in the least suggest. Side by side with his difficulties with "total depravity" (some very remarkable remarks upon Jesus' teaching with regard to it are to be found on p. 93), Mr. Robinson's difficulties with the Biblical doctrine of predestination should be mentioned,—seeing that these difficulties appear also to root in his extreme zeal for human "freedom". It should not fail to be observed that he is already compelled to recognize the complete sovereignty of God as the Old Testament view (p. 63)—a recognition not really broken by the attempt to set up "two conditioning facts", in the goodness of God and the freedom of man (p. 62). When he reaches Paul he is still harping on the "double truth" of the grace of God and the freedom of man, with a view to leaving an impression that though Paul never even saw that they needed reconciling, and much less suggests any reconciliation of them, they are yet wholly irreconcilable. In Mr. Robinson's own mind (surely not in Paul's) there is nothing for it but that the divine factor should give way to the human.

The history of the Christian doctrine of man subsequently to the New Testament is traced in the chapters bearing respectively the titles of "Dogmatic Anthropology" and "The Contributions of Post-Reformation Science and Thought". The former of these traces the history through the Reformation period, the latter thence to our own day. The discussions of the former period are presented as dominated by the contrast between grace and free-will; those of the latter by the problem of personality. Both chapters are ably written and are full of interesting detail. The discussion of the Augustinian-Pelagian debate is particularly well-done; and the exposition of the revived Augustinianism of the Reformers is clear and decisive. It is wrong, however, to say that the doctrine of "immediate imputation" comes into Protestant theology late. It is Zwingli's doctrine, the formal characterization of which (p. 223) is misleading: it is only the guilt of "inherited"

corruption, not "the guilt of Adam's first sin" which Zwingli doubts. It is wrong again to speak of Calvin's doctrine of predestination as "supra-lapsarian"; Calvin was explicitly infra-lapsarian. But the trouble here lies doubtless in the wide-spread misapprehension of the meaning of these terms. It is absurd, of course, to repeat from Fairbairn that "Calvin was as pure, though not as conscious and consistent, a Pantheist as Spinoza": Calvin's theism was exceptionally pure and conscious. And it is equally absurd to repeat the inconsiderate charge against Calvin of Scotist elements of thought; Calvin stood, in his thought of God, at the opposite extremity from Scotism. We do not know what to make of a clause like this: "Pre-scientific supernaturalism, so far as it subordinated the events of Nature to the control of God, glorified divine wilfulness and human self-importance" (p. 238). Surely no one will deny that "the events of Nature" "are subordinated to the control of God": and surely that God controls "the events of Nature" does not carry with it the necessity of "wilfulness" on His part. If what is meant is merely that before the age of "the reign of law" men ventured to believe that God would intervene in the affairs of the world for the benefit of His people, why, it is to be said, that there is every warrant in Scripture and Reason—and surely in "Christian Experience"—for believing that yet, and that in any event the denial of it is expressed in unnecessarily violent terms. We have gained immensely, of course, from the growth of scientific knowledge and in nothing more than in the deeper conception of the orderliness of the world which it has brought us: but this gain would be dearly bought if it separated us further from God, and left us in the hands rather of a machine. To be sure that all the events of Nature, and of History as well, are under the direct control of God cannot give us a "piecemeal" and "erratic" world. Law and God are not contradictories and if they were, it were better to choose God than Law for our portion. The chief interest in this chapter culminates, however, in the discussion of "evolution", which enters in during this period as a factor of importance in man's thought of man. The current ineptitudes in dealing with this subject reappear here. We cannot speak of evolution as relating "simply to the method of man's creation" (p. 242): evolution cannot *create*,—it presents a substitute for creation, and undertakes to show us how man may come into being without being created, by just, as Topsy says, "growing". Nor can we follow when we are bidden to look forward to further evolution with hope for ourselves, especially when this is connected with some thought of personal immortality (pp. 243-4). The doctrine of evolution has no hopeful message for us concerning our individual future; it teaches us to look not beyond death but beyond ourselves for what is more nearly to approach the longed-for goal. But of this we shall have something to say later.

The volume not only closes but culminates in its last chapter, for which we may believe the whole was written. It is entitled, "The Christian Doctrine of Man in Relation to Current Thought"; but what it is is the systematic statement "in modern terms" of what the writer

believes to be "the essential features of Christian anthropology" (p. 344). In the light of the whole history outlined in the preceding pages, he now essays to gather up what a Christian man finds himself permitted by modern thought to think of man. He sums it all up in five propositions: man has worth to God as spiritual personality; he is an individual self, possessing moral freedom and responsibility; sin is that which ought not to be; man is dependent on divine aid for the realization of spiritual possibilities; personal development must be defined in terms of social relationship. Personality, Freedom, Sin, Society—these are the topics which engage attention; and the interacting factors which determine conclusions are fundamentally the doctrines of evolution on the one hand, and of human autonomy on the other. Mr. Robinson's acceptance of the doctrine of evolution is quite decided and goes the whole way; but it can scarcely be said to be without misgivings. He apparently rejoices to be able to say that, "modern views of the Bible and of the origin of the race remove Adam's sin from the data of the problem", say, of the universality of sin (p. 269), but he is still compelled to add that evolution "still leaves us with an unsolved mystery of iniquity", which, he holds, "throws us back on personal freedom" (p. 302). He will not admit indeed that any other explanation of the universal sinfulness which our observation informs us of is tolerable than just that of personal freedom. "The search for explanation other than freedom, springs from an inadequate view of personality" (p. 304). But Mr. Robinson knows as well as we do that freedom will not account for universality of action: he finds his exit from the difficulty as others do—by denying sin to be sin and affirming that only that is sin which is "freely" done by man. "The general conclusion is that whilst we may speak of the whole mass of evil tendencies in the race, transmitted from one generation to another by heredity, organic and social, as alien to the divine purpose for man, we must not call it sin in the full sense, since apart from personal freedom appropriating it, it lacks the essential element of guilt. . . . Admittedly, this view of the facts leaves unexplained the universality of sin; yet if there be such a thing as real freedom, how can we ever go behind it, without denying its reality?" (pp. 306-307).

This is not all, however, which Mr. Robinson is willing to sacrifice to his unreasonable theory of freedom. To make room for it he is ready to curtail the omnipotence of God and His universal providence. God must have "limited Himself" when He created "finite personalities, possessing moral freedom" (pp. 334 ff.); and the Divine Providence, while no doubt its "general purpose" shall be realized, must "leave room for the contingency which is a mark of human action" (p. 335). The predestination which lies behind particular Providence is of course also denied, but strangely enough a particular foreknowledge is still allowed to God, on the remarkable ground that what God foreknows is unknown to us and thus cannot fetter our choice. "Thus there is full scope for human contingency; for divine foreknowledge does not enter as an operative force into our volitional activity" (p. 337). How foreknowledge differs in this from fore-

ordination is not explained to us. What God has foreordained is certainly as hidden from us as what He foreknows: and His foreordinations therefore enter as little as His foreknowledge as operative factors into our volitional activity. Of course we shall infallibly choose what God has foreordained that we shall choose. But no less shall we infallibly choose what He has foreknown that we shall choose: otherwise it could not be *foreknown*. The choice is as certain in the one case as the other; and the choice is as free in the one case as the other. Of course Mr. Robinson is not to be expected to be affected by such considerations. He is not even affected by the fully recognized fact that the quality of freedom which he demands for moral responsibility cannot be justified on psychological analysis (p. 292),—so that he is compelled to say, "On the level of psychological analysis; freedom"—that is such a "freedom" as he demands,—"seems impossible": though he adds, "On the level of moral personality, freedom"—that is this kind of "freedom" which he has in mind,—"is essential". We have no reason to believe this last assertion, however, except on the authority of its assertion. The plain fact is that it demands a kind of freedom for the grounding of moral responsibility which not only does not exist, but is not moral at all. God surely is a moral personality and immensely responsible; but He certainly does not possess a kind of "freedom" by virtue of which He may choose independently of the "set" of His nature. It is absurd to say we have no moral responsibility, unless we have equal power to choose as we choose and to choose as we do not choose.

The difficulties of the evolutionary scheme, taken as a complete account of the universe, seem to culminate in such facts as these: the presence among existences of living beings, among living beings of persons, among persons of the divine-man, Jesus Christ. If evolution itself is called on to give an account of these things, we must posit life as latent in the non-living, personality as latent in the impersonal, deity as latent in the undivine. The alternative is to suppose that life, personality, the divine are introduced from without—and that is to break away from the evolutionary principle as the sole organon of explanation. We are not quite sure that Mr. Robinson preserves throughout his discussions complete consistency in this matter. But ordinarily at least he takes his courage in his hands and goes the whole way with the evolutionary demands. We may feel considerable satisfaction as we begin to read this sentence (p. 278): "Whilst all personality is dependent on evolution for the clay of its physical manifestation, all personality must transcend the course of such physical evolution by the inbreathed breath of spiritual life." So far, it looks as if Mr. Robinson intended to allow for an intrusion from without at the point of the production of personality. But our satisfaction is at once dashed by the addition of this closing clause: "though that breath of God go back to the very beginnings of life." The "breath of God" producing spiritual life was then, according to him, already present, though no doubt only latently present,

through the whole series of non-personal living-beings. And there is no reason for stopping at the beginnings of life: it must have been equally present, though only latently present, also in the non-living existences that lie behind life. Similarly, with reference to Jesus Christ, we read (pp. 279-280): "From such conceptions, it is not far to the recognition of all human personality as the partial manifestation of the preëxistent Son of God, *i.e.*, the supra-naturalistic element we have recognized in all personality is spiritually akin to the one transcendent manifestation in Jesus Christ." And again (p. 280): "If it be asked how such an Incarnation be conceivable in connection with the acceptance of evolution, the answer is not an appeal to supernatural birth (*necessary* to Augustinianism only), but to the presence of personality in and amid the workings of natural law in the case of every man." The Incarnation is, then, not a new beginning except in the sense that every new species is a new beginning; it is a new form taken on by what is old—actually present in the evolving stuff beforehand. Accordingly Mr. Robinson quotes here with evident emphasis on the comparison made, Illingworth's words (*Lux Mundi*, ed. 1904, p. 152), to the effect that the coming of Christ "introduced a new species into the world—a Divine man transcending past humanity, as humanity transcended the rest of the animal creation, and communicating His vital energy by a spiritual process to subsequent generations of men." If we read Mr. Robinson aright here, then, he would posit the divinity which was "brought out" in Jesus as already latent in all personality, in all living beings, in the non-living existences which lie back of all. Jesus Christ is not an intrusion of the Divine into the human race; he is merely a modified man, as man is a modified beast, and a beast is a modified thing. All that is patent in Him was latent beforehand not only in us, but in the amoeba and in the sea-water. Such a theory has express affinities with Manichæanism and Gnosticism, with their extraction of the spiritual and the divine from entanglement with matter; it brings into clear view the Pantheistic background of the evolutionary philosophy (as lucidly expressed by, say, Le Conte); but it is not recognizable as Christian.

Another difficulty which is thrust upon Mr. Robinson by his evolutionism—we have already adverted to it briefly—concerns the outlook for the future. Mr. Robinson strenuously argues for personal immortality,—that is for the immortality of the soul, for, being rather of Plato than of Paul, he has doubts of resurrection; is not "death the natural fate of the bodily organism"? He cannot be content "with an ultimate philosophy which does not carry up all these values and personality itself into God as their home and source and hope" (p. 287). But on evolutionary ground, is this reasonable? Is it even to be desired? From the evolutionary point of view Christ is a new species, as different from present humanity as humanity is different from the beast. From Him as starting point a new kind may come into being, a new kind which after a while (it did not happen so with Christ) may win to itself deathlessness. But what of those

who lived before this new species had its birth? What of those who have lived since it made its appearance in the world, but have manifestly fallen behind it in the qualities of the new life? What of all mankind up to to-day, no one individual of whom has been quite a Christ? We might as well confess it frankly,—evolution has no hope to hold out for personal immortality. It bids us look forward to an ever bettering race not to an ever bettering individual. It tells us to see in the individual a stepping stone to a higher individual to come, built up upon its ruins in the survival of the fittest. How can it promise eternal survival to the unfit? And to what of the unfit will it promise it? If we are to project into eternity the unripe to abide forever, instead of seeing an ever-increasing succession of the riper and yet riper,—how far down the scale of unripeness does immortality extend? If the merely personal—not yet the divine—has in it the power of an endless life, why not also the merely living—not yet personal? Is not the logic of the matter shut up to this alternative: since from the bottom up all that is to come is latent in the evolving stuff, and hidden in the amoeba itself (or the clod, for the matter of that) there already exists, although not yet manifested, all the divinity that is in the Christ,—all is immortal and “the spirit” that is in every form that ever existed shall live on forever; or else the immortality which crowns all is not attained until the end of the process is reached—which is not yet? We must not permit the fundamental fact of the evolutionary principle to pass out of sight, that the goal to which all tends is not to be found in the future of the individual, but in the successors of the individual. On an evolutionary basis, immortality must mean the persistence of the evolving stuff in every higher manifestation, and cannot mean the persistence of the unripe individual itself. When Mr. Robinson proclaims then the immortality of the soul, and of all souls, and indeed the ultimate perfection of every soul—for Mr. Robinson would fain “trust the larger hope” and believe in the ultimate blessedness of all (p. 338)—he is drawing his faith and his high hopes from some other than an evolutionary fountain. And to be perfectly frank we do not see that Mr. Robinson has left himself any fountain from which he can draw them. Evolution, plus the autonomy of man, with some sense of wrong-doing and ill-desert and a more or less vague feeling of the goodness of God, constitute but a poor basis for any eschatology. In point of fact we cannot form any sure expectation of what is in store for us, unless God has told us of it. Where no authoritative revelation of God is allowed, no express eschatology is attainable.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Freedom and Authority in Religion. By EDGAR YOUNG MULLINS, D.D., LL.D. President and Professor of Theology in The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Ky. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press. 1913. Pp. 410.

The aim of this volume is to vindicate an objective authority in

religious knowledge, as against all purely subjective theories, and at the same time to conserve the idea of man's free acquiescence in the truth, as against the Roman Catholic conception of authority and implicit faith.

Without following the author through all the details of the several chapters, we may summarize his conclusions as follows:—he shows that there are two spheres of knowledge, the scientific and the religious. We know the mechanical universe of law and energy. This is the sphere of natural science. We have also a knowledge of a "supra-mechanical" and "supra-scientific" realm of personal relationships, and in particular of a personal fellowship between God and man in the religious sphere. Hence the term "science" must either expand in meaning to include more than one criterion of truth, or else it must cease to be a term inclusive of all knowledge, and become a technical term denoting only a single form of knowledge as in the exact sciences.

The religious life and experience of man contains and involves a real knowledge, because in it man is brought into direct contact with a sphere of reality to which he responds with his whole nature, not merely with his intellect or reason. When the totality of man's experience and knowledge is thus recognized, two "tyrannies", growing out of the abuse of two forms of freedom, will cease. The two forms of freedom are the scientific and the religious, and the two forms of tyranny are those of science and of religion. Science is the foe of freedom when it dogmatically denies man's intercourse with the spiritual universe, and religion is the foe of freedom when it seeks to trammel science in the study of Nature. God's method with the human race recognizes man's freedom, but His method varies with the form of human development aimed at. Religion calls for self-revelation on God's part, because it involves truth concerning God; and this alone can call forth man's free response to God. This truth is more than a mere revelation to man's intellect. It embraces the entire redemptive activity of God in history, and appeals to the whole man.

Out of this conception of religious knowledge the rise of authority in religion is inevitable. By the operation of fundamental psychological and social laws, truth achieved by man or disclosed to man, becomes objectified in authoritative forms which condition his further advancement. This objective and authoritative truth is man's sole means of adjusting himself to his physical and spiritual environment. Consequently subjectivism breaks down entirely as the sole criterion of any form of truth. Authoritative truth is the response of the universe to man's search and experience of it.

Religion is a personal relationship between God and man. Religious authority, therefore, is the authority of the religious object, the personal God. It is an authority which rests on God, and which comes to us through religious experience. But this kind of authority includes the idea of authoritative truth, since religious experience involves a knowledge of God. The authority of such knowledge is not merely intellectualistic in character, it is rather "experimental" arising out of

our contact with God. It does not, however, grow out of our individual experience, but has become objectified in Christ the revealer of God, and in the Bible which is the "literary expression of living experience", the experience of those who came into contact with Christ. Being the expression of the religious life of the writers under the influence of God's Spirit, the Bible is adapted to reproduce that experience in us. Dr. Mullins, however, asserts that the Bible contains also a direct supernatural revelation of truth from God to man to which the writers of the Biblical books freely responded. This would seem to introduce a different conception of the Nature of revelation and authority than the one above outlined. In point of fact Dr. Mullins never succeeds in reaching an adjustment of these two conceptions of authority. We shall dwell more at length upon this presently.

In this self-revelation to man, God disclosed Himself finally and fully in Jesus Christ. His authority over us is one of "moral and spiritual preëminence." It is not the authority of a merely human Christ, or that of a mere historical portrait of Christ, but of the ever-living divine Christ of the New Testament. Historical criticism has failed to eliminate this Christ from history or to naturalize Him, and it is this Christ to whom the New Testament organs of revelation give their free religious response.

This, in briefest outline, is the course of Dr. Mullins' argument. It would be interesting to follow him through his exposition and criticism of the different world-views. He gives this to expose the naturalistic motive of that type of criticism which would naturalize Jesus, and also to ground his own rejection of an "intellectualistic" criterion of truth. It would also be interesting to follow through his criticism of "subjectivism" in its representatives of various types. His exposition is clear, and his criticism often acute and to the point. Enough has been said, however, to set forth the substance of his thought in outline, and we shall pass at once to a few remarks by way of estimating the view of authority in religious knowledge and Christian truth above set forth.

To begin with, Dr. Mullins has not brought out with sufficient clearness the real crux of the question as to the nature and seat of authority in our knowledge of Christian truth as distinguished from other forms of authority. All truth has an authority objective to the individual. The question here is whether the authority is internal or external in reference to mankind, not whether or not it is external to the individual. Dr. Mullins does not forget this. In fact his aim is to establish an "external authority", in the above sense, in religious knowledge. He does not succeed in this because he nowhere makes adequate use of the idea of a supernatural revelation, the reality of which he freely admits. If God has spoken to man through Prophets and Apostles, this truth is authoritative to us for precisely this reason. The fact that this truth found a response in the experience of an Apostle is not the ultimate ground of its authority any more than is the response to it which I may find in my experience.

It follows, moreover, from the want of clearness on the above men-

tioned point, that there is to be found here no clear determination of the relation of revelation to Christian experience, and we find two different conceptions of the nature of revelation standing side by side. Christian experience is conditioned by the Christian revelation. This, Dr. Mullins not only admits but strongly asserts. Christ is God's revelation to man. But what Christ, we ask. Dr. Mullins rejects Herrmann's Christ and Bousset's Christ. His Christ is determined by the New Testament interpretation of Jesus. Christian experience responds to this Christ. But here is, nevertheless, an authoritative truth objectively given which is accepted on external authority, the authority of the Bible as a teacher of doctrine, and which is witnessed to by Christian experience. Thus Dr. Mullins really admits an idea of revelation and authority which appears to be indistinguishable from the "intellectualistic" conception which he seeks to reject. Christian experience no doubt witnesses to the Christian revelation, but it does not become a part of it, nor is it the ultimate ground of authority.

In consequence of this, Dr. Mullins' view of the authority of the Bible is inadequate. He rejects the view that the Scripture is only of value in arousing in man a spiritual life out of which doctrine springs. He will not even go so far with the "experiential theologians" as to assert that the Bible doctrines are authoritative because they find a response in our experience. He regards the Bible as the literary expression of the religious life of its authors, and as such authoritative for us. But this will not adequately ground the absolute authority which Dr. Mullins claims for Scripture. If Christian experience is the ultimate ground of authority in religious knowledge, so far as experience is concerned, my experience can never be superseded by the experience of another, be he Prophet or Apostle, just because immediacy is the most essential characteristic of experience. If the Bible contains a supernatural revelation from God to man, as Dr. Mullins admits, this fact constitutes the ultimate ground of its authority for us. That the Scripture finds a deep response in Christian experience, is one great evidence of its Divine origin, but can never be the ultimate ground of its authority.

There are many points in which we cordially agree with Dr. Mullins, and some others, besides the ones mentioned, in which we differ from him. But enough has been said to give an idea of his view of authority, and to indicate what seems to us the chief defects of the discussion. It is, however, a very suggestive discussion of a great theme.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Presbyterian Law and Usage. BY BENJAMIN F. BITTINGER, D.D.
Philadelphia, Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath
School Work. Morocco, 16mo. Pages 286. \$1.00 postpaid.

This new edition, revised by the Rev. William H. Roberts, D.D.,

LL.D., will be welcomed by all who have been familiar with the helpful hand book prepared by Dr. Bittinger. This Manual of Law and Usage prepared from the standards and acts and deliverances of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. has been of great service to all pastors and preachers who have been acquainted with the work since the early edition of 1888. This edition contains an Appendix prepared by Dr. Roberts in accordance with the deliverances of the General Assembly between the years 1895 and 1912. As is understood, the arrangement of subjects in this manual does not follow the order of our Form of Government, but is alphabetical and therefore it can be used even by those not familiar with the Presbyterian Standards. It includes practically all the information in reference to ecclesiastical law and procedure which is needed by an official of the Presbyterian Church and it is difficult to understand how a presbyter can fully accomplish his duties without the aid of this comprehensive manual.

Princeton, N. J.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Modern Call of Missions. By JAMES S. DENNIS, D.D. New York, Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth, 8vo; pages 341. \$1.50 net.

As is suggested by the sub-title, this volume contains Studies in Some of the Larger Aspects of a Great Enterprise. It is a collection of a number of articles contributed to the press by the author during the past few years. It shows the important bearings of Christian Missions upon human life and social progress and forms a strong apologetic for the missionary enterprise. Some of the titles of the chapters may indicate the scope of the volume: "Missions and Diplomacy", "The Missionary Factor in Colonial History", "Missions and National Evolution", "Commerce and Missions", "Missions in China: A Defense and an Appreciation", "The Lessons of Martyrdom: Its Message to the Church of our Day", "The Appeal of Missions to the Modern Church", "The American Missionary in the near East", "Islam and Christian Missions", "The Strategic Import of Missions in the Levant". The residence of the author for many years in Syria and his careful study of missionary problems, statistics, and results, enable him to write with authority and suggest that his characteristic optimism is founded upon a careful and discerning investigation of facts. Such discussions emphasize anew the urgency of the modern call of missions.

Princeton, N. J.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Man Among the Myrtles. By THE REV. JAMES ADAMS, B.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Cloth, 12mo; pages 142. 60 cents net.

This admirable little volume is one of *The Short Course Series* edited by the Rev. James Adams. It discusses the visions of Zechariah and presents the first six chapters of that prophecy in a most vivid and picturesque form. The author reveals his knowledge of the Hebrew

original, and while seeking to make a practical application of the prophet's message he bases his conclusions upon a careful study of the inspired text. While the discussion suggests an indebtedness to the helpful *Hand Book* by Marcus Dods, the presentation is original and can hardly fail to inspire the reader with a new conception of the possibilities of expository preaching.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Confessions of a Convert. BY ROBERT HUGH BENSON. London, New York, Bombay and Calcutta: Longmans, Green & Co. 1913. 12mo. pp. ix, 104.

Monsignor Benson's account of the processes of his conversion from the Anglicanism in which he was bred to "the Roman obedience" must be ranked among the more notable examples of its type of literature. It yields in interest, of course, to the piquant pages of George Tyrrell's *Autobiography*. There is, nevertheless, an odd resemblance between the two cases, in that in neither instance had the religious life of the future convert been marked by fervor. The listlessness with which each had drifted into his position as communicant member of the Church of England, and, in Benson's case, as a priest at her altars; and the apparently insufficient motivating of the change which carried each over to Rome, must strike every reader. With this, however, the resemblance between the two cases ceases. No two personalities could stand more apart from each other. Tyrrell was all moods and quickly found himself at odds with all the authorities to which he subjected himself. Benson apparently loves nothing as he loves authority. In Tyrrell we see individualism run out to its bitter end until indeed he seems at last to have nothing but his own individuality left him. Benson having found an authority which (however others may be compelled to look upon it) is sure of itself, simply basks in it.

In Benson's view Romanism seems almost to resolve itself into bare authority. "Among Catholics," he tells us "emotionalism and even strong sentiment is considerably discouraged, and the heart of religion is thought rather to reside in the adherence and obedience of the will." He is not startled therefore by what he admits to be the relative coldness of Catholic worship. "The result is, of course," he writes, "that persons of a comparatively undevout nature will, as Catholics, continue to practice their religion, and sometimes, in ungenerous characters, only the barest minimum of their obligations; whereas as Anglicans they would give it up altogether. It follows that perhaps it may be true to say that the average *emotional* level of a Catholic congregation is lower than the corresponding level of a Protestant congregation, but it is not at all a consequence that therefore Catholics are more formalistic than Protestants. These cold, undevout souls—or rather these souls of a naturally undevout temperament—adhere to their religion through the sheer motive of obedience, and it is surely remarkable to condemn them on that account! Obedience to the will of God—or even what is merely believed to be the will of God—is

actually more meritorious, not less, when it is unaccompanied by emotional consolations and sensible fervour." The distinction of this scrupulous observance of forms which have no particular significance to the observer under the sheer motive of obedience from formalism (which the dictionary at our elbow as we write defines simply as "scrupulous observance of forms") it may be difficult for some of Monsignor Benson's readers to trace; meanwhile we observe the conceptions of "merit" and "sheer obedience" ruling his view of religion.

Relief from this cold conception of religion is ordinarily found by more fervid souls in circles where it obtains in that individualistic reaction which we know as Mysticism. And oddly enough Monsignor Benson is the author of a Mystical book. It was written, however, in the period of transition before he became a Romanist and he gives us to understand that he no longer approves of it. "It is," he writes, "I think, rather a mischievous book in very distinct ways, since it implies that what I then strove to believe was spiritual intuition—and what is really nothing but imagination—must be an integral element of religious experience; and that 'sight'—or rather personal realization—must be the mode of spiritual belief rather than the simple faith of a soul that receives divine truth from a divine authority. The Catholic atmosphere is, on the other hand, something quite apart from all this. For Catholics it is almost a matter of indifference as to whether or no the soul realizes, in such a manner as to be able to visualize, the facts of revelation and the principles of the spiritual world; the point is that the Will should adhere and the Reason assert." Surely a religion in which the "facts of revelation" are not vividly realized, and "the principles of the spiritual world" are unapprehended, is a poor religion enough: if we were forced to choose between this hard voluntarism and the extremest emotionalism we should feel ourselves in bad case. Meanwhile Benson's diagnosis of the disease under which Anglicanism suffers is not without its shrewdness. "For Anglicans," he writes, "whose theology is fundamentally unreasonable, and amongst whom Authority is, really, non-existent, it becomes natural to place the center of gravity rather in the emotions, and to 'mistake', therefore, as Mrs. Craigie says somewhere, 'the imagination for the soul'. The Reason, for them, must be continually suppressed even in its own legitimate sphere; the Will must be largely self-centered. There remains, then, for them, the experience of feeling only, as the realm in which spirituality operates."

Not the least interesting portions of Monsignor Benson's book—to a Protestant reader at any rate—are the passages in its earlier pages in which he gives us glimpses of men of light and leading in the nineteenth-century Church of England whom we have delighted to honor. There is the picture given us, for instance, of his father, Archbishop Benson, lovingly drawn and very human. We are entertained to learn that, old-fashioned High Churchman that he was, he never "abstained from meat on Friday, or any other day"; had no objections on principle to clergymen marrying (he was married himself!);

and believed that the "innocent party" to a divorce was at liberty to marry again. We think the better of him for that! We share the son's puzzlement however as to how the father could interpret the words "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church" in the Apostles' Creed, and as to how he could conduct himself with respect to the Church of Rome and the several Oriental churches, precisely as he did. But then we wonder more still at Monsignor Benson's attitude in these matters. Then there is the beautiful portrait of Dean Vaughan of Llandaff to whom, despite his pronounced Evangelical views, his High-Church father sent the son to read for Orders; and whose faith, despite his pronounced Evangelical views (Monsignor Benson makes use here of the particle "yet") "was so radiantly strong, his love of the Person of our Lord so intense, that his pupils, I think, whatever their predispositions, were almost unconscious of the lack of other things". "When we were under his spell," Monsignor Benson continues, "it appeared as if no more could be necessary than the love and devotion of our master to God". To our thinking where such "faith" and "love" are, there can not be much that is important lacking.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Church and Social Reform. By JAMES R. HOWERTON, Professor of Philosophy in Washington and Lee University. With an introduction by REV. J. PRESTON SEARLE, D.D., Professor of Systematic Theology in New Brunswick Theological Seminary. Fleming H. Revell Company. 75 cents net.

The three lectures which make up the contents of this little book were delivered at the New Brunswick Theological Seminary. The author first speaks of the church in its relation to the Revolutions of the past and then considers the causes of the present social crisis. He finds the chief cause to be the love of money and sees in the rise of great corporations and in the concentration of wealth the forming of conditions under which selfishness is greatly encouraged and power corruptly used.

In the third lecture he carefully discriminates between the duty of the church and that of the State in meeting this crisis and pleads for the preaching of responsibility to Christians to *live* their gospel seven days in the week.

The church is to proclaim the Gospel as one not only for future salvation but also for the present age—the controlling force in the lives of all Christians at all times.

Dr. Howerton has of course pointed out the only cure for the maladies which so greatly afflict our present civilization. He is less happy in his diagnosis and description of these maladies, and a manifest conviction that all great wealth is dishonestly attained and that all large corporations are evil doers underlies all that is said of the present social order. Except for this blemish the lectures can be commended.

Cranford, N. J.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

GENERAL LITERATURE

Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language.

. . . Prepared by more than three hundred and eighty Specialists and other Scholars under the Supervision of ISAAC K. FUNK, D.D., LL.D., Editor-in-Chief, CALVIN THOMAS, LL.D., Consulting Editor, FRANK H. VIZETELLY, Litt.D., LL.D., Managing Editor. Also a Standard History of the World. Complete in one Volume xxxviii + 2916 pp. New York and London: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1913. 4°. Full morocco, \$30.

The Standard Dictionary has long held its place with the best of the modern encyclopaedic dictionaries, both as to the matter included and as to the treatment of this matter. This new edition is claimed to be "a new creation from cover to cover". This, of course, is rather euphemistic,—eufemistic, the Dictionary would prefer us to write. Its definition of eufemism is: "A figure of speech by which a word or phrase more agreeable or less offensive is substituted for one more accurately expressive of what is meant." This edition is a full revision of that of 1894, with many new terms and much additional matter under old terms. It records and defines over 450,000 terms, has over 3,000 pages and more than 7,000 illustrations. It includes in one alphabet the names of persons and places with the usual matter of a dictionary. This is distinctly desirable. In arriving at its contents 513,000 terms were critically examined and 63,000 of these rejected "as dead, obsolescent, of little or no value, and too rare or specific for a dictionary". There are about 65,000 proper names. The succinct historical statements in connection with the names of places are admirable. The full dates of historical events of importance are given in connection with the places with which they are associated. To indicate pronunciation two keys are used. Each word is respelled first in the Revised Scientific (or National Education Association) Alphabet, and second in what is commonly called the "Text-book Key". This use of the two keys is considered necessary during the period of transition from the second or old key to the new. The publishers, being warm advocates of "simplified" spelling have not neglected the opportunity of furthering the interests of this "reform". The simplified form is given the preference. Thus the word fizzle, given first, is defined under fizl; abuse under abuze. This is not true of surprize, which is defined under surprise. When a word is both a noun and a verb the rule of giving the verb first seems to have been strictly followed; but in the case of such a word as horse, it does not seem the proper order, since the noun must have been long in use before it began to be used as a verb. In the matter of definitions the most common meanings are given first. This sensible plan is based on the fact that "the average man (speaking in a general way) goes to a dictionary to find one or more of three things about a word, (1) Its correct spelling; (2) its correct pronunciation; (3) its most common present meaning". The number of illustrative quotations given, 32,000, is large for a one-volume dictionary, and these were selected from 2,000,000 sub-

mitted. And this is an illustration of the extraordinary amount of labor bestowed upon the Dictionary. At the end of the volume there are a list of disputed pronunciations, a list of foreign words and phrases, the population of towns, cities, etc., and the chief world events for each day of the year in order of the calendar. The mechanical features of the work are excellent. A two volume edition will meet the wishes of those who do not care to handle so large a book. On the whole it may be said that at the present time the New Standard is the most comprehensive and satisfactory of the larger English dictionaries. The propriety of including in it certain spellings preferred by a small number of English speaking people may be questioned. There are, properly speaking, that is from a dictionary standpoint, no such words in the English language as *fizl*, *muzl*, *puzl*, and the like.

Princeton.

JOSEPH H. DULLES.

Series xxxi Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science under the Direction of the Department of History, Political Economy, and Political Science. No. 1. *The Land System in Maryland 1720-1765*. By CLARENCE P. GOULD, Ph.D., Michael O. Fisher Professor of History in the University of Wooster. Pamph.; pp. xii, 106. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1913. Also No. 2. *The Government of American Trade Unions*. By THEODORE W. GLOCKER, Ph.D., Professor of Economics and Sociology in the University of Tennessee. Pamph.; pp. vii, 242. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1913.

These two scholarly and exhaustive treatises would seem to be well up to the high standard set by the others of these series several of which have been favorably noticed in this Review.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, October: HENRY P. SMITH, Charles Augustus Briggs; W. W. FENN, Modern Liberalism; CHARLES J. BUSHNELL, Place of Religion in Modern Life; SHIRLEY J. CASE, Problem of Christianity's Essence; ERNEST D. BURTON, Spirit, Soul, and Flesh in Greek Writers from Homer to Aristotle; EDGAR J. GOODSPEED, The Freer Gospels; ROBINSON SMITH, Fresh Light on the Synoptic Problem.

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, October: RAYMOND L. BRIDGMAN, A Bureau of National Assistance; JACOB THE SON OF AARON, The Book of Enlightenment; W. ST. CLAIR TISDALL, New Solution of an Old Problem; J. J. LIAS, Genuineness of the Second Epistle of St. Peter; ALLISON E. DRAKE, Some Evidences of Aryo-Semitic Kinship; A. NOORDIJZIJ, Old Testament Revelation of God and the Ancient Oriental Life; JAMES M. GRAY, Awakening of American Protestantism; HAROLD M. WIENER, Studies in Septuagintal Texts of Leviticus.

Church Quarterly Review, London, October: VISCOUNT WOLMER, Church and Parliament; ARTHUR CHANDLER, Saint Teresa; F. W. PULLER, Grace of Orders and Apostolic Succession; ELIZABETH WORDSWORTH, Jane Austen; MAURICE F. JONES, Language of the New Testament; J. G. SIMPSON, Presbyterian Reunion in Scotland; G. C. BOSANQUET, Christianity as a Gospel; H. F. HAMILTON, Canadian Unity Proposals.

Constructive Quarterly, New York, December: LÉONCE DE GRANDMAISON, Witness of the Spirit; CHARLES E. JEFFERSON, The Church and World Brotherhood; PERCY DEARMER, Love in the Churches; JAMES LINDSAY, Protestantism and Catholicism: Two Methods even More than Two Religions; JAMES R. MACDONALD, Religion and the Labour Movement; T. A. FINLAY, Brotherhood Through Business; ERNST VON DOBSCHÜTZ, The Gospel and Ascetism; HUGH R. MACKINTOSH, Heart of the Gospel and the Preacher; MICHAEL KROSSNOGEON, Religious Freedom in Russia; ARTHUR J. BROWN, High Church Anglicans and American Presbyterians in Shantung University; EDWYN BEVAN, Invocation of the Saints; CHARLES JOHNSTON, Paul and Philo; WALTER LOCK, An English Mystic.

East & West, London, October: ARTHUR HIRTZEL, Imperial Christianity; ALAN G. S. GIBSON, Christianity among the Bantu in South Africa; FRANK LENWOOD, Revenges of Caste upon the Christian Church in India; STANLEY P. SMITH, Chinese Philosophy and the Truth as it is in Christ Jesus; LESLIE JOHNSTON, Supply of Missionaries—the Apostolic Way; CHARLES HALDON, Judson, of Burma.

Expositor, London, October: W. SANDAY, Text of the Apostolic Decrees; G. BUCHANAN GRAY, Forms of Hebrew Poetry. 5. Varieties of Rhythm; ALBERT SCHWEITZER, The Sanity of the "Eschatological" Jesus; F. R. TENNANT, Aim and Scope of Philosophy of Religion; T. R. GLOVER, Teaching of Jesus upon Sin as Shown in the First Three Gospels; ALLAN MENZIES, Integrity of 2 Corinthians; T. W. CRAFER, Stoning of St. Paul at Lystra and the Epistle to the Galatians. *The Same*, November: B. D. EERDMANS, Primitive Religious Thought in the Old Testament; JOHN MURPHY, Psychology of Religious Development and Experience; ALEX SOUTER, Pastoral Epistles, Timothy I and II; SCHWEITZER, The Sanity of the "Eschatological" Jesus; J. RENDEL HARRIS, Some Notes on the History of the Syriac New Testament; F. C. CONYBEARE, Stoning of St. Stephen; W. A. CURTIS, The Altar of Unhewn Stone. *The Same*, December: JOHANNES DAHSE, Reply to Principal Skinner; ARTHUR CARR, Patience of Job; ADAM C. WELCH, Present Position of Old Testament Criticism; G. BUCHANAN GRAY, Forms of Hebrew Poetry. 6. Bearing of Certain Critical Theories on Criticism and Interpretation; SCHWEITZER, Sanity of "Eschatological" Jesus.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, November: J. RENDEL HARRIS, The So-Called Biblical Greek; LOUIS H. GRAY, New Testament Fragments from Turkestan; B. B. WARFIELD, The Importunate Widow and the Alleged Failure of Faith; WILLIAM HAMILTON, Many Mansions for God. *The Same*, December: J. ARTHUR THOMSON, Biological Control

of Life; F. H. WOODS, Revision of the Prayer-Book Psalter; T. G. PINCHES, Ancestor Worship and the Deification of Babylonian Kings; B. B. WARFIELD, The Importunate Widow and the Alleged Failure of Faith.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, October: KARL BORNHAUSEN, Study Religion, Theology, and the Churches of United States; CHARLES W. ELIOT, Churches and the Prevailing Social Sentiment; PRESERVED SMITH, Luther's Development of Doctrine of Justification by Faith Only; LUCIUS H. MILLER, Teaching of Ernst Troeltsch of Heidelberg; HERBERT A. YOUTZ, Peril of a Safe Theology; WILLIAM M. SALTER, An Introductory Word on Nietzsche; KEMPER FULLERTON, The Book of Isaiah: Critical Problems and a New Commentary.

Hibbert Journal, Boston, October: THEODORE ROOSEVELT, The Progressive Party; FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, Some Laymen's Needs; FREDERICK POLLOCK, The Relation of Mystic Experience to Philosophy; PRINGLE-PATTISON, "The Free Man's Worship"; ERNEST HAMILTON, Immortality and Competition; CHARLES E. OZANNE, Significance of "Non-Evidential Material" in Psychical Research; CECIL REDDIE, "The Public Schools and the Empire"; E. H. JONES, Evolution of the Social Conscience towards Crime and Industrialism; F. W. LEITH ROSS, International Morality; H. H. WENDT, Historical Trustworthiness of the Book of Acts; G. W. WADE, Miracles and Christianity; JOHN ERSKINE, The Moral Obligation to be Intelligent.

Hindustan Review, Allahabad, November: BISHAN N. DAR, Indian Progress and Anglo-Indian Opinion. II; P. C. GHOSH, European Intercourse with India during the Middle Ages; The Anti-Bengali Crusade; H. N. MAITRA, Rabindra Nath Tagore; J. N. SEN, History of the Portuguese Oppression in Bengal; K. L. L. OZA, A Short View of Great Questions; R. N. SINHA, Siva Sankar Sahay.

International Journal of Ethics, Philadelphia, October: G. F. BARBOUR, Christian Ethics and the Ideal of Nationality; H. S. SHELTON, Hegelian Concept of the State and Modern Individualism; HORACE M. KALLEN, Art, Philosophy, and Life; N. C. MUKERJI, Martineau on the Object and Mode of Moral Judgment; Proceedings of the Conference on Legal and Social Philosophy.

Interpreter, London, October: CANON KENNETT, Some Principles of Interpretation; G. W. WADE, The Resurrection in the Gospels and in St. Paul; CANON FOAKES-JACKSON, Literary Appreciation of the History of Israel; W. K. L. CLARKE, A Trinity of Evil; L. W. GRENSTED, Pain and Personality; R. W. BALLEINE, St. Paul in Arabia; A. T. CADOUX, Forgiveness, Human and Divine; C. H. W. JOHNS, Orientalia.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin, October: HUGH POPE, Where Are We in Pentateuchal Criticism? THOMAS GOGARTY, Dawn of the Reformation II; FRANCIS E. GIGOT, Virgin Birth in St. Luke's Gospel; J. B. O'CONNELL, Idealism; FRANCIS ROLA, Modern Mysticism; LAURENTIUS JANSSENS, Commissio Pontifica de re Biblica.

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, October: FRANK I. SCHECHTER, Rightlessness of Medieval English Jewry; B. HALPER, Scansion

of Medieval Hebrew Pottery; MAX RADIN, A Charter of Privileges of the Jews in Ancona of the Year 1535; NAHUM SLOUSCH, Representative Government among the Hebrews and Phoenicians.

Jewish Review, London, November: The Blood Accusation in Russia; Emancipation of the Roumanian Jew; Palestine and Panama; ISRAEL COHEN, General Survey of Modern Jewry; M. SIMON, Nachman Krochmal; HERBERT BENTWICH, Jewish Mission and the Hebrew University; ISALAH RAFFALOVICH, Legal Devices.

Journal of Biblical Literature, Boston, September: PAUL HAUPT, Cuneiform Name of the Second Adar; FREDERICK A. VANDERBURGH, Babylonian Name of Palestine; J. DYNELEY PRINCE, Ichabod; M. G. KYLE, The Hyksos at Heliopolis; WALDO S. PRATT, Studies in the Diction of the Psalter II; HENRY A. SANDERS, Latin Prologues of John; B. W. BACON, Genealogies of Jesus.

Journal of Theological Studies, London, October: C. BOUTFLOWER, Isaiah 21 in the Light of Assyrian History; J. PINKERTON, Origin and Early History of the Syriac Pentateuch; W. EMERY BARNES, New Edition of Pentateuch in Syriac; E. A. ABBOTT AND R. H. CONNOLLY, Original Language of the Odes of Solomon; W. K. L. CLARKE, First Epistle of Peter and the Odes of Solomon; C. H. TURNER, Primitive Edition of Apostolic Constitutions and Canons: an Early List of Apostles and Disciples; J. C. WEST, Order of 1 and 2 Thessalonians; E. G. KING, Some Notes on Text of Job; G. H. WHITAKER, Words of Agrippa to St. Paul.

London Quarterly Review, London, October: GEORGE G. FINDLAY, Methodist Missionary Centenary; SAINT Nihal SINGH, Egypt's Impending Fate; H. MALDWIN HUGHES, The Evangelical Succession; W. ERNEST TOMLINSON, Cavour and his Times; F. W. ORDE WARD, Christ: The World's Failure and the World's Foundation; J. A. FINDLAY, A Protestant of the Second Century; FERRAND E. CORLEY, The Poverty of God.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, October: ABDEL R. WENTZ, Significant Parallels between Church History and Political History of the United States; DAVID H. BAUSLIN, Impracticable Ideals in Church Unity; ELSIE S. LEWARS, Lutheran Institutions in the Battle of Gettysburg and its Anniversary; HAROLD HEISEY, Psychological Study of Religion; J. L. NEVE, Thoughts on Spinoza and his System; J. C. JACOBY, Confessional Principles of the Lutheran Church; V. G. A. TRESSLER, What Shall We Do with the Philosophy of Rudolph Fucken? C. W. HEATHCOTE, The Papacy since 1870.

Methodist Review, New York, November-December: W. I. HAVEN, Bishop Willard F. Mallalieu; THOS. S. DONOHUGH, "Mass Movements" in India; A. J. BUCHER, History and Present Condition of Church Singing; JAMES MUDGE, George Fox and the Quakers; PHILIP L. FRICK, Pragmatism and Haeckel's Denials; CHARLOTTE F. WILDER, Ancient Worthies—Christopher North; A. W. HEWITT, Steeples among the Hills.

Methodist Review Quarterly, Nashville, October: WILLIAM A. BROWN, Theological Leadership; HAROLD BEGBIE, A New Time-Spirit;

W. H. FITCHETT, The Towel and the Basin; H. W. CLARK, Ibsen and the Spirit of Revolt; WASHINGTON GLADDEN, The Call of the Kingdom; GEORGE B. FOSTER, Tolstoi; E. C. DARGAN, Charles Haddon Spurgeon; J. H. LIGHT, Son of Buzi; MARY N. MOORE, Shall Our Methodism Accord Women the Privileges of the Laity?; C. A. WATERFIELD, Lost: John Wesley; MRS. WILLIAM COURT, Social Service Lines of Home Mission Work; C. V. ROMAN, Racial Self-Respect and Racial Antagonism.

Monist, Chicago, October: BERTRAND RUSSELL, Philosophical Importance Mathematical Logic; RICHARD GARBE, Christian Element in the Bhagavadgita; ALBERT J. EDMUNDS, Accessibility of Buddhist Lore to the Christian Evangelist; ALFRED H. LLOYD, High Comedy of Philosophy; OTTO HERRMANN, Monism of German Monistic League; SYDNEY WATERLOW, "Interlingua" and the Problem of a Universal Language; C. L. MARSH, The Agnostic.

Moslem World, London, October: S. G. WILSON, Russia's Occupation of Northern Persia; Western Influences on Mohammedan Law; Islam from a Medical Standpoint; H. FRENCH RIDLEY, Moslems of China and the Republic; A. W. STOCKING, Education and Evangelization in Persia; C. S. G. MYLREA, Points of Contact or Contrast; W. ST. CLAIR TISDALL, Latest Mohammedan Mare's Nest; A. T. UPSON, Arabic Christian Literature since the Lucknow Conference.

Philosophical Review, Lancaster, November: BERNARD MUSCIO, Degrees of Reality; HENRY W. WRIGHT, Practical Success as the Criterion of Truth; DONALD W. FISHER, Problems of the Value-Judgment; NANN C. BARR, Dualism of Bergson.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, October: CORNELIUS WOELFKIN, Test of a Permanent Civilization; R. F. REED, Minister's Task in the Field of Theology; THEODORE F. HERMAN, Essential Elements of Religious Education; H. H. APPLE, Function of the College in the Making of a Man; PAUL B. RUPP, The Church and Modern Social Problems; RAY H. DOTTERER, Shall we Pray for Rain?; CLAYTON H. RANCK, Beneficiary Education in the Reformed Church; A. V. HIESTER, Contemporary Sociology.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, October: W. O. CARVER, Significance of Adoniram Judson; GALUSHA ANDERSON, Atonement Through Sympathy; E. B. POLLARD, Luther Rice and His Place in American Baptist History, II; SALLY N. ROACH, Love in its Relation to Service; GIOVANNI LUZZI, Modernism, II.

Yale Review, New Haven, October: ALFRED NOYES, A Watchword of the Fleet; WILLIAM G. SUMNER, Earth Hunger or the Philosophy of Land Grabbing; JOHN BURROUGHS, An Ever Present Mystery; J. B. BURY, The Fall of Constantinople; YANDELL HENDERSON, Progressive Movement and Constitutional Reform; LOUIS V. LEDOUX, A Sicilian Idyl; GAMALIEL BRADFORD, A Gentleman of Athens; BEULAH B. AMRAM, Giovanni Pascoli; HENRY A. PERKINS, The Schoolboy's Two Lost Years; JAMES W. TOUMEY, Who Should Own the Forests; EDWARD M. CHAPMAN, The New England of Sarah Orne Jewett.

Union Seminary Review, Richmond, October-November: T. C. JOHN-

SON, Dr. GIVENS BROWN Strickler; A. M. SCALES, The Atlanta Assembly; THERON H. RICE, Our First Lesson in the School of Christ; THORNTON WHALING, The Church and Social Reform; E. C. GORDON, Christianity and Miracle.

La Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Noviembre-Diciembre: NORBERTO DEL PRADO, El Problema ontológica (conclusion); ANTOIN L. PELÁEZ, Valor de la prensa periódica; LUIS G. A. GETINO, De Vitoria a Godoy. La edad de oro de San Esteban de Salamanca; FRANCISCO TRAPIELLO, Apreciaciones sobre la doctrina molinista.

Lehre und Wehre, St. Louis, September: D. Walther über Behandlung der Logenfrage; Das erste Auftreten der römischen Kirche in Nordamerika und die Religionsfreiheit; Die trunkene Wissenschaft; was sie will, und warum wir wenig Respekt vor ihr haben (Schluss). *The Same*, Oktober: Die "Wahl zum Glauben" ausdrücklich in der Schrift gelehrt; Etwas über die Gleichnisse unsers Herrn, sonderlich über ihren dreisachen Zweck; Das erste Auftreten der römischen Kirche in Nordamerika und die Religionsfreiheit. *The Same*, November: Die Tennesseesynode; Etwas über die Gleichnisse unseres Herrn, sonderlich über ihren dreifachen Zweck.

Recherches de Science Religieuse, Paris, Novembre-Décembre: XAVIER ROIRON, Saint Paul témoin de la primauté de saint Pierre; LEOPOLD CADIÈRE, Les religions de l'Annam; JOSEPH DE GUIBERT, Sur l'emploi d' *ἀπὸς* et de ses synonymes dans le Nouveau Testament; LOUIS LAURAND, La théorie du cursus dans saint Augustin; PROSPER SCHEPENS, Un anonyme patristique, cite par Fauste de Riez; JOSEPH DE GHELLINCK, Un épisode dans l'histoire de l'argument patristique au moyen âge; JEAN BAINVEL, D'un désaccord entre saint Thomas poète et saint Thomas théologien; CUTHBERT LATTEY, Sur un exemplaire d'Astruc.

Rendiconti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei, Roma, Settembre: PERICLE DUCATI, Egesisi di una Pelike Attica da Jpuz-Oba; MATTEO DELLA CORTE, Il Pomerium di Pompei; F. MASCI, La Filosofia dei Valori; C. CONTI ROSSINI, Schizzo del dialetto Saho dell'Alta Assaorta in Eritrea.

Revue Benedictine, Paris, Octobre: G. MORIN, Discours inedit de saint Augustin pour l'ordination d'un évêque; O. CASEL, Eine missverständene Stelle Cyprians; D. DE BRUYNE, De l'origine de quelques textes liturgiques mozarabes; A. WILMART, L'index liturgique de Saint-Thierry; H. LECLERQ, La liturgie catholique; G. MORIN, Une restitution en faveur d'Alcuin.

Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique, Louvain, Octobre: L. DIEU, Le commentaire sur Jérémie du Pseudo-Chrysostome serait-il l'oeuvre de Polychronius d'Apamée?; L. LAURAND, Le cursus dans le sacramentaire léonien; J. DE GHELLINCK, Les notes marginales du Liber sententiarum (fin); CH. MOELLER, Les bûchers et les auto-de-fé de l'inquisition depuis le moyen âge (fin).

Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, Lausanne, Septembre: ARNOLD REYMOND, La philosophie de M. Bergson et le probleme de la raison; HUGO GRESSMANN, La science de l'Ancien Testament et la tâche

actuelle; EUGÈNE DE FAYE, Les études gnostiques (1870-1912); HENRI-L. MIÉVILLE, La notion d'expérience d'après W. James; CH. SCHENTZLER, Zwingli et Calvin; Un testament philosophique; L. MONASTIER-SCHROEDER, Un problème hymnologique.

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JESUS' ALLEGED CONFESSION OF SIN

The pericope of "the rich young ruler" is found in all three of the Synoptic Gospels, and it is associated in all of them with narratives of a common type. In all three it immediately follows the account of Jesus' receiving and blessing little children; and it is clear from Mark's representation (as also indeed from Matthew's¹) that the incident actually occurred in immediate sequence to that scene. In Luke, these two narratives are immediately preceded by the parable of the Pharisee and Publican praying in the Temple; in Matthew they are immediately succeeded by the parable of the workmen in the vineyard who were surprised that their rewards were not nicely adjusted to what they deemed their relative services. It cannot be by accident that these four narratives, all of which teach a similar lesson, are brought thus into contiguity. It is the burden of them all that the Kingdom of God is a gratuity, not an acquisition; and the effect of bringing them together is to throw a great emphasis upon this, their common teaching.

Perhaps this teaching finds nowhere more pungent intimation than in the declaration of our Lord which forms the core of the account of His reception of the children: "For of such is the kingdom of heaven," (or "of God": Mt. xix. 14; Mk. x. 14; Lk. xviii. 16). These "little children" were, as we learn from Luke, mere babies (Lk. xiii. 15: τὰ βρέφη), which Jesus held in His arms (Mk. x. 16: ἐναγκα-

¹ Accordingly, Th. Zahn, *Das Evangelium des Matthæus ausgelegt*, 1903, p. 589 says correctly (on Mt. xix. 16): "The close chronological connection is assured by the καὶ ἰδοὺ, verse 16, after ἐπορεύθη ἐκεῖθεν, verse 15."

λίσσόμενος ; cf. ix. 36 and also Lk. ii. 28).² What Jesus says, therefore, is that those who enter the Kingdom of God are like "infants of days". Such infants are not to be debarred from coming³ to Him, because forsooth they cannot profit by His teaching or profit Him by their service. It is precisely of such⁴ as they that the Kingdom of God consists. "And verily I say unto you," He adds, "who-soever shall not receive the Kingdom of God as a little child, he shall in no wise enter therein" (Mk. x. 15; Lk. xviii. 17). The meaning is accurately expressed in Alford's paraphrase (the emphases are his own): "In order for us who are mature to come to Him, we must cast away all that wherein our maturity has caused us to differ from them and *become LIKE THEM*. . . . None can enter God's Kingdom except *as an infant*." But when Alford comes to explain what "as an infant" means, he loses the thread and

² Therefore Zahn, p. 587-8, is quite right when he comments on Matthew's παιδία: "Little children who were still in the arms (therefore, Lk. xviii. 15 βρέφη), were brought by their mothers or nurses to Jesus."

³ T. R. Glover, *The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire*, 1909, p. 121, remarks: "We are apt to forget that 'come' is a Greek verb carrying volition with it." This is scarcely true. Ἐρχομαι expresses rather mere motion, progress: cf. e.g. Mt. ii. 9, vi. 10, vii. 25, 27, ix. 15, x. 13, xviii. 7, xxiii. 35.

⁴ That is, not of infants like those now in His presence, but of people like those infants in the qualities which had led to their debarring. Zahn, however (p. 588), reasonably argues that in the τῶν τοιούτων there is included also a τούτων, or rather a καὶ τούτων. He soon, however, transforms this into its opposite, as if he were arguing that in a designated τούτοις there was also a καὶ τοιούτων included: "not only do the little children belong to the Kingdom and the Kingdom to them, but the Kingdom belongs only to them and to such as have become like them." Similarly Loisy, *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, 1908, II, p. 205. What our Lord says is that the Kingdom consists not of children, but of those who are like children; actual children are no doubt included, but we must not reverse the emphasis. Even Calvin (*Inst.* IV, xvi. 7 *ad fin.*), arguing for infant baptism, yields to the temptation to reverse it: "When He commands that infants should be permitted to come to Him, nothing is clearer than that He means true infancy. That this may not seem absurd He adds: 'Of such is the kingdom of heaven'. But if infants must be included, it cannot be doubtful that by the term 'of such' there are designated infants themselves and also those who are like them."

thinks of the innocence, the simplicity, the trustfulness of childhood, or the like.⁵ That in which maturity differs from infancy, however, lies just in its self-dependence and power of self-help. We become "as a little child" when, in the words of the revival hymn which was such an offence to James Anthony Froude, "we cast our deadly doing down" and make our appeal on the sole score of sheer helplessness.

Zahn, therefore, strikes a much truer note when he comments:⁶ "Over against the fancy (*Dünkel*) of the disciples, who ground their claim that the Kingdom belongs to them on their intelligence and will, Jesus reminds them that they must rather, by renunciation of their own intelligence and will, obtain the receptivity (*Empfänglichkeit*) for the blessings and benefit of the Kingdom which the immature children possess of themselves." And so does Wendt:⁷ "But in this very respect, of having no claim, so that they could offer nothing but only wish to have something, Jesus finds the ground for the children being permitted to come to Him, that He might show them His love and give them His blessing. For in their unpretentious receptivity He recognizes the necessary condition which must exist in all who would enter the Kingdom of God." "Under this childlike character, He does not understand any virtue of childlike blamelessness, but only the receptivity itself (which is the notion impressively emphasized by Him) on the part of

⁵ It would be difficult to go more astray here than A. Loisy does (p. 205): "He profits by the occasion to remind them of the moral worth of infants, and of the merit which belongs to the spirit of infancy. . . . Nothing is opposed to Jesus' having in view infants and those who resemble them in the spirit of candor and of simplicity." C. G. Montefiori (*The Synoptic Gospels*, 1909, I, p. 243) is better, though still confused: "The child symbolizes or represents the temper in which the Kingdom must be received. Humble trust, a complete lack of assertiveness, no consciousness of 'merit' or desert, simple confidence and purity,—these are the qualities which Jesus means to indicate in the character of a true child. The Kingdom can only be entered by those who can approach it in such a spirit." New-born babies represent no particular temper, and exemplify no particular spirit: they illustrate a particular condition.

⁶ Pp. 588-9.

⁷ H. H. Wendt, *The Teaching of Jesus*, E. T., II, pp. 49-50.

those who do not regard themselves as too good or too bad for the offered gift, but receive it with hearty desire." The emphasis which these expositors throw on "receptivity" as the characteristic of infancy—as if it were an active quality—is not drawn from the text but belongs to the habits of thought derived by them from a Lutheran inheritance. It requires to be eliminated before the meaning of our Lord's enunciation can be purely caught. Infancy is characterized by "receptivity" as little as by "blamelessness" or by "trustfulness"; its characteristic is just helpless need. He who receives⁸ the Kingdom of God "as a little child" receives it (in this sense) passively; is the pure recipient, not the earner of its blessings. What our Lord here declares is thus, in brief, that no one enters the Kingdom of God save as an infant enters the world, naked and helpless and without any claim upon it whatever.

No more illuminating comment on our Lord's teaching here could easily be imagined than that which is supplied by the immediately succeeding incident, that of the rich young ruler. No sooner had our Lord announced that "whosoever shall not receive the Kingdom of God as a little child, he shall in no wise enter therein", than one appeared before Him bent on making his way into the Kingdom in quite another fashion. And, indeed, if any could hope to acquire it for himself, it might well be supposed to be this eager young man. He had everything to commend him. He was young, he was rich, he was highly placed, he was clean. He was accustomed to desire good things, and, desiring them, he was accustomed to obtain them for himself: and, with the resources at his command,—resources of youthful energy, wealth, position, moral earnestness—he was accustomed to obtain them without much difficulty. He had heard of Jesus, perhaps had heard Him; and he recognized in Him a good man whose counsel were well worth

⁸ Δέχομαι, not λαμβάνω (or αἰρέω) is the word our Lord uses, and despite the wearing off of the edges of the distinction in usage, the difference remains fundamentally good that λαβεῖν is taking, δέξασθαι is receiving.

having. And he had conceived a commendable desire for the eternal life which Jesus was proclaiming. What remained but to learn from this good teacher what needed to be done, in order to obtain it? It never occurred to this rich and influential youth, accustomed to get what he wanted, but that this good thing which he now desired might be obtainable at its own proper price; and was he not prepared and fully able to pay the price and so to secure it? It seemed to him an easy thing to purchase eternal life.

It was our Lord's painful task, in response to the young man's appeal for guidance, to reveal him to himself in the shallowness of his nature and outlook; to open his eyes to the nature of that eternal life which he sought, in its radical difference from the life he was living; and to make it clear to him that what he had thought so easy to acquire was to be had only at a great price, a price which he might not be willing to pay, a price which he might find it was impossible for him to pay. And it was our Lord's task, further, on the basis of this incident, to carry home poignantly to the consciousness of His disciples the lesson He had already taught them in the incident of the blessing of the little children, that the Kingdom of God is not a thing into which in any case men can buy their way; that they stand before it helpless, and can make their way into it as little as a camel can force itself through the eye of a needle. It may be conferred by God: it cannot be acquired by men.⁹

As the result of his conversation, the young man departed with his countenance fallen,¹⁰ exceeding sorrowful,¹¹

⁹ Nothing could be more inapt than to say with Montefiori (1, p. 243); "Wellhausen points out most aptly how Shakespeare [Rich. II, act v, scene v] has felt the contrast between this section [on the blessing of the children] and the section which follows it [on the rich young man]. For *here* the Kingdom is a gift which one must accept as a child, *there* it is only to be won by effort and self-denial." In both sections alike the Kingdom is a pure gift and cannot be earned.

¹⁰ Mk. x. 22, *στυγνάζας*, full of gloom; cf. Swete's note *in loc.*

¹¹ Lk. xviii. 23, *περίλυπος*, hemmed in on all sides by sorrow, so that there is no escape; cf. *Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies*, 1912, p. 76.

—the eternal life which he had expected to reach out his hand and take was not for him. And the disciples had had borne in upon them with tremendous force the fundamental fact that salvation¹² in every case of its accomplishment is nothing less than an authentic miracle of divine grace; always and everywhere in the strictest sense impossible with man, and possible only with God, with whom all things are possible. The effect of this teaching, if it was naturally to depress those who sought eternal life by their own efforts, was equally naturally to exhilarate those who were looking to God alone for the blessings of the Kingdom, giving them a higher sense of both their certainty and their value. This surely is the right account to give of Peter's question (Mt. xix. 27; Mk. x. 28; Lk. xviii. 28), with our Lord's response to which the conversation closes. We cannot say, then, with Edersheim:¹³ "It almost jars on our ears, and prepares us for still stranger and sadder things to come, when Peter, perhaps as spokesman for the rest, seems to remind our Lord that they had forsaken all to follow Him." Peter rather, his heart swelling with freshly inflamed hope (*spe ex verbis Salvatoris concepta*, remarks Bengel accurately) inquires eagerly (not boastfully but in humble gratitude) into the nature of the blessings which God has in mind for those who have entered the Kingdom.¹⁴ Our Lord meets the inquiry in its own spirit and grants to His followers

¹² It is worth noting how the terms "eternal life", "the kingdom of God", "salvation" are interchanged in the narrative, as an indication of the sense put upon them by our Lord. In the conversation with the young man, the term used is "eternal life" (Mt. xix. 17, "life"). But on our Lord's turning to His disciples (Mt. xix. 23; Mk. xvi. 23; Lk. xviii. 24) "the Kingdom of God [heaven]" is substituted for this with no substantial change of meaning. This in turn in all three narratives (Mt. xix. 25; Mk. x. 26; Lk. xviii. 26) is understood by the disciples to be equivalent to "salvation". "Eternal life" appears again at the end (Mt. xix. 29; Mk. x. 30; Lk. xviii. 30).

¹³ *Life and Times of Jesus*,¹ II, p. 343; cf. the even more condemnatory note of Swete on Mk. x. 28, where he seems to suggest that a "tactless frankness" of speech meets us in Mark's report, which Luke already found it desirable to soften, and that Matthew's "what then shall we have" we may hope was never spoken.

¹⁴ Cf. A. Plummer, on Lk. xviii. 28.

a splendid vision of their reward,—only closing with words which would leave fixed in their minds the consciousness that all things are reserved to the Divine discretion: "And many shall be last that are first; and first that are last."

There are no substantial differences between the three reports which are given us of this remarkable incident. Each of the Evangelists records details peculiar to himself. Each narrative has its own tone and coloring: Mark's is distinguished by vividness, Luke's by plain straightforwardness, Matthew's by clearness. But it is precisely the same story which is told by them all: the same story in its contents, in its mode of development, in its dénouement, in its lesson. Having any one of the three we have it all, presented after the same fashion and with the same force. It has no doubt been common to represent the descriptions of the opening scene, by Mark and Luke on the one hand and by Matthew on the other, as divergent; and this divergence has been magnified, and serious inferences have been drawn from it, derogatory to Matthew's integrity as a historian and injurious to our Lord's dignity as a Divine person and even to His moral perfection. All this rests upon misunderstanding. The wide-spread vogue it has obtained requires, nevertheless, that it shall be carefully looked into.

A simple reading of the opening two verses in the three accounts reveals at once, of course, a formal difference between Mark and Luke on the one side and Matthew on the other in their reports alike of the words in which the young man addressed Jesus and of those in which our Lord responded to his inquiry. In Mark (and Luke) we read that the young man addressed Jesus as "Good Master" and asked Him broadly, "What shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?" In Matthew, he is represented as addressing Him simply as "Master," and asking Him with more exact definition, "What good thing shall I do that I may have life?" Correspondingly, Jesus is represented in Mark (and Luke) as replying, "Why callest thou me good? No one is good except one, God. Thou knowest the commandments . . .";

but in Matthew, "Why askest thou me concerning the good? One there is that is good. But if thou wishest to enter into life, keep the commandments" We have spoken of these differences as formal; it would seem to be difficult to magnify them into anything more. Though, naturally, a matter of curious interest, they in no way affect the significance of the story itself. Despite them the two narratives, even at this precise point, yield exactly the same general sense and differ only in the details through which this common sense is brought to expression. To make this evident we need only to attend separately to what each mode of telling the story actually places before us.

According to Matthew, then, scarcely had Jesus issued from the house in which He had received and blessed the children,¹⁵ when an individual (there is a slight emphasis upon his being *one* out of the multitude) came to Him, and, addressing Him as "Master", (that is, "Teacher", or "Rabbi"), asked Him, "What good thing shall I do that I may have eternal life?" He is asking, not for general prescriptions of righteousness, but for a particular requirement by doing just which he may secure the eternal life he seeks; and so set is his mind upon this particular good thing that when Jesus refers him to the divine commandments in general, he still demands (verse 18), "Which?" In response to his demand, nevertheless, Jesus points him just to the divine commandments, thus in effect repelling the implication that eternal life can be grounded on anything but that entire righteousness reflected in the law of God; and, behind that, suggesting that it was not instruction in righteousness that the young man needed but the power of a new life. Jesus' reply amounts, thus, to saying: "Why make inquiry concerning the good thing needed? There is One who is good and He has given commandments; keep them." It is the equivalent of, "They have Moses and the Prophets; let them hear them" of Luke xvi. 29. What Jesus actually says is: "Why askest thou me concerning

¹⁵ So Zahn correctly, p. 589.

the good? There is One that is good, and,¹⁶ if thou wishest to enter into life, keep His commandments."

The thing to be noted particularly is that no emphasis falls on the enclitic *με*, and therefore no contrast is intimated between Jesus and the One that is good. The contrast intimated is wholly between the good thing inquired of and the known commandments of God. To avoid the almost inevitable emphasizing of the "me" in a translation, it might be well to omit it altogether for the moment and to paraphrase simply: "Why dost thou inquire about the good as if that were a matter still in doubt? God, who is goodness itself, has published the eternal rule of righteousness." Keim,¹⁷ it is true, scoffs at the notion that no contrast is drawn between Jesus and God. "But *ἐγώ*," he cries, meaning that quite apart from the *με* the contrast is inherent in the mere declaration that "there is One"—that is to say, only One—"who is good". There is, however, an inadvertence apparent in this. The declaration that "there is One that is good" does set God in contrast with all others: it is to God in His already published will, not to anyone else whatever, that we are to go to learn the law of life. But it does not set God in contrast specifically with Jesus. So soon as it is read as contrasting God specifically with Jesus an emphasis is necessarily thrown on the enclitic *με* which it will not bear. Jesus is therefore not contrasting Himself here with God. He is only in the most emphatic way pointing to God and His published law as the unique source of the law of life. His own relation to that God is completely out of sight, and nothing whatever is suggested with reference to it. Zahn is accordingly entirely right when he writes:¹⁸ "For the question of the position Jesus assigns Himself between the one good One who is God and men who are evil, little occasion is given by this paedagogic conversation."

¹⁶ It is the continuative *δέ*, like *autem*: cf. Meyer *in loc.*

¹⁷ *Jesus of Nazara*, E. T., V, p., 37, note.

¹⁸ P. 590, note 64.

Mark, like Matthew, connects the incident of the rich young man closely with that of the blessing of the little children. It was while Jesus was in the act of coming forth from the house (verse 10) in which the blessing of the children had taken place, for His journeying,¹⁹ that an individual from the crowd (*ἐκ*) came running, and fell on his knees, and, addressing Him by the unusual title of "Good Master", demanded of Him what he should do to inherit eternal life. It is the strangeness of the address, "Good Master"—apparently unexampled in extant Jewish literature²⁰—which attracts attention here; and naturally it was this which determined the response of Jesus.²¹ It threw into relief—as it would not have done had it been more customary—the levity with which the young man approached Jesus of whom he knew so little, with so remarkable a demand. Jesus' response naturally, therefore, takes the form, "Why callest thou me good? No one is good except one, God. Thou knowest the commandments" This response

¹⁹ Cf. B. Weiss *in loc.*

²⁰ Cf. Edersheim, *Life and Times*, II, p. 339: "In no recorded instance was a Jewish Rabbi addressed as 'Good Master'"; A. Plummer, on Lk. xviii. 19: "There is no instance in the whole Talmud of a Rabbi being addressed as 'Good Master': the title was absolutely unknown among the Jews. This, therefore, was an extraordinary address, and perhaps a fulsome compliment"; G. Dalman, *The Words of Jesus*, E. T., p. 337: "This address was at variance with actual usage, and, moreover, in the mouth of the speaker was insolent flattery." F. Spitta, *ZNTW*, ix (1908), p. 14, strangely wishes to divide the "Good Master" into two independent designations: "If we keep Mark and Luke alone in view, there is to be remarked first of all, with respect to the address to Jesus common to them, *διδάσκαλε ἀγαθέ*, that the difficulty adverted to above, of connecting רַבִּי with the predicate טוֹב, is removed if we take *ἀγαθέ* as a second address by the side of *διδάσκαλε* (cf. von Hofmann on Lk. xviii. 18). By this, of course, the stress on the designation of Jesus as *ἀγαθός* is further strengthened", . . . Lagrange on Mk. x. 17, very properly remarks: "No example is known of a Rabbi being designated thus (רַבִּי טוֹב), but this is no reason for cutting the appellation in two (against Spitta). It is only necessary to note that it exceeds usage and accustomed courtesies."

²¹ Cf. Edersheim, II, p. 339: "The strangeness of such an address from Jewish lips giving only the more reason for taking it up in the reply."

at first sight seems in itself to be capable of two constructions. We may either fill out: "Thou art wrong in calling me good; this predicate, in any worthy sense of it at least, belongs to none but God." Or we may fill out rather: "There is a great deal involved, if only you appreciated it, in calling me good; for there is no one that is good but one, that is God." The primary objection to the former view is that it presses the contrast beyond the power of the enclitic *με* to bear. For the *με* is enclitic here as well as in Matthew, and can be emphasized here as little as there. The emphasis certainly falls not on it, but on the *ἀγαθόν*.²² The sense is therefore certainly not that the young man had called specifically *Jesus* good; but that he had called Jesus specifically *good*. There is no contrast therefore instituted between Jesus and God. This is the fundamental fact regarding the passage which must rule its whole interpretation.

The sense need not be, however, that Jesus identifies Himself here with God, though the words are in themselves flexible to that interpretation: "Why is it that thou dost thus address me as *good*? Dost thou fully apprehend what is involved in this? Art thou really aware that I am indeed that God who alone is good?" It may rather be that Jesus, without implication as to His own real personality, is only directing attention to God as the only true standard of goodness: "Why dost thou use this strange address of '*Good Master*'? Art thou seeking some one good enough to give sure directions as to eternal life? Hast thou forgotten God? And dost thou not know His commandments?" If it be thought that some slight contrast between Jesus and God is still discoverable, even in this understanding of the pas-

²² So Swete *in loc.* correctly: "The emphasis is on *ἀγαθόν*, not on the pronoun. The Lord begins by compelling the enquirer to consider his own words. He had used *ἀγαθέ* lightly, in a manner which revealed the poverty of his moral conceptions. From that word Christ accordingly starts. . . . The man is summoned to contemplate the absolute *ἀγαθωσύνη* which is the attribute of God, and to measure himself by that supreme standard."

sage, and the enclitic *με* is appealed to in order to forbid even so much emphasis on Jesus' person, the remark may be in place here as truly as it was with regard to Matthew's phrase, that the contrast involved in the words "No one is good except one, God", is not between God and Jesus, but between God and all others. There can be imported into the passage, in any case, no denial on Jesus' part, either that He is good or that He is God. It is again merely the "They have Moses and the Prophets; let them hear them." The whole emphasis is absorbed in the stress laid upon God's sole right to announce the standard of goodness. The question of the relation of Jesus to this God does not emerge: there is equally no denial that He is God, and no affirmation that He is God.²³ The young man is merely pointed to the rule which had been given by the good God as a witness to what it is requisite to do that we may be well-pleasing to Him. He is merely bidden not to look elsewhere for prescriptions as to life save in God's revealed will. The search for a master good enough to lead men to life finds its end in God and His commandments.

Obviously the drift of the conversation in Mark (and Luke) is precisely the same as in Matthew. The two narra-

²³ So J. A. Alexander, on Mk. x. 18: "The goodness of our Lord Himself and His divinity are then not at all in question, and are consequently neither affirmed nor denied"; Swete: "Viewed in this light the words are seen not to touch the question of our Lord's human sinlessness, or of His oneness with the Father"; Wohlenberg: "Whether this predicate does not belong to Him in its complete and full sense is a question into which our Lord does not enter." Lagrange: "But it may be said that the most traditional opinion is that Jesus glorifies His Father without comparing Himself with Him. The question of His own nature is not raised; in responding to the young man He only takes account of the state of his mind. . . . There cannot be drawn from this passage any conclusion for or against Christological doctrine." Cf. also Plummer on Mt. xix. 10 ff.: "The explanation of 'Why callest thou me good? None is good save one, even God', belongs to the commentators on Mark (see Swete). Suffice it to say here that Jesus was neither questioning His own sinlessness, nor intimates that the rich man ought not to call Him good unless he recognized Him as divine. The rich man could not have appreciated either of these points. Rather He turns his thoughts from his own inadequate standard of what may win eternal life to the Standard of the Divine Goodness."

tives are in substance completely consentaneous.²⁴ It is not to be supposed that either has reported in full detail all that was said. Actual conversations are ordinarily somewhat repetitious: good reports of them faithfully give their gist, in condensation. It has been said that Jane Austen records the conversations at her dinner-parties with such, not faithfulness but, circumstantiality that her reports bore the reader almost as much as the actual conversations would have done. There is no reason to suppose that the Evangelists aimed at such meticulous particularity in their reports of our Lord's conversations. Not all that He said, any more than all that He did (Jno. xx. 30, xxi. 25), has been recorded. Each selects the line of remark which seems to him to embody the pith of what was said; and the skill and faithfulness with which they have done this are attested by such a phenomenon as now faces us, where, amid even a striking diversity in the details reported, a complete harmony is preserved in the substance of the discourse. Wilhelm Wagner²⁵ makes himself merry indeed over what he considers the conceit of Olshausen,²⁶ who recognizes in both forms of narrative exact historical tradition, and looks upon each as preserving only fragments of what was said. And, no doubt, if the state of the case were as Wagner represents it,—if, that is, the two narratives were mutually contradictory and exclusive of one another, so that one could not say of them, *Sowohl . . . wie . . .* but only *Entweder . . . oder . . .*, Olshausen's treatment of them would be absurd. Since, however, they are entirely in agreement in substance, Olshausen's assumption is a mere matter of course. Each gives us in any case only a portion of what was said. It may be plausibly argued, indeed, that Mark intimates as much by his employment of the imperfect tense when introducing the words reported from the

²⁴ Cf. Schanz on Lk. xviii. 18: "The *punctum saliens* in both forms is the reference away from Himself and the reference to God. . . . The two differ only in form."

²⁵ *ZNTW*, viii (1907), p. 144.

²⁶ *Synoptische Erklärung der drei ersten Evangelien*, on Mt. xix. 17.

lips of the questioner: ἐπρώτα.²⁷ We are told, to be sure, that Mark's imperfects are not significant, that he interchanges them arbitrarily with aorists, and that therefore no inferences can be grounded on them.²⁸ This contention

²⁷ Cf. George Salmon, *The Human Element in the Gospels*, 1907, p. 400: "It had occurred to me as possible that Mark's imperfect (ἐπρώτα) might be understood to imply that the rich man had put his question more than once, and that thus there would be no contradiction between Evangelists who recorded different forms in which the question had been put. But I am now disposed to think that the imperfect tense indicates that the young man puts a question which he had asked before, and that now, learning of our Lord's approaching departure, he runs up to ask it once more before our Lord goes away." The earlier view is certainly the more plausible.

²⁸ Cf. the discussion on the subject referred to by P. W. Schmiedel, *Encyc. Bibl.*, II, col. 1874, note 1: "Feine, *JPT*, 1887, pp. 45-57, 77; 1888, pp. 405 f.; Holtzmann, *ibid.*, 1878, pp. 168-171, with Weiss' reply, pp. 583-585." B. Weiss, in his *Das Matthäus-Evangelium und seine Lucas Parallelen*, 1870, p. 27, had said of Mark: "The judicious interchange of the descriptive Imperfect, of the vivaciously representative Present, and of the narrative Aorist is far from arbitrary; it is conformed with the greatest accuracy to the whole disposition and intention of the representation, which makes itself clear precisely by means of its careful observation." H. J. Holtzmann declares this overdrawn: the Imperfect is often employed merely to give vividness and an autoptic air to the narrative and is "frequently in use by later writers, especially with verbs of saying, giving, sending." He quotes Alex. Buttmann (*Grammatik des N. T. Sprachgebrauchs*, 1859, p. 173 [E. T., p. 200]) to the effect that the interchange of Aorists and Imperfects in historical writing depends only on the caprice of the writer. In reply, Weiss (p. 584) reiterates his belief that Mark does not use the Imperfect without significance. Feine in response, endeavors to show by examples that Mark uses the Imperfect quite arbitrarily, often in quite the sense of the Aorist (1888, p. 405), and that especially with regard to ἐπρώτα which is only a verb of asking. Matthew uses this verb, when it occurs in a historical tense of the finite verb, always in the Aorist (seven times) while Mark uses it in the Aorist only six times, but in the Imperfect fifteen times, often in the Imperfect where Matthew in the parallel passage has the Aorist. Facts like these only show, however, that in narrating the facts the two writers present them to this extent from a different point of view, and this is what Buttmann means in the passage cited by Holtzmann,—not that the tenses do not differ in their implications but that it is often a mere matter of the way a writer looks at the same facts which is involved. For the matter in general, see the grammarians; beside Buttmann, §137, 7, also Winer, §40, 3, d, Blass, §57, 4, Jelf, §401, 34.

seems, however, to be overstrained; and in a case—like that now before us—where the present, aorist and imperfect tenses are brought together in close contiguity, their shades of implication can scarcely be wholly neglected. The general fact, however, does not rest upon the interpretation put upon Mark's *ἐπηρώτα*. It lies in the nature of the case that two accounts of a conversation which agree as to the substance of what was said, but differ slightly in the details reported, are reporting different fragments of the conversation, selected according to the judgment of each writer as the best vehicles of its substance.

An account of the relations of the two narratives quite different from this, it is true, is very commonly given. The representation which for the moment seems to be most widely adopted, looks upon Mark's narrative as the original one, and supposes it to have been closely followed by Luke but fundamentally altered by Matthew under the influence of dogmatic considerations. This view implies an interpretation of the narrative of Mark different from that offered above, as well as a different account of the relations of the narratives of the Evangelists to one another. According to it, Mark represents Jesus as repelling the attribution to Him of the epithet "good", because He is conscious of creaturely imperfection; and thus as, in His creaturely humility, setting Himself over against God in the strongest possible contrast. Matthew then is supposed to have drawn back from this representation as derogatory to Jesus' dignity as he conceived it, and to have therefore modified the narrative so that it should no longer imply a repudiation on Jesus' part of either goodness or divinity. That the conception of the drift of Mark's narrative which is assumed in this view is exegetically untenable, we have already endeavored to show. It is already wrecked indeed on the simple enclitic *με*,²⁹ which will not allow the contrast between Jesus and God which is its core. That it throws

²⁹ The matter is explained by Blass, *Grammar of N. T. Greek*, §48, 3 (p. 165). Perhaps Mt. x. 32-33 may be profitably compared with our present passage.

into chief prominence a matter which lies quite apart from the main subject under discussion is also fatal to it. There are, however, general considerations which also quite forbid it. That Matthew should be gratuitously charged with falsifying the text that lay before him in the interests of his doctrinal views is an indefensible procedure. There is no reason to believe Matthew capable of such dishonesty. And why the narrative as it lies in Mark's account should have been less acceptable to Matthew than it was to Mark himself and to Luke remains inexplicable. It is not doubted that the dogmatic standpoint of Matthew was fully shared by Mark and Luke. It is quite certain, that, if the meaning put upon Mark's narrative by this conception of it is its true meaning, that fact was wholly unsuspected by either Mark or Luke. And there is no reason to suppose it would have been divined by Matthew either. There can be no doubt that Mark and Luke supposed, when they were narrating this incident, that they were writing down words in full harmony with their reverence for Jesus the Divine Savior, for the expression and justification of which they wrote their Gospels. To attribute to incidents which they record with this intent an exactly contrary significance, a meaning which flatly contradicts their most cherished convictions and the whole tenor of their Gospels, is to charge them with a stupidity in "compiling" their Gospels which is wholly incompatible with the character of the Gospels they have written. A critical theory which is inapplicable except on the assumption of stupidity and dishonesty on the part of such writers as the Evangelists show themselves to be, is condemned from the outset.

Despite its impossibility, however, this theory has of late acquired wide vogue; and it is perhaps worth while to see how it is presented by its chief advocates. We may perhaps permit P. W. Schmiedel to expound it for us. He is speaking at the moment of the Gospel of John and remarks:³⁰ "And equally unacceptable to this Evangelist

³⁰ *Das vierte Evangelium gegenüber den drei ersten* (Religions-

would be the record in Mark (x. 17 f.) and Luke, that to the address of a rich man, 'Good Master, what must I do to obtain eternal life?' Jesus replied: 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good except God alone'. And yet beyond question this reply came from Jesus' lips. How little it could have been invented by any one of His worshippers who write in the Gospels, is shown by Matthew. With him (xix. 16 ff.) the rich man asks: 'Master, what good thing must I do that I may have eternal life?' And Jesus answers: 'Why askest thou me concerning the good? There is one that is good.' How does Jesus come by these last words? Should He not rather, since He was asked concerning the good, proceed: 'There is one thing that is good'? And that would not only be the sole suitable reply, because of what had preceded, but also because of what follows: for Jesus says further: 'If, however, thou wouldst enter into life, keep the commandments.' Accordingly, in Jesus' view, the good concerning which He was asked, consists in keeping the commandments. How did Matthew come by the words: 'There is one that is good'? Only by having before him as he wrote the text of Mark. Here we have our finger on the way in which Matthew with conscious purpose altered this text in its opening words, so that it should no longer be offensive: and on the way in which at the end he has left a few words of it unaltered, which betray to us the manner in which the thing has been done."⁸¹ This

geschichtliche Volksbücher, I, 8 and 10), 1906, p. 19. Cf. *Encyc. Bibl.*, II, 1901, col. 1847; "In Mark x. 17 f. the answer of Jesus to the question, 'Good Master, what shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?' is 'Why callest thou me good? None is good, save God only.' In Mat. xix. 16 f. the question runs, 'Master, what good thing shall I do that I may have eternal life?' and the first part of the answer corresponds: 'Why askest thou me concerning that which is good?' Very inappropriate, then, is the second part: 'One (masc.) there is who is the good (ὁ ἀγαθός)'. Had not Matthew here had before him such a text as that of Mark and Luke, he would certainly, following his own line of thought, have proceeded: 'One (neut.) is the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν)', all the more because the immediate continuation also (verse 5 17-19), the exhortation to keep the commandments, would have suited so admirably."

⁸¹ Cf. also Otto Schmiedel, *Die Hauptprobleme der Leben-Jesu-*

representation turns on three hinges. They are, first, that, according to Mark's account, Jesus repels the ascription of goodness to Him because He is conscious of not deserving it; secondly, that Matthew, offended by this attribution to Jesus of a consciousness of sinfulness, has deliberately³² altered the story so as to remove it; and thirdly, that Matthew has done this so bunglingly as to retain at an important

Forschung,² 1906, p. 47: "Here also belongs the passage which has been mentioned in another place, where Jesus, in Mk. x. 18, said to the rich young man, 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good except God.' Jesus denies therefore His absolute sinlessness. Matthew (xix. 17), seeks to efface that." At the place referred to (p. 27) he had said: "In Mk. x. 18 Jesus says to the rich young man, 'Why callest thou me good? No man is good except God.' To Matthew (xix. 17), this statement seemed dangerous to the sinlessness of Jesus, and so he changed it to: 'Why askest thou me concerning the good (neuter)?' Now, however, the following: 'No one is good', &c., naturally no longer fits on." Cf. also, the similar representation by W. Heitmüller in Schiele and Zscharnack's *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, III (1912), col. 359.

³² Even W. C. Allen declares the differences of Matthew from Mark "probably intentional" changes, and A. Plummer (*Com. on Mat.*, pp. 264-5) elaborately explains: "It is quite easy to see why Mt. has made these alterations. He could not bring himself to record that Jesus said, 'Why callest thou Me good? None is good save one, even God.' We have seen how readily he omits anything which seems to detract from the Divine nature of the Messiah, such as His asking for information or exhibiting human emotion, and how he loves to emphasize the wonderful features in His mighty works. Such a writer would feel that our Lord's reply, as recorded by Mk. was likely to mislead, and was not likely to be correctly worded; he therefore substitutes what seems to him to be more probable." Wilhelm Brückner (*Protestantische Monatshefte*, IV, 1900, p. 423), arguing that Mark looked upon Jesus as merely a creature, supposes that he naturally and without hesitation ascribes to Him the repudiation of the ascription of "Good Master", which Lk. xviii. 18, 19 retains, while at Mat. xix. 16, 17 there is found "a perfectly obvious tendential alteration." H. J. Holtzmann (*Die Synoptiker*, p. 268, cf. p. 88) also applies to Matthew's action the opprobrious epithet of "tendential". J. M. Thompson (*Jesus according to S. Mk.*, 1909, p. 160), considers Matthew's text "a clumsy attempt to get rid of what seemed to him a difficulty". F. C. Conybeare (*Hibbert Journal*, I, i, [Oct., 1902], pp. 109, 112), so far improves on this as to attribute this "bit of botching" not to the author of the Gospel of Matthew but to "an ancient corrector who could not bear even the shadow of an insinuation that the Lord was other than 'without sin'."

point, a trait from Mark which is meaningless in his own narrative.³⁸

The third of these contentions obviously neutralizes the second. A writer shrewd enough to undertake and so skillfully to begin the dogmatic alterations ascribed to Matthew would be shrewd enough to carry them successfully through. Certainly he would not have deliberately altered Mark's "No one is good except God alone", and yet have altered it so little to his purpose. To have supposed that Matthew, after having taken the trouble to reconstruct the first portion of the conversation of the young man with Jesus in order to adjust it to his own views, should have neglected to reconstruct the second portion of it and have left it in staring contradiction to what he had just written, would have been bad enough. But to suppose that he did not neglect to reconstruct the second portion also, but altered it too, but altered it so bunglingly as to leave it essentially the same in meaning as it was before alteration, and still in crass conflict with his reconstructed version of the former part of the conversation, is past crediting. A critical theory which will not hold unless we suppose not only that Mark and Luke were too stupid to perceive the open meaning of the incident they were recording, but also that Matthew, who was intelligent enough to perceive it and dishonest enough to attempt to adjust it to the view of Jesus common to all three, was yet so stupid that he could not carry the

³⁸ Cf. Wellhausen on Mt. xix. 17: "The εἰς ἀγαθός of his model he has retained, although it no longer makes sense. It should logically be 'There is one thing that is good'"; A. Plummer, *Com. on Mat.*, p. 264, note: "Somewhat illogically he has left εἰς and ἀγαθός unchanged: it should be ἓν and ἀγαθόν: 'one thing is good'"; Montefiori, *The Synopt. Gospels*, 1909, II, p. 696, "Matthew rather awkwardly keeps εἰς ὁ ἀγαθός, which is based on Mark's οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς εἰ μὴ εἰς ὁ θεός, although the words have really no meaning without the repudiation of 'goodness' as applied to Jesus." The odd thing is that none of the critics appears to have observed that "One thing is good" could scarcely be said by Jesus in this context, when the young man was inquiring after one good thing that he might do and Jesus was pointing him rather to the comprehensive law: "one thing is good" would be out of the key of the whole conversation.

adjustment through—although it required only the substitution of an obvious neuter for a baldly impossibly masculine,—is clearly unworthy of serious consideration. It is very plain that such a theory is violently imposed on the texts and is driven through in the face of impossibilities. We have already seen that it is based on a failure to catch the meaning, natural and easy, of either narrative the relations of which it professes to expound: we perceive now that the explanation it offers of these relations is nothing less than absurd. There is no reason to suppose that Matthew would put a meaning—and, be it remembered, an intrinsically unnatural and linguistically impossible meaning—on Mark's narrative which it is certain that neither Mark nor Luke put on it; there is no justification for imagining that, if he did, he was dishonest enough to attempt to reconstruct the narrative so as to bring it into harmony with his own conception of Jesus (which, be it remembered, was Mark's and Luke's also); there is no propriety in assuming that if he undertook such a task he was capable of botching it as he is, on this theory, represented as doing. Whatever may be the relations of these narratives, it is certain that Matthew's was not made out of Mark's; and assuredly not as a dogmatic revision in the interests of our Lord's sinlessness and deity.³⁴

³⁴ Keim (*Jesus of Nazara*, V, p. 37) insists on the priority of Matthew's narrative. In point of fact neither narrative can be derived from the other. And in general, no form of criticism is more uncertain than that, now so diligently prosecuted, which seeks to explain the several forms of narratives in the Synoptics as modifications one of another. P. W. Schmiedel very properly acknowledges (*Encyc. Bib.*, II, col. 1846) that "every assertion, no matter how evident, as to the priority of one Evangelist, and the posteriority of another, in any given passage, will be found to have been turned the other way round by quite a number of scholars of repute." The illustration he gives is characteristic. It is Mk. vi. 3 as compared with Mt. xiii. 55; Lk. iv. 22. "On the one side it is held that Matthew and Luke are here secondary, because they shrink from calling Jesus an artisan; on the other the secondary place is given to Mark because he shrinks from calling Jesus the Son of Joseph." The fundamental fault lies in the primary presupposition that the Evangelists (or their sources) have manipulated their material in the interests of the glorification of Jesus.

There is no reason, therefore, derivable from this critical speculation why we should desert the natural understanding of Mark's (and Luke's) narrative and its relation to Matthew's which lies on its surface. And our confidence in it will be greatly strengthened, if we will attend for a little to the alternative interpretations of it which have been proposed. These are very numerous and very divergent. They may be arranged, however, in a not unnatural sequence, and we may thus be enabled to survey them without confusion, and to catch their essential significance with some ease.

The interpretation which imposes on Mark's (and Luke's) narrative a repudiation by Jesus of the predicate "good", with its involved contrast of Him with God, was already current among the Arians,⁸⁵ and possibly even in certain heretical circles of the second century.⁸⁶ It is only natural that it should be widely adopted again in modern Liberal circles. Wilhelm Wagner in an interesting sketch of the history of the interpretation of the passage⁸⁷ chooses G.

Omit this unjustified presupposition and no ground remains for either form of conjecture. An (unsuccessful) effort was made long ago by A. Hilgenfeld (*Kritische Untersuchungen über die Evangelien Justins, der Clementinischen Homilien, und Marcions*, 1850, pp. 220 f., 362, 426; *Theologische Jahrbücher*, 1853, pp. 207, 235 f.; 1857, pp. 414 ff.; cf. *ZWT*, 1863, pp. 361-2, note 3) to discover an older form of text of which both Mk. (and Lk.) and Mt. are modifications in doctrinal interests; cf. also W. Bousset, *Die Evangelienzeit Justins*, 1891, pp. 105-106, and (as a curiosity of critical literature) F. C. Conybeare, *Hibbert Journal*, I, i (Oct., 1902), pp. 109-112. See the detached note below (note 87).

⁸⁵ So we are told explicitly by Athanasius (*Pat. Graec.*, 26, col. 985 C) and Epiphanius (*Pat. Graec.*, 42, col. 229): see also Ambrose (*Pat. Lat.*, 16, col. 563) and Augustine (*Pat. Lat.*, 42, col. 800); and as well the Clementine Homilies (*Pat. Graec.*, 2, coll. 404, 405), on which see Dom Chapman, *ZNTW*, IX (1908).

⁸⁶ Marcion is reported by Epiphanius, *H.* 33, 7 (p. 339, cf. p. 315) to have read the passage: "Call me not good; one is good, even God the Father" (but cf. Hippolytus, *Ref. Haer.*, viii, 19). See further Hilgenfeld and Bousset as above, note 34), and especially Th. Zahn *Geschichte des Neutestamentlichen Kanons*,¹ II, 1890, pp. 483 f. See the detached note below (note 87).

⁸⁷ *ZNTW*, viii (1907), p. 156.

Volkmar as the representative of this mode of interpreting it. In Volkmar's view,³⁸ what is given expression in Jesus' reply is that in the Kingdom of God proclaimed by Him God is the sole Good, to whom homage is due. God is the supreme Good, and the adoration of Him the highest aim of the Kingdom of God. "Jesus is the announcer and even the King of the Kingdom of God on Earth, but not the supreme Good itself, which is to be adored. The Son of Man sought only to lead man to the perfect worship of God." To make his meaning clearer he adds: "Also He went (Mk. i. 9) to the baptism of repentance in consciousness of sin (*sündbewusst*)."³⁹ Perhaps, however, the spirit of this interpretation is better expressed by no one than by H. J. Holtzmann³⁹ who writes: "We see Him who is addressed, in the consciousness of His own incompleteness, in remembrance of His severe moral battles and conflicts, in prevision of the approaching tidal-wave of a last and most violent trial, draw back, point above, and speak the humbly great word: 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good, except God alone' (Mk. x. 17-18; Lk. xviii. 18-19; cf. with this the deflection of Mt. xix. 16-17 which even the dullest eye must recognize as tendential). There is only one who stands above the world, without variableness or the necessity of ethical development, the eternally unchangeable God. By this, Jesus affirmed the fixed and immovable interval which separates Godhead and manhood in the moral sphere, as in Mk. xiii. 32 = Mt. xxiv. 36 He opens the same gulf between the two natures in the intellectual sphere. On both occasions Jesus takes His stand simply on the side of manhood." He goes on to say that the Lord's prayer, which he insists was not merely given to His disciples but was prayed by Jesus in company with His disciples, bears witness to the same effect, in its petitions for forgiveness and for protection from the evil one.⁴⁰ Among English writers

³⁸ *Die Evangelien oder Marcus und die Synopsis*, 1870, p. 469.

³⁹ *Lehrbuch der NT Theologie*, II, 1897, p. 268.

⁴⁰ Cf. also F. Barth, *Die Hauptprobleme des Lebens Jesu*,³ 1907, p. 251: "On the one side, Jesus takes His place wholly over against

J. M. Thompson affords an example of the same general point of view.⁴¹ "The stress in the last sentence is on 'good' not 'me'," he writes, "but this hardly lessens the force of the passage. It is not enough to suggest that the young man's idea of goodness needed correction, and that Jesus would point him from a wrong to a right meaning of the word. Nor is it Jesus' intention to deny as man any equality with God. The address, 'Good Master' contains no such suggestion. Theology is out of place in this passage, which deals with plain words in a plain way. There is in fact no adequate alternative to the natural interpretation. Jesus did not think Himself 'good' in the sense in which the young man had used the word, and in the sense in which it would be commonly used of God If He did not at this time feel Himself to be good in the sense in which God is good, neither did He think Himself to be divine in the sense in which God is divine." "A broad distinction is drawn—a distinction which cannot reasonably be confined to the simple ground of 'goodness'—between Jesus and God." Perhaps, however, no more pungent emphasis has been thrown upon this view than that thrown upon it by C. G. Montefiori.⁴² "The reply of Jesus," he writes, "is of the utmost significance. It is obvious that no divine being would or could have answered thus. Jesus knew Himself to be a man. . . . Yet it is a noble character which peeps through the fragmentary and one-sided records—none the less noble because we may be sure that of Jesus, both in fact and in his own estimate of Himself, the adage was true: 'there is no man that sinneth not'."⁴³

God on the side of man, and confesses Himself to possess the imperfection of human nature"—laying no claim to omniscience (Mk. xiii. 32), omnipotence (Mk. x. 40) or moral perfection (Mk. x. 17 f.). This last passage is misinterpreted if it is made to imply the deity of Christ: "the Christ of dogma would have spoken thus; the historical Jesus on the other hand refuses the predicate 'good', as belonging to God alone."

⁴¹ *Jesus according to S. Mark*, 1909, p. 159, also p. 254.

⁴² *The Synoptic Gospels*, 1909, I, pp. 246-7.

⁴³ The attitude of P. W. Schmiedel to the sinlessness of Jesus, and

The nerve of this interpretation resides of course in the contention that a repudiation of the epithet "good" is necessarily involved in the question, "Why callest thou me good?" (Mk. x. 18; Lk. xviii. 19). This contention is unjustified: whether the question involves a repudiation of the epithet "good", or is a call to a closer consideration of the implications of the original request, is a matter for the context to determine; and the context very decidedly determines it in the latter sense. Nevertheless the contention is often given very vigorous expression; and by no one is it given more vigorous expression than by Wilhelm Wagner, who writes as follows:⁴⁴ "Whoever cannot attribute to Jesus the use of language more to conceal than to reveal His thought, whoever rather holds the opinion that Jesus really meant His words in the sense in which they must be understood by every unprejudiced hearer,—cannot help allowing that Jesus in Mk. x. 18 distinctly distinguishes between God and Himself, and that He just as earnestly rejects the predicate *ἀγαθός* for Himself here, and reserves it for God, as in Mark xiii. 32 he denies knowledge of the day of the Parousia for His own person and ascribes it to the Father

the bearing of our passage upon it, is revealed in the following words from the paper contributed by him to the volume called *Jesus or Christ?* printed as a "Hibbert Journal Supplement" for 1908 (p. 68):—"As far as Jesus is concerned, it is certain that all the writers of the New Testament assumed His sinlessness, even though they speak of it with remarkable infrequency. But we are surely not at liberty to see a proof in this aspect of the matter, when we consider the attitude of veneration in which they stood towards Him, and the kind of being whom they held Him to be" [the meaning is that the testimony of the New Testament writers is invalid, because from their point of view they must have held Him sinless]. "Nor can we regard the passage in the Fourth Gospel (viii. 46) as an expression of Jesus Himself in view of the character of the book in which it stands. All the more importance attaches to Mark, x. 16-18: 'Why callest thou me good? There is none good save God'. It is true that philologists are now proving with much zeal that the original Aramaic word means 'gracious' [*gütig*]; but they do not reflect that Jesus cannot have justly regarded Himself as morally good, if He repudiated even the epithet 'gracious'."

⁴⁴ *ZNTW*, viii (1907), p. 154.

alone." Wagner does not admit, however, that in thus repudiating the predicate "good" of Himself, Jesus confesses Himself a sinner. Thus we are advised that it has been found possible to hold to the interpretation of Jesus' response to the young ruler which sees in it a repudiation of the predicate "good", and yet escapes from the ascription of conscious sin to Jesus. There are in fact more ways than one in which this has been attempted. A series of variant interpretations of our passage has thus arisen, differing from one another in the sense put upon the term "good" or in the explanation offered of Jesus' intention in repudiating that predicate, but agreeing that He does repudiate it in some sense, not involving the confession of sin on His part. Some account should be given of these mediating methods of exposition.

Wagner himself, in company with a considerable number of recent expositors,⁴⁵ wishes to take the term "good" in the sense, not of moral excellence, but of graciousness, kindness. This, in itself attractive, suggestion is rendered nugatory, however, by the unfitness of the address, "Kind Master" as a preparation for Jesus' reply. Johannes Weiss seems to be right when he remarks of the ἀγαθὲ: "The questioner clearly wishes to express by it not merely his reverence but also his conviction that Jesus, as a perfect man, is able to give new life and particular information as to

⁴⁵ For example, G. Dalman, *The Words of Jesus*, E. T., p. 337: "The proper translation is 'Kind Master'"; J. Wellhausen on Mark x. 18 (p. 86): "Ἀγαθός means less 'sinless' than 'gracious'"; Karl Thieme, *Die christliche Demut*, 1906, pp. 106-7; M. J. Lagrange, on Mk. x. 17: "Goodness of heart (Schanz, Wellhausen, Spitta) rather than moral perfection (Loisy, etc.); ἀγαθός can mean goodness, it is true, but also the goodness of benevolence (Mt. xx. 15) and this is always the case when in the O. T. it is said that God is 'good' (Spitta: cf. W. Wagner, *ZNTW*, 1907, pp. 143-161)"; F. Spitta, *ZNTW*, 14 (1908), pp. 12 ff.; J. Lebreton, *Les Origines du Dogme de la Trinité*, I, 1910, p. 235, etc. *Contra*, e.g. Wohlenberg, *Kom. zu Markus*, p. 273, note 89; P. W. Schmiedel as above, note 41. Wagner thinks that Justin Martyr already took the 'good' here in the sense of 'kind'; but see on this the note of J. Moffat, *The Expositor* for January, 1908, p. 84.

the way to eternal life."⁴⁶ Jesus' reply puts the sense of moral perfection on the address. The advantage sought by reading the predicate as "gracious" rather than "good", is that in that case its repudiation by Jesus does not imply a confession of sin on His part. "If the word should be so understood," remarks Dalman, "then there is no need to inquire in what sense Jesus disclaims sinlessness."⁴⁷ "His sinlessness or moral perfection Jesus has, therefore, not denied in our passage", is Wagner's way of putting it.⁴⁸ The inquiry of P. W. Schmiedel whether the repudiation of "kindness" is not also, however, the repudiation of moral goodness,⁴⁹ is here very pertinent; and it is observable that Wagner at least does not seem prepared with a plausible answer to it. After declaring that, since what is under discussion is "kindness", Jesus does not deny His sinlessness or moral perfection, that there is no question raised as to that, he continues:⁵⁰ "No doubt, however, He does disclaim the predicate 'kind-gracious' (*Gütig-gnädig*) for His own person and reserve it for God. Should this result nevertheless seem to anyone equally objectionable with Volkmar's exposition, mentioned above, the reply is to be made to him that we must adjust our conception of Jesus to that of the Holy Scriptures and not *vice versa*. . . ." No doubt. Therefore the question presses whether it is easy to believe that the Jesus presented to us, we do not say broadly in the Holy Scriptures, but in the Synoptic Gospels, would repudiate the predicate "kind" or "gracious," when applied to Him, especially with the energy which is supposed in this interpretation of His words. It does not appear that the predicate *ἀγαθός* is elsewhere in the Synoptics attributed to

⁴⁶ Wagner (p. 159, note) criticises Weiss' use of the word "perfect" instead of "good" in this remark, but on the very next page himself equates the terms "sinlessness" and "moral perfection". Cf. what Dalman (p. 338) says in opposition to A. Seeberg's explanation which is similar to that of Weiss.

⁴⁷ P. 338.

⁴⁸ P. 160.

⁴⁹ See above, note 43.

⁵⁰ Pp. 160-161.

Jesus, nor is it, for the matter of that, elsewhere attributed to God—and it may be a nice question to which limb of this statement we might consider Mt. xx. 15 a quasi-exception. But surely it is difficult to suppose that the Synoptists, who attribute “compassion” to Jesus more frequently than any other emotion, and one of whose number represents the sponsor of another as summing up Jesus’ career as a “going about, doing good” (ἐνεργεῖν, Acts x. 38), could have understood Him to be repelling here the attribution to Him of “kindness”. And surely this repudiation of the predicate of “kindness” sounds strange upon the lips of the Jesus who is represented by them as declaring that He had compassion upon the multitude (Mt. xv. 32; Mk. viii. 2), and as inviting all those who labor and are heavy laden to come to Him that He might give them rest (Mt. xi. 28).

Wagner endeavors to ease this difficulty by suggesting that like ἐνεργεῖν, which Jesus forbids His disciples to permit themselves to be called (Lk. xxii. 25), ἀγαθός, “gracious,” might have come to be employed almost as a divine attribute; and he connects this suggestion with Jesus’ disgust at the “honor-hunger” which characterized “the Scribes and Pharisees” of the time, and which provoked Him to forbid His disciples to be called Rabbi or Leader (καθηγητής, Mt. xxiii. 10). This line of thought had already been carried a step further by Karl Thieme,⁵¹ and before him by Karl Heinrich Weizsäcker.⁵² These writers,⁵³ threw the whole

⁵¹ *Die christliche Demut*, 1906, p. 107.

⁵² *Untersuchungen über die evangelische Geschichte*,³ 1901, p. 295.

⁵³ Cf. also J. Lebreton, *Les Origines du Dogme de la Trinité*, I, 1910, p. 235: “It would clearly be a mistake to see in the ‘goodness’ in question here, virtue or moral excellence: and when our Savior attributes it exclusively to God, that is not in order to make it understood that God alone is morally perfect, but no doubt only because He alone is Goodness itself, infinitely beneficent and benignant. Applied to a Rabbi—and the interlocutor of Christ saw in Him nothing more—this designation of ‘Good Master’ was, as Dalman remarks, an ‘insolent flattery’: our Lord repelled it without revealing to an auditor so badly prepared to receive it a property he was far from suspecting. The meaning of the text is very similar to that of a text cited above: ‘Call no man here below Father, for you have but one Father, that is

burden of Jesus' repudiation of the predicate "good" upon His revulsion from Rabbinical vanity, and hence held that "this interdiction of the designation 'Good Teacher' has nothing at all to do with the self-consciousness of Jesus, but is solely a repulsion of the Rabbinical title." From this point of view, Thieme, who also takes the *ἀγαθός* in the sense of "gracious", is able to contend that Jesus by no means repudiates that quality for Himself. "According to this interpretation," he writes,⁵⁴ "Jesus defended Himself from involvement in the Rabbinical title-seeking. He repelled it from Himself without giving a single thought to whether He Himself had or had not a right to the title of 'gracious'. He did not address Himself here to a solemn deliverance as to His distinction from God, but, painfully affected by the extravagances of the rich man, He gave expression to His old aversion to the whole odious behavior of the Pharisees and Scribes, in a quick and sharply spoken word of reprehension. It is therefore rather an emotional declaration from which may be learned how unlike the Pharisees and Scribes He was."

Attractive as this exposition is it is burdened with the insuperable difficulty that Jesus does not, in point of fact, refuse for Himself any of the titles which He forbids His followers to accept. He forbade them to be called Rabbi or Leader; but He claims both titles for Himself (Mt. xxiii. 8 f.). It is not merely in John (xiii. 13) that He vindicates His right to the titles of Master and Lord. Both are put upon His lips with reference to Himself by the Synoptists also (Mk. xiv. 14; Mt. xxvi. 18; Lk. xxii. 11; Mk. xi. 3; Mt. xxi. 3; Lk. xix. 31), and He constantly and without apparent difficulty accepts them both when applied to Him by others. Thieme himself has to acknowledge that "when He was Himself called Rabbi, He found it right, for He was it,

God; and have not yourselves called Masters, for you have only one Master, the Christ.' The only difference between the two texts is that in the second (Mk. x. 17) the Christ effaces Himself far more before God His Father."

⁵⁴ P. 108.

He alone and no other in His little flock."⁵⁵ If He revolted against the lust for empty titles of the Scribes and Pharisees, that was because those titles were empty for them; they did not rightly belong to or describe them; were mere vanities with no other function than to gratify pride. He would not have His disciples like the Scribes and Pharisees in this. But it does not follow that He would repel these titles when applied to Himself, to whom they rightfully belonged: in point of fact He did not.⁵⁶ There is an essential difference between craving vain titles, and accepting just ones. We may be quite sure that Jesus would not have repudiated the ascription of graciousness to Him unless He had felt that it did not rightly describe Him and that He therefore had no right to it.

A far more widely adopted interpretation of the passage, seeking the same end, accepts the term *ἀγαθός* in the sense of morally good, but distinguishes between the quality of goodness which is proper to man, and that absolute and indeclinable goodness which belongs to God alone. Jesus, it is said, when He repels the predicate "good" of Himself, and declares that God alone is good, means the term good in its highest, its absolute, sense, and in no way implies that He is not good as a man wholly without flaw may be good. Sometimes what is meant by this is that only God is Good-of-Himself (*αὐτοἀγαθός*), has the source of His goodness in Himself; men, though wholly good, can have only a derived goodness, and must owe all their goodness to the goodness of God. Origen,⁵⁷ indeed, would carry this distinction far beyond the sphere of creaturely relations, into the Trinitarian relations themselves. According to him our Lord speaks here not as a man but as the Son Himself, and yet

⁵⁵ P. 107.

⁵⁶ Cf. R. Stier, *The Words of the Lord Jesus*, Fourth American Edition, I, p. 360 f., note f: "Never has Jesus anywhere said (if He says so here it is the only time) that anyone honored Him too highly; never did He protest against any degree of love, honor, thanksgiving, adoration (Roos, *Die Lehre J. Christi*, p. 79)."

⁵⁷ *De Principiis*, I, ii, 13.

separates Himself in His goodness as Son from the Father, the *Fons Deitatis*, from whom is derived all that the Son is. No other goodness exists in the Son as such save that which is in the Father; and when the Savior says that "there is none good save one only, God the Father", He means to declare, not that He, the Son of God, is not good, but that all the goodness in Him is of the Father. God alone is primarily good; the Son and Spirit are good with the goodness of God: while creatures can be said to be good only catachrestically and have in them only an accidental, not an essential goodness. It is not of the subordinationism of Origen, however, that our modern writers are thinking when they say that our Lord, in denying that He was good and reserving this predicate to God alone, meant merely that His goodness was not original with Himself but derived from God the sole source of goodness. They are thinking of the man Jesus who, they suppose, is here referring His goodness to the Father, the source of all goodness. An example of this mode of expounding the passage is supplied by Karl Ullmann in the earlier editions of his famous book on *The Sinlessness of Jesus*.⁵⁸ According to him what Jesus means is, "If I am good, I am so only in and by means of God, so far as I am one with God", and he expounds his own meaning as follows: "Here, then, *ἀγαθός* is to be taken in the most pregnant sense: as the ultimate highest source of good, as the absolute good; Jesus is good, but only in His inward complete communion with God, as the expression of the divine; and in this sense He demands of the young man:

⁵⁸ *Ueber die Sündlosigkeit Jesu. Eine apologetische Betrachtung.* Hamburg, 1833, p. 112, note; ed. 3, 1836, p. 136. The former of these editions is called the "second, improved and enlarged edition" on the title page, but appears to be the first separately printed edition, the treatise having appeared in the first instance in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, I, 1828. Cf. also Ullmann's *Polemisches in Betreff der Sündlosigkeit Jesu* in the *TSK* for 1842. An English translation of *The Sinlessness of Christ* (Edinburgh, 1870, newly issued 1902) was made from the seventh German edition. The passage referred to has been so modified in the later editions that the feature for which it is cited has disappeared.

"Thou must rise above the common human goodness,—and in so far also above me, considered as a man detached from God, as merely a good teacher in the sense of the Rabbis and Pharisees—and hold to the supreme source of all good, and thence there will flow to thee the good, and eternal life." Another example seems to be supplied by A. Plummer's comment on Luke xviii. 19. The young man's defect, he tells us, "was that he trusted too much in himself, too little in God. Jesus reminds him that there is only one source of goodness, whether in action (Matthew), or in character (Mark, Luke), viz., God. He Himself is no exception. His goodness is the goodness of God working in Him. 'The Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father doing. . . . For as the Father hath life in Himself, even so gave He to the Son also to have life in Himself. . . . I can of Myself do nothing; as I hear, I judge: and My judgment is righteous, because I seek not my own will but the will of Him that sent Me' (Jno. v. 19-31) *Non se magistrum non esse, sed magistrum absque Deo nullum bonum esse testatur* (Bede). There is no need to add to this the thought that the goodness of Jesus was the goodness of perfect development (see on ii. 52), whereas the goodness of God is that of absolute perfection (Weiss on Mk. x. 18)."⁵⁹ An extraordinary number of

⁵⁹ Similarly, Henri Bois, *La Personne et l'Oeuvre de Jésus* propounds, and in an article in the *Revue de Théologie et des Questions Religieuses*, xxii, 1 (January, 1913), pp. 40-53, defends the view that Jesus does not indeed confess Himself a sinner yet ranges Himself definitely as subordinate to God in the moral sphere also. He thinks this view "the golden mean" between the "rationalistic" view which makes Jesus acknowledge His sinfulness and the "orthodox" view which makes Him proclaim Himself God, and defends it in the Review article against strictures by A. Berthoud, *Jésus et Dieu*, 1912. According to Berthoud (see also *Avant-Garde* for Ap. 15, 1907) Jesus proclaimed Himself *in point of goodness* equal to God. He repels the homage of which he was made the object, not because He felt Himself unworthy of it, but because He felt it to be banal. It was not a sense of imperfection which dictated His response; He speaks rather out of a consciousness of purity without flaw, of perfect holiness. He is thus not assimilating Himself with men, but proclaiming Himself equal with God—not indeed metaphysically, but morally. The ideas of immuta-

expositors have retained the fundamental notion of this interpretation as one, but not the chief, element in their explanations: a clause or two suggesting that the goodness of Jesus finds its source in God is inserted in the midst of other matter. The difficulty with it is that there is nothing in the passage either to suggest or to sustain it. An attempt has, indeed, been made by Karl Wimmer to find a point of attachment for it in what he calls the conditional sense of *εἰ μὴ*. Instead of "No one is good except God", he would render rather, "No one is good if not—that is to say, without,—God"; and then explain this as declaring that goodness cannot exist apart from God. But this is only a curiosity of exegesis.⁶⁰

bility, absoluteness, eternity, are not here in question: goodness is a *moral* conception, and it is from a moral point of view only that Jesus feels on an equality with God. Bois rightly rejoins that the moral and metaphysical cannot be thus separated. If Jesus is equal with God in holiness, He is metaphysically the same with God. He cannot be the prototype of the moral law, the sole inspirer and source of all good, without being God, the creator and conservator of the world. Bois does not himself seem to conceive his own interpretation clearly. He cites *both* Dalman, who denies that *moral* good is here in question, and Swete who denies that Jesus' goodness in any sense is here in question, as if they supported him who thinks that it is precisely of moral good that Jesus is speaking and that He is proclaiming Himself subordinate to the Father precisely with respect to *it*. "Jesus recognizes," he says, "His subordination over against God even in the moral point of view,—subordination, which is, however, perfectly compatible with the absence of sin." In this moral subordination of Jesus to God, he recognizes on the one side that His holiness is positive and not negative; but declares on the other side that it finds its whole source in God—that "every idea of the good is in Jesus, an inspiration which He receives from God, the sole absolute good."

⁶⁰ *TSK*, 1845, p. 128. He argues that *εἰ μὴ* is fundamentally conditional, not exclusive, in its meaning; and that, therefore, when Jesus says, "No one is good *εἰ μὴ* God", He does not mean that no one except God is good, but that no one without, apart from, God, is good; that the divine goodness is the condition of all other goodness, and all that is good has its ground in God's goodness. Jesus, thus, does not set God over against all others as the only good one, and does not contrast Himself with God, either as not unexceptionally good or as not absolutely good. He only declares that He does not wish to be called good, without the proper recognition that any goodness which belongs to Him, has its source in God.

It has been more common, therefore, to seek the contrast which Jesus is supposed to intimate between His goodness and that of God in the essentially developing character of human goodness as distinguished from the absolute goodness of God. A very clear expression is given to this view by the compressed comment of E. P. Gould:⁶¹ "The reason of the question and of the denial of goodness to any one but God which follows it, is that God alone possesses the absolute good. He is what others become. Human goodness is a growth, even where there is no imperfection. It develops, like wisdom, from childhood to youth, and then to manhood. And it was this human goodness which was possessed by Jesus. See Lk. ii. 52; Heb. ii. 18, v. 8." The longer comment of H. A. W. Meyer on Mark x. 18, which has in substance been retained by B. Weiss through all of his revisions is perhaps, however, more typical.⁶² "Ingeniously and clearly Jesus makes use of the address, διδάσκαλε ἀγαθέ, in order to direct the questioner to the highest moral Ideal in whose commands the solution of the question is given (verse 19). He does this in such a manner that He takes the predicate ἀγαθός in the highest moral sense (against Bleek and Klostermann, according to whom He only denies that man *as such*, and without relation to God can be called good). 'Thou art wrong in calling me good: this predicate, in its complete conception, belongs to none save One, God.' Cf. Ch. F. Fritzsche, in *Fritzschor. Opusc.*, p. 78 ff. This declaration, however, is no evidence against the sinlessness of Jesus; rather, it is the true expression of the distance which human consciousness—even the sinless consciousness as being human—recognizes between itself and the absolute perfection of God (cf. Dorner, *Jesu sündlose Vollkommenheit*, p. 14). For⁶³ the human per-

⁶¹ *International Critical Commentary on Mark*, Mk. x. 18.

⁶² Meyer on Mark, E. T., vol. I, p. 164: We quote from the sixth German edition, which is the first of those prepared by Weiss, p. 152: in ed. 8 (p. 176) which announces itself as revised by Bernhard and Johannes Weiss, it is somewhat compressed; and in ed. 9 in which Johannes Weiss' name falls away again, it remains much as it appears in ed. 8.

⁶³ This important last sentence is retained verbally through the ninth edition.

fection is necessarily a *growing* (*werdende*) one, and even in the case of Jesus was conditioned by His advancing development, even though it can respond at every point to the moral ideal (Lk. ii. 52; Heb. v. 8; Lk. iv. 12, 22, 28. Cf. Ullmann in the *TSK*, 1842, p. 700); the absolute being-good that excludes all having become and becoming so (*das absolute, alles Gewordensein und Werden ausschliessende Gutsein*) pertains only to God who is *verae bonitatis canon et archetypus* (Beza)."⁶⁴ "Even the man Jesus," adds Meyer (omitted by Weiss) "had to wrestle until He attained the victory and peace of the cross." Quite similarly E. K. A. Riehm⁶⁵ writes: "The emphatic 'No one is good except one, God', or, as the words stand in Matthew, 'One is good', does not fit in well with the explanation according to which Jesus does not wish to refuse the predicate 'good' for Himself, but wishes to say only that the young man should not, *from his standpoint*, that, namely, He was only a human teacher, address Him as 'Good Master'. We

⁶⁴ Cf. here Paul Feine, *Theologie des NTs*, 1910, p. 28: "He, who had given out of the perfection of His inwardness all the ideal commandments of the Sermon on the Mount, and had conceived the nature of God out of the pure ground of His life in an ethical purity hitherto unknown, declines to be called good. That predicate belongs to God only." He adds in a note: "It is wrong when many seek to make capital of this declaration in favor of the contention that Jesus was ethically imperfect. When Jesus says to the rich young man, 'Why callest thou me good?' or 'Call me not good' (*μή με λέγε αγαθόν*), as Conybeare, *Hibbert Journal*, 1902, I, 92-113 represents the oldest form, after Marcion, the Clementine Homilies, Tatian, Origen, &c., in Mk. and Lk. xviii. 19), 'No one is good except *one*, God'—that is as much a refusal of the address as in the case of the Syro-phoenician woman, Mt. xv. 25 f. As nevertheless in that case, Jesus yet fulfilled the request of the repulsed one, so there occurs here too in the end an answer to the question, 'Good Master, what shall I do to have eternal life?' He knows the way, and indeed He alone, for His answer culminates in the word, 'Come and follow me' (Mk. x. 21). He could not have said that, in the loftiness of His requirement for entrance into the Kingdom, had He not been 'good'. We must have an eye for the antithetical, contrast-loving manner of Jesus. Then we can avoid such essential misunderstandings as the repulsed young man fell into."

⁶⁵ *Lehrbegriff des Hebräerbriefes*, 1867, p. 383.

are of the opinion that Christ wishes the word 'good' to be taken in the absolute sense (cf. the $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$) and really refuses the predicate in this sense for His own person, and ascribes it to God only. When so understood, the expression does not at all show that Jesus had any other consciousness than that of essential unity with the God-will, but it does show that He was conscious that in His moral development He had not yet reached the highest stage of absolute perfection, which still was therefore proper to God alone."

Following Wagner's example we may add some further examples of this exposition, taken from dogmaticians. He selects for the purpose R. A. Lipsius and J. Kaftan. The former⁶⁶ maintains for Jesus, indeed, a development free from the consciousness of guilt, but nevertheless conceives of Him so humanly as to open a great gulf between His hardly retained integrity and the absolute perfection of God. To wish to deny for Him the possibility of sin or natural temptability, he declares, would abolish the reality of His humanity, for to it the $\sigma\acute{\omega}\rho\acute{\epsilon}$ of necessity belongs. Jesus was tempted, and that shows that He was not free from inner vacillations and momentary obscurations of His God-consciousness. All of this He no doubt victoriously overcame: but certainly we cannot wonder that He felt impelled to distinguish His goodness, if He so conceived it, from God's absolute goodness. In much the same spirit, Kaftan,⁶⁷ will not hear of the attribution of impeccability to Jesus. This would yield, he thinks, only an unmoral notion of Him. Jesus' sinless perfection was a truly moral condition and receives its content from the uninterrupted moral trial to which He was subjected. In Mk. x. 18 "the predicate $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ applies in its absolute sense to God only, who is $\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\lambda\pi\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron}\varsigma$, not to man who, while living and walking in the world, remains always subject to temptation. If we would wish to find expressed in this declaration of Jesus, instead of this, the consciousness of a moral fault attaching

⁶⁶ *Lehrbuch der Evangelisch-protestantischen Dogmatik*,² 1879, p. 596 f.

⁶⁷ *Dogmatik*,¹ and ² 1901, p. 441.

to Him, that would come into contradiction with His testimony with respect to Himself elsewhere. He is the sinlessly perfect man, but He became such by His own act and confirmation, by virtue of actual ethical decision through temptation." If we may appeal to a prophet of our own, we may find the whole tendency and significance of this mode of interpreting the passage very clearly expounded by H. R. Mackintosh.⁶⁸ The salutation of the young ruler, he tells us, Jesus "waved back with the uncompromising rejoinder, 'None is good save one, even God'." And then he continues: "The words cannot be a veiled confession of moral delinquency, which certainly would not have taken this ambiguous and all but casual form. What Jesus disclaims, rather, is *God's* perfect goodness. None but God is good with a goodness unchanging and eternal; He only cannot be tempted of evil but rests for ever in unconditional and immutable perfection. Jesus, on the contrary, learnt obedience by the things which He suffered, being tempted in all points like as we are (Heb. v. 8, iv. 15). In the sense of transcendent superiority to moral conflict and the strenuous obligation to prove His virtue ever afresh in face of new temptation and difficulty, He laid no claim to the absolute goodness of His Father. Which reminds us emphatically that the holiness of Jesus, as displayed in the record of His life, is no automatic effect of a metaphysical substance, but in its perfected form the fruit of continuous moral volition pervaded and sustained by the Spirit. It is at once the Father's gift and progressively realized in an ethical experience. This follows from the ethical condition of incarnation."

That the goodness of Jesus' human nature was a developing goodness, and was not only not while He was on earth but never can be the infinite goodness of God is a matter of course. It is further not inconceivable that in referring to His moral quality He might on occasion quite readily speak of the moral quality of His human nature

⁶⁸ *The Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, 1912, p. 37.

only, as, in a famous instance, in referring to His knowledge, He has spoken only of His human mind (Mk. xiii. 32). It is certain, still further, that in speaking of God's goodness in our present passage He has the absoluteness of His goodness in view. So far we encounter no grounds of objection to the general line of interpretation which we have just been illustrating. There is no reason in the nature of the case why Jesus might not have contrasted His human goodness with the infinite goodness of God, which is here adverted to. But neither is there any reason obvious why we should suppose Him to wish, at this moment and in the midst of the irrelevant conversation recounted, to interpose a bit of instruction upon the developing character of His human goodness. The remark of Fritzsche seems also pertinent: "the words, *τί με λέγεις ἀγαθόν*, do not mean *in what sense* do you call me good? but *why* do you call me good?"⁶⁹ If this question has, as Fritzsche also insists, the force of an "objurgation", and means "You wrongly call me good", it is hard to see how Jesus could have expected His interlocutor to understand Him as meaning no more than that His goodness (as respects His human nature) was not the absolute goodness of Deity. To say, 'You are wrong in calling me good, because though, even in my human nature, I am really good, good through and through, good without flaw, I am nevertheless (in my human nature) not good as the infinite God is good', would not only be a subtlety which this interlocutor could not be expected to follow, but as addressed to him inconsequent. If Jesus means to contrast Himself as not good with God as good, He can scarcely mean less in this context than that He is in the common sense of the word, not good; that is, that He is not free from sin. The interpretation which would pare this down to a contrast between immaculate goodness and absolute goodness is a refinement unconformable with the simplicity of the language employed and the directness with which the conversation develops. It is idle to appeal to

⁶⁹ *Fritzschiolum opuscula academica*, 1838, p. 79.

such passages as Job iv. 18, xv. 15, xxv. 5; for the point is, not that the distinction in question is not real, nor that it cannot be expressed in natural language, but that it is not suggested by the language of the present passage and breaks in upon the course of its development.⁷⁰ From the dogmatic point of view this interpretation is of course more acceptable than that which sees in the passage a plain confession of sin. It has moreover the great advantage of not giving us a Jesus wholly out of harmony with the Jesus of the rest of the Synoptic tradition, and even perhaps with the Jesus of the remainder of this very narrative—where He speaks of “following” Him as the foundation of the new life. But from the narrower exegetical point of view it is at a disadvantage in comparison with the other; and yet lies open to all the exegetical objections which are fatal to that view.

Still another modification of the interpretation which supposes Jesus in our passage to repudiate the predicate good, has had large vogue. Jesus, it is said, repudiates this predicate not from His own but from His questioner's point of view. This interpretation, which is very common among the Fathers, is well illustrated by a passage in one of Athanasius' anti-Arian tracts.⁷¹ “And when He says,” we read, “‘Why callest thou me good? No one is good except one, God’, God, reckoning Himself among men, spoke this according to His flesh, and with respect to the opinion (*νόος*) of him who came to Him. For that one thought Him man only and not God, and the response keeps this opinion in view. For, if you think me a man, He says, and not God, call me not good, for no one is good. For the good does not belong to human nature but to God.” It is obvious, that to say that Jesus repudiates the predicate only from the point of view of His interlocutor is to say that He does not really repudiate it at all. It is not strange, therefore, as Montefiori

⁷⁰ Cf. what R. Stier excellently says in criticism of Oettinger and Ullmann, in *The Words of the Lord Jesus*, I, pp. 360b-361b.

⁷¹ Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, xxvi, col. 993 A and B.

seems to find it,⁷² that "the capable Roman Catholic commentator," Schanz, "who honestly insists on the correct translation of this verse," understanding its repudiation to be meant *ad hominem*, adds that "the words do not exclude 'that Jesus as respects His higher nature, may belong to this divine Being'."⁷³ And Olshausen is quite logical when he writes:⁷⁴ "The questioner saw in Christ a mere διδάσκαλος. To such a conception, however, the ἀγαθός was not suitable. He [Jesus] repudiates, therefore the name and directs him to Him who is Goodness itself. By this, however, the Lord does not deny that He is Himself just the ἀγαθός, because the true God is reflected in Him as His image; only this teaching could not be dogmatically presented to the young man, but should vitally form itself in his own heart." And Keil:⁷⁵ "Jesus, taking this predicate in its full sense, uses this address to direct the young man to God as the Supreme Being, when He replies: 'Why callest thou me good?', that is, 'Call me not good', 'no one is good except one, God'. Jesus by no means repudiates goodness or sinlessness by this, but only says that the predicate would not be suitable for

⁷² I, p. 264.

⁷³ Schanz's comment on Mk. x. 18, runs as follows: "Jesus makes use of the address διδάσκαλε ἀγαθέ, in order to teach the young man that the word ἀγαθός in its full sense, as the designation of essential, immutable goodness, belongs to God only, so that it is only by conforming to the will of God that blessedness can be attained. Since, however, the young man had addressed Jesus, according to his conception, as a human teacher, even though exalted far above others, Jesus replied to him, as He often does elsewhere, from the standpoint of the questioner (Chrysostom, Jerome, Bede, Euthymius, Theophylact, and all Catholic expositors; Bengel, Olshausen, Ebrard, Keil), an explanation to whom of His Sonship to God was not now in place. No doubt, there must be supplied with οὐδεὶς not λέγεται but only ἐστὶ (Krüg, 62, 1, 1, Kühn, 417, 21) and the sense of οὐδεὶς εἰ μὴ is nothing else than *nemo nisi*, i.e., 'none but'; but all this does not exclude that Jesus, with respect to His higher nature, can Himself belong to this Divine Being: 'and He does not say, "Except my Father" that you may learn, that He did not ἐξεκάλυψεν Himself to the young man' (Chrysostom)."

⁷⁴ *Erklärung der drei ersten Evangelien*,² p. 735 (quoted by Wagner, p. 153).

⁷⁵ On Mark x. 18 (Wagner, p. 153).

Him if He were nothing more than a διδάσκαλος, for which the young man took Him. This question gives no occasion, however, to instruct the young man thoroughly as to His Divine-human nature." This interpretation, therefore, readily passes into the essentially different one—with which we are on the entirely different ground that Jesus does not in any sense repudiate the goodness attributed to Him—which understands Jesus in His response to be really announcing His deity. The transition from the one to the other of these interpretations is perhaps indicated by such a comment as that of M. Lepin, who writes as follows:⁷⁸ " 'Why callest thou me good?' says He to the young man who accosts Him; 'No man is good except God only.' The young man, no doubt, saw in the Master only an ordinary Rabbi. Seemingly Jesus refuses, as due to God alone, a title which is given Him only as man. Perhaps, however, He does not refuse it absolutely, and wishes discreetly to insinuate to His interlocutor, or to His disciples, who surrounded Him, that He to whom this title is given and who, as they well know, thoroughly deserves it, is not merely man but is God also. There is indeed nothing to show that our Savior wishes formally to decline such an attribution; that would indeed be strange and out of keeping with His usual attitude; had He not said, 'Learn of me, for I am meek and lowly of heart?' The turn of expression employed, 'Why callest thou me good?' seems rather intended to cause the young man to reflect upon the unconscious bearing of his appellation. It is thus that on another occasion the Divine Master asked the Jews, 'Why do the Scribes say that the Christ is the Son of David?' Considering the subsequent reflection made by the Savior, the method employed when He remitted the sins of the paralytic is recalled: 'God only can forgive sins, as you say; well, I claim to forgive sins; and thus I prove my authority to do so!' Similarly here: 'Thou callest me good. The title is de-

⁷⁸ *Jésus Messie et Fils de Dieu*,³ 1907, pp. 336 ff. (E. T. *Christ and the Gospel*, 1910, pp. 412 ff.).

served: thou thyself hast judged me in comparison with ordinary masters; I therefore do not decline it; but consider well! there is none that is good but God alone!"

A comment like this brings us to the point of turning away altogether from the "objurgatory" interpretation of our Lord's demand, "Why callest thou me good?" It remains therefore only to read the question simply as a question, that is to say as an incitement to inquiry on the part of the questioner.⁷⁷ In that case only two lines of interpretation lie open. Either the question, along with the succeeding clause, "no one is good but one, God", is intended to suggest to the interlocutor that Jesus is Himself divine, or else it is intended to turn attention for the moment away from Jesus altogether and focus it on God. The former line of interpretation has been taken by many and was for long indeed the ruling view.⁷⁸ As so understood, so far from suggesting that our Lord is neither divine nor good, it is an assertion that He is both good and divine. Ambrose will supply us with a good example of this interpretation.⁷⁹ Inveighing against the Arians who make out that our Lord

⁷⁷ A. Plummer, commenting on Lk. xx. 42 (p. 473) suggests that the question there may be intended only to make the Scribe think; and illustrates by a reference to our present passage: "The question 'Why callest thou Me good?' appears to serve a similar purpose. It seems to imply that Christ is not to be called good (Mk. x. 18). But it need mean no more than that a young man who addressed Jesus as 'Good Master' ought to reflect as to the significance of such language before making use of it." He compares also Lk. xi. 19 as possibly a similar case.

⁷⁸ Cf. Schanz on Lk. xviii. 18: "The most of the Fathers, if they do not call the question an ensnaring one (*versuta*, Ambrose; *tentans*, Jerome, Cyril) and therefore look upon the reply as a repulse, *arguta responsio*, assume that it is meant for the young man's instruction as to the deity of Christ. Jesus, it is said, reproves the ruler for calling Him a good teacher instead of a good God." He cites as expressing this latter view, Ambrose, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nanzianzus, Basil, Cyril, Chrysostom, Hilary, Jerome, Augustine, Bede. Cf. A. Plummer, on Lk. xviii. 19 (p. 422, note 1), where Cyril and Ambrose are quoted and Jerome, Basil and Epiphanius referred to (with Maldonatus and Wordsworth among the commentators).

⁷⁹ *De Fide*, II, 1 (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, 16, col. 563; E. T., *Post-Nicene Fathers*, second series, X, p. 226).

here denies that He is good, he asks that we consider when, where and with what circumspection our Lord speaks here. "The Son of God," he continues, "speaks in the form of man, and He speaks to a Scribe,—to him, that is, who called the Son of God 'Good Master', but denied Him to be God. What he does not believe Christ adds, that he may believe in the Son of God, not as a Good Master but as the Good God. For, if wheresoever the 'One God' is named, the Son of God is never separated from the fullness of the Unity, how, when the one God is declared good is the Only-begotten excluded from the fullness of the divine goodness? They must therefore either deny that the Son of God is God, or confess that He is the good God. With heavenly circumspection, then, He said, not 'No one is good but the Father only', but 'No one is good but God only'. For 'Father' is the proper name of Him who begets, but the 'one God' by no means excludes the Godhead of the Trinity, and therefore extols the Natures: goodness is therefore in the nature of God, and in the nature of God is also the Son of God, and therefore what is predicated is not predicated of the Singularity but of the Unity. Goodness is, then, not denied by the Lord, but such a disciple is rebuked. For when the Scribe said, 'Good Master', the Lord responded, 'Why callest thou me good?' And that means, 'It is not enough to call me good whom thou dost not believe to be God. I do not seek such disciples, who rather believe in a good master according to manhood than according to Godhead the good God.'

It is not easy to turn up a modern comment moving on precisely these lines. Perhaps something like it is intended by Friedrich Köster, when he writes:⁸⁰ "Should it, now, seem as if Jesus in the words, 'Why callest thou me good', repels the predicate of goodness from Himself, it is already remarked by Wolf (in *Curis ad h. l.*), *Haec quaestio non negantis est, sed examinantis*. 'Dost thou consider well, when thou callest me good, that this predicate belongs to God

⁸⁰ TSK, 1856, p. 422.

alone?' It belongs to Jesus, therefore, only by virtue of His perfect union with the Father." And Rudolf Stier plays upon the same note amid others which go to make up his chord, when he writes:⁸¹ "Christ takes care not to say, *I am not good*, for One only is good, *my Father*. . . . He deals more exactly with the word than the rationalists, who 'exhaust themselves in phrases, call Him the best, noblest, most excellent, most perfect, etc.', and yet deny His divine dignity. He said then to the young ruler what He must say still more strongly to these modern panegyrists, not in kindness but in anger: 'Why callest thou me good?' He, however, at the same time attests His divinity (although He does not speak plainly of what is concealed) when He who knew no sin affirms: 'None is good save One, that is God'." In support, he quotes in a note⁸² the following dilemma: "Choose then, ye friends of reason, between these two conclusions dictated by reason itself. None is good but the one God; Christ is good; therefore Christ is the one God. Or: none is good but the one God: Christ is not the one God; therefore Christ *is not good*." The sober and pregnant comment of Bengel may also find a place here. "Nevertheless," he writes,⁸³ "He does not say, I am not good; but, Why dost thou call me good? Just as in Mat. xxii. 43 He does not deny that He, the Lord of David, is at one and the same time, also the Son of David. God is good: there is no goodness without Godhead. This young man perceived in Jesus the presence of goodness in some degree: otherwise he would not have applied to Him: but he did not perceive it in the full extent; otherwise he would not have gone back from Him. Much less did he recognize His Godhead. Wherefore Jesus does not accept from him the title of goodness without the title of Godhead (cf. the

⁸¹ *The Words of the Lord Jesus*, I, p. 360b. Cf. p. 361a: "Thou speakest with too much readiness of *doing* good (I too should not be good as thou thinkest, if I were a man as thou supposest)."

⁸² From the *Hom. lit. Correspondenzblatt*, 1826, p. 176. He tells us that the same dilemma is well presented also in a sermon by Nitzsch.

⁸³ *Gnomon*, on Mk. x. 18.

'Why call ye me Lord, Lord', Lk. vi. 46); and thereby He vindicates the honor of the Father with whom He is one. See Jno. v. 19. At the same time He causes a ray of His omniscience to enter into the heart of the young man, and shows that the young man has not as yet the knowledge concerning Himself, Jesus Christ, worthy of so exalted a title, which otherwise is altogether appropriate to Him. Wherefore, He does not say, *There is none good save one, that is my Father*, but, *There is none good save one, that is, God*'. Our Lord often adjusted His words to the capacity of those who questioned Him (Jno. iv. 22)."

Most recent writers, however, who have come to see that our Lord's question is *non negantis sed examinantis*, have also come to see that His purpose here is not inconsequently to proclaim His own deity, but in accordance with the demands of the occasion to point the young man inquiring after a law of life to Him who had once for all proclaimed a perfect law of life.⁸⁴ They have, of course varying ways of

⁸⁴ Cf. J. A. Dorner, *Ueber Jesu Sündlosigkeit*, 1862, pp. 13-14. After showing that Jesus had no intention of leading the young man to suppose that he could enter into life apart from Him, or of pointing him away from Himself when He pointed him to God, Dorner continues: "But the first thing he had need of, as Jesus saw from the light, easy way in which he used the word 'good' was self-knowledge, not the announcement of Christ's mission and dignity, for the understanding of which he still lacked the preconditions; concerning which therefore, in accordance with His method as elsewhere manifested, Jesus meanwhile preserved silence. . . . The purpose of the passage is, therefore, not to deny goodness to the person of Christ, nor to make a positive declaration as to what He is, but to rebuke the frivolous attribution of goodness to a teacher at the cost of reverence to God, and by a striking declaration, which would conquer through its humility, to reveal to the young man his fundamental fault, namely that he took goodness too lightly. That Jesus intended to ascribe sinfulness to Himself is impossible, since that would be out of accord with His other self-expressions as to His redemptive vocation, both in the Synoptics and in John, and with the position He takes in the Kingdom of God. The Evangelists too, as little as the primitive church so understood Him. . . ." Dorner thinks, however, that there is nevertheless intrinsic in the passage a contrast between Jesus' goodness, as human, and God's, as absolute—"since no earthly, creaturely goodness can yet be called perfect, because it is not yet perfected, and is not yet raised beyond temptations and change."

expressing the general understanding of the passage common to them all; and they inevitably bring out its implications and connections with more or less completeness, and with more or less penetration.⁸⁵ The emphasis seems to be particularly well distributed in a passage in A. Schlatter's *Theology of the New Testament*,⁸⁶ and we therefore venture to quote it here. "To him who sought from Him the Good Master, direction as to the work by which he could secure for himself eternal life, He replied that no one is good except God, but God is really good; and instead of meeting his wish and Himself giving him a commandment, He binds him to the divine commandments in their simple clearness. The desire to obtain, instead of them, a new prescription which should now for the first time assure eternal life, Jesus calls impious, a denial of God, which is made no better by being attributed to Him too. To permit Himself to be praised as good, while at the same time, or even thereby, God's goodness is denied, could not be endured by Jesus. Against this kind of religion He ever spoke as the Son who defended the goodness of the Father against every doubt, and hallowed His commandments as perfect. A glorifying of His own dignity at the cost of God's, a trust in His judgment along with distrust in God's commandments, an exalting of His own goodness along with reproaches against God—meant to Him absolute impossibility." No doubt, there are elements in this statement which are open to criticism. But the main matter comes in it to clear announcement. Jesus' concern here is not to glorify Himself but God: it is not to give any instruction concerning His own person whatever, but to indicate the published will of God as the sole and the perfect prescription for the pleasing of God. In proportion as we wander away from this central thought, we wander away from the real meaning of the passage and misunderstand and misinterpret it.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ See above, note 23, for some of the commentators of this class.

⁸⁶ A. Schlatter, *Die Theologie des NTs*, I, 1909, p. 303.

⁸⁷ *Detached note on some attempts to discover a more original text than that transmitted by our Gospels, especially F. C. Conybeare's* (see

notes 34, 35, 36).—H. J. Holtzmann, *Hand-Commentar zum N. T.*, I, *Die Synoptiker*,³ 1907, p. 88, writes: "This section concerning riches early aroused doubts on the score of the repudiation of the predicate 'good' (Mk. verse 17 = Lk. verse 19). Instead of recognizing the distinction between deity and humanity (see on Mat. vi. 12), which is obliterated by Matthew (verse 18) in a tendential manner, but is otherwise manifoldly witnessed in the early ecclesiastical literature (Bousset, *Justin*, 105 f.), the patristic exegesis found here instruction on the deity of Christ, as if Jesus' reply presented the major and the address to Him the minor premises of a syllogism, of which the reader is expected to draw the conclusion." At the place referred to in this cautious allusion (*Die Evangelientexte Justins*, &c., 1891, pp. 105-6) Bousset seeks to show from certain early citations of our passage that there existed an early form of the text—from which Matthew's text was derived "by dogmatic adjustment"—in which the latter part of our Lord's response stood something like what we find in Justin, *Dial.* 101⁸: εἰς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ πατήρ μου ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς. How the first part of our Lord's reply ran, he seems to be less sure. He supposes, however, that there lay behind Justin a form of text in which were combined a repudiation of the address of "Good Master" and a response to the demand "What shall I do to inherit eternal life?"—much as we find them combined in the Gospel according to the Hebrews. This text, though an earlier source than our Synoptic Gospels, he does not consider the original text (p. 106, note 3). The form preserved in Justin, or something like it, he judges to be more likely to be that. In *Dial.* 101⁸ this stands merely τὶ με λέγεις ἀγαθόν;

In this discussion Bousset makes no advance upon what Hilgenfeld had argued a half-century before (*Kritische Untersuchungen über die Evangelien Justins, der Clementinischen Homilien und Marcians*, 1850, pp. 220 f., 362, 426; *Theologische Jahrbücher*, 1853, pp. 207, 235 f.; 1857, pp. 414 ff.; cf. *ZWT*, 1863, pp. 361-2, note 3). That the reading attributed to Marcion by Epiphanius, *H*, 42,⁸⁰ p. 339: μὴ με λέγεις (p. 315 λέγετε) ἀγαθόν, εἰς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ θεὸς ὁ πατήρ is a divergent text-form and not an interpretation, Hilgenfeld is sure; and that this text-form was in circulation beyond Marcionite, or even Gnostic, circles he thinks is shown by its occurrence four times in the Clementine Homilies (*Th. Jhbb.*, 1857, p. 415). Our present Matthew-text preserves from this earlier form the positive clause εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγαθός. This positive clause is not to be supposed, therefore, to have been made out of the negative form found in our Mark and Luke: οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς εἰ μὴ εἰς ὁ θεός. The contrary is the fact: the negative clause (first found in Justin, *Apol.*, I, 16) is rather a correction of the positive clause in an anti-Gnostic interest. For the Gnostics interpreted the εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγαθὸς ὁ πατήρ (in which the ὁ πατήρ is the essential thing) as a distinguishing declaration that the only good God was the Father of Jesus Christ. The difference between the positive and the negative forms is, then, far from unimportant; it was of deep polemical significance. "If this difference seems small, it is nevertheless by means

of the negative turn that the contrast between the perfect God and the imperfection of all men is made the sole possible interpretation. And if, now, in our present Matthew-text there is apparent a purpose to exclude the distinction of Jesus from the perfect goodness of God, we recognize in this just a second alteration of this expression, at the basis of which lies already the doctrine of the deity of Christ" (*Theol. Jhbb.*, 1857, p. 416). It is an illusion to suppose therefore, that Matthew is made out of Mark: Matthew preserves a reading earlier than Mark's which Mark has set aside in an anti-Gnostic interest. But our present Matthew is a product of a still later revision,—in the interests of the deity of Christ.

A further attempt is made by F. C. Conybeare (*Hibbert Journal*, I, i, Oct., 1902, pp. 109-112) to validate the Marcionite text as underlying all three of the Synoptics, with the interest shifted now, however, to the opening (instead of the closing) words of our Lord's reply. The contention in which Conybeare is particularly interested is that, in the original text, we have not a question but a categorical injunction: "Call me not good!" And he endeavors to show that this reading held its ground into the fourth century, not in heretical circles only, but also, as at least an alternative reading, among the orthodox (Origen, Athanasius, Didymus, Ephrem). Conybeare does not write with judicial balance or in the spirit of scientific objectivity. He has a thesis to sustain, and pushes matters to such an extreme as to be self-refuting. There would be no reason for entering upon any examination of his contentions except for the fact that some tendency has shown itself of late to accept these speculations whether of Hilgenfeld or of Conybeare as findings of fact, and even to build critical conclusions upon them.

Thus, for example, F. Barth, *Die Hauptprobleme des Lebens Jesu*,² 1907, p. 251, describing Jesus' testimony to His person, writes as follows: "That Jesus saw Himself compelled to make clear His position with reference to God by a self designation, we see better in proportion as we closely contemplate this position in detail and convince ourselves that it is a thoroughly peculiar, almost an enigmatical one. On the one hand, Jesus takes His place wholly on the side of man, over against God, and confesses Himself to possess the imperfections of human existence. He lays claim to no omniscience, but declares that He does not know the time of the parousia (Mk. xiii. 32); nor to any omnipotence, for it is not His to make determination as to the places of honor in the Kingdom of heaven (Mk. x. 40). We may be most struck, however, that He also seems to repudiate absolute moral perfection in the answer to the rich young man who asked Him, 'Good Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?' (Mk. x, 17 f.; Lk. xviii, 18 f.). Jesus responded: 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good but *one*, God.' The reading: 'Why callest thou me good?' (or 'Call me not good!') 'No one is good but one, my Father in heaven' is no doubt a Gnostic heightening. It would originally emphasize the contrast with the world-maker, the Jewish

God, who is not the Father of Jesus and not good (gracious), but righteous and wrathful. The Catholic counterpart to this is formed by the rare reading: "No one is good except God only who has made all things"; here the sole good one is identified precisely with the world-maker. Still more decisively in contrast with it is the change which the Gospel of Matthew contains. . . ." At the point marked by an asterisk he gives a list of vouchers which certainly show that a reading in which "the Father" or "my Father who is in heaven" took the place of "God" in our Lord's response was in early circulation: but it is not so clear that this reading was manufactured by the Gnostics, though no doubt it was utilized by them; and neither is it clear that the alternative reading in the first clause "Call me not good" is a genuine "various reading". And it is certainly not clear that the readings which Barth enumerates, Justin's and Matthew's, illustrate how readily "uncomfortable readings are pushed out of existence". An even better example of the unjustified use of these textual speculations is supplied by Paul Feine, *Theologie des NTs*, 1910, p. 28, note, who, in explaining the meaning of our Lord in His response to the young ruler, incorporates quite simply, these words: "When Jesus says to the rich young man: 'Why callest thou me good,' or 'Call me not good' (*μή με λέγε αγαθόν*, as Conybeare, *Hibbert Journal*, 1902, I, 96-113, represents the oldest form, after Marcion, the Clementine Homilies, Tatian, Origen, in Mk. and Lk. xviii. 19). . . ." A phenomenon like this seems to require that we should subject Conybeare's argument to a sufficiently close scrutiny to bring out its real character.

Conybeare is engaged in seeking out doctrinal modifications of the original text occurring in the text of our Gospels. In the present state of critical opinion it is not unnatural that he fixes at once upon Mt. xix. 17 as an instance. This "bit of botching", as he calls it, however, contrary to the common critical opinion, he attributes not to the author of the Gospel, but, in accordance with his present quest, to an ancient corrector, working on the original text of Matthew "before Matthew was joined in one book with the other two gospels". He is not content however to find "doctrinal modifications" in Matthew's text; he discovers them in the text of Mark and Luke as well. The evidence on which he relies for this discovery, he gives as follows. Marcion, according to Epiphanius, read at Lk. xviii. 19: *μή με λέγε αγαθόν· εἰς ἐστὶν αγαθὸς ὁ θεὸς ὁ πατήρ*. "And Marcion's evidence goes back far behind any other." It is *a priori* unlikely, from Marcion's philosophical views, that he himself made the reading, "Call me not good". And that he did not make it is put beyond doubt by its appearance in the Clementine Homilies also, where, although it appears rather as a citation from Matthew than from Mark-Luke, it *a fortiori* argues the presence of the imperative reading in Mark-Luke. All this is borne out by the persistence of the imperative reading in later writings. In the Old Armenian version of a tract of Athanasius, it appears four times, and though in the present Greek text it is found in only one of these places, the editor tells us it occurs in the best manuscripts

in another of them; and we may believe that if the best manuscripts were scrupulously followed it would occur in all four of them. It seems to be presupposed in certain passages in the Armenian version of Ephrem's commentary on Tatian's *Diatessaron* "though the actual citations have been conformed to the ordinary text". It seems likewise to be presupposed in some passages in Origen's commentaries "though the text has been conformed either by the scribes or editors of his MSS".

As marshalled by Conybeare there seems to be presented here a considerable body of evidence. This is, however, illusory. The whole of the later evidence, from Origen to Didymus and Ephrem, may be at once dismissed. No question of reading is raised by it but only of interpretation. To suggest that Tatian must have read the imperative in his text because Ephrem, in commenting on this passage, speaks of Christ as "renouncing the appellation of 'good'" is nothing less than monstrous (cf. Zahn's *Tatians Diatessaron*, p. 173). To intimate that Origen must have read the imperative in his text, because he understands the Lord to reject the epithet "good", is so absurd that it reaches almost the level of the sublime. Not only does Origen repeatedly quote the passage and always with the interrogative, not the imperative (e.g. in the first two volumes of the Prussian Academy's edition, I, 9, 5; II, 12, 19; II, 355, 16; in the Commentary on John in the same series, 45, 10; 261, 28); but he explicitly tells us that the interrogative stood in his text of Mark and Luke,—that while Matthew reads, "Why askest thou me concerning the good", "Mark and Luke on the contrary say that the Savior said: 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good except one, God'" (*Com. in Mat.*, Tomus xv, 10; Lommatzsch iii, p. 346). Conybeare's dealing with Athanasius and Didymus, however, is so characteristic and therefore so instructive as regards his methods, that it deserves to be quoted at large and examined in some detail. "Among the writings of Athanasius," he writes, "is one called 'About the Epiphany of the Flesh of the God word and against the Arians', printed in Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, vol. xxvi, col. 984 foll. The text is cited from Mark or Luke four times, viz., col. 985 C, col. 993 A and B, col. 1012 B. In only one of these passages, 993 B, has the imperative, *μή με λέγε ἀγαθόν* survived the efforts both of editor and copyist to keep it out, and won its way into the printed text. But in 985 C the editor, Montfaucon, in his note states that it was so read in the three best MSS. In all four passages the old Armenian version renders, 'Call thou me not good' so testifying that the Greek MSS had it. Perhaps a more accurate editing of these would show that they have it still. In his treatise on the Trinity (c. 377) Didymus also cites the text in the form 'Call thou me not good', but with condemnation." Possibly it is Conybeare's predilection for things Armenian which has led him astray with reference to Athanasius' reading. The fact is that Athanasius cites the text of Mark and Luke in the form in which it now finds a place in these Gospels, and never otherwise. It stands in this form, therefore in 993 A and 1012 B where he is directly citing the text: in 993 B he is not making a citation; and in

985 C, he is citing the text not directly but from the lips of his Arian opponents. There is no evidence to be derived from these passages, therefore, that the text was read by Athanasius in the form "Call me not good". It will repay us to look at the passages.

In 1012 B, Athanasius is directly citing Scripture to support a proposition. He argues: "For unless the Holy Spirit were of the essence (*τῆς οὐσίας*) of the Only Good (*τοῦ μόνου ἀγαθοῦ*) He would not be called good, since the Lord prohibits Himself to be called good, in so far as He had become man, saying, 'Why callest thou me good? None is good but one, God.' The Holy Spirit, however, is not forbidden by the Scriptures to be called good, as David says, 'Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land'." What we read in the continuous passage embracing both the references, 993 A and B, is this: "And when He says: 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good but one, God', God, reckoning Himself among men, spoke this according to His flesh, and with respect to the opinion of him who came to Him. For that one thought Him man only and not God, and the response keeps this opinion in view. For, if you think me a man, He says, and not God, call me not good, for no one is good. For the good does not belong to human nature but to God." Obviously the "Call me not good" here is not a citation but a free rendering of the sense of the "Why callest thou me good?" which is immediately before formally cited. The final passage, 985 C, is more complicated. Athanasius is talking of his Arian opponents. "And now, these people," he says, "if they knew the Holy Scriptures, would not dare to blaspheme the Creator of all things as a creature and a piece of handiwork. For they distort them to us, saying How can [the Son] be like [the Father], or of the Father's essence, when it is written, As the Father has life in Himself, so He has given also to the Son to have life in Himself. There is, they say, a superiority in the giver above the receiver. And, Why callest thou me good? they say, No one is good but one, God. And again, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? And once more, Of the last day no one knoweth, not even the Son, except the Father. And again, Whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world. And again, Whom the Father raised from the dead. How then, they say, can He that is raised from the dead be like or of the same nature (*ὁμοούσιος*) with Him that raised Him?" Here is a series of Scriptural texts in use by the Arians and cited from their lips—Jno. v. 26; Mk. x. 18; Mt. xxvii. 47; Mk. xiii. 32; Jno. x. 26; Gal. i. 1. Some of them are quoted with accuracy (Jno. v. 26; Mt. xxvii. 47; Jno. x. 36). But some of them merely reproduce the sense (Gal. i. 1). Mk. x. 18 is printed as an accurate quotation. But the editor tells us in a note that in some of the MSS. it is read rather: *μή με λέγε, φησὶν, ἀγαθόν*, that is to say, "Call me not, they say, good". It may well be, as Conybeare contends, that this reading should be put into the text. In this context this would not mean that Athanasius so read it in his Mark, but only at the most that the Arians so read it in their Mark. We say "at the most", for there would be little more reason for

supposing that even they so read it in their Mark than for supposing that they read also in their Mark (at xiii. 32): *περὶ τῆς ἡμέρας τῆς ἐσχάτης οὐδεὶς οἶδεν, οὐδὲ ὁ υἱός*. If this is merely a paraphrase of the meaning, that may equally well be so too.

We presume that the "c. 377" attached to the reference to Didymus' treatise on the Trinity is meant to indicate the column in Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, where the passage referred to may be found. No such passage, however, is found at that reference. In cols. 349-352, however, there is a passage which we take to be the one intended. Heb. ii. 24 had just been quoted and commented on; and the discourse continues: "The Son also, however, showed that the deity is one, when He said, 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good but one, God'; but that the three hypostases are of equal dignity and of equal power, by the teaching concerning baptism [that is, by Mat. xxviii. 19]. Not responding to the lawyer who questioned Him temptingly, 'Call me not good' but 'Why callest thou me good?' He showed that He too is good equally with the Father, and from His Father's goodness manifests His own, and demonstrates that He is good generated from God" It is, of course, conceivable that Didymus is referring here to a rival reading of Mk. x. 18 rejected by him. But there is no likelihood of that being the case. On the face of it, what he says is that this reading is *not* found in Mk. x. 18. We observe in passing that Didymus elsewhere also quotes Mk. x. 18 in the form "Why callest thou me good?" without betraying any consciousness of another reading; e.g. at col. 864: "And the response to the lawyer who temptingly addressed our Lord as a man, 'Good Master' and heard 'Why callest thou me good?' is of this kind"

Thus nothing is left as evidence of the currency of a reading "Call me not good!" but Epiphanius' representation that this was the reading of Marcion's Gospel, supported by the appearance of the passage in this form in the Clementine Homilies. Conybeare seems very sure that Marcion's text read as Epiphanius represents. A glance at the very full note of Zahn at the place (*Geschichte des Neutestamentlichen Kanons*,¹ II, 1890, pp. 483-4) will show how little this confidence is justified. Zahn himself prints Marcion's text in the hesitant form: *τί (or μή) με λέγετε ἀγαθόν; εἰς ἐστὶν ἀγαθός, ὁ (?) θεὸς ὁ πατήρ (?)*; tells us that it is "variously transmitted"; and suggests that the *μή* transmitted by Epiphanius may be only a transcriptional error for *τί*, —unless, he adds, the *τί* transmitted by Hippolytus is a transcriptional error for *μή*. "We ought not to let it fall out of sight, that there is no evidence for the currency of the phrase "Call me not good", as a reading at Mk. x. 18; Lk. xviii. 19, Mt. xix. 17 earlier than the fourth century, for it seems that the Clementine Homilies should be assigned to that century (cf. Dom Chapman, *ZNTW*, IX, 1908). When Hippolytus (*Refut.*, VII, 31) cites this text from a Marcionite book—apparently from Marcion himself—he gives it in the form, *τί με λέγετε ἀγαθόν*. Our own inclination is to suppose that the reading *μή με λέγε ἀγαθόν* stood in Marcion's Gospel as it was in circulation in the fourth century,

but was not original in it. We are led to this view by the circumstance that in the Clementine Homilies too (where this reading occurs four times; iii. 57, xvii. 4, xviii. 1, 3) it seems to appear (xviii. 1) as a Marcionite reading (Zahn, pp. 469, 483). But it is to be observed that in this understanding of the matter, all appeal to the Clementine Homilies as evidence that this reading was in circulation elsewhere than in Marcionite circles, or earlier than the fourth century, is precluded. Conybeare is as sure that Marcion (he would doubtless extend this to the Marcionites as a body) could not have invented the reading "Call me not good" as that it was read by Marcion. One would think a simple reading of Hippolytus' chapter just referred to (*Refut.*, vii, 31) would disabuse anyone's mind of this misjudgment. Whether, however, the reading arose by "doctrinal modification" on the part of the Marcionites or by simple transcriptional error as Zahn supposes, is of little moment. The point of importance is that there is no convincing evidence that such a reading was known earlier than the fourth century and no evidence whatever that it ever had any currency outside (later) Marcionite circles and perhaps among the Arians, to whom it was transmitted by the Clementine Homilies; for this is apparently the significance of the Clementine Homilies in this matter—that they formed the connecting link between Marcionite and Arian. It is meaningless, therefore, when Conybeare remarks: "Marcion's evidence goes back far behind any other", though that remark would be inexplicable in any case. It is probably not Marcion's personal evidence that is in question, but only that of the later Marcionites. And were it his personal evidence that was in question, Justin who quotes the text in the interrogative form was his strict contemporary, Tatian but a little younger contemporary, to say nothing of Marcosians and Naasenes with whom Irenaeus and Hippolytus connect the text in its interrogative form. In any case the total direct transmission of the text of the New Testament is not to be treated with this levity. On the face of it, apart from all citations of as early a date as Marcion, the text as set down in the critical editions of the New Testament is older than Marcion and was already in his day in wide circulation in versions as well as in the original Greek. When we speak in terms of relative originality—instead of in those of mere chronology—there is no room for question here. Any history which may be back of our existent manuscript-text of Mark and Luke in this passage (as indeed of that of Matthew too) is not a textual history but a literary history. What emerges from the ruck of confusion into which Conybeare has gratuitously cast the matter is thus simply that there may have been in circulation in heretical circles in the fourth century a reading in Mk. x. 18 or Luke xviii. 19 which substituted an imperative for the interrogatory form. Needless to say such a fact affords no slightest justification for looking upon this form as "the original" form.

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ASSYRIOLOGICAL RESEARCH DURING THE PAST DECADE¹

Assyriology is still a comparatively young science. It is but a life-time—three-score and ten years—since the first excavations were conducted in the vicinity of Mosul by French and English excavators.² And only within a decade have the last of the pioneers—Jules Oppert, Rassam and Schrader—passed away. The work of Oppert as excavator and decipherer carried us back almost to the very beginning of Assyriology. He was a member of the second French expedition, which was sent out in 1852, and in 1857 he helped to place this science on a firm basis and to win for it the confidence of scholars by his translation of the cylinder inscription of Tiglath-Pileser I.³ Rassam in 1854 discovered the famous Library of Assurbanapal at Nineveh, from which 20,000 tablets or fragments of tablets, many of them of the greatest value, have been recovered. Schrader, rightly called “the father of Assyriology in Germany”, carried us back into the sixties; and his investigations, which were especially along historical and geographical lines, won for him an international reputation.

The labors of these men, and many others whose names might be mentioned, have made possible the rapid advance which Assyriology has made during the past decades. They have supplied our museums with thousands of inscriptions

¹ This article is in substance an address delivered on September 19th, 1913, in Miller Chapel at the opening of the One Hundred and Second Session of Princeton Theological Seminary. The writer has however claimed the privilege of quite considerably revising and expanding it before its publication.

² Botta began excavations at Nineveh (*Kuyundjik*) in December, 1842, Layard at Calah (*Nimrud*) in November, 1845.

³ Rawlinson, Hincks, Fox-Talbot and Oppert were the members of a committee appointed by the Royal Asiatic Society to make test translations of this inscription. They worked independently of one another and the substantial agreement between their translations did a great deal to establish confidence in Assyriological studies and to remove suspicions regarding their value and reliability.

and antiquities of various kinds. They deciphered the complicated cuneiform script and have solved most of its difficulties. They have published many inscriptions and supplied the student of to-day with grammar and lexicon, with works on history and religion, and with textbooks and helps of all sorts. In fact so rapid has been the progress that the Assyriologist of to-day is being forced to become in ever increasing measure a specialist in some one or more of the many fields of investigation which the cuneiform inscriptions have opened up to us. And even when we restrict ourselves to the work of the decade which is past⁴—the seventh and in many ways the most productive in the history of Assyriology—it is by no means easy to trace the progress which has been made and it is necessary for us to confine ourselves more especially to the most important fields. We shall consider therefore the progress this decade has made in the work of excavation; in philological research; in chronology and history; in the study of legal and business documents, and letters and of the proper names; and in the investigation of the religion.

THE EXCAVATIONS

The work of excavation has been carried on with vigor and although no single finds have been reported which rank in importance with the discovery of the Library of Assurbanapal by Rassam in 1854, the finding of the Tell-el-Amarna letters in 1888 and the unearthing of the Stele of Hammurapi in 1901, some very important discoveries have been made and much valuable information has been obtained.

⁴ This period is counted roughly as beginning with 1903 and extending to the present time. This is a little over a decade, but still is sufficiently accurate for our purpose. For several years back Dr. H. Pick of the Royal Library at Berlin has prepared a brief yearly summary of the progress made in Assyriological research for the *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*. Cf. also H. W. Hogg, *Survey of Recent Publications on Assyriology*, vol. I, 1908; vol. II, 1910, which are favorably spoken of by Pick, and also L. W. King's survey for the years 1910-12 in the *Britannica Year-Book*, 1913, pp. 256-60.

The Germans who were the last to enter the field have done more work during this period than any other single nation. The *Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft*, which was founded in 1898 and began excavations at Babylon in the following year, has continued its work uninterruptedly and although the results of those excavations have been rather disappointing in some ways they have thrown very welcome light upon the topography of Babylon, especially upon the character of the fortifications, palaces and temples of the Babylon of the time of Nebuchadnezzar.⁵ In 1903—just ten years ago—excavations were commenced at Assur, the ancient capital of Assyria, and have been in progress ever since. These excavations have been especially valuable for the light which they have thrown upon the early history of Assyria.⁶

The *Orient-Gesellschaft* has also conducted excavations at Fāra, which is probably to be identified with the ancient Shuruppak, which according to the Babylonian legend was the home of Ut-napishtim the hero of the Flood, and at Abu Hatab, another very ancient ruin, and has recently begun excavations at Warka, the Biblical Erech. Three cities of far less antiquity, Hatra, near Assur, and Samarra and

⁵ Meissner who was for a time connected with the expedition, has recently expressed the opinion (*OLZ*, XV, 416) that the fears entertained by "most German Assyriologists" that these excavations would not be sufficiently successful to warrant the great expense involved, have been proved to have been justified by the results. "Especially as regards literary and archaeological data, the results are quite moderate. Only the architect has thus far perhaps gotten his money's worth." The costs of the 13 years excavations he estimated at \$200,000 or more. For an account of these excavations cf. the *Mitteilungen der Deutschen Orient Gesellschaft* also the *Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen* of the same society and especially the account of the work of the expedition recently presented by Koldewey in his *Das wiedererstehende Babylon* (1913). Koldewey who has been in charge of the work at Babylon from the very start estimates that about one-half of the necessary work has been accomplished. The magnitude of the task is shown by his statement that 200 to 250 men have been working on it steadily for thirteen or fourteen years.

⁶ Cf. pp. 243 ff. For the official accounts of these excavations cf. the publications of the *Deutsche Orient Gesellschaft* mentioned in note 5.

Ocheidir in Babylonia have also been visited and studied by German archaeologists.

The French have resumed their excavations at Tello, which were interrupted by the death of de Sarzec in 1901. Capt. Gaston Cros, his successor, reached Tello in 1903 and the work of excavation has been carried on with very considerable success. At Susa where excavation was commenced in 1897 and where the code of Hammurapi, the obelisk of Manishtusu and a number of other very valuable finds were made, the work of the *Délégation en Perse* has been continued and some work has also been done in other parts of Persia. At Oheimir, the site of the ancient city of northern Babylonia, Kish, excavations have recently been carried on by Genouillac and they are reported to be successful.⁷

Of the work of the English excavators little has been heard. King conducted excavations at Nineveh nearly ten years ago, and he, with the assistance of Thompson, made a new copy of the trilingual inscription of Darius the Great at Behistûn.⁸

Only two American expeditions have been at work in this region during the decade.⁹ The expedition of the Uni-

⁷ Cf. Gaston Cros, *Nouvelles Fouilles de Tello* (de Sarzec's monumental work *Découvertes en Chaldée* which was begun about 30 years ago and which gives an account of the excavations of this distinguished archaeologist at Tello, was completed last year by Heuzey and Thureau-Dangin, eleven years after the death of de Sarzec); also L. Heuzey in *Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, 1910. Heuzey reports that Cros has discovered a part of a wall built by Gudea. For the excavations at Susa compare the *Mémoires de la Délégation en Perse* and the other publications of the *Délégation*. It is worthy of note that according to Scheil (*Comptes Rendus*, 1910) it is now possible to trace the old Elamitic language, or as he has named it *Ansanite*, as far back as Naram-Sin. For a reference to the excavations at Oheimir cf. *OLZ*, XV, 426. The French have also been working at Samara cf. Viollet, *Fouilles à Samara en Mésopotamie*.

⁸ *The Sculptures and Inscription of Darius the Great on the Rock of Behistûn in Persia*. A new collection of the Persian, Susian and Babylonian Texts, with English translation, plates, etc. 1907.

⁹ The excavations of the University of Pennsylvania at Nippur have not been continued since 1900.

versity of Chicago under the direction of Dr. Banks excavated the site of Bismaya,¹⁰ the ancient *Adab*, in 1903-4 and the Cornell expedition under Olmstead, Charles and Wrench, which has thus far only published the results of its excavation in the Hittite country of Asia Minor, will also work in Mesopotamia, if it has not already done so.¹¹

Besides these expeditions the natives have done considerable excavating on their own account, notably at Sippar (*Abu Habba*), Drehem, Warka and Dailem, and many hundreds of tablets found by them have been bought by European and American collectors.

Through the excavations just enumerated the material for our study of ancient Babylonia and Assyria has been greatly increased. The inventory-lists of objects excavated at Assur passed the 20,000 mark during the past year. At Babylon No. 30,130 was found on Feb. 20, 1905. At that point the inventory ceases, at least as far as all reference to it in the "Reports" is concerned; but the latter indicate that the number must have grown very considerably since then. The inventory numbers at Susa have passed the 15,000 mark, and judging from the registry-numbers of the British Museum that collection has been increased through excavation or purchase by at least 10,000 objects.¹² The other excavations referred to have yielded less.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to form anything approaching an accurate estimate of the extent of the material which has been recovered. A conservative estimate would probably place the total at about 300,000 objects, of which perhaps one-fourth have been recovered during the past decade.¹³ The collection of the British Museum, which

¹⁰ Cf. Edgar J. Banks, *Bismaya*, 1913.

¹¹ Cf. A. T. Olmstead, B. B. Charles, J. E. Wrench, *Travels and Studies in the Nearer East* (Cornell expedition to Asia Minor and the Assyro-Babylonian Orient).

¹² The figures for the Susa excavations and also for the British Museum are based on the inventory or registry numbers of the tablets of these collections in official publications and they may be considerably too low.

¹³ The Kuyundjik Collection of the British Museum numbers, as has

is by far the largest single collection, has passed the 100,000 mark by several thousand. The Imperial Ottoman Museum at Constantinople probably comes next,¹⁴ then the Louvre and then Berlin, for the European collections. The largest collection in this country is that of the University of Pennsylvania, which has about 17,000 tablets.

An estimate of this kind is also very unsatisfactory because of the heterogeneous character of the collections. A single number may represent a large cylinder, or tablet, or a small tablet or even a fragment of a tablet. It may stand for an uninscribed terracotta figurine—according to Koldewey some 6,000 often fragmentary have been found at Babylon—or for a basalt or diorite stele or statue. Of course the small tablets and the fragments are in the majority.

Still these figures give some idea at least of the extent of the material. And it can consequently occasion no surprise that although the work of publishing and copying the inscriptions was entered upon immediately, the pen of the copyist and the varied labors of the decipherer have never been able to catch up or to keep up with the spade of the excavator. In 1850 Botta and Flandin completed their *Monument de Ninive*. In 1851 Layard published his *Inscriptions in the Cuneiform Character*. The first volume of Rawlinson's *Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia* appeared in 1861 and the fifth volume was published nineteen years later. Other texts and series appeared from time to

been said, over 20,000 tablets or fragments. Rassam estimated that 50,000 were found at Sippar. During the years 1893-5 about 30,000 were excavated according to de Sarzec at Tello. Hilprecht has estimated the Nippur yield at over 50,000. These are the most noteworthy finds of previous decades, as far as numbers are concerned.

"Under the present regulations of the Turkish government all antiquities are its property and are to be handed over to the Imperial Ottoman Museum. What percentage of these inscriptions, excavated by European and American archaeologists, will eventually reach the Museums which they represent and what percent of the recently excavated material has already been transferred to Constantinople it is difficult or impossible to say. According to report most of the antiquities found at Babylon are still there, and have not been removed to Constantinople.

time; but Rawlinson was, until about twenty years ago, the great *corpus inscriptionum* of the Assyriologist. About thirty years ago Strassmaier, who himself during the eighties and early nineties published several thousand tablets (contracts), complained of the reluctance of scholars to undertake the publication of new inscriptions. And no one who knows the difficulty involved in this work can wonder at this. The texts are often very hard to read, being usually more or less mutilated and often quite fragmentary and the writing is sometimes very difficult to decipher. But yet probably no decade has a better record in text publications than this one. Over ten thousand inscriptions of various kinds have been published. Clay, Ungnad, Thureau-Dangin, Scheil, Genouillac, King, Thompson, Harper and Virolleaud have published a great many inscriptions and a number of others have made more or less extensive contributions.¹⁵ Most of these are texts not previously published. Many of these inscriptions are small and a large proportion of them are contracts or other documents of a business character. A large part of these latter are in Sumerian, the non-Semitic language spoken by the early inhabitants of Southern Babylonia, from whom the Semitic Babylonians borrowed the cuneiform script.

This record for a single decade is quite noteworthy and shows the great interest which is being taken in this field of investigation. With so many new texts constantly appearing, so much new material to be studied, it is no easy task to keep abreast of the work which is being done in Assyriology alone, not to mention the discoveries in other fields, especially Egyptian, Hittite, Cretan and the Greek papyri, which claim attention. And yet despite this great output it is probable that only a comparatively small part, perhaps not over ten to twenty per cent of the excavated material has been published thus far. There are doubtless in many of our

¹⁵ de la Fuye, Messerschmidt, Hilprecht, Barton, Myhrmann, Radau, Langdon, Klauber, Le Gac, Pinches, Poebel, Weissbach, Peiser, Friedrich, Waterman, Lau, Macmillan, Hincke, Hussey, Delaporte and some others.

museums tablets of the greatest value, which are as unknown as if still covered by the dust of ages. The publication by King, in 1907, of a chronicle containing a valuable synchronism between Babylonian and Assyrian history, a tablet which had seemingly lain in the British Museum for some years before its value was discovered, occasioned the humorous comment by Winckler that "excavations in the British Museum seem more successful than those which are conducted on the site of many a capital city of Babylonia".

This witticism was aimed perhaps more at those responsible for the rather unproductive excavations at Babylon than at the Trustees of the British Museum who have shown very commendable zeal in the publication of texts and in the opening up of their treasures to scholars from all parts of the world. And it is to be hoped that future "excavations" will prove even more successful. This great collection has not yet been even fully catalogued. Bezold took over ten years to catalogue the Kuyundjik Collection alone, which is only about a fifth of the whole, and years must elapse before all its treasures shall have been published. And the same is true in a lesser degree of the other large collections. And in the meantime the work of excavation is being pushed.

PHILOLOGY

Considerable progress has been made along the line of linguistic and philological study. Delitzsch and Sayce have published new editions of their Assyrian grammars. Ungnad and Meissner have published short grammars. The first of these latter is especially valuable because of the prominence which it gives to 'old Babylonian'. Prince has published a new chrestomathy for beginners and Delitzsch's well known *Lesestücke* has appeared in a fifth edition. Special problems of grammar have been studied by Ungnad, Bezold, Thompson, Böhl, Ebeling, Ylvisaker, and others. Brockelmann has made use of Assyrian very extensively in his comparative semitic grammar. The first Sumerian

grammar has recently been published by Langdon—and another by Delitzsch will appear very soon. The advance which has been made in this direction is shown by the fact that at Berlin University Professor Delitzsch expects to make Sumerian a distinct discipline instead of as heretofore merely a department of Assyrian. Lexicography has also made great progress. Almost every new inscription of any length brings us some new word or new expression. Muss-Arnolt's lexicon was completed in 1905, and has about 1200 pages. It is rumored that the supplement to Delitzsch's *Handwörterbuch* (1896), which has been promised for half a decade, will be nearly as large as the original dictionary. The glossary in the new edition of the *Lesestücke* contains much new material. Quite recently Holma, a Finnish scholar, has published a monograph of nearly 200 pages on the names given to the different parts of the body in Assyrio-Babylonian (*Die Namen der Körperteile im Assyrisch-Babylonischen*). This study brings together some 350 words and although many of them are still of uncertain meaning, this work shows something of the possibilities of Assyrian lexicography. Prince completed in 1908 his *Materials for a Sumerian Lexicon* and Meissner finished in 1910 his great collection of rare Assyrian ideograms. This work contains approximately 10,000 ideograms and is intended as a supplement to Brünnow's *Classified List*, which appeared in 1889. Other less extensive contributions have been made by Fossey, Virolleaud, Langdon and Hussey.

Barton has been making an elaborate study of the cuneiform script. The material for such a study has increased greatly of recent years. The publication of texts of all periods, especially of so many of the period of Hammurapi and still earlier, has made it possible to trace the stages in the development of the script from very early times in its various modifications.¹⁶ A comparative study of this kind is very helpful and carries on the work of Amiaud, Thureau-

¹⁶ The publication of early Assyrian inscriptions has shown that about the time of Hammurapi the Assyrian script closely resembled the Babylonian although at a later date it developed marked peculiarities.

Dangin, Delitzsch and others. The most ancient script has been especially studied by Toscanne.

The controversy with regard to the character of the Sumerian language, which has been waged with greater or less activity since 1874, when Halévy first put forth the hypothesis that instead of being a non-Semitic language, it was an ideographic or cryptographic script (*allographie*) of Semitic origin, has now been practically settled in favor of the opponents of Halévy. The family to which it belongs is still in dispute. Indeed little light has been thrown upon this subject in the last quarter of a century. But the fact that it is a genuine language is now practically universally admitted. Jastrow, who until recently was a supporter of Halévy, now admits that the proof contained in the "royal inscriptions", which have recently been edited and translated by Thureau-Dangin, that the Sumerian had *phonetic* elements, has convinced him that it was once a spoken language and not merely an ideographic way of writing Semitic-Babylonian.¹⁷ This evidence has seemed to him more convincing even than the evidence produced by Ed. Meyer to show that on the monuments we find representations of two distinct races, the one Semitic, the other the Sumerian. Jastrow was one of the last if not the last prominent supporter of Halévy. So that the latter now stands practically alone and although he has quite recently written a lengthy defence of his standpoint, and predicts that "some day the historians and philologists will be grateful to him for having delivered them from the absurd nightmare, which has troubled their minds for sixty years and which is called 'the Sumarian mystery' ", it is hardly likely that he will win many converts to his position.

It is interesting to note in this connection that the cuneiform inscriptions have thrown valuable light on the vocalization of ancient Egyptian. As is now generally admitted, this language was written, like Hebrew and most of the

¹⁷ Cf. Jastrow, *Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, vol. II, pp. ix. Many of these inscriptions had been previously edited. But this translation constitutes a great advance in this field.

other Semitic languages, without the vowels. The cuneiform although in many respects a complicated and cumbersome system has the advantage that it does render the vowels. Ranke has collected considerable material bearing upon this subject. And while it is probable that the Egyptologist will have to look in the future as in the past chiefly to Coptic for light upon this important question, the value of the cuneiform is not inconsiderable.

The excavations conducted by Winckler at Boghaz-Keui in 1907 have also made it clear that it is to the Cuneiform, which has unlocked for us the long forgotten Sumerian, that we are to look for the key to the Hittite. Winckler found there Hittite tablets written in the cuneiform script and containing a number of Assyrian words. It is also reported that bilingual syllabaries have been found. Such tablets should make possible that scientific study of the Hittite language, which is necessarily a preliminary step before any thorough study of the hieroglyphs can be made. For it has been the circumstance that the language as well as the script was unknown which has made the problem so exceedingly difficult.¹⁸

CHRONOLOGY AND HISTORY

Important light has been thrown upon chronology and history by chronicles, date lists, dated contract tablets and historical inscriptions of various kinds, published during the past decade. Two new chronicles published by King¹⁹ are especially valuable. One gives us a synchronism between early Babylonian and Assyrian history, by stating that Ilu-shûma, king of Assyria, was a contemporary of Su- (or Sumu-) abu, the first king of the First Dynasty of Babylon—a synchronism which carries us back more than 500 years

¹⁸ Thompson, in his *New Decipherment of the Hittite Hieroglyphs* (1913) has made considerable use of the cuneiform tablets published by Winckler (*MDOG*, No. 35), and his decipherment seems to rest on sound principles. Just how much of it will eventually prove to be correct, it is hard to predict at present.

¹⁹ L. W. King, *Chronicles concerning early Babylonian Kings*, 1907.

before the "Synchronistic Chronicle" starts *i.e.*, to about the beginning of the second millenium B.C.²⁰ Another chronicle states that Samsu-iluna, son of Hammurapi, waged war against Iluma-ilu. As this Iluma-ilu is admitted to be the first king of the Second Dynasty, or, as it is called, the Dynasty of the Sea-Land, this statement proves that the Second Dynasty was contemporaneous with the First for one third to one half its duration. Whether the Second Dynasty held sway at Babylon at all is not yet definitely settled. King thinks that it did not. In this opinion he is supported by Ed. Meyer. The fact that as early as the ninth year of Samsu-iluna the Kassites, as Hilprecht expresses it "knocked at the door of Babylonia", and that no inscription dated in the reigns of these kings has ever been found, goes a long way toward establishing this contention.²¹ That this is the case was argued fifteen years ago by Hommel, following a suggestion of Halévy. This evidence brings down the date of Hammurapi very considerably and largely obviates the difficulty in the way of the acceptance of the identification of this king with the Amraphel of Gen. xiv. The chronology is still too uncertain to warrant an attempt at exact determination,²² but this discovery goes a long way toward harmonizing the two chronologies

²⁰ Another important datum for the history of the early period is the fact that we are able in view of a recent discovery of Thureau-Dangin to assign the Cappadocian Tablets, which have been found near Boghaz-Keui, to about 2300 B.C., *i.e.*, to a period several centuries earlier than the first dynasty of Babylon. Cf. *The Britannica Year-Book*, 1913, p. 259.

²¹ Hilprecht in 1906 expressed the opinion that the Dynasty of the Sea-Lands is for a great part contemporaneous with the Hammurapi dynasty and that the first eighty to one hundred years of the Kassite dynasty run parallel with the closing years of the preceding dynasties (cf. *Babylonian Exped. of the Univ. of Penn.* Series A, XX, 1, p. 43).

²² Auchincloss (*Chronology of the Holy Bible*, p. 61) fixes the date of the Promise to Abraham at 1907 B.C. and states that Rogers on the basis of Babylonian data assigns this event tentatively to 1915 B.C. Beecher (*The Dated Events of the O. T.*) places this event twenty-one years earlier. Both of these scholars accept the view that the Second Dynasty never ruled at Babylon and that the Third or Kassite followed immediately on the First. F. A. Jones (*The Dates of Genesis*) regards

at this point. The fact that this tablet furnishes us with a definite instance of a dynasty being to all appearance regarded by Assyrian chroniclers as successive when it was really contemporaneous in whole or in part with other dynasties is, as King points out, of the greatest importance because it helps in the solution of another problem which has long been puzzling scholars—the date of Naram-Sin. According to Nabunaid, the last king of Babylon, Naram-Sin lived about 3800 B.C. This date has been regarded as too high by many scholars. It could not be accepted without admitting enormous gaps in the history, as known, or inventing new kings or dynasties to fill them. Lehmann-Haupt tried to obviate this difficulty by assuming that the scribe made a mistake of 1,000 years, writing 3200 for 2200 and this view has gained considerable acceptance. But, as King points out, while this correction answers fairly well in this instance, it cannot explain other cases of conflict and is not scientific. King argues with justice that it is far more probable that the scribes of Nabunaid made the same mistake in calculating the date of Naram-Sin which modern scholars have made in estimating the date of Hammurapi, that is, they have regarded as successive dynasties which appear consecutively in the lists but which should really be treated in some instances at least as contemporaneous. We have seen that the evidence that the Second Dynasty did not rule in Babylon at all or at the best only a part of the time assigned to it in the “King-Lists”, brings down the date of Hammurapi approximately 125-350 years. Had the scribes of Nabunaid made this same mistake and also counted several of the earlier dynasties, some of which we know to have been contemporaneous, as consecutive, an error of a thousand years, great as it is, would readily be

1913 B.C., Ussher's date for Gen. xiv, as approximately correct. Toffteen (*Ancient Chronology*, Part I) on the other hand allows an interval of about 150 years between the First and Third Dynasties and his date for the “Promise” is 2090 B.C., very much higher than that proposed by the others.

explicable. King's latest estimate for the date of Naram-Sin is about 2700 B.C.²³

For the history of the earlier period new data are furnished by a dynastic tablet recently published by Scheil, which records the names and reigns of the kings of three new dynasties. Two of these are Sumerian, the third Semitic, the dynasty of Guti. This last dynasty, although only mentioned in the list, clears up several difficulties of the history of the early period, proving as it does a period of Semitic domination lying between the time of Sargon and the Hammurapi dynasty, and King describes this invasion as "an event of the first importance". Hilprecht in 1906 published the latter part of a fragment of a dynastic tablet giving the dynasties of Ur and Isin (preceding the Hammurapi dynasty). He argues from the shape and size of the tablet that it must have contained the names and reigns of about 135 rulers of the period prior to Ur-Engur whose reign he places between the limits 2500-2200 B.C. Poebel has found in the Nippur collection another dynastic tablet which should prove of great interest, since it purports to carry us back to the kings who reigned after the Deluge. How much, if any, historical value it will prove to possess, it is at yet impossible to say. King asserts that "the age of Sumerian civilization can be traced in Babylonia back to about the middle of the fourth millenium B.C., but not beyond".

The tablet referred to above which has proved that the First and Second Dynasties were in part contemporary, contains an additional statement which must be mentioned, namely a reference to an invasion of Babylonia by the Hittites at the close of the First Dynasty of Babylon. This information throws light upon several problems. It accounts perhaps for the fall of the First Dynasty and for the success of the Kassites in establishing their power there. King thinks that it was at this time that the images of Marduk

²³ Hilprecht in 1906 (*op. cit.*) assigned him to a date between 2950 and 2650 B.C. Ed. Meyer in 1909 fixed his date as low as 2450 B.C.

and Sarpanitum were carried off, which more than a century later the Kassite king Argum II brought back from Khani and restored to the temple Esagila in Babylon. This fact is of especial interest because of its confirmation of the book of Genesis, which testifies to the power of the Hittites at this early period. "Among the great political forces of the ancient Oriental world," declares Professor Sayce, "we now know that none exercised a more profound influence than the Hittites of Asia Minor."²⁴ The "nebulous" kingdom of the Hittites is assuming very definite shape!

A number of strictly historical texts have been found coming from all periods. Those from the excavations at Assur have greatly increased our collection of the inscriptions of the Assyrian kings.²⁵ The inscriptions of Adad-Nirari I,²⁶ Salmaneser I (c. 1300 B.C.) and Samsi-Adad are especially worthy of mention and there are a number belonging to subsequent monarchs. About four years ago Scheil and Gautier published a valuable inscription of Tukulti-Ninib II (889-884), a king who until then was practically known only by name. The account which he gives of his military expeditions is especially valuable because of the light it throws on the geography of that period. Recently King has published a cylinder of Sennacherib, acquired by the British Museum, which is of peculiar interest because it gives us an account of the expedition of Sennacherib against

²⁴ Garstang, *The Land of the Hittites*, p. ix.

²⁵ The most recent list of Assyrian kings published by Andrae, the German excavator at Assur, contains 72 names. The discovery of new inscriptions has changed our nomenclature to a considerable degree. Pul is now Tiglath-Pileser IV, not III; Assurnasirpal is now III. Samsi-Adad (823 B.C.) and his son Adad-nirari are now respectively V and IV. Johns indeed calls the former Samsi-Adad VII. A Sargon I has been found, who ruled at Assur about the time of Hammurapi of Babylon, so that it is he and not the founder of the neo-Assyrian empire who first assumed the name of the ancient king of Akkad.

²⁶ Prof. R. D. Wilson has called my attention to the fact that one of the newly discovered inscriptions of this king contains a reference to the Arameans (*Akhlami*). The earliest previously known reference to them on an Assyrian inscription is from the reign of Tiglath-Pileser I, about two centuries later. Cf. Schiffer, *Die Aramäer*.

Cilicia and the Greeks. This expedition, which is, according to King, the sixth conducted by that monarch, took place in 698. It is described in the *Chronicles of Eusebius* (Armenian version) but is not referred to at all in the *Taylor Cylinder*, despite the fact that the latter is dated in 691. This confirmation of an ancient tradition is especially noteworthy because the silence of the "Taylor Cylinder" might easily be construed as discrediting the account given by Eusebius.²⁷ This new cylinder also gives a lengthy account of Sennacherib's extensive building operations at Nineveh and is of value for a study of the topography of the city, giving as it does the names of its fifteen gates and describing the new palace and park.

Another interesting inscription is the Sargon-tablet which has been recently published by Thureau-Dangin. It is a letter and one of unusual length (430 lines). It was written by the king, while residing at Calah, to the officials and citizens of Assur and gives an account of his activities. It is really a war bulletin. It begins, following the epistolary style: "To Asur, the father of the gods, the mighty lord, who dwells in *Eharsaggalkurkurra*, his great temple, may there be most abundant prosperity." Then follows a similar greeting to the other gods and to the citizens of Assur. Sargon writes a letter to his god!

During the course of the excavations at Assur a number of steles have been discovered—nearly 150 in all—which are of not a little historical interest since they usually bear inscriptions. There are two rows of these steles. One is confined to royal personages, the other to officials. About twenty-five of the former have been found, the oldest being that of Erba-Adad, who lived considerably earlier than Adad-Nirari I. One of these is especially interesting because it bears the name of Shammuramat, i.e., Semiramis. This stele shows that she was the wife of Samsi-Adad V and the

²⁷ Cf. L. W. King in *Cuneiform Texts*, XXVI, p. 11 f. Cf. also Professor R. D. Wilson's discussion of the argument from silence in the first volume of his *Studies on the Book of Daniel* which will soon be published.

mother of Adad-nirari IV (800 B.C.). Lehmann-Haupt of Berlin has made a careful investigation of the historical basis of the legend of Ninus and Semiramis, which has come down to us through Greek sources, notably Ctesias, and he believes that this legend must have had its origin not in Assyria but in a foreign country, probably Media. Shammuramat seems to have been a remarkable woman. The fact that her name appears on this stele and on several other inscriptions proves this, for of the Assyrian queens we hear but little. She was a Babylonian, probably of royal birth, and Professor Lehmann-Haupt thinks that her prominence in this legend can be accounted for, if she accompanied her husband and later her son on their warlike expeditions against Armenia and Media and through her prowess and ability won fame and renown as a warrior-queen. That a legend, which represents a queen, who lived in the ninth century B.C., i.e., at a time when the kingdom of Assyria had been in existence for centuries, as being the consort of the founder of the empire, could have grown up on native soil, he believes to be impossible.

In his brief history of the life and times of Assurbanapal²² (Sardanapalus) Professor Delitzsch calls attention to what seems to have been a practice of Assyrian and Babylonian rulers of carrying off dust and rubbish from the cities which they captured and destroyed and pouring it out in a heap at the gates of their royal cities or of the temple of their gods. Sometimes they erected on it a monument recording their exploits. This custom, which seems to be very ancient, is of significance because it is perhaps referred to in the boastful message of Ben Hadad to Ahab recorded in 1 Kings, xx. 10. "The gods do so to me and more also if the dust of Samaria

²² Delitzsch identifies Assurbanapal with the "great and glorious Asnapper" of Ezra iv and points out that as against the Greek and Roman legends which represent him as weak and effeminate, this characterization which we find in the Bible is the only true one. It must be borne in mind, however, that neither the identification of Asnapper with Assurbanapal on the one hand, nor that of Assurbanapal with Sardanapalus on the other can be regarded as certain.

shall suffice for handfuls for all the people that follow me." The vain and ambitious king of Damascus is thinking probably of Nineveh with its victory-columns raised on the ruins of captured cities. He too hopes to erect his monuments before the gates of Damascus. And so, enraged at Ahab's obstinacy in refusing to yield to his demands, he utters this scornful taunt. "You Ahab trust in your city of Samaria, with its walls and its warriors! The dust of your ruined city will not even suffice to fill the hands of my soldiers when I and my two and thirty kings return in triumph to erect before Damascus my victory-stele as conqueror of Samaria!" A braggart speech and one which might well come from the lips of Ben Hadad!

Boundary stones have received considerable attention during the past decade. King has recently published a fine collection of boundary and memorial stones—thirty-seven in all (a number of them are fragmentary)—, and two-thirds of these for the first time. Twenty had been found at Susa up to 1905. Hincke has made a thorough investigation of this class of inscriptions. Their dates range from the Kassite period down to the Persian—*i.e.*, a period of nearly a thousand years. While not historical texts strictly speaking they contain data which are of value to the historian.

LEGAL AND BUSINESS DOCUMENTS, LETTERS, PROPER NAMES

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the discovery of the Code of Hammurapi in 1901 has in several ways revolutionized our ideas of conditions existing at the time of Abraham. This code has been diligently studied during the past decade. Several editions of the text have been published and a number of translations of it have been made. Its contents have been studied from various aspects, prominent among them being the comparison of it with the Mosaic legislation.²⁰ The proof of the existence of a code of this

²⁰ The text of the code was first published by Scheil; subsequently by Harper and by Ungnad. The latter has also published several fragments of the code which have since come to light. It has been translated by Scheil, Müller, Johns, Harper, Winckler, Ungnad and others.

kind five hundred years before the time of Moses is a strong argument for the possibility of the promulgation of the Law at the time of the exodus. There has been a tendency on the part of some to disparage the Mosaic to the advantage of the Babylonian code, and to argue that the admittedly human origin of the latter must of necessity dispose of the argument in support of the supernatural origin of the former. This was of course to be expected. But it must be admitted that the discovery of this code has in many ways both directly and indirectly confirmed the historicity of the Pentateuch.

The discovery of the Code of Hammurapi had, as might have been expected, the effect of stimulating interest in legal and business documents of that period. Some work had already been done in that field, notably by Strassmaier, Meissner and Peiser, several hundred texts having been published and more or less carefully studied. During the past decade over 1,300 tablets have been published and the majority have been translated by Ungnad, and Kohler has made a study of the legal questions involved. Over 600 tablets dating from the Kassite period and about 1,500 from the Neo-Babylonian and Persian period have also been published. From the Assyrian period relatively few new texts have been published, although Ungnad has translated most of the texts published by Johns (1898-1901), and some others making nearly 900 in all, and Kohler has discussed the legal problems.

It is of interest to note that quite recently Koschaker, of the University of Prague, has written a valuable study of an important legal problem, the law of guarantee (*Bürgschaftsrecht*) as it was operative among the Babylonians and Assyrians. He studies it not merely in the early period but

The problems of the code and its relation to the Mosaic legislation have been studied by S. A. Cook, D. H. Müller, Grimme, Edwards, W. W. Davies, Kohler and Ungnad, and others. The name of this king was formerly read Hammurabi. It has been shown however that the sign read *bi* has also in Old-Babylonian the value *pi*. And since this king is generally identified with the Amraphel of Gen. xiv. (see p. 240) the new reading, which was first proposed by Ungnad, is to be preferred.

in the late as well, and in order to do this he, although a jurist and not an Assyriologist, devoted considerable time and effort to the study of the Assyrio-Babylonian that he might be able at least to study transcribed texts in the original language. Schorr, an Assyriologist who has devoted much time and study to this line of investigation, remarks in reviewing Koschaker's book that it is a noteworthy event in the history of Assyriology that a jurist has taken the trouble to study Assyrio-Babylonian in order to investigate its legal problems.

In addition to the tablets just mentioned, about 3,000 business documents or temple-records as they are frequently called, dating in the main from the third millenium B.C. and written in Sumerian and not in the Semitic Babylonian, have been published and quite a number have been translated.

The fact that these business documents are usually dated makes them of value, sometimes of great value, historically. They serve as an important check on the dynastic lists, date lists and chronicles and, where these are fragmentary or unreliable, they are of great assistance in determining the chronology. This is especially true of the early period, the third millenium, and also of the Kassite period, for which the "King-List" is fragmentary. The tablets of the Assyrian period, most of which were published by Johns, give us the names of most if not all of the eponyms for Assyrian chronology between 666 and 606. But for about the last forty years of this period it is impossible for us as yet to determine their order. The Eponym Canon enables us to establish the chronology between about 900 and 648 (Ugnad) with almost no breaks.³⁰

Letters form a not inconsiderable group among the tablets which have been excavated. The number is relatively small as compared with the far greater number of contract and other business documents which have come to light. But

³⁰ This custom of dating by eponyms in Assyria is very ancient. It is regularly used by Adad-Nirari I (cir. 1300 B.C.) on his larger inscriptions and we even find it on "Cappadocian Tablets," which (*cf.* note 20 preceding) may now be assigned to the period of the Second Dynasty of Ur (cir. 2300 B.C.) instead of to the fifteenth century B.C. (*cf. Sayce, Encycl. Brit.*, 11th edition, Vol. III, pp. 101 f.).

over 2,000 letters have been published thus far and they are receiving a good deal of attention. The study of letters practically began with the discovery of the El-Amarna letters in 1888. A few years later Harper undertook the publication of the letters contained in the Library of Assurbanapal—there are some 1,500 letters or fragments in this collection—a task which is now nearly completed. King published a little over ten years ago some eighty letters written by kings of the First Dynasty of Babylon. Many of these letters are of very considerable historical interest. Some of them throw important light upon the customs secular and religious of the people. A great deal has been written on the subject of the El-Amarna letters especially and a new edition of them has been prepared by Knudtzon.

It is practically within the last decade that private letters, *i.e.*, letters written by and generally to private individuals as distinguished from official letters written by or to the king, have been studied. Some 400 tablets of this character, chiefly of the period of the First Dynasty⁸¹ and of the Neo-Babylonian period have been published. They have been studied by Thompson, Ungnad, Landersdorfer, Martin, Ebeling and others.

These letters, despite the many difficulties which they present to the translator, are a very interesting study. Covering as they do a period of some 1,500 years and coming from different localities, they present similarities and differences which are quite marked. It is instructive to study the epistolary style, the differences in the forms of the greeting, etc. The private letters are intrinsically far less important than the official or royal letters. But in one respect they are of great value, namely for the sake of their witness to the degree of education and culture possessed by their writers.

⁸¹ Thureau-Dangin has recently published a tablet which is of peculiar interest. It is somewhat mutilated. But he seems to have good grounds for his view that it is a letter written by Luenna, chief priest of Ninmar, to Enetarzi, chief priest of Girsu, at Lagash (Tello). In it Luenna tells of his successful warfare with invading Elamites. This letter dates from about 2850 B.C. and is written in Sumerian.

In this respect the letters of the early period are especially valuable because they indicate that a fairly high degree of culture prevailed in Babylonia at the time of Abraham. Thus the contents of some of the letters which have been found are of such a trivial nature that the fact that such messages were committed to writing seems to indicate that letter writing was neither a rare accomplishment nor a difficult task for the people of that age. When for example Akhum writes to Lipit-Ishtar and Awêl-Bau: "Now then send me the ass about which Zaziz spoke to you", or Adayatum to Nanna-intukh: "Give a shekel of silver to the agent of Sin-asharidu", or Nanna-intukh to Shumma-Shamash: "Give 60 *Qa* [c. eight gallons] of date-wine to Marduk-nâsir son of Bêl-khâzir"—brief instructions which could easily be conveyed by word of mouth, especially since the letters were probably delivered by private messengers—it seems clear that letter-writing could not have been a rare accomplishment, confined to temple scribes, or such messages would hardly have been written down. This is confirmed by the nature of the script. In these letters the characters are often carelessly written or scribbled and the inference seems justified that they are written by and to men who were so well accustomed to their complicated script that they did not feel obliged to write every character with great care and precision in order to avoid misunderstanding. When we remember that this script contains some 300 characters, some phonetic, some ideographic and many of them quite complicated, it speaks a great deal for the culture of this age. It is also a noteworthy fact that, despite minor differences, letters of the early period are all written in much the same general style, showing that letter-writing was taught in the schools of 4,000 years ago.

In the conclusion to the Code of Hammurapi we read the exhortation to the oppressed to come and read the words of the Code: "Let the oppressed man who has a cause come before my image as king of righteousness and let him read"³²

³² Ungnad favors the rendering "let him have read to him". But the

my inscription which is written and let him hearken to my precious words and let my inscription show him his case, let him see what is his right and let his heart be at ease." Judging from the letters and business documents of the period it seems certain that many of Hammurapi's subjects were able to avail themselves of this exhortation and that the inscribing of the code on a great block of diorite and setting it up where all could see it served a very practical purpose.

That was however not the only purpose of the setting up of the stele. This great stele, with its bas-relief representing the king receiving the code from the Sun-god, was also intended to be a memorial stone, a tribute to and reminder of the goodness of the Sun-god, the god of justice and righteousness, the giver of the Code. And this was probably the chief reason that Moses commanded Joshua to set up great stones on Mount Ebal and to plaster them and write on them the words of the Law of Jehovah. It was to be a memorial, an Ebenezer, an Ebenezeker. Whether we can from it draw any inference as to the amount of education possessed by the Children of Israel when they entered Canaan is difficult to say. We know of course that the priests were to have copies of the Law and to teach it to the people. It is consequently assumed that the priests could read and possibly a considerable number of the people could also.

As Professor Sayce has recently reminded us, an old argument against the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch was that writing was not known at the time of Moses and that, had the Law been revealed to him, he could not have written it down and codified it. This position has of course long been utterly untenable. But it has found its echo in the claim that the Israelites were merely nomads, strangers to the high culture of Babylon and Egypt. In the light of other is equally if not more probable in itself and it is certain that many could have read for themselves, although it must be regarded as no less certain that very many could not. Perhaps the expression is on this account intentionally ambiguous.

archaeology, it is certainly not too much to say that Abraham probably learned to read and write when a boy in Ur of the Chaldees and that Moses, who was versed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, may during the long years spent at the court of Pharaoh have learned not merely to read and write Egyptian but even have mastered the Babylonian cuneiform as well, since the El-Amarna letters show that it was at that time the *lingua franca* of a very wide area.

The contract tablets, business documents and letters contain a great many proper names. During the past decade several scholars, notably Ranke, Tallquist, Huber, Clay, Dhorme and Poebel have collected and published the names occurring on some thousands of tablets of different periods, both Semitic and Sumerian.³³ This study has proved very valuable. The study of the theophoric names throws considerable light upon the religious life and thinking of the people, as has been shown by Tallquist's investigations. The similarity between these names and names contained in the Old Testament is sometimes very great. One fact which has been brought out very clearly is the frequency with which names were abbreviated, through the omission of one or more of the component parts. In such cases a termination often having the force of a diminutive is frequently added. This feature is probably more characteristic of names in the Bible than is as yet recognized. The study of these names is also proving valuable, as Clay's investigations have shown, from the ethnological standpoint. It is possible clearly to distinguish men of different nationalities by the names. And Clay has shown that the study of the proper names of the Kassite period throws considerable light upon the puzzling Hittite problem.

The contracts, many of the other business documents and some of the letters bear seal-impressions; and many signets of various kinds have been discovered. These signets form a very interesting and fruitful field for investigation, attrac-

³³ Dhorme, Huber and Poebel have been studying Sumerian proper names, Ranke names of the First Dynasty, Clay those of the Kassite period and Tallquist those of the Neo-Babylonian and Persian period.

tive alike to antiquarian, artist and historian. In 1910 appeared W. H. Ward's *Cylinder-Seals of Western Asia*, which is a very valuable contribution to this subject. It is a seal impression on one of the "Cappadocian Tablets" which has established their early date (see note 20). A casual reference in Gen. xxxviii proves that, as might be expected, the Patriarchs carried signets.

THE RELIGION

In the study of the religious texts, which possess for us an interest which is in some respects at least scarcely inferior to the historical texts, very marked progress has been made.³⁴ Most noteworthy is perhaps the study of the omen

³⁴ The study of the historical texts, with which Assyriology began, furnished of course some information with regard to the religion of these peoples. The study of the myths and legends practically began with George Smith's discovery of portions of the Babylonian Flood-legend (1872), followed by his *Chaldean Genesis* in 1876. Since then a number of myths and legends, of which the Gilgamesh-epic (the account of the Flood is contained in the eleventh tablet of this epic), the Creation Tablets and the Descent of Ishtar are the most generally known, have been extensively studied. Within the past decade Jensen has published a new edition of the more important of these texts. The study of the magical texts began with the appearing of the second volume of Rawlinson's *Cuneiform Inscriptions* (1866). Oppert and especially Lenormant (1873) opened up the study of the incantations and exorcisms practiced in the Babylonian demonology. This line of investigation has been continued by Tallquist, King, Fossey, Thompson, and others. In 1875 appeared Lenormant's *La Divination et la Science des Présages chez les Chaldéens*, in which work although he was to a very considerable extent dependent on the classics for information, he pointed out most of the departments of this field (to astrology he devoted little attention). The hymns and prayers to the gods early received attention and many of them were published. In 1885 Zimmern's *Bab. Busspsalmen* appeared, in 1893 Kundtson's *Assyrische Gebete an den Sonnengott*. In the course of the decade a good deal of work has been done in the study of the cults of special deities—Bollenrücher, *Nergal*; Perry, *Sin*; Combe, *Sin*; Gray, *Shamash*; Hrozny, *Ninrag*; Schollmeyer, *Ishtar*, Myhrmann, *Labartu*, Pinches, *Ishtar*. Langdon has been studying the old Sumerian hymns and temple ritual and contributions to this subject have been made by Radau, Zimmern, Myhrmann, Macmillan and others. Behrens has made a valuable study of seven of the letters which have been published by Harper, which relate to religion and cult. Works on the religion have been published by Rogers, Sayce, Dhorme, Pinches and Jastrow.

texts. Within a year the second volume of Jastrow's German edition of his *Religion of the Babylonians and Assyrians* (1898) has been completed. This volume is very largely devoted to the study of these omen texts and contains a great deal of new material. In fact the writer devotes nearly 800 pages, more than the compass of his entire first edition, to this one subject. He discusses at very considerable length the most important forms of augury and divination which were practiced at Nineveh and Babylon—examination of the liver (hepatoscopy), observation of the heavenly bodies and of natural phenomena, divination by means of oil and water (lucanomania), augury based on the encountering of different animals and the observation of their actions, augury based on the birth of monstrosities, oracles, dreams, etc.³⁵

The omen literature attracted attention quite early in the history of Assyriology, as was natural in view of the references to it in the classical writers as well as in the Old Testament. And all of the branches of it, which Professor Jastrow investigates, have received more or less attention from previous writers. He is however one of the first to emphasize the great importance of this aspect of the religion and he has also been the pioneer in the study of the texts dealing with the examination of the liver.³⁶ In the study of astrology, the Jesuit Kugler has come to be regarded as an authority and Boissier, Virolleaud, Fossey, Hunger, King, Klauber, Handcock and others have made contributions to these lines of investigation. Professor Jastrow regards hepatoscopy and astrology as the two most important forms of divination practised by these peoples. The former he characterizes as the popular, the latter as the scientific system.

³⁵ Cf. also his *Aspects of Religious Belief and Practice in Babylonia and Assyria*, 1911.

³⁶ As early as 1875 Lenormant called attention to the importance of hepatoscopy and referred to two unedited text fragments dealing with this subject. But, as has been stated, it is only quite recently that this subject has been carefully studied.

Professor Jastrow has been accused of devoting too much attention to this one subject—the omen literature—in his new work and with thus giving his readers a false, or at least a one-sided, conception of this religious system and of the importance of this feature in it. That there is some truth in this objection must be admitted. For, as he himself admits, he is forced to reserve for a new volume the treatment of a number of subjects which should be discussed in a work bearing this title—subjects which occupied over a third of the space of the first edition—because he has devoted fully one-half of the space of these three volumes to this one topic.

His reply to this objection is however significant. He points out in the Preface to the second volume that these omen texts form a large part of the religious literature as we know it. They constitute, as he reminds us, the largest single group in the texts coming from the Library of Assurbanapal. He argues with justice that we must take the material as we find it and further justifies his procedure by the fact that this group of texts has been largely neglected in the past. Having himself devoted a great deal of time and pains to the study of texts dealing with the liver, it is only natural that he should discuss this “new subject” more fully than he might otherwise have done. His second reason is especially noteworthy. He contends that the preponderance of omen texts is not accidental, but that it is really due to the especial prominence of this feature in the religious beliefs and usages of the people. He tells us that “it was in these very omen-texts that the theory of the universe, which dominated the lives of the people in Assyria and Babylonia, from the very earliest to the latest period, expressed itself, that it was one of the chief objects—if not the main purpose—of the religion in its practical form to enable men to prepare themselves for that which was impending and to enable them to do their best to ward off every evil, when it was impossible to prevail on the gods to alter their purposes.”

This characterization of the religion of Babylon and Nineveh, given to us by one who is a recognized authority in this field, is very significant. That these nations used divination and augury was known to us, as has been remarked, through the Old Testament and the Classics even before the study of Assyriology began. But it is only recently that the great prominence of this feature in these religions—the special emphasis upon the “future problem”—has been made clear by this literature itself. And this fact is of unusual importance not merely for our study of this religion, but even more for a true appreciation of the relation in which it stands to other religions and especially to the religion of Israel.

In this age of comparative study and research, to which the words development and derivation are so familiar, a comparison between these religions is unavoidable, more especially since the interest which has been taken in Assyriology has come largely from the study of the Old Testament, and Bible lovers have been inclined to welcome every new point of contact between the Old Testament and the Monuments and have looked to the latter for confirmation of the truth of the former. And to many, of course, connection necessarily suggests derivation or dependence, and an emphasis on the correspondences between the religion and culture of these nations leads naturally to the inference that there was an interdependence—a derivation.

The attempt to prove the dependence of Israel upon Babylon in religious and other matters, which can be traced back for several decades,³⁷ was brought prominently before

³⁷It received its first real impulse through the discovery of the Babylonian myths of the Flood and of Creation. In 1877 C. P. Tiele, in his inaugural address as professor of comparative religions at Leyden on: “*Die Assyriologie und ihre Ergebnisse für die vergl. Religionswissenschaft*,” asserted that the religious literature of the Babylonians and Assyrians was destined to play in the comparative theology of the Semites the same rôle as the Vedas in that of the Indo-Germans. In 1888 Dr. Edw. G. King in his *Akkadian Genesis* tried to trace the influence of early Babylonian religion on the language and thought of Genesis and advanced some quite extreme views. The discovery of the El-Amarna

the public eye through the so-called "Babel-Bible" lectures of Professor Friedrich Delitzsch of the University of Berlin. The first of these lectures was delivered in January, 1902, the second a year later and the third in 1905. The main thesis defended by Professor Delitzsch was to the effect that many features of the religion of the Old Testament which have been and are regarded as distinctly characteristic of that religion and as having their origin in supernatural revelation are derived directly or indirectly from Babylonian sources. In the second lecture, for example, he contrasted the Mosaic law with the recently discovered Code of Hammurapi and argued for the purely human origin of the former. The law of revenge he affirmed could not come from the thrice-holy God. In the third lecture he took occasion to inveigh against the narrow "particularism" of the Hebrew prophets who so bitterly opposed all foreign innovations and were so intensely exclusive in their spirit.

These lectures, which were delivered by one who was regarded as an authority in the field of Assyriology and who had done so much for its development, and which furthermore were delivered before the *Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft*, which was conducting excavations in Babylonia, Palestine and Egypt and had the warm support of the German emperor, naturally became the storm-centre of a very active controversy. Numerous articles, pamphlets and books written by theologians and Assyriologists have been published and the controversial literature is very extensive. Professor R. D. Wilson who delivered the "Opening Address" in Miller Chapel in the fall of the same year in which

letters gave strength to this movement because it showed how far-reaching was the influence exerted by Babylonian language and literature at the time of Moses. In 1895 Gunkel in his *Schöpfung und Chaos* argued that in the account of the Serpent in Genesis and of the Dragon in Revelation we have Babylonian mythical elements. In the next year Zimmern published a little book entitled: *Vater, Sohn und Fürsprecher* in which he sought to show that the Babylonian theology presented some noteworthy correspondences with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. In 1896 Eduard Stucken began his studies of astral myths.

the first "Babel-Bible" lecture was given by Professor Delitzsch chose for his subject: "Babylon and Israel", and showed by "a comparison of their leading ideas based on their vocabularies" that the alleged influence was opposed by weighty philological evidence.³⁸ Sayce, in *Monumental Facts and Higher Critical Fancies*, König, in *Bibel und Babel*, a little book, which has passed through a number of editions in Germany and has been translated into English, Hommel, in *Altisraelitische Denkmäler*, and a number of others have opposed the views advanced by Professor Delitzsch. A. T. Clay, in *Amurru, the Home of the North Semites* has argued that the influence was the other way around and that it was the West-Land that influenced Babylon. In justice to Professor Delitzsch it should perhaps be remarked that although his lectures have attracted more attention than the utterances of any other scholar, which might be expected in view of his high position and distinguished attainments, he has certainly not gone to greater extremes than some other almost equally prominent German Assyriologists, e.g., Zimmern, Jensen and Winckler, in the attempt to prove the dependence of Judaism upon Babylon. Winckler through his astral myth theories, Jensen in his attempt to find in Moses, Jesus and Paul, variants of the ancient Babylonian mythical hero Gilgamesh, and Zimmern in his more recent writings and already in his *Vater, Sohn und Fürsprecher* (1896) have gone further probably than Delitzsch. Jensen and Zimmern, especially the latter, have taken part in the recent controversy precipitated by Drews' *Christ-Myth*, and although Alfred Jeremias has attempted to combine a most unqualified recognition of mythical and legendary elements in the Old Testament with a firm belief in its historical trustworthiness, the Pan-Babylonists, of whom he and Winckler were the leaders, have had

³⁸ This address appeared in THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW (April, 1903). It was repeated in a somewhat different form, at the Boston Convention in December, 1904, under the title, *The Linguistic Evidence for the Relations between Babylon and Israel*, and was published in the *Bible Student and Teacher* (May, 1905).

recourse to far fetched and fanciful theories hardly less extreme than those of Jensen. When one reads a book like *Moses, Jesus, Paulus*, which may be regarded as an extreme type of much that has been written to prove Babylonian influence, one is tempted to ask one's self whether these scholars have not, like so many Jews of the time of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, fallen victim to the spell of Babylon. One might almost imagine that a third "Babylonian Captivity" is pending, a thought to which the distinguished Jesuit scholar Kugler has given expression in the title of his recent book, *Im Bannkreis Babels*, in which he seeks to show that, as far at least as astrology and astronomy are concerned, the influence of Babylon on Israel has been greatly exaggerated.

In view of these attempts to make the Old Testament more or less tributary to Babylon and Assyria in religion and culture, especially the former, the new light which has been thrown upon the character of the religion of the Babylonians and Assyrians is especially valuable since it brings out clearly, as against the derivation theories which have been so freely advanced, one at least of the very important points of divergence between these religious systems—namely, with respect to augury and divination.

As regards Babylon and Assyria it is clear not only that divination and augury in their varied forms were very prominent in their religious systems, but also that the two forms most frequently used were hepatoscopy and astrology. In Israel on the other hand, not only was the emphasis on the "future problem" far less marked, but the recognized means for the ascertaining of the divine will were different, namely oracle and dream or vision, two means which according to Jastrow were not at all prominent in the Assyrio-Babylonian cult. Furthermore these two choice means employed by the latter, hepatoscopy and astrology, seem to be intentionally interdicted in Israel. While on the other hand necromancy, to the practice of which the Israelites were especially inclined, does not seem to have figured at all in the systems of the Assyrians and Babylonians.

The liver, the examination of which was so important for augural purposes among the Assyrians and Babylonians, is only once referred to in this connection in the Old Testament, namely in Ezek. xxi. 21 where the king of Babylon is represented as standing at the head of the two ways and practising divination: "he looked into the liver" (*רָאָה בִּלְבָבִי*). But nowhere do we read of this form of divination being practised by the Hebrews. Instead "the instruction, which is frequently reiterated in the Old Testament, that in sacrificing, the caul above the liver, which played such an important rôle in hepatoscopy, should be burned, seems to be a protest against this form of augury" (Hehn).

Similarly as regards astrology we find nothing in the religion of the Law and the Prophets corresponding to the Assyrian and Babylonian usages. We know it is true that cults of the heavenly bodies flourished more or less in Israel (*cf.* 2 Kings, xxiii. 4 f.; Jer. viii. 2; Ezek. viii. 16; Amos v. 26; Acts vii. 43). But they were condemned by the Law (Exod. xx. 4-5; Deut. iv. 19, xvii. 3) and according to Hehn the conditions in Israel were not only unfavorable to the development of astrology, but "the religion of Israel was obliged to reject astrology on principle because it would have led directly to the worship of the stars as divine beings".

In his book *The Biblical and the Babylonian Idea of God*,³⁹ which we have just cited, Hehn has carefully investigated this all important problem of the nature of the conception of God as it is found in these two religions. He brings out very clearly, as may be gathered from the following brief summary, the great fundamental distinctions existing between them. The gods of the Assyrians are "personifications of the cosmical manifestations of the forces which are operative in the world of human beings, animals, and plants". Jehovah is transcendent and not connected with any natural phenomena. The relation between the pagan gods and their worshippers is a natural one.

³⁹ Hehn, *Die biblische und die babylonische Gottesidee*, 1913.

They are nature gods. The relation between Jehovah and His people is a covenant relation. The nature gods are very tolerant and admit other cults alongside of their own. The difference between deities is often only one of name. The Assyrio-Babylonians took Sumerian gods into their pantheon. The Egyptians took over Semitic deities. Ishtar of Nineveh pays a visit to the king of Mitanni. "Jehovah alone tolerates no other worship beside His own. He alone is intolerant and exclusive." Images too figure prominently in these cults. Jehovah forbids plastic representation of the deity. In the theology of the nature gods, the sex idea is prominent. We find gods and goddesses and complex relationships as among human beings. This idea enters too into the cult, and sensuous rites are found in this as in other ethnic religions of the Orient. This is absolutely foreign to and most emphatically condemned in the religion of Israel. Further, "Jehovah as national God is the ethical God whose first demand is for love and righteousness". "In the case of the nature gods the ethical factor is more accessory." The fact that the religion of the Old Testament centers around certain great figures, Moses, Samuel, Elijah, etc., finds no parallel in Babylon. And finally the uniqueness of the Old Testament religion shows itself in a peculiar inner contradiction which is to be observed in no other religion of the ancient Orient, namely, "the antagonism between the demands of the religion of Jehovah and the leanings of the people toward polytheism and nature worship". Were the religion of Jehovah of the same general character as that of the other neighboring peoples such a phenomenon would be inexplicable.

Barton says of this book: "In the face of Hehn's sober comparison no one can hereafter successfully contend that Yahweh as he appears in the Old Testament is a creation of Babylonian influence or that Hebrew Monotheism is borrowed either from Babylon or Amenophis IV." A judgment of this kind expressed by one who is himself a "natural evolutionist" of a pronounced type and who might conse-

quently be expected to be somewhat biased in favor of the "derivation theory"⁴⁰ is quite significant. And while it would be rash to assert that the "Babel-Bible" controversy is ended—it is far from that—it is a fact which can hardly be gainsaid, that the investigations of the past decade have tended to no inconsiderable degree to emphasize the differences and not the resemblances between the religion of Israel and the religion of Babylon and Assyria.⁴¹ And this is but to assert that the trend has been to confirm the witness of the Hebrew Prophets who lived at the time when the influence of Assyria and Babylon was at its height.

In fact if we would guard ourselves from the danger of forming a false estimate of Babylon and Nineveh we cannot do better than turn to the "Prophets", who just because of that particularistic attitude which Professor Delitzsch decries were peculiarly qualified to form a true estimate of these great nations which left a name at which the world grew pale long after their capitals were desolate wastes. The excavations have brought vividly before us the evidences of the might of these nations, their high civilization, the breadth of their influence. But they do not make it out to have been one whit greater than these Prophets of old describe it as having been. It was no puny

⁴⁰ Cf. his *Sketch of Semitic Origins*, in which he traces the beginnings of the religion of Israel not to Babylon but to the Kenites.

⁴¹ It is also worthy of mention that Farnell in *Greece and Babylon* reaches much the same conclusion regarding the influence of Babylon on ancient Greece. He believes that "where the influence of Babylon upon Greece can be reasonably posited, it reaches the western shores of the Aegean at a post-Homeric rather than a pre-Homeric epoch" (p. 249). Thus the use of incense and the examination of the liver are comparatively late. "... the theory that primitive Hellas was indebted to Babylonia for its divination-system is strongly repugnant to the facts." This "all-pervading atmosphere of magic which colors their [the Babylonians'] view of life and their theory of the visible and invisible world" he stigmatizes as "most un-Hellenic". The closing paragraph summarizes his conclusions as follows: "So far, then, as our knowledge goes at present, there is no reason for believing that nascent Hellenism, wherever else arose the streams that nourished its spiritual life, was fertilized by the deep springs of Babylonian religion or theology."

state that overthrew Samaria and no weakling who carried captive Judah. It was a high culture and an alluring religion which exerted such a subtle and baleful influence upon these peoples. And the Prophets do not disguise the fact. They proclaim it rather with great plainness of speech. They tell us how the kings of Assyria subjugated and plundered the nations as an egg hunter plunders the nests. The boastful words in Isa. x find their counterpart in the "royal inscriptions". They tell us too how the daughters of Zion aped the luxurious customs of the Assyrians, and that even in the very temple of Jehovah women baked cakes for Ishtar, the Queen of Heaven, and made a wailing for Tammuz. But they tell us that it was for this very sin of aping the foreigner and worshipping his gods that Assyria was made the "rod of His anger" and Babylon became to them a second Egypt. And they deny most emphatically that this "strange worship" had any place or part in Israel. They speak with scorn and contempt of the idol gods, who see not and hear not, who are made by men's hands and carried on men's shoulders. They scoff at the signs of the wise men and diviners, which are vain, and exalt Jehovah as the One who alone can predict and perform.

This warning of the Prophets to the men of their age is one to which the men of our own will do well to hearken. Assyriology has done much and we have reason to hope that it will yet do much more to confirm the Scriptures and to open up anew for us the history of long ago. But there is a danger that in the interest and fascination of these new discoveries, which seem almost to annihilate time and carry us back to the days when Assyria and Babylon were at the height of their power we lose a sense of true proportion and turn to them and not to the "Law" for light and leading. It is for this reason that the evidence which has been produced to show how essentially different was the religion of Israel from that of Babylon and Assyria is especially welcome. And we have reason to hope that future discoveries will make this all the more apparent, and that

we, who look back upon Assyria and Babylon through the mist of centuries will be able with ever increasing confidence to cite the witness of the monuments in support of the great affirmation of the Hebrew Prophet: The Word of our God shall stand forever.

Princeton.

OSWALD THOMPSON ALLIS.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

The First Principles of Evolution. By S. HERBERT, M.D. (Vienna), M.R.C.S. (Engl.), L.R.C.P. (Lond.), Author of "The First Principles of Heredity." Containing ninety illustrations and tables. London: Adam and Charles Black; New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. 8vo; pp. ix, 346. \$2.00.

"This book, like a previous one, 'The First Principles of Heredity,' is the outcome of a series of lectures given to a class of workmen and others." It aims to "present the problem of Evolution comprehensively in all its aspects," but to do this in a "simple yet scientific manner." This aim Dr. Herbert has realized.

His work is comprehensive. It discusses "Inorganic Evolution," "Organic Evolution," and "Superorganic Evolution," under the last head considering "Mental," "Moral," and "Social Evolution," and under Social Evolution dealing with "The Family," "The State," "Religion," "Evolution and Progress." These subjects, moreover, are taken up under two aspects: first, the facts illustrative of the process of evolution are presented and, secondly, the various theories of this process are stated and criticized. The book concludes with two chapters, one on "The Formula of Evolution" and the other on "The Philosophy of Change."

Again, this work is simple, wonderfully simple in view of the inherent complexity and difficulty of the subject-matter. This simplicity results from the logical arrangement of topics and from the accuracy and directness of the author's style, and it is much aided by the numerous and admirable illustrations. The serviceableness of the volume is also greatly enhanced by the Bibliography, the "Glossary," and the "Index," with which it closes.

Once more, Dr. Herbert is to be congratulated on having given us a thoroughly scientific discussion. It is distinguished by fullness and exactness of information, by being in all respects up to date, and by absolute honesty and frankness.

Indeed, he is so bent on setting forth the truth, and only the truth as he sees it and believes it, that he often prejudices his own case. There is no denying that he holds a brief for Evolution, and yet the reading of this brief has raised in the mind of the reviewer the following among many questions:

1. Do not the number, and especially the contradictory character, of the various theories of the process of evolution militate against any one of them being the true theory and reduce them all to improbable,

if not to impossible hypotheses? Thus, to give but an example or two, the Neo-Lamarckians depend for evolution on environmental factors while the ultra-Darwinians maintain the all-sufficiency of natural selection. The former insist on the inheritance of acquired characteristics, while the latter as resolutely deny it. Hence, as Dr. Herbert remarks, "the difficulties of either of these extreme schools are very great indeed when taken singly, each side being able to make out an apparently strong case against the other"; and yet, as I may add, they are mutually exclusive, and so cannot be combined.

Again, take the auxiliary hypotheses that have been devised in aid of natural selection and the Darwinians, such as panmixia, germinal selection, intra-selection, coincident selection, and isolation. These hypotheses may not be exclusive of each other, speaking strictly; but are they not admitted to rest on only a small basis of fact? Are they not but so many guesses? Do they not by their very number as well as by their futility emphasize their purely conjectural character?

Once more, take the two modern schools of heterogenesis and of orthogenesis. The former "look upon discontinuous variations as the material of organic evolution," while the latter "assume a determinate progressive movement in the organic world as an intrinsic part of its organization."

Neither of these theories, however, may be regarded as supplementing the two older ones. They can not be combined with them. Heterogenesis emphasizes the discontinuity of variations, whereas the point of the older theories is that they emphasize the continuity of variations; and orthogenesis insists on "a determinate progressive movement in the organic world as an intrinsic part of its organization," whereas the older theories resort to accidental variations in the organism or in the environment. Nor can these two modern theories be themselves combined. Heterogenesis lays stress on single variations or sports; orthogenesis, on the contrary, falls back on an "inherent growth of the organism." The method of the one could not be more opposed than it is to that of the other.

Nor is the case different when we compare the two schools that hold to orthogenesis. These are as exclusive in their fundamental principles as mechanism and vitalism. And the same is strikingly true of the vitalists themselves. They divide into two camps, one holding to purpose, the other, as Bergson, denying it. Is not Dr. Herbert overmodest in his conclusion? "It has become evident that the problem is by no means so simple as the pioneer of evolution thought. And, we must add, the difficulties have by no means been overcome by their successors." Is it not nearer the truth, the reviewer would ask, that they have been greatly multiplied?

2. Does not our author's admission just quoted weaken his further conclusion? "One thing is sure, however, organic evolution or the transformation of living beings has been established as a scientific fact on a sufficient and independent basis, and is now the accepted creed of the age." Whether that it is "the accepted creed of the age"

is not too strong a statement, we need not pause to discuss; but the former assertion we must consider. "The only question" is not, as Dr. Herbert claims, "How has the progressive differentiation of the organic world come about?" "The other question that he regards as settled is still a question. We must still ask, Is the progressive differentiation of the organic world a universal fact? And this inquiry depends on the former. That is, the inquiry whether evolution be a universal process depends to a large degree on the admittedly unanswered inquiry as to the theory of this process. In a word, facts cannot be considered apart from their meaning. We cannot understand a fact until we discern its meaning. To affirm that it illustrates a certain process we must have a true theory of that process. The various organic forms might illustrate creation according to type as well as evolution one out of another. Or they might illustrate, as the reviewer believes that they do, the employment of both methods; but what they will illustrate will depend on our theory. Apart from a reasonable theory they may not rationally be conceived as illustrating anything; and, as we have seen, the theories of the process of evolution thus far proposed are rational only in the sense that they are successively destructive.

3. Is not our author correct in the closing sentences of his admirable book when he says "It is in the field of metaphysics rather than that of biology that the riddle of evolution will have to find its final solution"? Doubtless, our solution would not be his, but we are at one in holding that we must seek it beyond the pale of pure science.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series—Vol. XIII. Containing the Papers read before the Society during the Thirty-fourth Session, 1912-1913. Published by Williams and Norgate, 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W. C. 1913. 8vo; pp. 375. Ten Shillings and Sixpence net.

This volume, as compact and well printed as ever, contains the following papers: I.—On the Notion of Cause. By Bertrand Russell; II.—The Nature of Willing. By G. Dawes Hicks; III.—Purpose and Evolution. By Arthur Lynch; IV.—A New Logic. By E. E. Constance Jones; V.—Intuitionist Thinking. By Frank Granger; VI.—What Bergson means by "Interpenetration." By Miss Karin Costelloe; VII.—The Analysis of Volition: Treated as a Study of Psychological Principles and Methods. By R. F. A. Hoernlé; VIII.—Does Consciousness Evolve? By L. P. Jacks; IX.—Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, with some of its Ulterior Bearings. By William W. Carlile; X.—The Notion of Truth in Bergson's Theory of Knowledge. By Miss L. S. Stebbing; XI.—Symposium—Can there be anything obscure or implicit in a Mental State? By Henry Barker, G. F. Stout, and R. F. A. Hoernlé; XII.—Memory and Consciousness. By Arthur Robinson; XIII.—The Philosophy of Probability. By A. Wolf.

These able papers are all so good that, as usual, the reviewer hesi-

tates to discriminate among them. He may say, however, that the discussion "On the Notion of Cause" and that on "The Notion of Truth in Bergson's Theory of Knowledge," he has read with peculiar interest, if not, in the case of the former at any rate, with entire agreement.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Personality. By F. B. JEVONS, Litt.D. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd. 1913. Crown 8vo; pp. ix, 167.

This book consists of four lectures given in the summer of 1912 at Oxford in the Vacation Term for Biblical Study. They undertake the task of vindicating the reality and of (in part) defining the nature of Personality. The method pursued is logical analysis of the several points of view which dispense with the idea of Personality with the result of an ever growing strength of demonstration that in the very effort to deny Personality Personality is assumed.

Mr. Edward Clodd supplies the text for the first lecture with his attempt to postulate a pre-animistic stage for human development, in which men did not yet personify the "powers" with which they felt themselves in contact: they had as yet no conception of "a person at all, in any sense of the word". Dr. Jevons has no difficulty in showing that the conception of impersonal powers presupposes that of person. He is willing to allow that not primitive man alone but the most advanced science—even that science called Psychology—can get along without the conception of personality, on one condition. That condition is that it will consent to be purely descriptive. As soon as we insist on "accounting for things" another situation is reached; and if science is "causal thinking," we may add (though Dr. Jevons would probably not press this) and "causal thinking" demands the postulation of adequate causes for the whole as well as the part, the discovery of Personality back of not only our activities but those of the world—all is unavoidable. In the second lecture there is very amusingly shown the inconsequence of William James' reasoning that Personality and Personal Identity are "inferences" and wrong inferences at that. The very alternative suppositions with which we start out,—'I am the same I that I was yesterday,' and 'I am not the same I that I was yesterday,'—already assume both the Personality and the Personal Identity, which it is their purpose to bring to the question. The I of to-day and the I of yesterday are summoned before the court of the I of both to-day and yesterday. We cannot even raise the question of Personality or Personal Identity without presupposing it and demonstrating it by the very raising of the question. From James' thought without a thinker we advance in the third lecture to Bergson's change with nothing to change. Here Dr. Jevons is at his best. Bergson's method is incisively shown to differ in nothing from that of his predecessors from Hume down: he merely in the course of his argument somehow drops out the subject. Resolving it into its parts he bids you look at the parts—with the implication that their existence as parts excludes the existence of the whole of which they are parts. "The truth is,"

remarks Dr. Jevons finally (in two senses), "that it is impossible to resolve the 'me' into something else which is not me. If the something else is not 'me,' it is not me—and I have not been resolved into it."

So far Dr. Jevons' argument seems to us as cogent as it is clever. The final lecture which is entitled "Personality and Individuality" and in which the social aspects of Personality are discussed appeals to us much less strongly. Perhaps the reason is that the aspect of the general subject here treated lends itself ill to Dr. Jevons' method of logical analysis and *reductio ad absurdum*. We have no impulse to recoil from the propositions maintained. "It is maintained," says Dr. Jevons in his preface, "that persons are not individuals, in the sense of closed systems, but are at once subjects cognizant of objects, and objects presented to other subjects; but the principle of unity which holds persons together, and the impulse towards unity with one's neighbor and one's God, is love." But the development of these propositions leaves us cold. We find ourselves fancying that we are being treated only to plays on words, wondering whether Dr. Jevons has not merely a crotchet to defend, feeling that, however true the propositions put forward may be, they have no organic support in the general line of reasoning. Possibly we simply do not easily think on the lines of Mr. Bosanquet's teaching.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

De Pragmatische Philosophie van William James, en haar Begrip van Waarheid. Door Dr. J. G. UBBINK. Arnheim: A. Tamminga. 1913. 8vo; pp. xiii, 377. Full analytical Table of Contents, and extensive annotated Bibliography.

Dr. Ubbink's Doctorate thesis, published in the autumn of 1912, bore the title of *The Pragmatism of William James*. It met with so much acceptance that it is now reissued in this goodly volume under the amended title of *The Pragmatic Philosophy of William James and its Notion of Truth*.

In Dr. Ubbink's view it is its notion of Truth which provides the hinge of William James' system, and he therefore makes James' Doctrine of Truth the center of his discussion. The book consists of an Introduction and eight chapters. These chapters bear the following titles: William James as Author; The Method and Results of James' Scientific Work; The Will to Believe; Pragmatism and its New Notion of Truth; Origin and Relations of the Pragmatistic Notion of Truth; The New Notion of Truth, its Origin and Principle Criticized; Pragmatism and Religion; the Metaphysics of Pragmatism. Three of the seven chapters, it will be seen, are devoted to James' notion of Truth; they in turn carefully ascertain his meaning, seek to discover the origin and relations of the conception, and offer criticisms upon it.

The two elements which enter into James' conception of Truth are pointed out as, (1) its subsumption under the broader category of the good ("truth is one species of good and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and coördinate with it") and (2) its reduction to a mere transitory phase in a process of action, which for

the time brings satisfaction ("the truth of an idea is not a stagnant present interest in it: truth *happens* to an idea"). "Accordingly," writes Dr. Ubbink, "when we keep all this well in view, we must speak of truth thus: 'the most true' (not, the true: it is not absolute but relative) 'we shall' (not, we may: not to-day but only in the future, not to-day before the action but only after the experiment, after the occurrence itself) 'call the idea, theory, or world-view which leads us' (not which corresponds or shall correspond with a reality), 'to the human action most satisfactory to the man' (and not, indifferently whether it is pleasant or unpleasant to the man)" (p. 177). Reluctantly therefore he agrees with the criticism of Hoekstra: "What is useful to man varies day by day, and if, as James says, the truth is what is useful, there is no longer any constant truth but only contingent truths. *The truth does not exist; there is only a body of truths which serve for given occasions. Truth becomes, 'is in the making.'* By Pragmatism, the sharp antithesis between truth and falsehood is in principle abolished and the essential distinction between them is reduced to a matter of degree. It teaches, indeed, that truth is what is good. In this definition the deepest root of Pragmatism is laid bare, and at the same time its *πρώτον ψεύδος* is brought to light." Dr. Ubbink, having quoted this judgment of Hoekstra's approvingly, adds: "And yet! Nowhere does James give the impression of having wished to deny the truth. Never does he give evidence of proceeding from such sceptical and cynical aims. And therefore in my judgment the fault must be sought more deeply." He finds it in a general exaggerated evolutionism and the transference of the notion of the eternal becoming to spheres in which it has no fitness. The critical chapter is very sharply written and issues in the conclusion that the whole idea of truth on which James' entire system turns not only is completely untenable but is crassly self-contradictory.

The characteristics of Dr. Ubbink's treatise which most strike the reader are its thoroughness and the richness of the literature which it surveys. Not only has all that James wrote been carefully explored, but pretty nearly everything of importance which has been written about him has been noted and considered. The book serves the purpose therefore not only of an estimate of James' teachings themselves, but also of a report upon the wide-spread discussion which they have aroused. This side of its usefulness is enhanced by the very full Bibliography, with brief characterizations, which is added.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

A Handbook of Christian Apologetics. By ALFRED ERNEST GARVIE, M.A. (OXON.), D.D. (GLAS.), Principal of New College, University of London, Author of "The Ritschlian Theology," "Studies in The Inner Life of Jesus," "The Christian Certainty amid the Modern

Perplexity," "Studies of Paul and His Gospel," etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. 8vo; pp. xii, 241.

This is the last volume to be issued of the series known as the "International Theological Library." This fact defines its aim and indicates its method; for that library was meant to be "a series of textbooks for students of Theology, and yet a systematic exposition of the several departments of theological science for all intelligent persons." It also sets and assures a high standard of excellence; for however one may differ from the positions taken by some of the writers of this series, all must admit that they form a distinguished company of theological scholars.

Dr. Garvie's argument for Christianity is simple and clear. He ignores entirely the old classification of the evidences into external, internal, collateral, etc.—as it seems to us with some loss of comprehensiveness and cumulative effect—, and he seeks continuity by discussing in succession the great doctrines of the Christian religion. Thus after an introductory chapter on "The Purpose" and the "Problems of Apologetics," he considers in turn: "Religion and Revelation," "Inspiration and Miracle," "The Lord Jesus Christ," "The Christian Salvation," "The Christian View of God," "The Christian View of Man," "The Christian Ideal," and "The Christian Hope." A "selected Bibliography" follows, and the book closes with an "Index."

"In accordance with the author's idea of the task of Apologetics as commendation rather than defense, less attention is given to meeting objections than to presenting the attractions of the Christian Gospel." This is done in a winning way. The writer's style could not be more in harmony with his purpose. It is the best illustration of his own words: "The manner of Christian Apologetics should be appropriate to the matter and the method. A gospel of grace should be commended and defended graciously." We confess that sometimes it seems to us to be done—we do not say too fairly,—but just a little too graciously. When the issues at stake are the most tremendous conceivable, it is sometimes well that they should be presented more sharply than would be done in a parlor meeting. This, however, must not mislead any. The tone of the book is as serious throughout as it is gracious. Nor is its method, on the whole, concessive. It gives up much that the reviewer himself would earnestly contend for; but this is not because the author would meet his opponents more than half way, it is because the Christianity which he holds seems to the reviewer to be, even in its utmost extent, comparatively attenuated. As the expositor of Ritschl, while not agreeing with him at all or, perhaps, at most points, he would appear to have been so influenced by him as to have lost his grasp on much that many regard as belonging to the Christian faith.

It would be impossible within the limits of this notice even to indicate the various respects in which the reviewer fears that this is the case. He may refer, and briefly, only to the following:

1. Dr. Garvie's theory of inspiration is distinctly that known as the Gracious theory. "We must conceive the apostolic inspiration as the common Christian inspiration raised to a higher power in the measure of the clearer vision of closer communion with, and fuller consecration to Christ as Savior and Lord" (p. 65). That is, the difference between the Apostles and ourselves with regard to inspiration is one of degree merely and not of kind. "Paul's writings have a significance and value for us such as no writings outside of the New Testament have, because he was so fully and thoroughly Christ's" (p. 66). This was not, however, the view which he took of himself. He claimed divine authority for his teaching, not because of his piety, but because he spoke "not in words which man's wisdom taught but which the Spirit taught" (1 Cor. ii. 13). His claim, too, and that of the other Apostles, was confirmed by God himself "in signs and wonders, and divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost." And then this view breaks down on Dr. Garvie's own principles—it is unworkable. The Apostles declared those anathema who did not receive their doctrines: we, however, would think ourselves anathema, were we to make any such claim for ourselves. But where are we to draw the line? Our inspiration is the same in kind with the Apostles'. To what degree, then, must it attain to render him anathema who does not appreciate it?

2. Equally unsatisfactory and even more inconsistent is our author's position as to miracles. He argues acutely and conclusively against Harnack and J. M. Thompson when they would explain away the miracles of our Lord, and he makes Mill and Hume in their opposition to miracles destroy one another: but he himself rejects every one of the Old Testament miracles; and while he frankly admits the impossibility of desupernaturalizing all of the New Testament ones, he regards them as "constituents" of Christ's mission rather than as "credentials" of it, more as the reflected glory of his redemptive work than as the signs and seals of supernatural revelation, rather as suggesting problems than as attesting the glory of the Son of God. That is, he accepts Christ as his Lord and Master and then declines as credentials the credentials to which he appeals (Luke vii. 22).

3. Equally defective is our author's theory of the will. With such writers as Julius Müller, James Seth, and Samuel Harris, he holds to the "self-determination of the will." While making much of the necessity and the power of motives, he maintains that the secret of the moral life is not in the character in which the self appears to express itself, but in an unexpressed residuum of the self. Hence, "personal development is creative evolution." As Müller says, "we form our own character out of self." There is no objection to the theory of the indifference of the will which does not apply almost equally to this. In essence, indeed, it involves the Kantian distinction between the transcendental ego and the empirical ego.

4. The doctrine of the fall is rejected as mythical and as unessential.

"It is impossible to maintain as literal history," we are told, "the narratives in Genesis I-III. We now know that these stories are borrowed from Babylonian mythology, although stripped of polytheism, and clothed with monotheism in the telling. Even if we could take them literally, does the cause—the eating of an apple—seem adequate to the effect—the sinfulness of the human race" (p. 175)? As though it were the mere eating of the apple, and not the disobedience, to say no more, involved in the eating of *that* apple, that was the cause. Paul, it is true, believed this and other stories, but he could well have been mistaken. Nor is our author phased by the fact that if the fall is denied, the universality of sin is left unexplained. He is content to leave it unexplained, and we must give him credit for criticising acutely and rejecting the evolutionary and other theories of the origin of sin that have been proposed in explanation of its universality.

5. Our author's point of view, as might be expected from his Ritschlian sympathies, not to say tendencies, is christocentric rather than theocentric. With him Christ is the great fact. He seems to forget our Lord's own words, "Ye believe in God, believe also in me" (John xiv. 1). This causes him to present his argument in what seems to us an illogical order. Thus he discusses the "Lord Jesus Christ" and the "Christian Salvation" before he vindicates the "Christian View of God;" and we cannot but think that his argument suffers from his doing so, and more especially as, unlike Ritschl, he appreciates the need of a metaphysic of Christ's person and finds it in that which the Fourth Gospel offers. To receive Christ as the Son of God, must we not start with God the Father?

6. It is, however, in his eschatology that Dr. Garvie departs most from the "faith which was once for all delivered unto the saints." Thus, for belief in the personal and physical second advent of our Lord he substitutes "the experience of Christ's presence here and now, the expectation of clearer vision, closer communion, and greater resemblance in heaven, and the conviction that the Sovereignty of Christ's Saviorhood will yet be fully owned on earth." The conception of the General Judgment he so transforms as virtually to reject it, and he affirms distinctly a second probation for all who have not deliberately rejected Christ. The doctrine of the eternal punishment of the impenitent is set aside and for it is substituted the fancy that the finally impenitent, if such there be, will, not by any act of divine omnipotence annihilating them, but by the inevitable decay of their personality, drop out of existence.

But enough. It must be evident that the Christianity which this "Handbook" would vindicate is the Christianity of this age; it is not the Christianity of the ages. And yet the reviewer would be most unwilling to make the impression that he has found nothing good. He has found much that is excellent. The chapter on the "Christian Salvation" is in the main true and illuminating. The objective reference of Christ's death and the vicariousness of his sacrifice are

strongly insisted on. At times one almost fancies that he is reading the blood theology of the Fathers. So, too, the chapter on the "Christian Ideal" is a just, a noble, and a timely presentation. We do not know of a more pertinent and satisfactory vindication of Christian ethics. Perhaps, we would better say, We do not know of one that is so good. Finally, Dr. Garvie's argument for the realization both of the universal and of the individual Christian hope is conclusive; it is triumphant; it is the tonic that we all need in an age of doubt; we thank him heartily for it, and all who are "not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ" must do the same.

Princeton,

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Constructive Natural Theology. By NEWMAN SMYTH. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. 8vo; pp. viii, 123.

This small but attractive volume contains four lectures delivered upon the Taylor Foundation of the Yale School of Religion. They are entitled "Scientific Materials for Theology," "The Method and Problems," "Christ as Final Fact of Nature" and "Scientific Spirituality." They are written in the striking and often brilliant style, with the wealth of literary allusion, with the breadth of knowledge, and also with the evident distaste for dogmatic theology, characteristic of their distinguished author. They have for their aim to show the importance and to lay down the method of "a theology of nature constructed in accordance with the known mechanical principles of evolution" to take the place of "the older natural theology which, strongly built as it was from the scientific materials of its times, has been abandoned as an antiquated and no longer tenable fortification." To speak more correctly, these lectures would point out that "two features characterize generally, with some honorable exceptions, the teaching of natural theology in our Protestant theological seminaries: namely, the method is negative, an attempted destruction of scientific objections; and also the books referred to are not distinguished by familiarity with scientific researches up to date": and they would hold up as an example for all the "New College, Edinburgh, where instruction abreast of the times is furnished in science, and where examination in Professor Simpson's course of general biology is required for a degree in divinity."

With the general aim of this discussion the reviewer finds himself in hearty accord. While he is not ready to admit that the principle of "the older natural theology" has been set aside, and still less that the principle of evolution should take its place, he sees clearly the importance of a new natural theology which shall utilize the new wealth of scientific material to prove the existence and to illustrate the ways of God. It does not seem to him, however, that this calls for the introduction of courses in science, even in biological science, into the curricula of our theological seminaries. Such in-

struction is provided in our colleges; and our seminaries, almost without exception, require their students to be college graduates. Then, too, the theological curriculum has become too crowded to allow any addition to it. Still further, as compared with natural theology, revealed theology must hold the place of first importance. It is God's last and special message to men: natural theology illustrates it, but it interprets natural theology. Finally, no matter how developed, not even when based on the most up-to-date science, has natural theology anything to say of what the sinner needs most to know; namely, redemption.

This is true of natural science in general and from the nature of the case, but it would seem to be specially true of natural science as our author understands it. Indeed, we do not see how, reading it as he does, he can discern in it the possibilities that he finds. Our interest in natural theology is strong because we agree with Paul that "the invisible things of God since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity" (Rom. i.20). We confess that our interest would be greatly lessened were we, with our author, obliged to reduce the meaning of nature as follows: "The presence of some 'unknown factor' in nature is everywhere to be felt; that factor seems to indicate some energy of mind in forming matter, an energizing that is superhuman, but not necessarily supernatural. By whatever means wrought out, nature seems to have been first thought out" (p. 67). If this be all that the latest science can tell us of God, the only ground on which it could claim admission to the theological curriculum would be that the latter were empty.

Indeed, we would question its right to admission even then; for its testimony is most uncertain precisely as to what is most essential in theology as well as in religion. It is of "the superhuman, but not necessarily supernatural" that it speaks. Now the supernatural is the characteristic idea, the fundamental fact, of both theology and religion. It is, however, from Dr. Smyth's christology that we would dissent most earnestly. He regards Christ as "the final fact of nature"; but if this be the teaching of natural theology, then the latter must be the contradiction of revealed theology. How can he belong to the world when, as John tells us, "all things were made by him" (St. John i.3)? How could the evolution even of the whole creation develop him who declared himself to be one with the Father (John x. 30)? At least, how could this be, unless, as in pantheism, God and the universe are identified? How can natural heredity, even if accompanied by an "influx of spiritual power which is beyond our apprehension, but not beyond the capacity of nature to receive," (p. 84) account for him that "descended out of heaven, even the Son of man, which is in heaven" (St. John iii. 13)? Nor in holding thus would we for a moment admit that our Lord did not enter into "the full inheritance of our human nature" (p. 84), and so can not be a "high

priest touched with the feeling of all our infirmities." What we would most emphatically deny is, not that he did not at and through his incarnation take our humanity, but that he who was in the beginning with God and who himself from all eternity existed as God (John i. 1-18) could ever have been developed out of that humanity which he himself in time created.

It may be remarked in closing that our author's view of "the virgin birth" is in complete accord with his general attitude. He regards the narrative of the virgin birth as "very likely one of the earlier after-thoughts of some of the disciples concerning their risen Lord" (p. 82), and he thinks that it furnishes an "exceptionable difficulty" precisely because it emphasizes our Savior's supernaturalness. Could there be a clearer proof that we have not misstated Dr. Smyth's position?

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Legal and Historical Proof of the Resurrection of the Dead with an Examination of the Evidence in the New Testament. By JOHN F. WHITWORTH, Author of "Taxation of Corporations," "Statutory Law of Corporations," "Creation of Corporations," "Corporate Opinions," etc. Harrisburg, Pa.: Publishing House of the United Evangelical Church. 1912. 8vo; pp. 70.

The title of this book exactly describes its contents. It argues for the trustworthiness of the New Testament, and so for the truth of the testimony to the resurrection of the dead, on the same ground on which Greenleaf takes in his standard work on Evidence; on the basis of the historical witnesses, even from the first and among her foes, to the facts of Christianity, and from the circumstances and especially from the character of the writers.

If men of the world would always judge in religion as they do in the ordinary affairs of life, there is no doubt that their verdict would accord with our author's presentation of the case; and, therefore, we earnestly hope that it will be so widely circulated as to call for other editions. Should this be so, however, the whole work should be carefully revised. There are several slips. Among them we may mention the following: Justin Martyrs on p. 37; the statement regarding Matthew on p. 39, that "he wrote about the year 38"; the assertion on p. 46 that "the world is indebted to Luke alone for the preservation of the Lord's Prayer"; the statement on p. 67, that "Dr. Lyman Abbott declares that no 'event in the world's history is better attested than is the resurrection of Jesus'" (what we question is not the truth of the declaration, but its source); and the use, p. 19, of the phrase "the resurrection of the dead" as "synonymous" with the expression "the immortality of the soul."

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Everyman's Religion. By GEORGE HODGES. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. 297. 50 cents net.

This book may be described as both an argument and appeal for the Christian Religion in language that is intelligible to the average man or woman. It gives the impression of having proceeded from a vigorous intellect that has thought its way honestly through the problems presented by the contact between faith and reason, and it indicates a heart that has tested the teachings of Christianity in experience and found them good. Familiar themes are handled with a marked freshness of language; indeed, there is a rather remarkable absence of triteness throughout the book. Nearly every page is interesting and stimulating. Apparently the author is so true a scholar that he is free from the affectation of scholarship—there is no pedantry about him whatever. An illustration may be afforded by a typical paragraph from the chapter on "The Means of Grace": "Another means of grace is a decided initiative. This is only a condensed statement of the plain psychological fact that if we really desire to keep a good resolution, we must begin strong. . . . We must make the matter public. Thus we bring the environment of expectation to bear definitely upon our case." We infer from this that Dr. Hodges has been reading Professor James, though the thought is truly his own; and he modestly refrains from cumbering the page with such a phrase as "as Professor James says." There is such a thing as an over-use of allusion which is like a man carrying the most of his wealth in the form of diamonds on his person; and from this fault Dr. Hodges is free.

If we were to try to characterize this book in two words we should be inclined to use the terms *sanity* and *wholesomeness*. While all the fifteen chapters are stimulating and spiritually helpful we particularly commend the chapters on "The Means of Grace," and "The Life Everlasting."

Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

The Christian Tradition and its Verification. By T. R. GLOVER, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; University Lecturer in Ancient History. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Crown 8vo; pp. xiv, 229. (Being the Eighth Course of Angus Lectures, 1912.)

The Nature and Purpose of a Christian Society. By T. R. GLOVER, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; University Lecturer in Ancient History. Third Edition. London: Headley Brothers. 1912. Crown 8vo; pp. 85. (Being the Fifth of the Swarthmore Lectures, 1912.)

Under the title of *Life and Letters in the Fourth Century*, Mr. Glover published some dozen or more years ago (1901) fifteen studies of typical figures and movements in the literature of that century in which heathenism was dying and the Church was advancing to take its place as the governing force of the Roman world. It is a delightful

volume full of insight and marked by great delicacy of touch and it gave us great pleasure to say as much, in reviewing the book in *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review* (Oct. 1902; vol. xiii, pp. 662-4). When, a few years later (1907), he was called upon to deliver the Dale Lectures in Mansfield College, Oxford, Mr. Glover was well advised to adopt for them the same method of treatment which he had so successfully used in his earlier volume. The subject he chose was *The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire*, and the resulting volume (1909) contains ten graphic studies of the various forms of religion which jostled each other in the opening centuries of the Christian era, presented, as he says, "not in the abstract, but as they show themselves in character and personality." This too is a delightful volume, vivid and illuminating. There are essays on the Roman Religion, the Stoics and Plutarch; on Celsus and Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian; on the Conflict of Christian and Jew and the struggle between "Gods and Atoms." In the midst of them there stand essays also on "Jesus of Nazareth" and "The Followers of Jesus." These are not the best essays in the book. Mr. Glover is essentially a humanist; his interest lies in literature and the expression of personality in literature; his charm consists in his lightness of touch, the daintiness of his handling of his material, a certain fastidious humor which is poured over all. These are not the qualities which fit one best to deal with Jesus of Nazareth or those first missionaries of the cross who, "in deaths oft" broke a way through the ingrained prejudices of the old world's life and thought for the entrance of Christianity. Nor are Harnack and von Dobschütz and Weinel, Wernle and Pfeleiderer, Wellhausen and Bousset, nor even Professor Burkitt, and certainly not Mr. Conybeare, the best guides to the understanding of the beginnings of Christianity or the person of its founder.

Not that Mr. Glover fails in appreciation of the human personality of Jesus, or of the new spirit which animated His followers. He only fails to appreciate that there was anything more than a human personality in Jesus or that His followers were animated by any other spirit than may be summed up in the immense impression made upon them by Jesus' human personality. In his attempt to portray this human personality he says many fine and beautiful things about Jesus; many of the traits which really characterized Him he catches and knows how to throw vividly forward. He understands His uniqueness and the uniqueness of the religion He founded, and has such things as this to say about it. "As its opponents were quick to point out—and they still find a curious pleasure in rediscovering it—there was little new in Christian teaching. Men had been monotheists before, they had worshiped, they had loved their neighbors, they had displayed the virtues of Christians—what was there peculiar in Christianity? Plato, says Celsus, had taught long ago everything of the least value in the Christian scheme of things. The Talmud, according to the modern Jew, contains a parallel to everything that Jesus said—('and

how much else!" adds Wellhausen). What was new in the new religion, in the 'third race' of men? The Christians had their answer ready. In clear speech and in aphasia they indicated their founder. He was new" (p. 116). But of the real uniqueness of Jesus Christ and of the religion which He founded—of the redemption of the world in His blood ("the blood of God" Paul calls it), of the regeneration of the world by His Spirit ("the Spirit of Jesus" is with Mr. Glover, but His influence, His character "repeating itself in the lives of men and women" p. 139), Mr. Glover has no sense. And therefore his chapters on "Jesus of Nazareth" and "the Followers of Jesus" flat dreadfully among the more sympathetic studies which otherwise fill the volume. Jesus Christ is too high for him: he cannot attain to Him. Accordingly there creeps over one as he reads these chapters something of the feeling of unreality and insufficiency, though happily in indefinitely less degree, that assaults the soul as we read the pages of, say, Renan. As an expounder of the colour and movement of life in the ages of transition from heathenism to Christianity, Mr. Glover moves with firm step and shows unending skill: when he passes to expound Jesus Christ and His Gospel he has got beyond his *métier*.

It seemed to be needful to say some such things as these about a volume which we are not now reviewing, because we may thus be enabled to make clear, in the fewest possible words, the exact nature and character of the volumes which we are reviewing. In them Mr. Glover turns aside from the portrayal of the ideas and personalities of the later classical period to undertake the exposition and defence of fundamental Christianity and of its function in the world. It will scarcely be necessary for us to say that these volumes are therefore of indefinitely less value than the former ones. Of course, in these too Mr. Glover writes interestingly: probably he could not write uninterestingly if he tried. He writes here, it is true, with what seems almost exaggerated simplicity of diction. It would appear that he is determined to be thoroughly understood by "the general." But all the old brightness is here. Indeed many of the old bright sayings are here, for Mr. Glover has permitted himself in perhaps an unusual measure to treat his former (Dale) lectures as a mine from which to derive gems for the ornamentation of the plainer pages of his later (Angus and Swarthmore) lectures. The reader of the former volume, at all events, continually meets in the pages of the later ones fine turns of speech which are already familiar to him; mingled, no doubt, with others which are here new, derived from other fields of learned and loving research. Here, too, Mr. Glover, as is natural, writes largely *en historien*. This is his point of view. He has swept the wide horizon with widely open eye and stands forward to tell his less fortunate brethren, as simply as may be, how Christianity appears to him and what seems to him to be its function in the world. We are bound to say also that the "reduced" view of the Person of Christ and of the essence of His work as an atoning sacrifice, which was thrown clearly, if even then

prudently, up to observation in the more scientific Dale Lectures retires into the background in the more popular Angus and Swarthmore Lectures; or perhaps we may even say recedes out of sight. It is doubtful if the cursory reader of these Lectures, while he might feel that not always all was said that might well be said, would detect any tendency to transpose the great music of Christ and His Gospel into a lower key. The whole treatment is instinct with reverence for Christ, and that not merely as the historical source of the whole movement which we call Christianity but as its moving factor still; everywhere there is evident the most complete dependence on the Holy Spirit; and the fervor of Christian love glows on every page.

Behind the deep devotion to the person of Jesus which is everywhere manifest, we do not easily see that, after all, this Jesus is to Mr. Glover no more than a good man, who was not a "mediator between God and man, making atonement" in His blood (*Conflict*, p. 156); whose death on the cross was only "a pledge of His truth," "making possible our reconciliation with God" (p. 139); and whose entire function it has been to reveal to us with new poignancy the great fact that God is our Father (p. 142). Who could imagine that beneath the constant references to the Holy Spirit as the power of a new life in Christians, there lies nothing but a reference to the "influence of Jesus" "repeating itself in the lives of men and women" (p. 139), which though Paul may call it "the holy spirit" (note the lower-case initials) we may speak of perhaps as "the Christian instinct" (p. 150)? And certainly when we read the appeals to the Great Commission we are hardly prepared to understand that it is extremely doubtful (*Conflict* p. 114) whether this Commission is allowed by Mr. Glover, we will not say merely to be an utterance of our Lord's, but even to be a genuine portion of Matthew's Gospel. We read at the end of his Swarthmore Lectures these moving words: "We have found the nature and purpose of a Christian Society, and we can sum it up in familiar words: 'Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature'; and, if we obey, we in our turn shall be able to speak of 'the Lord working with us and confirming the word with the signs following'" (p. 85). It is not likely that Mr. Glover attaches any authority to either text which he here cites: it is not likely that he believes either to be a genuine part of the Gospel in which it is now found. His bringing them together in this solemn passage, may help us to form an estimate of how much significance we may attach to his citation of the Great Commission as if it were of importance to Christians; and also of his method of dealing with his audiences. Clearly in these Lectures Mr. Glover has not wished to wound the sensibilities of his hearers by any suggestion of critical hesitations, or of doctrinal doubts. He has wished to speak to them on the basis of whatever of Christian belief,—and more, of whatever of Christian sentiment,—remained common to him and them. No doubt his justification of this course would be that Christianity after all is a life not a dogma: and no doubt this justification is valid—to a certain extent.

Thus, at all events, the Lectures gain immensely in usefulness as addressed to Christian audiences: they may be read with profit by all. But they lose equally in significance,—unless we are to read them as signs of the decay of Christianity as a doctrine and of its persistence merely as a traditional sentiment, seeking still to justify itself as such by its fruits. We wonder if Mr. Glover does not feel as he delivers such Lectures much as he portrays Plutarch as feeling as he argued for the old religion which he looked out upon with saddened eyes in its decay—that “delightful man of letters,” as Mr. Glover describes him, “so full of charm, so warm with the love of all that is beautiful, so closely knit to the tender emotions of ancestral piety,—and,” Mr. Glover adds, comparing him with Seneca, “so unspeakably inferior in essential truthfulness.”

It was highly appropriate that the distinguished son of Dr. Richard Glover should be called upon to deliver a course of the Angus Lectures; and the general tone of the lectures which he has delivered on that Baptist foundation is a testimony to the Christian training which he received in the Baptist manse at Bristol in which he was bred. The subject chosen—*The Christian Tradition and its Verification*—gives large opportunity for the manifestation of a Christian heart, and the opportunity is taken. The verification of the Christian tradition is sought in experience; and the effort of the lecturer is to give to his hearers some sense of the immense mass of experience the Church of Jesus Christ has accumulated of Him; with the hope that by its contemplation they will be led on to experiment and by experiment to the discovery of “what life in Truth is.” The lectures are six in number and are entitled in their order: The Challenge to Verification, the Use of Tradition, the Significance of the Christian Church, the Experience of the Early Church, Jesus in the Christian Centuries, and The Criticism of Jesus Christ. The practical note is everywhere dominant, but it is no unintellectual Christianity that Mr. Glover recommends. As he elsewhere expresses it (*Conflict*, p. 125): “It is only the sentimentalism of the Church that supposes the flabby-minded to be at home in the kingdom of God: Jesus did not.” What Mr. Glover aims at is the consecration of all human powers to the service of Christ: “action,” he says, “is impossible without some working theory, and this very fact drives earnest men into speculation” (p. 37). He suggests, indeed, in a somewhat Sphinx-like saying, that “Jesus Christ is not a teacher to be quoted” (p. 31); but what he seems to mean is that His words are not to be repeated merely but lived. If he gives too secondary a place in the Christian life to the life of the mind (which is emphasized in the declaration that we must love the Lord our God, as with our whole “heart” and “soul,” so also therefore of course with our whole “mind”—“the whole *understanding*, all the powers of thought and will,” as Meyer explains it), he yet insists on the life of the mind. And he places Christ at the center. “The plain fact is that, in the long run, despair is at the heart of every religion without Christ; and if man or woman is to get through the world at

all, it must be by the hardening or deadening of the more sensitive parts of human nature. Marcus Aurelius' *Diary* is a sort of breviary of despair" (p. 68). "One thing has always stood out clearly sooner or later. Whenever the Church at large, or any church in particular, has committed itself to any scheme of thought that has lessened the significance of Jesus Christ, it has declined. Error always tells, and the error of over-estimating Jesus Christ ought to have told by now, but the experience of the church so far suggests that it has no real reason to dread any danger from overestimating Him, but rather that the danger has always come from obscuring or abating His significance. It is, I think, worth while to reflect upon what this involves. The faith has been tested in every compromise that Christian's have attempted, and if it is still held, it is with some warrant" (p. 86). Good apologetics, that! Can we have read Mr. Glover wrong, when we have read him as "obscuring and abating the significance of Christ," both in His Person and in His work? We could wish he had known "Jesus Christ and Him as crucified" better, and Wilhelm Herrmann less well!

The Swarthmore Lecture runs somewhat on the lines of the third of the Angus series. Its leading topic is the significance of the Christian Church, and its key note is perhaps struck in some such words as these. "We do not enough value the fact that the story of the Christian religion is the story of personality influenced by personality—rebirth constantly the product of the influence of the reborn" (p. 27). There may be an echo of Wilhelm Herrmann in this and we are glad therefore to read on the next page: "The blessing comes from a higher source, but the broken bread is given by human hands"—followed by some illuminating remarks. We do not wonder that surprise has been felt that this particular topic was chosen for a lecture addressed to Friends. Mr. Glover defends his choice of topic in an interesting preface, the upshot of it being (if we understand him) that Friends especially need instruction on the Church. This is probably true; at all events it is instruction on the Church that Mr. Glover gives them—and he does it very well. Beginning with the inheritance we have in the Christian Church, he ends with the duty of the Church to the world, while between the two he expounds the relation of the individual to the Church. In the center of all, here too he sets Jesus Christ. "From the very beginning and ever onwards right in the center of all their thoughts, the Christian communities have had Jesus Christ, the Son of God, in whom God was, reconciling the world unto Himself. He has been the leaven within the Church, disruptive, propulsive, re-creating and stirring, the permanent life, the guarantee and promise of a future that shall progressively transcend the past—

No dead fact stranded on the shore

Of the oblivious years,

but the living Christ, always recognized, and owned and loved by the Church. The great function of the Church has been to witness to Him, and to bring the world face to face with Him" (p. 43). We

ask again, can we have misread Mr. Glover when we read him as holding to a "reduced" Christ? For the rest, we call attention to two small points. One is the comma in the first sentence we have quoted after the phrase "in whom God was." This gives a particular interpretation to 2 Cor. v. 19—an interpretation which, indeed, is wrong, but which seems notable on Mr. Glover's lips. The other concerns the allusion to the Parable of the Leaven, in which an interpretation of that Parable which Mr. Glover repeats in more than one of his series of Lectures, is adverted to. This interpretation conceives that parable as teaching not so much, as it has been customary to expound it, the hidden, pervasive growth of the Kingdom in the world, as the seething, fermentation of life which takes place in the Church of Christ,—in the individual man and in the community. The leaven, says Mr. Glover, *works*; and in its working bubble after bubble *breaks*; the breaking of the bubbles is not an indication that the end has come, but that there is *life* at work behind them. The interpretation again is wrong; but again it is not without its significance on Mr. Glover's lips.

We must not close without pointing to a passage in each of the Lecture-courses which has pleased us vastly. In the Swarthmore Lecture we point to the section on "Grace" (pp. 33-37).—"the greatest of all the Catholic doctrines," Renan said" (p. 33). In the Angus lectures we point to the passage on the phrase "From the foundation of the World" (pp. 135-140),—in which is enshrined "the great fact of God's love as antecedent to all things,—of Christ as the embodiment of purposeful love—of the universe itself in all its range as a Cosmos indeed, inspired and achieved by love, and subservient in its last detail to love" (p. 139).

Princeton.

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EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Textkritische Materialien zur Hexateuchfrage. Von JOHANNES DAHSE, Pfarrer in Freirachdorf (Westerwald). I. Die Gottesnamen der Genesis. Jacob und Israel. P in Genesis 12-50. Verlag von Alfred Töpelmann (vormals J. Ricker) Giessen. 1912. 8vo; S.viii, 181. Mark 4.80.

Pastor Dahse has already published studies bearing on the matter contained in this volume. *Textkritische Bedenken gegen den Ausgangspunkt der heutigen Pentateuchkritik* appeared in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 1903, S.305-319; *Textkritische Studien* in the *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1908, S.1-21 and 161-173; *Naht ein Umschwung in der Pentateuchkritik*, in the *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, September 1912, reprinted by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge in an English translation with the title, *Is a Revolution in Pentateuchal Criticism at Hand?*; and an article

entitled *New Methods of Inquiry concerning the Pentateuch* in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for October, 1912.

In the present work, arguing from the names Jacob and Israel the author concludes that these two names are valueless as indications of different literary sources. Regarding "P in Genesis 12-50," he holds that the book of Genesis, in the form in which it now lies before us, is an elaboration of an older narrative. This earlier work was supplemented in order to adapt it for use in public worship. These additions are found in most of the so-called P sections, but are not confined wholly to P. They originally stood on the margin or at least were separated from the rest of the text; and they may reasonably be ascribed to Ezra.

The portion of this book, however, which is devoted to "the divine names in Genesis" forms by far the larger part of the work, 121 pages out of 174; and it is particularly interesting because of the novel theory that is propounded, and because of the bearing of this theory on critical questions relating to the text and to the literary analysis of the book of Genesis. The subject is intricate in its nature, and the difficulty of following the discussion is increased by the author's habit of scattering his arguments for a particular reading in various parts of the book instead of setting forth the facts and reasons in one place once for all. An exposition of the theory, therefore, rather than a minute criticism of it, is about all that will be attempted at the present time.

Pastor Dahse points out, among other things, that 1. The translation of the word Jehovah, occurring in the Hebrew text, by '*o theos*, God, in the Septuagint, was not due to any awe for the Name felt by the Greek translators, seeing that they often reproduced by *kurios*, Lord, the word Jehovah, for which the Hebrews at that time read '*adonay*, Lord. Accordingly it is quite probable that they followed the Hebrew text which they had before them, and with fair accuracy transmitted the divine names which stood in that text (comp. S.93; see also S.51, argument 3). 2. The LXX, when it diverges from the Masoretic Text in respect to the divine names, frequently has the support of other ancient versions, attesting the existence of an ancient Hebrew text that diverged from the MT and witnessing to the fidelity of the LXX to this ancient Hebrew text in the matter of the names (comp. S.51, argument 2). 3. The divergence between the present Hebrew text and the LXX in respect to these names is quite as likely to have originated in a revision of the divine names in the Hebrew text by the Jews themselves as to be due to the methods employed by the Greek translators; for the Jews did not hesitate to change the divine names, but at will substituted a different title of God for the one which appeared in the original documents of their Scriptures, as may be seen from duplicate psalms, parallel passages in the books of the Kings and the Chronicles, quotation in the Talmud, and the translation in the Targums (comp. S.51, argument 1).

The arguments advanced by Pastor Dahse may be strengthened by observing the fidelity of the LXX in representing accurately the divine names in test cases, where the name was discriminatingly used by the Hebrew writer. For example, 1. When Elohim is the only proper term to employ (as in Gen. 1, where God appears as the Creator of the universe, and not as the God of grace or the God of Abraham; and in Gen. 3:1-5,¹ in the conversation between the serpent and Eve; and in Gen. 39:9;² 40:8; 41:16-32, where Joseph speaks to Potiphar's wife, to the Egyptian prisoners, and to Pharaoh; and in Gen. 9:26f,³ where the word Jehovah in verse 26 and God in verse 27 mark a distinction and are used intentionally), and especially 2. In reproducing current expressions in which uniform Hebrew usage required the designation Jehovah and where the term God would be inadmissible: such as "to call upon the name of Jehovah," Gen. 4:26; 12:8; 13:4; 21:33; 26:25; and *n'um 'adonay*, "declaration of Jehovah," Gen. 22:16 (with Num. 14:28 the only occurrences in the Pentateuch). These names, as they appear in these passages in the MT, were unquestionably used in the primitive Hebrew text. In every case the LXX reproduces them accurately. Evidently the Greek translators are conscientiously following their Hebrew original in these typical instances. There is no carelessness here.

The *sedarim*, it will be recalled, are paragraphs, 153 in number, into which the Pentateuch was divided. They were designed for weekly lessons in the public worship; and, by being read consecutively on successive Sabbaths, the entire book of the Law was gone through once every three years.⁴ The *parashiyyoth* are longer sections of the Law, and number 54. Used as weekly lessons, they make it possible for the Law to be read through in the course of a single year. A table of the *sedarim* and *parashiyyoth* in the book of Genesis is given herewith for convenience of reference. The divine names most commonly used in Genesis are God and Jehovah, Elohim and Jhvh; and in the table the letter E or J indicates which of these two divine names occurs first and which last in the *seder*.⁵ A straight line shows that the two names do not interchange; a row of dots indicates that they do interchange; the perpendicular declares that one name, used regularly up to a certain point, yields there to the other.⁶

¹ In a J environment.

² The cycle of three years prevailed in Palestine, till the exiles from Spain brought their customs into the Holy Land (Jewish Encyclopaedia).

³ For various reasons, however, other divine titles are occasionally employed, either alone or appended to Jehovah or Elohim: for example, at the beginning or end of a *seder* 2:4b; 21:33; 33:20; 43:14; 46:3; 48:3.

Neither divine name is found in chap. 14, unless in verse 22; and no divine name is used in chaps. 34, 36, 37 or 47, nor in the thirty or more consecutive verses 29:1-30; 40:9-41:15; 42:29-43:13; 46:4-34. A divine name occurs only once in chap. 23, and there it is idiomatic, and without significance (v. 6, a prince of God = mighty prince); and only twice in chap. 10, both times in verse 9; and in three verses of chap. 49, namely verses 18, 24, 25.

⁴ Regarding the nearness of the two names to the beginning and end of the *seder*, it may be stated that in each of the first thirty-two *sedarim* the divine

Pastor Dahse propounds the general theory that "the use of the divine names [Elohim and Jehovah] is influenced in the Massoretic text (and in a different manner in the Hebrew text back of the LXX) by the practice of the synagogue in the public reading [of the Torah]" (S.32). In the MT the parasha is the present unit, within which the influence has been felt; in the Hebrew text back of the LXX the seder was the unit (S.94); and each underwent independent revision (S.39).

I. And, first, the theory of Pastor Dahse regarding the sedarim. The custom of reading by sedarim in public worship led, according to this theory, to a modification of the divine names in some of these paragraphs. The effect is seen, and the system which was followed is revealed, in the Hebrew text which was used by the LXX (S.107). If one divine name was used throughout the paragraph, it might remain unchanged; and of course it did remain unchanged, if no other divine name was equally appropriate. For example, in seder i Elohim is used throughout, since the creation of the universe is the topic. But "in those ancient sedarim in which a change of the divine names occurs," i.e., in which both Elohim and Jehovah are used, Jehovah customarily stands at the beginning or end of the paragraph" (S.97; cp.3). The different cases under this rule seem to be: 1. Where one of these divine names was used continuously in the first part of the seder; and the other in the latter part. No change was required, for the word Jehovah already stood either at the beginning or the end of the paragraph. 2. If Elohim were used throughout in the original narrative, Elohim might be changed to Jehovah on its first or last occurrence, or in both places, if the title Jehovah was suitable to the divine activity described in the verse. 3. If the two divine names were used frequently in the seder, Jehovah was desiderated as first or last.

What are the facts, when the text is examined? In two sedarim neither divine name occurs (xxxiii and xli). In the first seder and the last eight sedarim (i and xxxvi-xliii), except in chap. 49:18, Elohim only is used and for a special reason; and therefore, in the eyes of those who understood, was not susceptible of revision. Sedarim vi., xxii., xxxi. and xxxii. likewise of the two names contain Elohim only (with El twice in seder xxxi., Gen. 35:1^b and 3); seder vi. but twice, and that in a single verse, and seder xxii. but once. Twenty-eight sedarim remain. Of these ix., xx., xxi., and xxiv. have Jehovah only; viii. has Jehovah only, except once where Elohim is necessary (9:27), and xxxv. has Jehovah only, except twice where Elohim is necessary (39:9 and 40:8). There are left twenty-two sedarim (or twenty-three if seder xliii is included because of the occurrence of the name of Jehovah in chap. 49:18), in each of which the two

name E or J appears in one of the first three verses, generally in the first verse, except in sedarim viii., x., xi., xvi., xxii., xxiv., xxx., and xxxi.; and frequently so near the end of the seder that it is found in one of the last three verses, as in x., xxiv., and xxxi.

	Seder	Genesis	Hebrew text used by the Greek translators	Present Hebrew text transmitted by the Massoretes
Para- sha 1	i	chap. 1:1 —2:4 ^a	E — E	E — E
	ii	2:4 ^b —3:21	E . . . J	J E — J E (E 3:1-5) ⁵
	iii	3:22 —4:26	E . . . J	J E J (E 4:25) ⁵
	iv	5:1 —6:8	E . . . J	E J
Par. 2	v	6:9 —7:24	E . . . J not same as	E . . . J
	vi	8:1-14	E — E same as	E — E (twice)
	vii	8:15 —9:17	J — . E (J 8:15-21)	E — E (J 8:20, 21)
	viii	9:18 —11:32	J — J same as	J — J (E 9:27) ⁵
Par. 3	ix	12:1-9	J — J same as	J — J (6 times)
	x	12:10 —13:18	E — J (J 13:4, 18)	J — J (7 times)
	xi	14:	neither divine name, unless in verse 22	
	xii	15:	J . . . E or J	J — J (7 times)
	xiii	16:	J — J (E in v. 5)	J — J (8 times)
	xiv	17:	J — E J once, same as	J — E (E 9 ⁶)
Par. 4	xv	18:	E . . . J (E vs. 1, 14)	J — J (10 times)
	xvi	19:	J . . . J (E v. 29 a. b.; J v. 29 c)	J — E (E v. 29 a. b.)
	xvii	20:	E — J E 6 times, same as	E — J (J once)
	xviii	21:	J . . . J	J E J (E 11 tm's)
	xix	22:	E . . . J	E J ⁵
		23:	In v. 6 E is used, but without significance to the theory	
Par. 5	xx	24:1-41	J — J	J — J
	xxi	24:42-67	J — J	J — J
	xxii	25:1-18	E but once, same as	E
Par. 6	xxiii	25:19-26:34	J — J (E 25:21 b)	J — J (11 times)
	xxiv	27:1-27	same as	J — J (thrice)
	xxv	27:28-28:9	E — E [or J, Sam'n]	E — E (twice)
Par. 7	xxvi	28:10 —29:30	See comments on this seder	
	xxvii	29:31 —30:21	J E	E E (J 4, E 6)
	xxviii	30:22 —31:2	E — J (J once)	E J (E 3, J 3)
	xxix	31:3 —32:3	J — E (J once)	J E (J 31:3, 49)
Par. 8	xxx	32:4 —33:17	? E	J — — E (5 times)
	xxxi	33:18 —35:8	E — E (only in ch. 35)	E — E
	xxxii	35:9 —36:43	E — E (7 times, 35:9-15)	E — E (5 times)
Par. 9	xxxiii	37:	No divine name	
	xxxiv	38:	J — E	J — J (thrice)
	xxxv	39 and 40:	J — E same as	J — E (J 8, E 2) ⁵
Par. 10	xxxvi	41:1-37	E — E	E — E
	xxxvii	41:38-42:17	E — E	E — E
	xxxviii	42:18-43:13	E — E	E — E
	xxxix	43:14-44:17	E — E	E — E
Par. 11	xl	44:18-46:27	E — E	E — E
	xli	46:28-47:31 or 27	No divine name	
Par. 12	xlvi	48:	E — E	E — E
	xlvi	49 and 50	J — E same as	J — E (J 49:18)

⁵ The continuity in the employment of the same divine title is here unbroken, except where the use of a different divine name was unavoidable.

divine names are used, and by which the theory must be tested. It is the Hebrew text reflected in the LXX, not the Massoretic text, that is now under review. What are the facts? Seder ii. closes and perhaps opens with Jehovah; seder iii. closes with Jehovah in 4:26, where, however, the title Jehovah could not be avoided (for Elohim at the beginning, 2:4^b and 3:22[23] see Dahse, S.35, "Zeugniss de Origenes," with S.58 and 98); sederim iv. and v. also close with Jehovah; seder vii. opens with Jehovah four times, in the first verse taking the place of Elohim found in MT; seder x has Elohim (see Dahse, S.40, 102), except in 13:4; where no title save Jehovah could be used, and in 13:18, the last verse of the seder, the final word of the paragraph being Jehovah. Seder xi. contains Jehovah once, Elohim not at all; and even this occurrence of Jehovah is rejected by Dahse as an ancient interpolation (S.39, citing Eerdmans). The passage records the interview between Abraham and Melchizedek, who worshiped in common the most high God ('el 'elyon). The addition of the word Jehovah to this title in verse 22 is proper enough, but is quite unnecessary. If not original, its presence in the text may be due to the practice of the reader in the synagogue of distinctly identifying the most high God with Jehovah. Seder xii. begins and perhaps ends with Jehovah; seder xiii. begins and ends with Jehovah; seder xiv. begins with Jehovah (which Professor Skinner ascribes to redactional change or scribal error), and has Elohim and once El Shaddai elsewhere; seder xv. opens with Elohim and closes with Jehovah; seder xvi. has Jehovah seven times, followed by Elohim twice in one verse (19:29), Elohim being original in this verse (Dahse, S.106 f, 111; cp. Skinner, p. 310) and explicable. In addition the LXX shows Jehovah in verse 29^a. Seder xvii. uses Elohim, and with discrimination as far at least as verse 16, since the narrative concerns a foreigner. The final verse of the seder (20:28) contains Jehovah. Here, however, the Samaritan and certain texts of the LXX represent Elohim; perhaps due to the influence of the preceding names. Professor Skinner remarks of this verse that it is "universally recognized as a gloss." Seder xviii. opens with Jehovah, and closes with Jehovah, the Everlasting God (El). On 21:2 and 6, see Dahse, S.102. The opening Jehovah is readily accounted for as it concerns the birth of the heir; whereas 21:8-32 correctly have Elohim, because Hagar has been cast off by Abraham. Seder xix. closes with Jehovah (22:16). The name occurs in the phrase "a declaration of Jehovah"; and is original, since in that phrase Elohim would be contrary to usage. In this chapter, according to the Syriac, Elohim was used everywhere except in verses 14 and 16. This seder (but not Parasha 4) includes chapter 23, in which neither divine name occurs, except in verse 6 where Elohim is part of an idiom (prince of God = mighty prince) and without significance in relation to Pastor Dahse's theory. Seder xxiii. opens and closes with Jehovah, having this name everywhere except in 25:21^b. Seder xxv. has Elohim twice; but in place of the second Elohim the Samaritan has Jehovah (28:4). Seder

xxvi. perhaps uses the title Jehovah at the first opportunity.* Seder xxvii. begins with Jehovah (29:31). The presence of this name in verses 32 and 35, and perhaps 33, is proper, according to a principle which characterizes Genesis, Jehovah being the name used in connection with the birth of the legal or actual heir. Thenceforth Elohim. Seder xxviii. closes with Jehovah (30:30), Elohim is used previously, and has the support of the Syriac which with the LXX reads Elohim in verses 24 and 27. Seder xxix. begins with Jehovah. Thenceforward Elohim is used, and properly; though in 31:7, 9 and 16^a Samaritan, and in 16^b Syriac, have Jehovah. Seder xxx. may be regarded as beginning with Jehovah in 32:9 [Heb. 10], although compound epithets containing Elohim preceded it in this verse. It is attested by the MT LXX uncertain. Dahse regards it as "interpolated later" (S.13). Seder xxxiv. begins with Jehovah in 38:7^a, Elohim in 7^b and 10. The divergence from the MT existed in Origen's day (Dahse S.103). In seder xxxv. Jehovah is used, except in speech to a foreigner (39:9; 40:8). In seder xliii. the title Jehovah appears in 49:18, the first occurrence of the divine name in the seder; but it is in a quoted poem and need not be regarded as significant in relation to Dahse's theory.

In several of these sedarim the title Jehovah, where it occurs at the opening or close, is necessarily employed, and therefore proves nothing as to the correctness of the theory. Its presence, however, satisfied that desire of the directors of the synagogue worship which the theory presupposes. The facts are that the name Jehovah is found at the beginning or close of practically every seder, where this word with its connotations could be appropriately used. Whether the facts are sufficient in number and character to justify and sustain the theory concerning the divine names in the sedarim is a delicate question. Intention may especially be assumed whenever textual criticism can prove that Jhvh takes the place of an original Elohim at the beginning or end of a seder (cp. 2:4 and 3:22, Dahse, S.35 and 98, Z 13 ff; 8:15¹). In regard to sedarim xii., xiii., xiv., in parasha 3; and xv. and xviii. in parasha 4; and xxiii. in parasha 6; and xxvii. in parasha 7; and xxxiv. in parasha 9, eight sedarim in all, several possibilities demand consideration. 1. The initial Jehovah in 15:1; 16:2; 17:1; 18:1; 21:1; 25:21^a; 29:31-35; 38:7^a may be the characteristic of one of the sources from which material was drawn for constructing the narrative contained in the Pentateuch, this particular source being one in which God was regularly mentioned by the title Jehovah. Thus, in general, the divisive critics, who denote this source by the letter J. 2. The initial Jehovah in these passages

*The paragraph, Gen. 28:10-22, is difficult from the standpoint of textual criticism. If Jhvh is due to dittography in verse 21 (the clause then reading: "and will be God to me"), the name Jehovah is attested in verses 13 and 16 only. There was reason for using Elohim in the phrases "angels of God" and "house of God." The designation "angels of God" occurs but twice in the Old Testament, in Gen. 28:12 and 32:2 [Eng. 1], beginning and ending the parasha (as Dahse remarks, S.95); never "angels of Jehovah," although "his angels" are mentioned (e.g. Ps. 91:11; 103:20).

may be due to the intention of the writer to begin each account of the birth of the presumptive heir to the Abrahamic blessing with the title of the God of Israel, the author, maker of the promise, and its guarantee (see subsequent remarks). 3. The initial Jehovah may be due to the desire for this name at the beginning or close of a seder. The fact that the LXX, without variation in the transmission, attests Elohim in 18:1, the first divine name in seder xv., makes for the theory that the use of initial Jehovah in the Hebrew of these narratives is due to a change introduced into the original text either in order that each of these particular narratives may begin with the name Jehovah or else in order to the symmetry within the parasha (see below).

II. The theory regarding the parashiyyoth. The Hebrew text of Genesis, known as the Massoretic text, is more recent in respect to the divine names Elohim and Jehovah than is the Hebrew text underlying the Septuagint (S.97). The divine names which are found in the MT represent the rule followed in the synagogue at public service when it had become customary to read the Pentateuch according to the annual cycle of fifty-four large divisions called parashiyyoth (S.32). When the law of Moses was divided into fifty-four sections in order that by reading them consecutively on successive Sabbaths the whole Torah might be covered in one year, and when as a result the sedarim became merged in these larger divisions, the divine names God and Jehovah were sometimes found to intermingle in a manner distracting to the worshipping audience. When such was the case, a slight revision of these names was undertaken, so Dahse holds, in order to secure a comfortable symmetry in the parasha (cp. S.107). The revision was more extensive than had been required when it was desired merely to obtain the name Jehovah at the beginning or end of a seder. To secure the desired uniformity in the parashiyyoth various methods were employed: the word God was changed to Jehovah, when it stood between Jehovah-passages (S.94), and the name Jehovah might be changed to God, when it came between verses in which the word God was used (S.99 Z 12 f; cp. S.38); or the one name might be added to the other (S.98, Z. 13 ff). The object aimed at, whatever the method of revision, evidently was to allow one name to be used continuously for a stretch, avoiding the distraction of repeated change from one to the other, and linking consecutive topics together. Of course, though Dahse does not seem to mention it specifically, revision was not in every case necessary, since symmetry sometimes existed already; and in several cases where symmetry did not exist revision was impossible or undesirable, because no other divine name was so suitable as the one originally employed in the narrative; for example, God and not Jehovah was the proper title to use in referring to the Creator of the universe, in the conversation between Eve and the serpent, and where foreigners are speaking of the deity without special reference to the God of the Hebrews. The avoidance of revision in these cases, and the resulting lack of symmetry, made the distinction of thought more noticeable.

Of Parasha 1 a comparison of the MT with the earliest readings of the Greek indicate a revision. Thus, read as a parasha, a symmetry altogether lacking in the text attested by the LXX has been secured in the MT: God, 1: 1-2:4^a, where God is the only appropriate divine name to use; then Jehovah God, 2:4^b-3:25, except thrice, where Eve and the serpent are talking together; then Jehovah alone, 4:1-4:16; then God, 4:25-5:24, except once, 4:26, where the retention of the word Jehovah was unavoidable; finally Jehovah, 5:29-6:8, with the exception of 6:2 and 4 where the title Jehovah was inadmissible. This revision (and critics of the text generally admit a revision) ignored the boundaries of the sedarim. In Parasha 3 also the MT shows a symmetry in the use of the two divine names that is lacking in the earlier constituent sedarim. The word God no longer stands between passages in which the divine name is Jehovah. The designation Jehovah is used consecutively about thirty times, followed by Elohim nine times. In Parasha 5 likewise the name God does not occur between Jehovah passages; the sequence being Elohim once, then Jehovah twelve times, then Elohim once. The Greek and Hebrew agree, no adjustment was made. In Parasha 6 Elohim is not found between Jehovah passages; Jehovah being used fourteen times consecutively, then Elohim twice. This unbroken sequence, exhibited by the MT, is not shown by the Greek texts. In Parasha 8, Elohim does not appear between Jehovah passages. Barring compound titles, the parasha opens with Jehovah in 32:10[9], thenceforth Elohim only. In this respect there is no divergence between the Hebrew of the LXX and the Hebrew of the Massoretes. In Parasha 9 Elohim occurs once between Jehovah passages, (39:9), where, however, the title of Elohim is unavoidable. The last divine name in the parasha is Elohim (40:8), where also its use was unavoidable. This symmetry is lacking in the Greek. Parashiyoth 10 and 11 have Elohim only. In this the MT and LXX agree. Parasha 12 has Jehovah but once, and that in a poem with other divine titles; Elohim continuously. In only four of the nine parashiyoth just noticed, namely in 1, 3, 6 and 9, is there divergence between the MT and the Hebrew text represented by the LXX, but in these four the symmetry of the MT in comparison with the Hebrew of the LXX is striking. In all nine, moreover, the MT uses the two divine names in the symmetrical manner which Dahse has observed and seeks to explain by his theory.

Parasha 2 has Elohist character (S.38), due to revision. It is difficult to prove, by the critical apparatus at present available, whether in several instances the divine names which appear in the MT in sedarim v.-vii., Gen. 6:9-9:17, are original or have undergone a change.¹ In the MT Elohim occurs five times in succession, then

¹ On the assumption that the names have been subjected to an Elohist revision (S.38), it is necessary to account for the presence of Jehovah in 7:1, 5, and 16. Concerning 8:15 the general concurrence of the Greek texts for Jehovah against Elohim of the MT may be interpreted either as the change of an original Elohim to Jehovah at the beginning of a new seder; or the change of an original Jehovah to Elohim in carrying out an Elohist revision (as Dahse holds).

Jehovah twice (7:1 and 5), Elohim twice, Jehovah once (7:16), Elohim thrice, Jehovah thrice (8:20 and 21), Elohim six times, Jehovah and Elohim (9:26 and 27, each being unavoidable), finally Jehovah seven times. The MT, just as it stands is more uniform than the LXX; and a yet greater symmetry exists if with the Samaritan (not Petermann's), and the Syriac (S.63 and 99) Elohim be read in 7:1, which probably involves 7:5 also. Dahse accounts for the retention of the name Jehovah in 8:20 as due to the feeling that this designation was alone suitable, and in the following verse the name Jehovah remained because of the intimate connection (S.99). If Elohim is original in 7:1 and 5, then from Gen. 6:9 to 9:17 Elohim occurs eighteen times, interrupted by the name Jehovah once, at the end of a seder (7:16), and again in 8:20, 21, where the designation Jehovah was important; from Gen. 9:26-11:9 the word Jehovah is found eight times, broken by one unavoidable Elohim (9:27). Parasha 4 is likewise more symmetrical in the MT than in the LXX. In sederim xv.-xviii. the name Jehovah occurs seventeen times in the MT (not so in the LXX), and is followed by Elohim eight times (as in the LXX also), Elohim being the proper term to use; then Jehovah occurs thrice (at the end of seder xvii. and the beginning of seder xviii., Gen. 20:18; 21:1), Elohim eleven times (differing from LXX), being the proper term to use in 21:9-32; and finally Jehovah once (21:33), closing the seder. That half of seder xix. which belongs to this parasha, namely Gen. 22, is not uniform in the use of the divine name, Elohim being used in verses 1 to 10 and Jehovah in verses 11 to 18. This change from Elohim to Jehovah at the crisis of the narrative has been regarded as original, and significant (even by Knobel). But if Elohim be read with the Syriac in verses 11 and 15, then Elohim only is used in the seder, except in verses 14 and 16. In the latter verse Jehovah is unavoidable, being in the phrase "declaration of Jehovah,"* and in this phrase Elohim was never used. Regarding verse 14, Professor Kent (cp. Dillmann also), without the authority of the ancient versions, claims that the word Jehovah has been substituted for the original Elohim by a Judean editor. Thus the entire section may be made to contain Elohim only, except in verse 16, at the end of the series, where the phrase requires Jehovah. Dahse, however, retains Jehovah in verses 11 to 18, yet considers its use in verses 11, 14 and 15 to be "motivated," and therefore not inconsistent with pronouncing seder xix. "Elohistic, only the conclusion Jahwistic, 22:16" (S.94 and 95). The remaining half of seder xix., namely chap. 23, belongs to Parasha 5. Regarding Parasha 7, in seder xxvi. the divine names intermingle; and in most instances where Elohim is used, that particular name was unavoidable. In sederim xxvii.-xxix. Jehovah occurs four times at the beginning of seder xxvii.; then Elohim nine times; Jehovah four times (LXX and Syriac but twice), including the end of seder xxviii.

* When the divine Being is the subject, the divine name is always Jehovah either alone or enlarged.

and the beginning of seder xxix.; Elohim twelve times, interrupted by Jehovah once (31:49, where LXX has Elohim).

Thus it appears that even in these three parashiyyoth, 2, 4 and 7, notwithstanding that the final determination of the original names in certain cases still eludes textual criticism, yet a tendency towards symmetry is observable in the MT, which is lacking in the Hebrew text of the LXX. And with this phenomenon Pastor Dahse's theory agrees.

It is possible to take a broader view than is taken by Dahse and to consider certain phenomena which bear upon the determination of the original Hebrew text and perhaps of its later stages. Whatever the sources, oral or written, were, from which the narrative in the book of Genesis was obtained, it would seem that the author or his editor followed several rules in his use of the divine titles. 1. Unless it was the intention of the speaker to refer specifically to the God of the patriarchs (cp. 1 Kin. 17:10-14; 2 Kin. 5:10-19; 18:19-35), a foreigner and a Hebrew in conversation used the generic word God or other high and holy name which embodied the common conception which each party had of God; as 'el 'elyon, God most High, possessor of heaven and earth (14:19-22), 'elohim, God (20:9-13 E; 39:9J; also 43:23, 29, and 44; 16J, where Joseph appears as an Egyptian); cp. Kuenen, *Hexateuch*, p. 56. 2. In every narrative in Genesis, which concerns the birth of the presumptive heir to the Abrahamic blessing (Gen. 12:1-3), the Massoretic text has Jehovah for the introductory divine name in the paragraph and also for the divine name in the few instances where one occurs in the reason assigned for the heir's name, whatever name or names may be used for the deity later in the narrative: thus, the promise of an heir (15:1); attempt to secure an heir (16:2); and the reason for the name (16:11; LXX, exhibiting the composition of the name, Ishmael, uses God); renewed promise of an heir (17:1); promise of a son by Sarah within a year (18:1, and verse 13 where the specific promise is given; but 17:15 God, Old Latin, Lord); birth of Isaac (21:1); birth of Esau and Jacob (25:21^a); birth of Reuben, and of Judah who ultimately became the heir (29:31 with 32 and 35); failure and refusal of Judah's sons to beget the legal heir, and birth of the ultimate heir in the house of Judah (38:7^a, with 29). The Septuagint with one exception (18:1) attests the word Jehovah at the beginning of these paragraphs, as the first divine name in the seder, however much the Septuagint may differ from the Massoretic text in respect to the divine name elsewhere in the paragraph. Dahse's theory, it will be noted, accords with these facts regarding the initial divine name, and also accounts for the difference between the Massoretic text and the Septuagint in 18:1. And the general agreement of the two texts in regard to the divine name used, where a particular rule seems to have been followed by the author or early editor of the narratives, is an additional attestation of the fidelity of the Greek translators to their Hebrew text, and affords valuable testimony to the readings of the early Hebrew text.

3. According to the Massoretic text the patriarchs never approach the deity under the generic designation of God, but always use a formal title, drawing nigh to God in a specific character, expressed in a unique title, as Jehovah, or El or the word Elohim qualified by an adjective or a limiting genitive or a relative clause. Thus they build the altar to Jehovah (8:20; 12:7, 8; 13:18), or to El, the God of Israel (33:20), or to El who answered me (35:3); offer sacrifice to Jehovah (4:3) or to the God of his father (46:1); and they call upon the name of Jehovah (4:26; 12:8; 13:4; 21:33; 26:25). Where they are represented as themselves speaking they address their prayer or invocation of a blessing, not to God in the generic sense (as they might when making supplication in behalf of a foreigner, 20:17), but to Jehovah (32:9; Ex. 5:21; cp. the indirect prayer of Rachel, Gen. 30:24, where however the Greek and Syriac with propriety have the word God, which may be original), Lord Jehovah (15:2, where the early Septuagint attests only Lord, Dahse, S.13), Lord (Gen. 18:30; Ex. 4:10; 5:22), Jehovah, God of my master (Gen. 24:12, 42), God of my father (32:9; cp. 48:15), God Almighty (28:3; 43:14), and El (Num. 12:13), the only exception in the Massoretic text being in two successive verses of a poem-prayer or blessing, where the word God is used in sequence to Jehovah (Gen. 27:27, 28); and they give thanks for answered prayer to Jehovah (24:27, 48), they take oath by Jehovah, the God of heaven and earth (24:3), they bestow the blessing of the birthright before Jehovah (27:7), and when speaking to other men specifically of the God of Abraham, they say Jehovah (chap. 24 throughout; 27:20; 30:30, end of the seder; cp. verse 27 where, however, the Greek has God, which is equally good). Such is the Massoretic text; and Dahse's theory meets with no obstacle in any of these passages, but coincides. Moreover, the uniformity of the agreement between the Massoretic text and the versions in reading a formal title of God in practically all such instances, together with the evident propriety of such a title in the circumstances, is once more a strong argument for the ancient use, if not for the original use, of the formal name in these passages. Even the Greek translation of Gen. 28:3 and 43:14, notwithstanding Dahse's argument to the contrary, attests the words God Almighty, the phrase used being a form employed by the Greek translators for rendering this title elsewhere.

4. On the other hand, in the familiar intercourse of the family, when speaking to each other or with their kinsfolk, Abraham and his descendants do not use the divine name Jehovah. They say God (mostly Elohim, occasionally El); for example, 30:2-8; 31:4-16; and even 33:5, 10, 11 J. The exceptions in the Massoretic text where the word Jehovah is used in the customary, easy conversation of the household are few and doubtful. They scarcely number ten or eleven, and only five or fewer occur in ordinary conversation, 16:2, 5; 30:27, 30; 31:49 (the others being 16:11; 29:32, 33, 35; 30:24; and to include the period before Abraham, 4:1). In six instances there is textual authority in the versions for reading God (4:1; 16:5; and 31:49, Septuagint; and

30:24 and 27, Septuagint and Syriac; and 16:11, Septuagint, probably an attempt to correct a supposed error). In two cases, 16:2 and 30:30, the name Jehovah begins or ends the seder, but is equally well accounted for otherwise. In 16:2 and 11, and 29:32 and 35, the title Jehovah found in the Massoretic text is used by the author or editor of the narrative because the birth of the heir is related. In 30:27 and 30, in a conversation between Laban and Jacob, the use of the name Jehovah in reference to the God of Jacob is quite intelligible and proper, but perhaps is not original; while in verse 24 the Massoretic reading Jehovah, although explicable as the original text, is not unlikely a late play upon the first syllable in Joseph (for these three verses, see the foregoing remarks). The names given to children likewise indicate that God, not Jehovah, was the divine name ordinarily used in the familiar talk of the household. The word Jehovah was not used, so far as the records go, in the proper names of this period, except perhaps in Jochebed. El is common, as Ishmael (16:11, J; 16:15, P) and Israel (32:28, J; 35:10, P; 42:5, E context; 48:2, 8, 11) and others (46:10, 14, 17, 24; Ex. 6:22-24, P). This phenomenon regarding the word God as the divine name used in the ordinary conversation of the home sustains the originality of the Greek reading in a number of instances; and it supports Dahse's double contention that the Massoretic text represents alterations made in the "mixed" sedarim in order to secure the occurrence of the name Jehovah either at the beginning or end of the seder, and made in the parashiyyoth with a view to securing symmetry in the use of the name.

Dahse's conclusions regarding the original text will not in every case be accepted as warranted; moreover he does not hold that either the Greek translation or its Hebrew prototype is faultless. But all that may be left aside. The facts are that many sound reasons exist for believing that the Septuagint represents careful transcription of the divine names which occurred in the copy of the Hebrew text used by the Greek translators. Where there is divergence from the Massoretic text, the latter's preference for the divine name Jehovah may be due in a few instances to the natural desire to use that name in connection with certain narratives. When the preference of the Massoretic text is not evident, Dahse's twofold theory is apt to offer an ingenious reason.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

The Source of the Christian Tradition. A Critical History of Ancient Judaism. By EDOUARD DUJARDIN. Revised edition, translated by Joseph McCabe. (Issued for the Rationalist Press Association, Limited.) Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. Pp. xvi, 307.

Two decades ago Maurice Vernes published a series of Old Testament studies, in which he advocated the postexilic origin of substantially all the Biblical literature, including the prophets. There are others who since that time have ranged themselves—at least with respect to this or that prophetic book—on the side of Vernes. Now

M. Dujardin comes forward with the claim that, apart from "legends and customs belonging to earlier times", of which "the compilers of the Mosaic writings made use", the entire Old Testament dates from after the exile, according to the following scheme: Pentateuch—Kings, during the 4th and at beginning of the 3d century, Chronicles, Ezra and Nehemiah still later; the prophets, latter part of the 4th and in the course of the 3d century; Psalms, Daniel and "other works", during the 2nd and 1st centuries.

It is evident that such a scheme upsets the prevalent criticism of to-day, which builds on an 8th century Amos and Hosea, by removing its very foundations. Thus "extremes meet", here as so often elsewhere. The conservative critic and this ultra-radical are at one in opposing the order: first prophets, second law. So this Dujardin, after appealing to Vernes' writings, seeks comfort and support next in the conservative Halévy, because forsooth Halévy's *Recherches bibliques* may be cited as demonstrating "that the prophetic books are later than the Mosaic writings." The author expressly adds, "With the new theory of dates we return to the traditional formula: the Prophets after the Law."

This fact and this alone constitutes the significance of a book that is a wild orgy of skepticism. To its author history is imagination, prophecy is forgery, law is a pious fraud. "Pseudonymity is the invariable condition of Hebrew literature" (p. 186). Nothing is true, nothing sacred. Yet on every page there are familiar tones. The difference, one feels, between the methods of this writer and those of Professor Moore, Smith or Kent is but a difference of degree. And it seems to us that critics of that type should read a book like this with a certain uneasy feeling that its author differs from them mainly in his greater consistency. For it is a fact too patent to need proof, that for them the criteria for determining whether a writing belongs before or after the exile lie within the scheme of religious evolution first elaborated by Graf. Many lines of argument are often adduced to support the conclusion reached, but the discerning reader marks that this conclusion was already a foregone conclusion. Yet the application of the same lines of argument, minus such a foregone conclusion, will often lead to just such results as Dujardin here reaches. *Exempli gratia*, Chapin and Day on Amos and Hosea.

Against this thorough-going skepticism what is one to plead? We are driven back upon faith. But, faith in what? Let us not answer, tradition. For that word will inevitably frighten our liberal school. But let us say, faith in *the men who produced the Biblical literature*,—in a word, faith in the Bible's own account of its origin, so far as it gives an account. This is internal evidence, not external. But it is a justifiable act to distinguish between the men who wrote the Old Testament and the men who collected the canon and transmitted it to us. Of the latter we know little or nothing. But of the former we have a personal revelation in their works. We know them, as we know few characters back of our own day. And is it not a reasonable faith

that proclaims, I trust the assertions of the man who wrote this book, including his assertions or implications that settle its date and authorship? There is no essential difference between the man who puts Deuteronomy in the 7th century, and the man who puts it in the 4th. Both alike have cast off faith in its author—one of the glorious religious characters of all time—and both alike are adrift upon the sea of conjecture, to find a precarious harbor where they may. Let this book under review be a warning to the critic whom we are accustomed to call "radical," but whom it makes to appear as "a cake not turned."

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

The Building Up of the Old Testament. By the Rev. R. B. GIRDLESTONE, M.A. London: Robert Scott. 1912. Pp. xx, 314. (Library of Historic Theology, edited by the Rev. Wm. C. Piercy, M.A.)

The nature of this book cannot be better stated than in the words of its preface: "This is intended to be a reverent and rational restatement of the position of the Old Testament, dealing with its form, its substance, and the relationship of its various parts, examining how far the later Books presuppose the earlier so that the whole is fitly framed together by words, idioms, texts and ideas, exhibiting traces of purpose throughout. The book consists of two Parts. The first considers the phenomena of the Old Testament as a whole; the second analyzes each book, its language and contents, in order to find out its position and design. . . . In a book of this compass it is impossible to go into all details, but while a broad view is taken of the Old Testament as a whole, the writer has not consciously ignored or evaded any material objections to the position to which he has been led after fifty years of study and thought."

In carrying out this plan Canon Girdlestone has embodied his views on a great variety of questions, both theological and philosophical, archaeological, chronological, geographical, literary. The weakness of the book is its discursiveness. There is plenty of bread, but it is buttered too thin. Yet to put into the hands of a layman, perplexed about Biblical criticism as such without quite knowing what it is—for that describes the mental state of many in our churches—and lacking any coherent principles of Biblical interpretation, such a book as this, with its sound fundamentals, is perhaps the best sort of a guide to be found.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life in Israel, in Judaism, and in Christianity or Hebrew, Jewish and Christian Eschatology from Pre-prophetic Times till the Close of the New Testament Canon. Being the First Jowett Lectures delivered in 1898-99. By R. H. CHARLES, D.D., D.Litt. Speaker's Lecturer in Biblical Studies, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford, Fellow of the British Academy. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. London: Adam and Charles Black, pp. x, 484. 1913.

Immortality. The Drew Lecture, Delivered October 11, 1912. By R. H. CHARLES, D.Litt., D.D. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1912. pp. 38.

The first edition of Dr. Charles' *Eschatology* appeared in 1899. Fourteen years lie between that date and the publication of this second edition. The "Revised and Enlarged" on the title-page of the latter does not mean that any considerable new material has been added, or that the main positions of the first edition have been to any important extent modified. The one extensive addition occurs in the treatment of the nature of Apocalyptic, more particularly its relation to Prophecy and the causes of its pseudonymity. Here the writer offers a new theory. But the other changes do not affect the main character of the work as representing a definite view in regard to the development of biblical eschatology. So far as the Old Testament is concerned this view is that of the Graf-Wellhausen school. It might be summed up in the following positions: a purely paganistic ethically-indifferent individual eschatology (Sheol) prior to the introduction of Jahvism; the development of an ethical collective eschatology through the influence of the higher prophetism from the eighth century onward, and this first of all in the adverse sense of an announcement of judgment upon Israel, and only later in the favorable form of Messianic prediction (the promissory passages in Amos and Hosea being rejected); the moral transformation of the original paganistic views of the state after death through the individualizing of the ethical nationalism of the great prophets; the successive and only partially successful attempts at effecting a synthesis between the national and individual hopes through the doctrine of the resurrection, the synthesis being perfectly attained in Christianity only; the broadening out of this particularistic into a universalistic and cosmical eschatology under the influence of the ethical principle. Within the limits indicated by these positions the author is moderate in his views. He assumes a stronger admixture of the ethical element in the Mosaic conception of Jahve than perhaps most of the critics of the school would allow, although on his own showing the ethical ingredient postulated remained practically dormant until the prophets resuscitated it. On the other hand it might be classified as a somewhat radical position when the author sides with Stade and Schwally a.o. in ascribing ancestor-worship to the pre-Mosaic Hebrews and construing from this point of view their primitive heathen eschatology. In the second edition this is still adhered to, although in the meanwhile, in result of what has been written on the subject, the theory has lost considerable of its erstwhile prestige. We think the author too curtly dismisses the objections raised by Frey and Grüneisen, especially by the latter. He is, of course, within his rights when choosing to abide by his original judgment, but the theory has certainly become sufficiently shaken to require of every scholar, who still thinks himself able to uphold it, a careful restatement of the arguments and a refutation of the counter-arguments adduced. Instead of this, the author simply repeats the reasoning of Stade and Schwally

in its original form. Especially Grüneisen's interpretation of the mourning-customs as defensive measures adopted to ward off the dangerous influence of the souls of the departed, is in many respects much more plausible than the interpretation of these same customs as acts of worship. And even if it should be urged that in this sphere of pagan superstition the line between defensive treatment of the spirits, or care and provision for the spirits, and of a positive religious cult of them, is hard to draw, it still would have to be remembered that the phenomena of the mourning-customs at any rate would not point to *ancestor*-worship in the specific sense, but could at best only be used to prove the worship of the departed in general, so that many of the far-reaching corollaries of the theory in regard to the tribal and family-organization of Israel appear unwarranted. As the matter stands the non-expert reader will be apt to form from Dr. Charles' statements a very inadequate conception of the merits of the controversy. Even Eerdmans, whom none will suspect of conservative leanings, declares in a recent issue of the *Theologisch Tydschrift* (1913, II, p. 124) that the whole theory of the primitive religious cult of the departed turns out to have been "*een groote misgreep*" i.e. a huge mistake. The point at issue does not concern pre-jahvistic paganism exclusively, but also affects the view taken of the Old Testament teaching itself in regard to the state after death. Charles assumes that Jahvism, in order to combat ancestor-worship, conceived a theory of the nature of the soul, which implied the destruction of all life in Sheol. The trichotomy of Gen. ii. 7 makes the existence of the soul depend on the presence of the spirit, which at death withdraws to its source in God. Nothing therefore remains to descend into Sheol. According to the author the denial of immortality in Eccl. xii. 7 is the logical outcome of the anthropology of this creation-account. But, he assures us, the destruction by Jahvism of all life in Sheol was necessary with a view to the truly ethical doctrine of the future life. We do not believe that the intent of Gen. ii. 7 is to deny the continuation of the individual life after death. And we cannot help feeling that the ethicizing of the future state, by means of the (temporary) denial of the survival of man, would be a procedure beneath the dignity of revelation. Nor do we believe that there is, as the author seems to assume, a historical connection between what he calls "the later view" in regard to Sheol as a place of silence, inertia, forgetfulness (in distinction from the older ascription to it of a relatively high degree of life, movement and remembrance) and the anthropology of Gen. ii. 7. This passage, if it did imply the cessation of man in toto, could only have led to the abolishment of Sheol. How it could have operated towards depressing the degree of activity in Sheol we fail to see. The whole distinction, moreover, between an alleged later and an alleged older view, is without sufficient basis. Dr. Charles favors it evidently, because it falls in with the theory of primitive ancestor-worship. The whole thing amounts to a difference of emphasis in the various popular conceptions reflected in the Old Testament as concerning the degree of life

and activity ascribed to the dead, and with a difference of religious principles it has nothing to do. As a matter of fact, even on the alleged older view of Sheol the dead are so wholly deprived of energy and influence as to exclude every idea of their worship by the living. Grüneisen has convincingly shown the incongruousness between the general Old Testament view of Sheol and the theory of ancestor-worship, although he falls into the same mistake as Charles, viz. of finding in Gen. ii. 7 the view that the soul does not survive death. Only according to him this is not the later doctrine, it is the general and original teaching of the Old Testament. And the popular belief about Sheol and the shades were inconsistent with it.

Another point in regard to which the enlargement claimed for the new edition might have been expected to show itself concerns the antiquity of the promissory (Messianic) eschatology and of the cosmical framework of the eschatological expectations in general. These appear in accordance with the modern theory as after-developments. But Gunkel, Gressmann and others have presented some very weighty arguments in support of the opposite view, and if their conclusions are correct, the whole scheme of development above outlined and almost conventionally followed by the Wellhausen-School will need considerable revision. Here again no fault could be found with the writer, if after due presentation of the evidence he chose to adhere to his original conviction. But Dr. Charles does not raise the question at issue anywhere. Throughout the discussion only casual references to Gunkel occur, e.g. pp. 182, 198. On p. 189 we read about the "cosmological myths" in Gen. i.-iii., and of other elements of a similar nature preserved in the prophets. From the next page we learn that "in later Judaism these cosmological myths were transformed into eschatological expectations." And a little later this is qualified by the statement that "this transformation of primitive myth into eschatological expectation was already known to the prophets at all events in poetical form." That under these vague and easy statements a far-reaching problem, involving the whole development-hypothesis with which the writer is identified, hides itself, no uninformed reader would be led to surmise. Practically the author treats the controversy as non-existent. After what Gressmann has written, one is surprised to find on p. 99 the following statement: "In Zephaniah the judgment appears for the first time to be universal. Its universal scope is the necessary corollary to the Monotheistic faith of the prophet." We believe that the number of Old Testament scholars ready to subscribe to this statement at the present day is considerable less than it was in 1899, when the first edition appeared. There is an increasing recognition of the fact that much of the wider eschatology is older than the eighth century, and therefore cannot be explained as the product of the ethical monotheism of the prophets of that period. Either the monotheism of which that eschatology is claimed to be the correlate must be older likewise, or no real connection between it and ethical monotheism exists. In the latter case the universalistic, cosmical set-

ting of the earlier eschatology will have to be explained from Babylonian influence. Dr. Charles, who is prevented by his general position, from adopting the former view, should have at least made clear on what grounds he rejects the other side of the alternative.

By far the most valuable, and we may add the most reliable, part of the work is that which deals with the apocryphal and apocalyptic literature. Here the writer is an acknowledged authority, and we can only be thankful to him for the illuminating way in which he has presented to us the essential points and the great lines of development in the confusing mass of phenomena. In view of his long preoccupation with the subject, it can hardly create surprise that the author magnifies the value of this literature for the student of biblical eschatology. His praise of it, not merely of its eschatological teaching, but also of the ethical content of some of its documents, and that in pointed contrast to the Old Testament, is so generous, that we do not see how it leaves room for any canonical distinction between this literature and the recognized Hebrew Scriptures. In this connection the author attaches no blame whatever to the pseudonymity of most of these writings. He offers for it the well-known excuse that in those days the modern conception of literary property was entirely unknown. We fail to see how this covers the point. The case is not one of appropriating the work of others as a literary product, but of usurping the authority of others as a moral asset. And the new hypothesis which the author brings forward to explain this feature of the apocalyptic writings is found to accentuate most painfully the moral aspect of the matter, and insofar to discount the force of the conventional excuse. According to Dr. Charles the pseudonymity arose from the absolute control which legalism with its doctrine of the completeness and finality of the law as a rule of faith and practice had gained over the congregation. This state of affairs made it necessary, if any new truth was to be presented, to introduce it under the auspices of primeval religious personages, so that its acceptance might not seem to be in contravention to the monopoly of the law. This amounts to saying, that the writers gained for their views a hearing under the guise of pseudonymity which they knew could not be accorded to it had they stood back of them with their own persons. In doing this they committed a fraud, not to be sure upon Enoch or Moses, but upon the representatives of legalism, whose control they dared not openly to dispute. And it is difficult to understand how the latter could be so naïve as to be taken in by this palpable disguise of the pseudepigraphical writers. Whether the author's new explanation of the phenomenon, be successful or not, at any rate it ought to have led him to tone down somewhat his high estimate of the literature in question.

The discussion of the New Testament Eschatology covers much less space than that of the intercanonical period. Considerable of it skims lightly on the surface. In regard to the teaching of our Lord, which the writer does not take special pains to separate from that of the

synoptical gospels, his standpoint is opposed to that of the extreme eschatological school. He recognizes the presence in Jesus' teaching of the idea of a present, spiritual kingdom. The evidence however adduced in support of this view will need some sifting. *E.g.* when the opening message of our Lord's ministry to the effect that the kingdom is *at hand* is appealed to, the author overlooks, that the extreme eschatologists use the very form of this message as an argument on their side, on the ground that a kingdom *at hand* is not a *present* kingdom. Dr. Charles also seems to think that our Lord began with the idea of the present kingdom pure and simple, and added to this the eschatological expectation as an afterthought, when his experience had shown Him that the optimistic forecast of a gradual, uninterrupted development of the present kingdom could not be realized. This is a construction based exclusively on the fact, that what the writer considers the earliest sayings of Jesus contain no explicit reference to the eschatological aspect of the kingdom. But, even if the question of criticism were discounted, it would remain an argument from mere silence. The author does not deny that our Lord expected a new heaven and a new earth as the scene of the perfect kingdom. The question is pertinent how He could have possibly conceived otherwise than by way of catastrophe of the creation of this final environment for the kingdom. On this point the writers are not lacking, who make the development of Jesus' mind move in precisely the opposite direction, viz. from the eschatological to the present kingdom. And it does not appear that they have any greater difficulty than the advocates of Charles' view in arranging the chronology of the sayings to suit their theory.

The author agrees with the extreme eschatological school in one point. He ascribes to Jesus in his later teaching the view, that the consummation of the kingdom would take place within the lifetime of that generation. The possibility of interpreting the sayings pertaining to this head of a spiritual advent to the church is not considered, although in other connections the actual occurrence of such a way of speaking in the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse is admitted. While conceding that Jesus here held a mistaken view, Dr. Charles strives to minimize the importance of the mistake. It was a mere question of time which did not touch the essence of the matter. But here once more it might have been worth while to take some account of the contention of the hypereschatologists to the opposite effect. On their view not merely the fallibility of our Lord on a chronological question, but the character of His ethics is involved, not to speak of the bearing which the subject has acquired on the question of our Lord's mental balance.

In other respects the author's tendency is to use the ethical or sub-ethical character of the eschatological sayings of Jesus as a test of their genuineness. We notice in this connection that he eliminates from the great eschatological discourse the so-called "Small Apocalypse," considering it with—Weiffenbach and others a purely-Jewish

document. The grounds on which this is done are those usually adduced. In our opinion they are wholly insufficient to bear out the view in question, when once the unwarranted idea is abandoned, that Jesus could have no eschatological interest that was not motivated ethically and spiritually in the most direct manner. If interest in eschatology is not in itself a culpable thing, why not allow for it in Jesus, who was a true man in this respect also. It is hardly self-consistent when the author argues on the one hand that the signs of the end enumerated in the small Apocalypse cannot come from Jesus, because He declares that no one knows the time of the end, and that it comes by surprise,—a declaration to be taken in the most absolute sense, and yet on the other hand appears to find no conflict between this declaration of absolute ignorance and the positive declaration that the parousia will come within the time of the then living generation.

The discussion of the Pauline eschatology is largely subordinated to the development-theory which Charles holds in common with Teichmann, Pfeiderer and other recent writers. Four periods are distinguished, the first represented by 1 and 2 Thessalonians, the second by 1 Corinthians, the third by 2 Corinthians and Romans, the fourth by Philipians, Colossians and Ephesians. We do not believe that on the author's own premises, the necessity of separating 1 Thessalonians from 1 Corinthians, i.e. the first period from the second, can be demonstrated, for Dr. Charles does not believe that 1 Thess. teaches a resurrection of the unchanged body, as other advocates of the development-theory assume. Nor can it be maintained that the eschatology is in 1 Thess. un-pneumatic, for, if on the one hand the body is to be changed, and if on the other hand the dead are *νεκροὶ ἐν Χριστῷ*, there is no other conception that will account for these two features, than the Pauline conception of the union between believers and Christ in the Spirit. As to 2 Thess. the only thing to mark this off from the later Epistles would be the doctrine of the Antichrist. The difference as regards 1 Corinthians would amount merely to this that here Paul is silent on the subject, for certainly nothing is said here that excludes it. The case is somewhat different with Romans for, here, as Charles urges, the optimistic perspective of Chap. xi clashes with the pessimistic outlook of the Antichrist-expectation of 2 Thess. ii. But the writer overlooks that according to the latter chapter itself the Antichrist-movement spreads itself and gains force on the basis of an extended apostasy, which apostasy, to judge of it in the light of other New Testament statements, takes place within the church. Accordingly there is no contradiction here either.

The warrant to posit a third distinct period depends entirely on the exegesis of 2 Cor. v., 1-10. Of course there is an interpretation which finds here the prospect of the endowment with the resurrection-body at the moment of death. But many prominent exegetes interpret the passage quite differently, and there are some most serious objections to the exegesis espoused by Charles. Foremost among these stands the fact that on the basis of it that which Paul professes to shrink

from, and which he hopes to escape by survival till the parousia, would have to be the momentary dissolution of the body. Now as a matter of fact the Apostle tells us in so many words that it is not this *momentary experience*, not the *articulus mortis*, but the *state of nakedness* from which he recoils. Dr. Charles does not enter into the question exegetically at all. He simply quotes the pericope, as if its meaning were so plain as to obtrude itself on the mere reading of it. The reader will do well to compare on this whole question the recent monograph of Deissner entitled *Auferstehungshoffnung und Pneumagedanke bei Paulus*, noticed in the October-number for 1913 of this REVIEW.

The main peculiarity of the fourth period consists in this that Paul makes the evil angel-spirits the subject of redemption. The same view is, as a possible alternative, suggested by the writer, in connection with the two well-known Petrine passages. And throughout the author lays great stress on what he calls the "moralizing of Sheol" as the only legitimate issue of the trend of biblical eschatology. He does not hesitate to intimate that the possibility of repentance in Sheol must either lead to conversion or to final annihilation. Every other conception of Sheol, or Gehenna, in other words the doctrine of eternal punishment he stigmatizes as unethical. Where it occurs in the New Testament it is a Judaistic survival. We do not believe that the biblical development previous to the New Testament can be shown to tend towards the doctrine of a future probation. To be sure Sheol is moralized, in comparison with the primitive pagan conception of it as a place indifferent to ethical distinctions, but in this sense Gehenna as the scene of eternal punishment is most intensely ethical. On the other hand if "ethical" be made to mean a state which admits of repentance, then there is nothing to show that such a moralizing was contemplated by any biblical writer, and Dr. Charles' advocacy of it is plainly not of a historical but of a theological nature, it being in line with his semi-pelagian predilections. If it were not for these he would scarcely have handled the Petrine passages and the statements in Colossians after such an easy and summary fashion. It is positively painful to read on how slender grounds the author finds even in Jesus' teaching the intimations of repentance in the future state. Every student of the subject knows that here also a great deal has been said on the other side and that not merely by believers of the doctrine of eternal retribution. The view that even after the final judgment there is no absolute finality runs directly contrary to and means the destruction of eschatology at its core.

We are glad to notice, that, apart from the well-known passage in the Apocalypse, Dr. Charles finds no Chiliasm in the New Testament not in Acts iii., nor in 1 Thess. iv., nor even in 1 Cor. xv. He rightly points out that the whole trend of the New Testament, especially of the teaching of our Lord and of Paul, points away from such a doctrine and leaves no room for it.

Our chief criticism of the treatment of the New Testament would be that it fails to raise and answer the fundamental question to what

extent the development of soteriological teaching in general proceeded on the basis of eschatology, and therefore partook of the character of an anticipation in the present of what was originally expected in the eschatological period. In bringing this question once more to the front the hyper-eschatologists, Schweitzer foremost among them, have rendered a real service. But our author does not touch upon this problem. For Schweitzer in particular he seems to have little respect, to judge from the following statement in the preface to the second edition: "Since Schweitzer's eschatological studies show no knowledge of original documents and hardly any of first hand works on the documents, and since further they make no fresh contribution to the subject, no notice is taken of him in this edition." One feels tempted to suggest that Schweitzer's case would not be the first one in which remarkable intuition into the meaning of historical developments had been evinced on the basis of a merely second hand acquaintance with the sources. We doubt not Schweitzer could learn a great deal from Charles, but that does not prove that Charles can learn nothing from Schweitzer.

The Drew Lecture for 1912 summarizes in a very lucid way the views elaborated in the large volume grouping them around the idea of immortality. Its perusal will be found helpful both before and after the study of the larger work.

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Primitive Christianity and Its Non-Jewish Sources. By CARL CLEMEN, Ph.D., D.D., Professor in the University of Bonn. Translated by ROBERT G. NISBET, M.A., Lecturer in Latin in the University of Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 30 George Street. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912.

Professor Clemen is the Baedeker in the field of modern theological controversy. In the October number for 1912 we noticed his *Der geschichtliche Jesus*, a brochure furnishing an excellent introduction to the contemporary debate about the historicity of Jesus. The present work renders a similar and equally valuable service with regard to the wider and somewhat older issues raised by the *religionsgeschichtliche* interpretation of Christianity and the New Testament. In its German form the book appeared in 1909 under the title *Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments*. The English translation now offered to the public has been revised by the author himself, and the reader is assured in the preface that in every respect it truthfully represents his meaning. It has besides this, as Dr. Clemen generously concedes, the unusual merit of reading better than the original. This judgment is verified by the comparison we have made of the two. The cases where the German may be consulted to advantage in clearing up obscurities of the English are few in number compared with the cases where the opposite procedure will be found helpful.

After an introduction in which the history of the religious-historical interpretation is traced from Celsus down to Drews and Jensen, and

in which the methodological principles for instituting the inquiry are carefully laid down, the author deals successively with the two rubrics of the leading ideas of Christianity in general and the individual types of teaching (Jesus—Paul—the Johannine writings) in particular. The former rubric is subdivided into three sections treating of the ideas inherited from Judaism, the New Ideas of Christianity and the Institutions of Primitive Christianity. What precedes the discussion of these three subdivisions is a chapter of considerable length entitled Christian thought in some of its more general aspects. This title is a misnomer, for the chapter is entirely devoted to the consideration of concrete resemblances in thought or expression between the New Testament and the cotemporaneous Hellenistic literature. Owing to the barrenness of results this part of the book is apt to have a wearying effect upon the reader. The author arrives in nearly every instance at the negative verdict of "not proven." In the subsequent discussion things become more interesting. While the author keeps to the end strictly within the rôle of a referee, who weighs and judges, but offers no new suggestions of his own, and while within this rôle his attitude remains one of great caution and impatience with the extravaganzas of the more notorious representatives of the school, there nevertheless appear many points where he concedes the probability of foreign influence. Under the head of the leading ideas inherited from Judaism, the writer rejects the derivation of the Monotheism of the Old Testament from Babylonia, and likewise that of Parsistic influence. The seven angels, and eyes, and stars of Ezekiel and Zechariah and the Apocalypse are derived from the seven planets, but it is emphasized that the writer of the Apocalypse has no perception any more of this original meaning. Dr. Clemen also admits that the names of the Archangels are not explainable from this theory. The twenty-four elders and the four living creatures of the Apocalypse are likewise originally stars. The author's sober sense reasserts itself in his refusal to associate the twelve Apostles with the signs of the zodiac. Neither has the "Lamb" anything to do with the constellation Aries. A sort of half-way position is taken in regard to the *στοιχεῖα*: the stars meant by this term are conceived as animated bodies, but they are not as such brought into connection with the angels and no fatalistic astrological influence is attributed to them. Satan is explainable not from Babylonia but (at least in part) from Mazdeism. Even the Spirit of God is represented as possibly in its origin a Parsistic conception. Equally interesting is the discussion of the foreign provenience of Christianity's eschatological inheritance from Judaism. Here Clemen goes with the Graf-Wellhausen school. He rejects Gunkel's and Gressmann's views about an ancient, pre-prophetic cosmological and universalistic eschatology in Israel and particularly the assumption that this eschatology was the popular belief of the early period, adopted and afterwards revived by the prophets. None the less at a later stage Rahab and the dragon, and the beasts of the Apocalypse were derived from the Chaos-monster. The explanation

of the repetition of this mythological conflict in the future, and in general the development of the whole idea of eschatology in the minds of the Babylonian astrologers from the precession of the equinoxes is not endorsed. For this a possible derivation of the idea of eschatological recurrence from Mazdeism is substituted. Gog is not a mythological conception (against Gressmann). The identification of Satan with the Dragon is due to Parsism. The belief that nature-phenomena are precursors of the end is not traceable to any foreign source. Neither can the personal precursors of the Messiah be so explained. The Messianic idea is not of foreign origin. The argument against Gressmann on this point is staked on the un-Messianic interpretation of Isa. vii. and on the treatment of Mic. v., 2 as a late interpolation based on the misunderstanding of Isa. vii. as a Messianic prophecy. The prophets know nothing of a mother of the Messiah. The ancient myth of a Redeemer-king born of a virgin exists only in the imagination of Jeremias. Isa. ix. and xi. are not based on the idea of a return of the golden age. The Messiah is no more than the King of the last days, and he is looked forward to on no other principle than that there will be a restoration of the earlier power of Israel. Once more Gressman's interpretation of Isa. liii. is rejected on the grounds chiefly that the servant is not an individual, and that the sacrificial, expiatory character of his death is lacking in the myths of Adonis, and Attis and in the account of the righteous servant from the text of Assurbanipal's library. Gunkel's assertion that there even existed in Jewish belief a myth which ascribed death and resurrection to the Messiah is declared unfounded.

The author's preference, shared by him with Bousset, for Mazdeism as the chief foreign source of New Testament eschatological ideas clearly reveals itself in his discussion of the Son-of-Man problem. The idea is traced back to that of the Persian "heavenly man." Although Paul in 1 Cor. xv., 45 ff. polemizes against the idea so far as the priority in sequence of the heavenly man with regard to the earthly man is concerned, he is nevertheless said to have appropriated the substance of the idea in his doctrine of Christ as "the man from heaven." Clemen also explains from this source the *μορφή θεοῦ* of Phil. ii., for of this Persian "heavenly man" it is said that he was in the form of God. In the same context the *μορφή δούλου* is interpreted on the basis of the Poimandres, where the primal man is represented as becoming *ἐναρμόνιος δούλος* i.e. enslaved to the Heimarmene. The author is, however, careful to emphasize that all this does not carry an idea of pagan provenience into the core of the official consciousness of Jesus, because the function of judging the world was not originally inherent in the idea of the heavenly man, but was extraneously added to it in Judaism, and by Jesus Himself.

The expectation of a life after death both in its immortality and in its resurrection form is held to have had no antecedents in Babylonian. While in part indigenous to the development of Old Testament religion in the direction of spiritualizing and individualism, it also underwent a perceptible influence from Parsism.

The observation may be made on the basis of the foregoing that Dr. Clemen's reserve towards accepting the religious-historical explanations has something to do with his theological position as an adherent of the "liberal" views. He follows the "liberal" tradition of exegesis within the Old Testament, which may not unjustly be characterized as minimizing the supernatural and preferring wherever possible to rationalize the mental processes of the writers. Over against this the *religionsgeschichtler* have a positive liking for realism of interpretation and for emphasizing the magical irrational aspects of religious conceptions. It is plain that the former attitude more easily lends itself to the explanation of acts on the principle of indigenous rational development, whereas the latter more naturally exploits the disconnectedness of the irrational in favor of its hypothesis of foreign derivation. If Dr. Clemen's exegesis had been more realistic, the instances in which he admits that ideas are borrowed would have doubtless been more numerous. In the matter of interpretation e.g. of the Messianic texts we cannot help feeling that Gunkel and Gressman are more nearly right. If from the mysterious and disconnected character of such material we on our part do not draw the inference that it is derived from Babylon or Persia, this is simply due to the fact that we reckon with a solid supernaturalism. But on the standpoint of Clemen, who does not do this, a movement away from the "liberal" exegetical tradition would inevitably lead to acceptance of the religious-historical conclusions on a much larger scale.

The same observation might be made with regard to the author's treatment of the specifically Christian ideas and institutions. Here his attitude is even more reserved and negative than where the Jewish inheritance is concerned. This is the natural result of the reflection that the primitive Christian church was much less open to direct influence from pagan sources than Judaism had been in its longer history. The canon accordingly results, that to prove influence it will be necessary in such cases to point out its working in the Jewish antecedents of Christianity, and with regard to the specifically Christian ideas this cannot be done. The author makes frequent and sound use of this canon. Nevertheless here also, we believe that from his unsupernaturalistic standpoint a less "liberally" colored exegesis would have rendered him more receptive to the views of the other party. As it is he makes concession only at isolated points, and that largely in formal respects. His criticism of the Gilgamesh theory is searching and conclusive. He has no use for the derivation of the passion and resurrection story from an Adonis or Attis or any other myth. The Sacaea cannot have given rise to the account of Jesus' maltreatment. The explanation of a large part of Paulinism from the mystery-religions finds no favor in his eyes. At the utmost the form of expression and in no wise the substance has been influenced from this source. A somewhat peculiar position is taken with regard to the virgin-birth. The theories or origination of the idea from Isa. vii. of Babylonian, North-Arabian, Persian, Indian and Greek origin are

alike rejected. On the other hand Clemen does not believe that the idea is founded on fact. In his discussion of the Lucan narrative he employs the usual arguments to show that it was not originally inherent in the tradition, but subsequently added to it. How then does he account for its rise? He suggests that it may have sprung from a view previously current in Jewish circles that the patriarchs were supernaturally begotten of God without a human father through a virgin-birth. And this idea, he thinks, could easily have been developed out of the older notion, vouched for by Paul, that Isaac was born after the Spirit, i.e. that there was a supernatural factor involved in his procreation. The sole support for this theory is the allegorizing statement of Philo to the effect, that, where the patriarchs represent virtues in the Old Testament narrative, they are not introduced as "knowing" women. In spite of Conybeare and Badham, there is nothing in Philo's statement to indicate, that his allegorizing fancy has at this point a solid basis of Jewish realistic belief. But the theory is interesting because it brings the virgin-birth into connection with the idea, that in our opinion, is actually embodied in it as a fact, viz. the necessity of the direct supernatural origin of the human nature of the Saviour, so far as this was possible within the terms of His office. If Dr. Clemen will translate his theory out of the sphere of ideas into the sphere of history, we are prepared to accept it.

The general conclusion at which the author arrives at the end in his retrospect at the discussion, needs a word of comment. It sounds comparatively reassuring to hear him declare that "if we leave external matters definitely on one side, the New Testament *ideas* that are *perhaps* derived from non-Jewish sources—for we may emphasize once more the hypothetical nature of most of our results—lie mainly on the fringe of Christianity, and do not touch its vital essence." But it should not be forgotten that the reassuring import of such a statement with its comforting distinction between "fringe" and "essence" is wholly dependent on the theological standpoint from which it is made and received. Dr. Clemen is a "liberal" theologian, and he distributes the contents of the New Testament as to essence and form in accordance with his liberal interpretation of what Christianity means. The historic faith of the church has always counted among the essence not a few things which "liberalism" declares purely formal. Insofar as certain of these things are declared by Dr. Clemen of pagan origin, it is small comfort for us to know, that to his "liberal" point of view they appear of a formal nature. The reassurance that we need regards, not the liberal but the orthodox interpretation of what constitutes the essence of Christianity. Conservatives have no occasion to infer from Dr. Clemen's book that the danger from the religious-historical interpretation of the New Testament is purely imaginary.

Of errata in the English text, partly occurring also in the original German, we note the following, p. 52 Mt. viii., 22 ff. for 23 ff.; p. 57 Lk. iv., 28 for 23; p. 69 in the quotation from Epictetus *τοῦτον* for *τοῦτο*; *הקשבו* on p. 129 should have no Dagest in the *ו*.

The translation is uniformly accurate. Only on p. 86 the rendering

"this representation" would have better given the sense of the original than "all such reasoning." On p. 97, line 14 the "zugleich" of the original is neglected in the translation. On p. 368, last paragraph, "of course" should be "to be sure."


Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

Worte Jesu und Gemeindeüberlieferung. Eine Untersuchung zur Quellengeschichte der Synopse. Von WALTHER HAUPT. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1913. Pp. iv, 263. M. 7.50, geb. M. 8.50.

This is the third Heft in the series of *Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament* edited by Windisch, and, like the first by Spitta—*Die synoptische Grundschrift in ihrer Überlieferung durch das Lukasevangelium*, 1912—, is a discussion of the Synoptic Problem. Taking Luke as the basis of his investigation Spitta sought to determine the character and content of the fundamental documentary source (Grundschrift) of the Synoptic Gospels. The result of his literary analysis is given in translation (pp. xiii-xlvi); the process by which this result is reached is set forth in a detailed study (pp. 1-450); the conclusions are then summarized (pp. 450-500) and compared with the results of a similar analysis of the Fourth Gospel (*Das Johannes-Evangelium als Quelle der Geschichte Jesu*, 1910). The Grundschrift (Gr) is found to be preserved entire—with the exception of a few short passages—in the Gospel of Luke. It began with the appearance of John and continued through the passion (death and resurrection). With it two other documentary sources are combined in the Third Gospel, the infancy narrative (i-ii) and a book of the discourses of Jesus (ix. 57-xviii. 14)—also certain independent sections and additions which are not derived from Mk-Mt but from an earlier form of Mk (Mk¹) which in turn is derived from an earlier source (Gr^m) different from the Gr embodied in Lk (Gr^l), the two forms of the Gr representing different Greek translations of an Aramaic original.¹ Haupt too attaches importance to Lk in determining the content of the Grundschrift (G),

¹ This yields the following scheme (p. 499):



Gr is dated in the beginning of the forties (p. 478).

tendency of G, was vivid in description, not narrowly Jewish Christian, was not related to Peter (vs Papias), and was written about the year 60. In Mk these sources, G-Q¹-Q² and S, were united about ten years later. G and S run parallel through the Gospel, the narrative following first one and then the other; but the discourse material is scattered. The combination of these sources and the method of their use solves the problem of the structure of the Gospel and makes it possible to explain the omission of Mk. vi. 44-viii. 27 by Lk on the theory of its derivation from S. After the composition of Mk, Q was revised and enlarged under the influence of a catechetical motive, a universalistic point of view with an advanced Christology and contributions of a high ethico-religious value (Q^u). G also prior to its use by Mt-Lk received additions,—a genealogy of Joseph, differing in the different exemplars used by Mt-Lk; the supernatural birth, Lk's deviations being due to the use of another source (L); and certain additions known to Mt but not to Lk. The special source of Lk, L, is later and more extensive than G or S; it was written about the year 80, is idealizing, fond of miracles, universalistic but originating in Jewish Christian circles. It has points of contact with the Fourth Gospel and a local origin possibly in Asia Minor. Q also received certain glosses differing in the forms used by Mt and Lk; but beside these the Q used by Mt had undergone a Jewish Christian (Nazarene) redaction. The Gospel of Lk was written at the end of the first century (c. 100) and Mt somewhat later, each adding to the sources,—in the case of Lk an ascetic interest, in the case of Mt reflective adduction of O.T. prophecies, a typological manner of thought, an interest in Peter and the Church, the universalism of the end of the Gospel, and a possible allusion to the author himself in an apt description of his work in xiii. 51 f.

This analysis of the literary relation of the Synoptic Gospels is intricate. The phenomena admittedly do not permit a nice separation of the sources nor a precise indication of the strata which enter into the literary structure of these Gospels. The influence of the interests of the Christian community, doctrinal (eschatological, Christological), apologetic (Messianic), catechetical (ethico-religious and universal), is too readily set in contrast with and without adequate proof taken to be new and different from the interest of Jesus, so that doubt arises whether authenticity attaches to more than a few of the words attributed to Him even in the earliest sources. Haupt evidently feels the historical problem but thinks it does not matter whose words they were since their truth and life-giving power resides not in their source but in themselves and in their effect. The issue however still remains. The portrait of Jesus in the Gospels was painted by Christian hands, and as far back as we can trace its preliminary sketches, these too are of Christian workmanship. Do they faithfully portray their subject, or has the portrait been more influential than its original inspiration? And if they do not, then it is a serious question just what limit may

be set to Haupt's theory of idealization,² and whether that view is altogether without reason which extends it to the person of Jesus Himself.

Princeton:

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions. By H. A. A. KENNEDY, D.D., D.Sc., Professor of New Testament Language, Literature and Theology, New College, Edinburgh. Hodder and Stoughton: London, New York, Toronto. 1913. Pp. xviii, 311 6s net.

In the critical study of the New Testament attention has for some time been directed toward the environment in which Christianity had its origin and expansion. In the transfer of this religious movement from its Palestinian birthplace to the Graeco-Roman world, the Apostle Paul was an important factor. His Epistles embody his conception of the nature of the movement; and if the new environment seriously influenced the movement they will naturally have preserved traces of it. No feature of this environment has of late received more careful study than its religious ideas and ritual. In this sphere it appears that from 300 B.C. to 300 A.D. Oriental influences were a potent factor in the syncretism of which the Mystery-Religions were an important expression. It is not strange that the history-of-religions method should seek in the phenomena of these cults the historical explanation not merely of the environment in which Paul did his work but of constituent elements in his interpretation of Christianity. This effort is being pressed with vigor—to judge from Bousset's *Kurios Christos*—and sufficient progress has been made to indicate its essential features and the data upon which its conclusions are based. Under these conditions a survey of the field by Dr. Kennedy is both timely and instructive. His discussion is well ordered, beginning with the religious elements in the Hellenistic world of Paul's time and tracing their antecedents in Stoicism, the Orphic movement and the Oriental cults. A chapter on "Jewish affinities with the Mystery-Religions" prepares the way for criticism of the tendency to neglect the Old Testament background of Paul's thought. Five chapters are devoted to the discussion of "the character and influence of the Mystery-Religions (Eleusis, Cybele-Attis, Isis-Serapis, Hermetic literature)," "St. Paul's relation to the terminology of the Mystery-Religions (especially *μυστήριον, τέλος, πνευματικός, ψυχικός, νοῦς, γνώσις, ἀγνωσία, ἀποκάλυψις, μεταμορφοῦσθαι, εἰκὼν, δόξα, φωτίζειν*)," "St. Paul and the central conceptions of the Mystery-Religions (*θεωθῆναι, ἰνθουσιασμός, ἔκστασις, σωτηρία, ἀναγενᾶσθαι*)", "Baptismal rites,"

² P. 212. "The facts are so overgrown with creations of fancy that it is impossible to distinguish the one from the other. The narratives thus fashioned possess however such a refreshing simplicity, express the truth of Christianity in so charming a form that there is nothing to be compared to certain of these altogether unreal, yet inwardly true narratives in respect of their continued influence. This appears especially in the birth and resurrection (the Emmaus disciples) narratives of the [Third] Gospel."

and "Sacramental meals." The concluding chapter summarizes the results of the discussion and criticises Schweitzer's eschatological derivation of Paul's mysticism. Dr. Kennedy's treatment of his subject is sane and sensible. The reader will be impressed by the meagreness of the facts upon which large theories have been constructed; and he can scarcely fail to feel the force of Dr. Kennedy's presentation of the ethico-religious elements which enter into Paul's conception of the sacraments and which make impossible the attribution to him of a magical theory of their nature and efficiency, *ex opere operato*. Dr. Kennedy's point of view and the general result of his investigation are indicated in the following statement (pp. 280 ff): "The relation of the Mystery-Religions to Paul's environment requires no discussion. Ample evidence has been adduced to show that throughout the sphere of his missionary operations he would be in touch with many who had been initiated into Pagan Mysteries, and had finally entered the Christian Church. We cannot picture him engrossed in the cure of souls without recognizing that he must have gained a deep insight into the earlier spiritual aspirations of his converts, and the manner in which they had sought to satisfy them. Even apart from eager inquirers, a missionary so zealous and daring would often find himself confronted by men and women who still clung to their mystic ritual and all the hopes it had kindled. It was inevitable, therefore, that he should become familiar, at least from the outside, with religious ideas current in these influential cults. Sometimes, as *e.g.* in the case of *γνώσις* and *δόξα*, these ideas found remarkably close parallels in the thought of the Old Testament. Thus he would be impressed by their capacity for holding a genuinely spiritual content, and would use them in circumstances in which their earlier history would tend to make them more effective. Certain important terms like *τελειος*, *πνευματικός* *σωτηρία*, and others, were in the air. They meant one thing, no doubt, for a Christian, and quite another for a Pagan. Yet their fundamental significance for both had elements of affinity, sufficient to link together the respective usages. The essentially religious meaning, for example, of *πνεῦμα* and *νοῦς* in documents of Hellenistic Mystery Religion provided a common standing-ground for Paul and many of his readers. What holds of separate terms may occasionally be affirmed regarding groups of ideas. Thus the combination of *συμμορφιζόμενος* with *γινῶναι* in Philippians iii. 10 seems to indicate a background for the Apostle's conception akin to the Mystery-doctrine of transformation by the vision of God. But it has also become clear that we dare not make far-reaching inferences from terminology as to the assimilation by Paul of Mystery-ideas. For we were able to show that the central conceptions of the Mystery-Religions belong to a different atmosphere from that in which the Apostle habitually moves. There is no principle determining their relations, which in any sense corresponds to the Cross of Christ in the realm of Paul's thought and experience."

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

Jesus. Von W. HEITMÜLLER, D. and Professor der Theologie in Marburg. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1913. 8vo; pp. viii, 184.

This volume contains a reprint of the Article "Jesus Christ" in the third volume (1912) of the encyclopaedia published under the name of *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*; together with an Address on "Jesus of Nazareth and the Way to God" delivered on March 11, 1913 at the seventeenth meeting (at Aarau) of the Conference of Swiss Christian Students.

The occasion of the publication of the volume is not without its interest. The Theological Faculty of the University of Marburg has for sometime has been in controversey with the Prussian *Kultusministerium* over the appointments made from time to time to its professorships. One fruit of this controversy was a pamphlet—his opponents call it a *Brandschrift*—by Jülicher bearing the title of *Die Entmündigung einer preussischen theologischen Facultät*. Notice was taken of this pamphlet in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, and in the course of some remarks upon it the Freiherr von Schenck of Schweinsburg, who happened to be not only a deputy of the Chamber but also President of the *Konsistorialbezirk Kassel*, within the bounds of which the University of Marburg is situated, took occasion to comment also, with some sharpness, on Heitmüller's article on "Jesus Christ" (April 5, 1913). This is what he said:

"I am constrained to show you by means of a scientific work to what such a critical tendency can lead. I will be quite brief and, with the permission of the President, will read from the scientific work, *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, only the following sentences from the Article Jesus Christ, II, Particular Questions in the Life of Jesus. 'For the Jewish conception there lies immediately comprehensible in the idea of "the Son," that God stands to Jesus in a special relation of trust and love; as "the Son" Jesus knows Himself as before all other men the object of the special love of God. As we must understand from the context, He knows Himself as the Son precisely because He knows God in a unique fashion and God has made Him the vehicle of Revelation. Vehicle of a unique revelation, the Son absolutely—we are almost appalled (*erschrecken*) by the loftiness of this consciousness. It is certainly in no way a divine consciousness, but yet a vocational consciousness which almost oversteps the bounds of humanity and evacuates all the human experience which is otherwise manifested,—with reference to which we might ask indeed whether it can be made consistent with soundness and clarity of mind.' (Hear, hear! and for shame! from the Right.) 'Here is the point at which the figure of Jesus becomes mysterious, almost unearthly to us. But'—Now comes the But, for were the author to stop at this point and not proceed to this But, I am convinced that he, like any professor who propounds such teaching, must be liable to have a process entered against him for blasphemy (deputy Heckenroth, very true!) or at least for overstepping his professorial privileges. The text being read proceeds: 'But we have scarcely the right to distrust the essential contents of our passage, Mat. xi. 25 to 27, and that the less that the whole manner of conceiving the significance of Jesus (Revealer) which meets us here corresponds very little with the modes of thought of the primitive community.' Gentlemen, I am constrained to place my finger upon this point, because I say to myself, Here is an absolutely essential point, which must re-

ceive attention, for here there comes to an end what is otherwise spoken of as a theological tendency; here there meets us a point of view which is absolutely different from what we otherwise speak of as the Christian point of view (very true! from the Right). We are not dealing here with two tendencies, but with two world-views (very true! from the Right), with two completely diverse religions. They cannot be forced under the shibboleths of 'positive' and 'liberal' or dealt with from the standpoint of party politics. . . . Gentlemen, no indulgence can be shown to such things,—even under the mantle of freedom of teaching (*Lehrfreiheit*). I am convinced, if we enter upon such a pathway, that we must ultimately reach the point where it must be said, What is here offered to the people has nothing in common with Christianity except the name, but intrinsically nothing more. The monistic conception of life is making way among ever wider circles of our people, not merely among the professors at the universities, among the educated and learned,—no, it is already penetrating into very wide circles of all ranks, and the more deeply our population descends on the downward sloping road of the monistic conception of life, the more firmly and steadily must the *Kultusminister*, as the first counsellor of the throne, take his stand upon the high Christian world-view, and give expression to this his point of view in his decrees and acts." . . .

To the man in the street these must seem very sensible and straightforward remarks. But they naturally gave great offense at Marburg. The venerable Herrmann at once protested against them in behalf of his colleagues, in an open letter addressed to von Schenk and published in *Die Christliche Welt* for May 1, 1913 (No. 18), and Heitmüller has felt compelled by them to lay the article attacked before the wider audience before which he was incriminated, as his sufficient defence. In republishing thus this Article Heitmüller adds to it the Swiss Address as offering "a practical-religious supplement" to it. The Article is a scientific statement of what we historically know of Jesus. The Address deals with "the complex of the much discussed questions which concern the significance of the historical Jesus for faith." The two together may supply us, their author thinks, with some suggestion at least of his whole attitude, scientific and religious, towards Jesus.

The line which Heitmüller takes in reply to von Schenk is apparently a simple denial that he can justly be charged with ascribing to Jesus an unsound mind. He therefore contents himself at this point with a simple reference to a passage in his article in which he expressly declares that the attempt to represent Jesus as of unsound mind has not succeeded. This passage (p. 89) runs as follows: "As assured data of the tradition, we have the vocational consciousness transcending the limits of the prophetic and the fact that Jesus laid claim to the Messianic dignity in some sense or other. That these two facts raise difficult psychological questions, scarcely needs to be emphasized. And when of late the mental soundness of Jesus has been questioned, and He has been presented as a pathological subject, this attempt has at least a possible point of attachment here. It has not succeeded and it can never succeed. The poet of the parables, the framer of the proverbs, was as sound as ever man was. And in

this sound consciousness we find that content! Much can be brought forward to mitigate the puzzle; we are in no position to solve it." It is right to recall, however, that von Schenk does not represent Heitmüller as declaring Jesus to have been of unsound mind. He represents him as saving himself from that by a 'But.' The gist of his representation appears to be that Heitmüller deals frivolously with the charge that Jesus was of unsound mind and seems indeed to treat it as a preferable hypothesis to the ascription of a divine self-consciousness to Him: that he even appears to suggest that had Jesus' mysterious self-consciousness been but a little more exalted than he allows it to have been, we should have had to admit that He was of unsound mind. And this representation we can scarcely deny to be fairly justified.

The self-consciousness of Jesus is manifestly the crux of Heitmüller's presentation of Him. He declares it roundly to be merely human. "That the self-consciousness of Jesus," he says, (p. 68) "was through and through a human one, will be regarded as self-evident by every one who without hindrance from ecclesiastical dogma, makes use of the sources and of the historical criticism which is indispensable with reference to them." But in the palmary passage, which von Schenk cites (p. 71), it is only by dealing most drastically with *Mat. xi. 27* (which is there under discussion) and violently reconstructing its text after the unfortunate example of Harnack, that he can reduce the lofty selfconsciousness there ascribed to Jesus to something which he can pronounce human; and he seems indeed only barely able to pronounce even what he makes it soundly human. A little later he speaks of "this self-consciousness which far transcends all human experience and seems to lift its subject out of the series of men" (p. 118); and again at the end of the article (p. 148) of "that extraordinary vocational consciousness transcending all human analogies, which, if we regard it as sound, can be represented only as an intimation that in this man in peculiar measure a creative, or as the pious man puts it, a divine life has entered into history." The constant recurrence of the suggestion that this self-consciousness may be thought to be unsound—or is thought by some to be unsound—may serve the purpose of conveying to the reader a keen sense of its exaltation. It also, however, leaves the impression on the reader's mind that in Heitmüller's view Jesus' self-consciousness just falls short of being unsound; and that, even after he has reduced it far below its actual representation in such an unassailable passage as *Mt. xi. 27*. The conviction unavoidably forms itself, accordingly that Heitmüller, after all said, finds himself with a Jesus on his hands whose self-consciousness is so little "through and through human" that he does not quite know what to do with it, and is compelled to allow that those who pronounce it a deranged self-consciousness have some show of justification, even after he has reduced it from the actual representation of it in, say, *Mt. xi. 27*. And, if this reduction be not allowed—as it cannot be allowed—what then? We cannot see that

Heitmüller safely escapes from the antithesis, *aut Deus aut non sanus*; and since he will not have the *Deus* at any cost, that he has any just ground of complaint against von Schenk's charges. He does seem upon the verge of assigning to Jesus a diseased self-consciousness (and that is all that von Schenk charges) and he appears to save himself from this result only by dealing with extreme violence with his texts.

The vigor of Heitmüller's Socinianism in his conception of Jesus' person has already become evident. He will not hear of Jesus being anything else than a man and a man of His times. How he obtains this purely human Jesus from records which present a very different Jesus lies in that mystery of "Liberal criticism" with which we are so familiar now-a-days: Heitmüller's critical methods differ in nothing from those current in the "Liberal" circles of which he is an ornament, and require the less to be adverted to here in detail that we have recently had occasion to explain them pretty fully in this REVIEW (April, 1913, XI, ii, pp. 218 ff). By means of this "criticism" very drastically applied, he manages to extract from records which present to us a Divine Jesus, a purely human figure; from records which present to us a supernatural Son of God surrounded by an aureole of miracle, a simply natural man who wrought no miracle. Not at Nazareth only, but throughout His career, He could do no mighty work, though He laid His hand on a few sick folk and healed them. Jesus had an impressive personality and may be credited with "faith-cures" (p. 67); it was from this beginning that tradition, certainly very rapidly, transmuted Him into "the Aesculapius of His people" (p. 60). But the historian can allow to Him no real "miracle" (p. 61). When "the historian" is done with the records, indeed, we find ourselves with very much less real knowledge of Jesus in our hands than we could wish. Heitmüller desires to separate himself, it is true, from that overstrained skepticism with reference to the knowledge of Jesus which he recognizes has been of late far too common even among theologians (p. 153). But he recoils from the other extreme also, which would have it that we know Jesus "as if He were one of our contemporaries" (p. 154). The way in which he would express himself is this (p. 41): "What we can attain by this procedure is certainly far less than we could wish. It of course does not suffice for writing a Life of Jesus; but neither is it enough even to sketch a portrait of His character or of His activity. There are individual traits of the portrait of Jesus which we distinguish, some of them clearly, some of them only in obscure outlines; there is often lacking the unifying bond and if we are prudent and desire to proceed with surety we will do well to make very little use of complementary and psychologizing inferences. On the other hand what we can grasp historically is not little and it includes what is most important. Whether the Christian can found his faith on it is a question which it is not the historian's business to answer and the Christian should not raise it."

It must be admitted that Heitmüller is not very exigent with ref-

erence to the historical foundations of a Christian's faith. That is a matter which is more fully discussed in the Lecture at Aarau; but there are some odd hints regarding it even in the encyclopaedia Article which it may repay us to take note of in passing. When discussing the story of the Virgin Birth, he determines it to be an invention of Gentile Christians on the model of the heathen myths of divinely-begotten men, possibly in misapprehension of the proclamation of Jesus as the "Son of God" (pp. 45-46). Yet he can tell us (p. 43), that "the question as to the right of the faith which comes to expression in it, is not strictly speaking at all subject to the judgment of the historian." The historian it seems can only "determine whether this faith showed itself early or late, and in whom it is found in the primitive Christian community." The plain man is apt to think that when it has been shown by the historian that the belief that Jesus was born of a virgin stands on a par with the similar belief as to Plato, it is already determined that it has no right to exist. At an earlier point the distinction here suggested is drawn broadly out (p. 12). "The pious man, even the simplest and most unlearned, on sinking himself believingly in these faith-laden accounts, finds the Jesus who kindles faith and whom faith needs. But the historian who does not ask what Jesus means for faith, but would fain ascertain and present what can be known of Jesus' life, acts, and nature by means of the generally recognized instruments and methods of scientific research, is able only through infinitely toilsome and complicated investigation to establish the treasure which is hidden in these writings on really sure reports. The chief question for him, before he uses them, is that which concerns the historical value of these sources." Is not this "the chief question" for the man who seeks spiritual life in them too? We observe that even Heitmüller says that the pious man finds what he seeks in the Gospels only when he sinks himself in them *believingly* (*bei gläubiger Versenkung*). Can he ponder *believingly* upon accounts whose historical truth he suspects or denies? To recommend the pious man to kindle his faith by narratives which he knows or suspects to be fables is a frivolity which must avenge itself in the degradation of faith into empty sentimentality.

The state of the case is not really altered by Heitmüller's view that though the evangelical narratives are not historically trustworthy we come into contact in them with Jesus' "creative personality." How can we come into contact with Jesus' "creative personality" in accounts of words which He did not speak and deeds which He did not do? Meanwhile, we are led by this remark to observe Heitmüller's point of sight. According to him though we obtain from the evangelical narratives very little knowledge about Jesus, we do obtain from them a very vital knowledge of Jesus. Not that they enable us to form a clear conception of His whole personality. We may regret this; but we may congratulate ourselves that what is most important lies within our reach—a sufficient insight into His religious character, at least in its fundamental traits. "No doubt insight into its de-

velopment is here too almost wholly denied to us, and thus we lack an important key to its full understanding. But we discover nevertheless its outlines and the chief elements of it" (p. 107). There are (apart from Jesus' acts) two sources for our knowledge of it: His words, and the religious life of the primitive Christian community, quickened by Him, from which we can argue back to the personality which inspired it (p. 108). Through these means we come into touch with the really creative thing in Jesus, which was just Himself. "The secret of His efficacy from His death on rests in His personality, which received its peculiar stamp from that extraordinary vocational consciousness, leaving all human analogies behind, which, if we regard it as sound, can be taken only as an indication that in this man a life, in peculiar measure creative—the pious man says, divine—has entered into history. Filled with life in and with God, sustained by this enigmatical consciousness, Jesus' personality has become—that is its significance—a 'power of God' from which ever new streams and surges of religious power have proceeded and proceed, the inexhaustible source of religious life, out of which Christianity still to-day draws" (p. 148).

In these few words there is compressed a brief exposition of Heitmüller's whole conception of the function of Jesus, of Heitmüller's entire "Christianity." Elsewhere he merely expands it, as, for example, thus (p. 105-6):

"The pious zeal of the dominant ecclesiastical party and the prudent calculation of the magistracy had won in the unequal conflict with the bold Galilean prophet. In the gibbet at Golgotha they had prepared an abrupt ending of the history of the Messiah Jesus. Yet at and with Golgotha this history really began: the history of Jesus in His community, which has not reached its end even to-day. And this history leaves no doubt of the answer which is to be given to the historian's question, Where the original and creative element, the effective force of the manifestation of Jesus is to be sought, in what its world-historical significance is grounded. Not in His sacrificial death on the Cross, as dogma has determined. Nor yet, as Modern opinion wishes, in His teaching or preaching, which is called by predilection, 'the Gospel.' It needs only a glance into the beginnings of the Christian community to perceive the truth. The disciples had in their enthusiasm hoped that Jesus should redeem the people Israel. Their hope was shattered by Golgotha. Like sheep who have lost their shepherd they were scattered, without guides, without hope. But in a little while we find them again in Jerusalem, at first behind closed doors, then, however, in the streets. At first they whispered it in the ear,—then, however, they proclaimed it from the housetops,—that Jesus is nevertheless the Messiah. Rapidly the little band of simple Galilean men and women became a company which was feared and persecuted and yet thus only increased. What turned these fishermen and peasants into missionaries, these fainthearted and stupidly fleeing disciples into heroes, the little community into the mustard-seed whose branches should soon shade the whole earth? What was the mark of this community? The knowledge of the preaching of Jesus? The no-doubt valuable new information on religion and ethics which it contains? Certainly not. But *the personality of Jesus*. To Him the hopes and the thought of this band attached themselves, from

Him it looked for everything in life and death; that He would come was its hopes, its prayer that He would come soon. Jesus, *He Himself*, was the power which wrought here, not some kind of knowledge or other, which He had discovered and proclaimed; not some kind of transaction or other which He had wrought. Jesus Himself is the 'Gospel.' His personality was what was new and creative, that entered into history, animated the community, and has worked itself out in humanity."

This is eloquently said, but certainly not truly. On the face of it, it was the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, not His "personality," which reanimated His overwhelmed followers. Heitmüller, by the way, has strangely little to say of Jesus' resurrection: apparently he does not consider it even worth refuting, as he refutes, say, the Virgin Birth. But he had nevertheless, immediately before the passage which has been quoted, said this: "After a short time, we see His Galilean adherents back in Jerusalem; they proclaimed that Jesus was nevertheless the Messiah, that He was risen from the dead. This however belongs no longer to the history of the 'historical Jesus,' but to that of the primitive Christian community" (p. 104). On the face of it it was not "the personality" of Jesus that conquered the world, but the glad-tidings that God was reconciling the world with Himself in Christ—a text which Heitmüller misquotes (p. 169). Paul, for example, preached not Christ *simpliciter* but Christ "as crucified." Nor was Paul the first to preach this. There is no "double Gospel" in the records of the New Testament; and it was Jesus Himself who declared that He had come to give His life a ransom for many,—a text which Heitmüller vainly strives to rob of its true content and bearing (p. 117). It is not by the influence of His "creative personality" but by His blood of the covenant which is shed for many that Jesus has redeemed the world.

These ideas of course recur in the Aarau Address, the precise purpose of which is to show that—and how—Jesus may still be the—or a—way to God. This Address begins, like a sermon, with a text; and this text is taken from the words of Philip, "Lord, show us the Father, and it sufficeth us." In Heitmüller's view (for he makes as strangely little of Sin here as of the Resurrection in the encyclopaedia Article) the one thing needful is that we should "see the Father," that is, in his sense, realize God as Father. What Jesus does is merely "to show us the Father," that is by the impression made on us by His religious personality lead us to be, like Him, religious-minded. He is not the only one who can show us the Father: there are other ways of finding God and many there be who go to Him by them. We should not lose our faith, then, even were He to vanish out of history: should He prove a mere myth, we could still find our way to the Father. But Jesus is a Way to God; and we, in our surroundings, can not only best find our way to God by Him but the loss of Him as the inspirer of our faith would be a great loss indeed.

In developing these ideas Heitmüller begins by pointing out that the starting-point in all seeking after God must be found in our hearts.

But only the starting point. We cannot attain complete, victorious certitude of God, clearness as to that which He means for us, in isolation. "Generality, paleness, indeterminateness, characterize the religious experiences which we make in ourselves, in independence. They are without blood and sap, without triumphant, compelling power, without concrete content. Content and convincing, emancipating power are received by them, they become revelation of God, *only* and *first* when they fall in with a powerful experience of God outside of us, only by contact with the stream of religious life which surrounds and flows about us" (p. 158). Now, the religious life which thus surrounds us is in its peculiar form Christian,—goes back to Christ as its source. "Not in all cases—that we wish to recognize—but certainly for the most part, when men meet us with living faith in God, we hear that they owe to Jesus ultimately the best that is in them" (p. 161). Thus Jesus meets us in the way and serves as the rallying point for the religious-minded. "His figure is the symbol and vehicle of all religious goods and knowledge" (p. 162). And as time has gone on the richness of this symbolism has become ever greater. Into it has been interwoven all that the later generations of the Christian community have experienced, and thus, "the traits of His figure have been deepened, the outlines of its form here and there have been altered"—there have been contributions made to it by a Paul or a Luther or a Schleiermacher—and "thus Jesus, or what men have taken and still take for Him, the source and symbol and type of the Christian community's experience of God, as a whole," becomes indirectly and mediately, through His community, the way to God for us (p. 162). This, however, is not all: throughout Christian history, Christian faith has been powerful, rich and clear in proportion as Jesus has been clearly laid hold of, and thus He has been also directly and immediately the way to God for many (p. 163). "This is certain,—we wish to say it once more: that it is in any case not necessary that for men of the present-day Jesus should be directly the guide to God, that the religious life of the individual should relate itself immediately and constantly to Jesus, be determined by Him, correct itself with reference to Him. There are other media of revelation, other ways to God. God lets Himself be found, experience of God can grow and gain power, through the community,—and indeed also through the religious life outside the community" (p. 163). But all through the Christian ages, nevertheless, "Jesus, the historical form of Jesus of Nazareth, has been the immediate way to God *for many*," and He can still be such for us. It is a mistake to think of Jesus as wholly a figure of the past. "Jesus belongs in any event also to the *present*—in His effects. In manifold reflections and radiations He reaches in His effects up to our day. And we have to deal with *that* Jesus, who in His effects can be a *part of our reality*, not with the various fragments and externalities which are no doubt important for the historian, and belong to His person, not with His several conceptions and ideas, with His view of the world and of nature and the like, but

with His entirety, His personality, His essence, with that which has worked and works" (pp. 164-165).

If we ask where we are to find this really historical Jesus, "not the symbol and vehicle of the Christian religion, but the historical form of Jesus, of course that which is operative in history,"—we must certainly say, not in the presentation of exact research. "The historian who works with the instruments and methods of exact research, and for good or evil must confine himself to them, can certainly even with the richest sources, grasp and set forth only details, particular traits, of an historical figure, not its personality. Here however we can have to do only with the indefinable, mysterious somewhat which we call personality—it is the source of the effects which proceed from a man. The personality is not, however, grasped by the instruments of exact history alone," (we beg the reader not to omit to mark that "alone"); "it is true even of the men with whom we live that we recognize and grasp their personality, their real nature, not through exact observation of details; they can be perceived only by the inner eye, intuitively understood,—*experienced*" (pp. 165-6). There is perpetrated in this representation a complete reversal of the facts of life: if anything in life is certain, it is certain that it is precisely by the intense observation of details, often no doubt done unconsciously, and by their vital synthesis that we arrive at that vivid sense of personality which moves us in others. But working on this false analogy Heitmüller proceeds. Thus also we grasp the personality of Jesus by coming into contact with Him as He has lived in history; best of all in the narratives of Scripture (though Scripture, we have been told, does not depict Him as He really was!), when read—almost a lost art nowadays—simply and at large. Thus we meet with a character to which religion is first and God is all. Gazing upon this personality, we do not acquire indeed a faith in the history of Jesus, but we acquire faith by *means* of the history of Jesus (p. 175). No doubt, we do not see Jesus as He was, but only as He has been interpreted to us,—by a Luther, by a Schleiermacher. "But what Paul, Augustine, Francis of Assisi, Luther, and Schleiermacher experienced by means of Jesus, and on which we also nourish ourselves, was nevertheless also an effect of the historical Jesus." "And what if now" Heitmüller proceeds to ask, "it were proven that Jesus was only the reflection and the cult-figure of a community? It has not been proven,—but even if proven, then, what comes to the individual from the history of Jesus in the Gospels—which in that case would be a history of the oldest Christian community—by means of reception of it and living into it, bears in itself its own inner necessity and truth. No doubt, among other things we must in that case refrain from relating ourselves to Jesus and by this we would lose much. Above all for the times of inward uncertainty and weakness in our life with God, we should not be able to find support in this—that this manner of experiencing God has been actually a reality in its purity and compelling power in a man. It would be

a great loss, but certainly not destructive of faith itself" (p. 176): After this clear declaration that Jesus may indeed be useful but cannot be necessary to faith ("Christian faith," mind you!) Heitmüller has little more to add except this positive declaration with which his lecture closes: "Jesus' significance is a purely one sided and limited one, and on that very account a very great and abiding one: it rests on the absolute forcibleness of His consciousness of God, which precisely for this reason makes Him the revelation of God for others, and in the apprehension of God as holiness and love. Thus He is a source of power; from which there ever proceed new waves and surges of that faith in God, the exposition and further development of which remains the task left to the exigencies and gifts of the different generations—to the Spirit who takes of the things of Jesus (Jno. xvi. 12 ff.). Our generation too has had its particular task. But we too, like all generations, may with Philip turn to Jesus with the confident request: 'Lord, show us the Father, and it sufficeth us' (pp. 177-8).

We have transcribed the argument of this lecture with perhaps unnecessary fulness, because it seems to be put forward by Heitmüller as his defence against the charge that what he teaches is "Christianity" only in name, and has nothing but the name in common with anything that has hitherto been known by that name. Clearly it offers no sufficing defence against that charge. Under the name of "Christianity" indeed, it is clear that Heitmüller teaches a religion which stands in so external a relation to Christ, that it can get along very well without Him, and appeals to Him only to enable it to do a little more easily perhaps, perhaps a little more thoroughly, what it would be quite able to do even though He never existed. Jesus is an encouragement, an incitement, an inspiration to religious endeavour: nothing more. Obviously this has nothing but the name in common with the Christianity which sees in Jesus Christ not merely a revelation of God as Father, but the reconciliation of God to sinful man. Here as von Schenck truly says are not two varieties of "Christianity," but two different religions and the only question is, which of these two religions is Christianity. We know which is the Christianity of Jesus. of Paul, of all the New Testament writers, who all alike present Christ as offering in His blood a ransom for the sins of the world. This is not the "Christianity" of Heitmüller. We cannot profess to be of both parties here. They stand in crass contrariety to one another and we must choose between them; and choosing between them, we must frankly declare of which of these two religions we are.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

Alexandre Vinet. Histoire de sa vie et de ses ouvrages. Par E. RAMBERT. Quatrième édition, illustrée et augmenté d'une préface et de notes par Ph. BRIDEL. Lausanne: Georges Bridel & C^{ie} Éditeurs. 1912. 8vo; pp. xvi, 640.

The first and second editions of this standard biography of Vinet by Rambert appeared in 1875, the third, containing only a few minor changes, in 1876. Since that time a considerable number of volumes and magazine articles concerning Vinet's life and the wide and varied influence of his works have been published, among the most notable being Pressensé's *Vinet d'après sa correspondance inédite avec Luttheroth* (Paris, 1891), containing many valuable letters to which Rambert had not had access.

The present edition leaves the last revision by the original author unaltered, but offers in the form of additional footnotes and several appendices a wealth of valuable biographical details concerning the leading contemporaries of Vinet referred to in the body of the work, together with a number of important corrections to be made in the former texts.

In its new form this biography may justly be regarded as an adequate treatment of its distinguished subject. The copious use of Vinet's own diary gives us a vivid picture not only of his domestic life, so blessed yet so full of trials, but also of his intellectual struggles, his professional labors, his literary plans and achievements, and his engagingly sincere and humble piety. His letters, too, are skillfully introduced to disclose his slow but steady development into the mighty "initiateur religieux" that he became. His services as a teacher, critic and historian of the French language and literature are fully set forth, as is likewise his influence in securing the separation of church and state in his native land. Critical estimates are furnished of the most important of his varied writings—his lyric, patriotic and religious verses, his works in literary criticism, his philosophical, dogmatic and ethical dissertations, his articles on the nature and constitution of the church—but not of his numerous posthumous publications. Owing much, in the formative period of his religious development, to Thomas Erskine of Scotland, and in his later philosophical attainments to Kant, he felt himself most powerfully drawn to the Frenchman Pascal: and like Pascal he has exerted his characteristic and most potent influence not by means of a well wrought out system of ideas but rather through the suggestive treatment of a number of seed-thoughts which were bound to bear fruit in the soil in which he planted them.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Zwingli und Calvin. VON AUGUST LANG. Mit 161 Abbildungen, darunter zwei mehrfarbigen Einschaltbildern. 1913. Bielefeld und Leipzig: Verlag von Velhagen & Klasing. 8vo; pp. 152. 4 M.

This is the thirty-first volume in Heych's *Monographien zur Weltgeschichte*. In its external features this book, like the rest in the series, presents, in spite of its low cost, a high standard of artistic excellence. The beautiful illustrations, reproducing practically all the available contemporary pictures directly pertaining to the two reformers and their most intimate friends and fellow-laborers, add immensely to the reader's interest in the biographical sketches.

The author, the well known Professor Lang of Halle, has succeeded in giving within the compass of a hundred and fifty pages an admirable characterization of Zwingli and Calvin in their relations to the great movements of thought and life in the stirring period of the early Reformation. The treatment of both heroes is comprehensive in spite of its conciseness, and every page shows the firm touch, the broad strokes, and the delicate shading of a master hand. Special attention is devoted to the formative influences in the development of the two leaders. Important passages from the sources are cited, though commonly no mention is made of the places from which the extracts are taken. Here and there—as in statements of the extent of Zwingli's indebtedness to Luther and Calvin's to Bucer—one desires a fuller presentation of the evidence. The discussion of the doctrinal peculiarities of the reformers is necessarily rather limited, but readers who are specially interested in this phase of the subject will be grateful for a number of summary statements that will commend themselves by reason of their incisiveness and their fairness. The representation of Calvin's personality, and the estimate of his services to the church and the world reflect the more favorable judgments in these matters which the monumental work of Doumergue has secured.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Triumphes de l'Evangile, ou l'histoire des souffrances, luttas et victoires de l'église évangélique de France. Par HENRI FLIEDNER, un descendant des Huguenots, Nouvelle édition. Genève: J. H. Jeheber, Libraire-Editeur. 12mo; pp. 64.

This is a brief popular sketch, adorned with some thirty illustrations, of the external fortunes of the Reformed church in France from Calvin to the Revolution. The massacres of St. Bartholomew's, the cruelties perpetrated by the dragonades under Louis XIV, the devastations in the Cévennes, and the tortures inflicted upon the galley slaves and the prisoners in the dungeons are graphically portrayed as illustrations of the invincible power of the pure evangelical religion. Special sections are devoted to the labors of Antoine Court and Paul Rabaut. Neither Rousseau, nor Voltaire, nor the pope—concludes the author—but Christ alone can make France free.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Authoritative Life of General William Booth, Founder of the Salvation Army. By G. S. RAILTON, First Commissioner to General Booth. With a Preface by General Bramwell Booth. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1912. 12mo; pp. 331. \$1.00 net.

In a plain, straightforward style, quite devoid of excessive eulogy, the author sets forth the outstanding facts in the career of one of the most extraordinary and one of the best loved men of the last century. Doubtless the book will find eager and grateful readers in almost all

parts of the world. Made up in large measure of extracts from sermons, addresses, letters and official communications by "General" Booth, the narrative gives an excellent insight into his character and a fair basis for a proper estimate of his achievements as an evangelist and social reformer. One cannot peruse to its close this story of decades of noblest spiritual and philanthropic service in behalf of so many thousands of earth's unfortunates, without being forced to the conclusion that whatever may be the future of his "Army," Booth himself was one of the mightiest as well as noblest leaders of men whom England has given to the modern world.

Of special interest to many readers will be the chapters on the "financial system" the "organization," and the "spirit" of the Army.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell. In two volumes. Volume I: Autobiography of George Tyrrell, 1861-1884; arranged, with supplements, by M. D. PETRE. Illustrated. Second Impression. 8vo; pp. xvi, 280. Volume II: Life of George Tyrrell from 1884 to 1909, by M. D. PETRE. Illustrated. Second Impression. 8vo; pp. xii, 512. Index. London: Edward Arnold, 1912.

Those readers of George Tyrrell's writings (we confess ourselves among them) who have found them, despite their superficial brilliancy of style, neither an unalloyed pleasure nor particularly instructive,—who have felt in them a smooth hardness of surface beneath which it was difficult for interest to penetrate, and have been offended by their frequent inconsequences in argument, ambiguities of phrase, and general air of irresponsibility and wrongheadedness,—will be agreeably surprised when they open the pages of his autobiography. Here is a genuine human document of the highest interest, in which the note of sincerity rings with unmistakable clearness. We shall not, with Miss Petre, compare it with Augustine's *Confessions*: if it is self-accusatory like it, rather than self-justifying like Newman's *Apologia*, this may suggest to us Rousseau rather than Augustine as the type of its class. The real theme of Augustine is not himself, but the grace of God, which has rescued him from himself to the praise of Its own glory. This note is as far as possible from that struck by Tyrrell, who writes throughout in a minor key and seems to wish to be taken at the foot of the letter when he calls the life which he surveys, in words borrowed from the Curé d'Ars, a *pauvre vie*. Whatever he may have come to think of it later, whatever he may have been able to make of it during the short eight years that remained to it—and opinions may lawfully differ as to this,—when, at the age of forty (1901; he lived until 1909), he looks back over the course of his life thus far, the legend he writes over it is, Failure.

The Autobiography to our regret does not cover these forty years. It breaks off in the midst of them, when at the age of twenty-three he had just finished his scholastic course in the Jesuit schools, or, to date the epoch by an event which was much more significant to the

growth of his inner self, at the death of his mother. As disillusionment grew upon him what seems to have driven the iron most deeply into his soul was the intolerable thought, which at this moment seems naturally to have been most acute, that he had scouted those "God-given natural affections" which, says he bitterly, "even Jesuit asceticism can never wholly uproot". "Well I remember my last day at home," he writes in a passage which must be well nigh unique in the literature of regret, from the suppressed poignancy of feeling which it expresses, "my last day with those two now 'hid in death's endless night', who were my 'share of the world', the best this life has had for me; whom I forsook—for what? in the name of all that is sane and reasonable? For a craze; an idea, a fanaticism? or for a love of and zeal for the truth, the Kingdom of God, the good of mankind? Looking back on this crooked, selfish, untruthful past, is it more antecedently likely that my motive was interested or disinterested; pure or impure; truth or illusion? Can evil be the path of good? Had I been faithful to duty all along; had I worked hard at school and after; had I left aside problems that really did not concern me; had I stayed at home and supported my mother and sister, and made their sad, narrow lives a little wider and brighter, would not God have given me light had it been needful for my salvation? would not my chances of salvation have been better than they are now? Have I done so much good to others, who had no claim on me, as to atone for my neglect of those who had every claim? What have I given up or forsaken for the service of God, as I suppose some would call it, except my plain duty? These are the pleasant doubts which fill my mind at spare moments, and make me say, surely I have lived in vain!" "Perhaps," he writes again, seeking some alleviation for his sorrow,—“perhaps, had I stayed at home, instead of going on this wild-goose chase after abstractions and ideals, I might have made common what has remained sacred; I might have worn down an affection which separation fomented; I might have broken those hearts whose love was everything to me, and to which my love was everything. That is my faint hope and the salve of my conscience, when I think, with bitterness, how I abandoned the life of affection for the service of so barren a mistress as Truth, and let the substance of life escape me in the pursuit of shadows.”

No doubt there are elements even in these pathetic words which will strike a Protestant reader as not quite pure; there is too great an engrossment with personal salvation and too little simple trust in the wide mercy of God and too little appreciation of the relative value of the simple virtues. But no one can read such words without perceiving that in them there sounds the cry of a genuine heart which has awakened to a real sense of its own shortcomings. Perhaps the growing bitterness of those seventeen years of gradual disillusionment, from the death of his mother to his open break with the Society of Jesus, was too great to have been set down by so vivid a pen in autobiographical record; and it may be that we need not deplore too

deeply the sudden cessation of the autobiography at this point. As it stands it gives us a singularly searching account of the soul-history of a gifted but wayward boy from infancy up to his finding of his life-work. What is most impressive in it is what we may call its element of drift; for step by step Tyrrell appears to drift along into this and then into that attitude and action, until, almost despite himself, certainly not as the result of any profound movement of spirit, compelling action, he finds himself a fully trained Jesuit priest. He has not spared himself in the successive portraits he draws of himself in his progress; indeed in this respect his Autobiography may claim kinship with Augustine's *Confessions*—that, from his later standpoint, he seems to have painted his youthful follies in unnecessarily black hues. But through it all he manages to present to the reader's view an engaging personality, and we rise from his account of his ill-regulated life with a positive affection for him—a tolerant appreciation of his character and gifts such as we should never have derived from his writings. The attractiveness of his Autobiography was probably enhanced to the present writer by the circumstance that it was read in conjunction with another autobiographical account of a conversion to Rome, which presents some superficial resemblances to it, notably in the apparent lack of enthusiasm lying behind and dictating so great a step. We refer to Monsignor Robert Hugh Benson's *Confessions of a Convert* (Longmans, Green & Co. 1913). Father Benson also brings before us an interesting personality; and we are far from saying that his account of how he became a Romanist is without value. But Father Tyrrell, as Father Benson does not succeed in doing, lets us live with him his life and see into his heart; we feel when we have read his Autobiography that we know him and, despite many unlovely qualities, we feel that he is at bottom loveable.

Miss Petre asks our sympathy with her as she undertakes to continue, for the twenty-five years of active life, the history for which Tyrrell has provided in his *Autobiography* so vivid a commencement. She scarcely needs it. Of course the tone of the presentation is changed. Tyrrell wrote in a mood of self-accusation: Miss Petre naturally writes from the point of view of an admirer. But so large and skilful a use has she made of Tyrrell's own accounts of himself—in "many letters and a few documents"—that we feel that in her pages we have what has almost the quality of an appreciative Autobiography. In particular, the whole course of Tyrrell's troubles with the Society of Jesus, of his rupture with it, of his suspension, of his excommunication, is traced in great detail, and obviously with equal fairness. The uncertainties of Tyrrell's temper, the changeableness of his moods, his steady drift to ever more radical positions are not glozed. But the sound heart of the man is kept steadily in sight. It belonged to the infelicities of his position as a member of the Society of Jesus and of the Church of Rome, that he should not be always quite able to separate between the revolt of his spirit against the ecclesiasticism by which he felt oppressed and the increasing departure of his thought

from fundamental Christianity. But it was not merely from the Society of Jesus or from Rome that he drifted.

How far he drifted, what was the actual position which in the end he occupied, it is not easy to determine with precision. We have of course in *Christianity at the Cross-Roads* a notable document. But even it is not free from that curious tendency to cling to the husk while discarding the kernel which characterized all his later life. Of course he had drifted away from everything distinctively Romish. "Needless to say" he could write at the end of 1908, "that I entirely deny the ecumenical authority of the exclusively Western Councils of Trent and the Vatican, and the whole mediaeval development of the Papacy so far as claiming more than a primacy of honor for the Bishop of Rome." If this had been all, what reasonable person could reproach him? But unfortunately he seems to have drifted equally away from everything distinctively Christian. When he writes in *Mediaevalism*:—"All that the fathers of the Church have said as to the inerrancy of the General Councils and of sacred tradition is as nothing to what they have said as to the inerrancy of those classical pages of tradition which we call the Bible; with all due deference to the Biblical Commission and the Holy Office, the hard and fast mechanical view of Scriptural inerrancy has yielded for ever to a much looser, more fluent and dynamic view of inspiration",—he is merely using the euphemisms of his class and really means to intimate that all authority has departed from the Christian Scriptures. "The walls of the Gospel," comments Miss Petre on his attitude in such matters, "could not shelter him from questions of ultimate value any more than the walls of the church" (II, p. 352). At the end (Feb. 20, 1909), this seems the position to which he had come: "Houtin and Loisy are right, the Christianity of the future will consist of mysticism and charity, and possibly the Eucharist in its primitive form as the outward bond: I desire no better." And even of mysticism he did not feel so very sure. "Mystics think," he writes Aug. 23, 1908, "they touch the divine when they have only blurred the human form in a cloud of words. The best mysticism is to submit to the limitation *consciously*; to realize that our best God is but an idol, a temple made with hands in which the Divine will as little be confined as in our Hell-Purgatory-Heaven (*rez-de-chaussée; entre-sol; premier-étage*) schematization." Miss Petre labors to save him some rags of Christianity's torn and bedraggled garment to cover the nakedness of his ultimate religious attitude withal (II. pp. 398 *c.g.*). We hope she is right. Perhaps he spoke more skeptically in the letters than he would have done in more considered writing: but certainly in his latest letters he gives us not obscurely to understand that he had left to him only a human Christ and a shadowy God and an ethics which was the mere expression of "the growing soul and conscience of humanity".

After all, however, the portrait of Tyrrell drawn in Miss Petre's narrative is from the personal point of view an engaging one. It was not easy to maintain an engaging personality through the dreadful

experiences of the loss of faith through which he was called upon to go. We have tried to point out how exceptionally engaging his personality manifested itself through his change of faith from Protestantism to Catholicism by comparing favorably his Autobiographical account with the *Confessions* of even so notably attractive a personality as that of Monsignor Benson. We may employ a like comparison here. We have had given us lately a voluminous account of his desertion of the Jesuits and lapse into much the same form of "liberal" faith as that to which Tyrrell drifted, by another man of notable quality. We refer to Count Paul von Hoensbroeck's *Fourteen Years a Jesuit* (1911). He tells us that to him Christianity came to be summed up in the words, "I am God's child and God is my Father," and Christ became only the man who has made the fatherhood of God known to us. Let those who would appreciate the essential sweetness of Tyrrell's disposition, and the unusual elevation of his mind, simply compare the two books.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Alexander Henderson the Covenanter. By JAMES PRINGLE THOMSON, M.A., with a Foreword by Lord Balfour of Burleigh. Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson and Ferrier. 1912. 12mo; pp. 160.

Mr. Pringle Thomson is quite right in supposing that no apology need be made for the appearance of a new sketch of the life of Alexander Henderson. Knox, Melville, Henderson,—under these three names the history of the Scottish Church, and of the Scottish people, for a hundred years of greatness may be written. Mr. Pringle Thomson's admiration for Henderson's high character and qualities leaves little to be desired, though his sympathy with the causes for which he wrought is imperfect. His narrative suffers a little from being neither quite a history of Henderson's times nor purely a personal biography of Henderson. The events in which Henderson took part are notified, rather than the man himself portrayed; and the events described are rather too sharply separated from the total movement of the times to be perfectly lucid to the incompletely informed reader. The story, however, is told straightforwardly and the book will help to keep alive the memory of "the genius of the second Reformation in Scotland," as Mr. Pringle Thomson calls him.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Last Days of John Knox. By His Faithful Servitor, RICHARD BANNATYNE. With Notes by D. HAY FLEMING, LL.D. Edinburgh: The Knox Club. 1913. 8vo; pp. 23 (Knox Club Publications, No. 35).

"It has been said," remarks Dr. Hay Fleming in his brief Prefatory Note, "that no man is a hero to his valet; but every rule has its exceptions; and, to Bannatyne, Knox was a hero, a prophet, and a Christian statesman." What Bannatyne himself calls him is, "this man of God,

the light of Scotland, the comfort of the Kirk within the same, the mirror of godliness, and pattern and example to all true ministers in purity of life, soundness in doctrine, and in boldness in reproving of wickedness." Of Bannatyne's true reverence for Knox we could have no better proof than that which is afforded by this touching narrative of his last days; and the narrative is valuable as enabling us to see how in his weakness a great Christian can remain great. It is well that such a narrative should be given the wider circulation which its issue among the publications of the Knox Club insures for it. The Prefatory Note and the accompanying Notes afford all the help to understanding it that it requires.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Hepburn of Japan. By WILLIAM ELLIOT GRIFFIS, D.D., L.H.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 238. \$1.50.

It is given to few men to render to the world a service of such wide influence as that of the pioneer missionary to Japan whose life is related in this interesting volume. At twenty-six Doctor Hepburn began work at Singapore, at twenty-eight he was located in China, at forty-four he began the chief labors of his life in Japan, at seventy-seven he finally returned to America, and before the close of his career enjoyed nearly twenty added years of rest and multiplied honors among his friends in the home land. The great achievements of his thirty-three years residence in Japan include his introduction of medical science into the Island Empire, his production of the great Japanese-English lexicon, the translation of the Bible into Japanese, the establishment of Ferris Seminary, and of the Meiji Gaku-in, or College and Theological school, which he served for years as president. The full title of this biography "Hepburn of Japan and His Wife and Helpmates, A Life Story of Toil for Christ," suggests the scope and purpose of the volume, and intimates the merited meed of praise which is given to Mrs. Hepburn, and also to their fellow workers in the various fields of their endeavor. The author was well equipped for his work both by his long residence in Japan and also by his peculiarly intimate relation with the great missionary whose life he here outlines with so much of appreciation and discrimination and sympathy. No one can understand the full story of the development of modern Japan without some such definite knowledge of the life and work of Doctor Hepburn as this sketch embodies.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

Mystik und geschichtliche Religion. Eine systematische Untersuchung von WILHELM FRESSENIUS, Lic. theol. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1912. 8vo; pp. [2], 101. Index.

Licentiate Fresenius is an admiring pupil of W. Herrmann, and has

written this little book apparently for the purpose of defending the so-called "historical" conception of religion, held by Herrmann in common with his fellow Ritschlians, against the "mystical" conception of religion which is now again becoming very wide-spread. According to this so-called "historical" conception of it, religion is not a native possession of the human soul; it is something which meets man in the course of the process of living. It is an experience—an *Erlebnis*, something that occurs to him—which some day befalls him—*begegnet*, encounters him—when he finds himself face to face with goodness manifested in a personal life with such power that he cannot choose but utterly surrender himself to it. Religion is thus a fact which occurs in a human life, a transaction, a transaction of the man's own; yet it is rather produced in him than by him—through the might of the goodness revealed to his observation. "A man cannot make religion for himself; nor can he acquire it by labours or performances of any kind whatsoever,—he can neither earn it by works nor excogitate it by brooding. It has always itself laid claim to be a gift of God to man. Therefore, the only path to religion lies in observing and marking the experiences of our own life, if perchance there may speak to us in them a power of love and goodness which we cannot withstand. Experiences arise in our own life, however, only in our commerce with other men, with personalities in whom we are able to put trust, that is, from whom we receive the impression that they have risen above purely instinctive life to personal being. By their means we are turned to that which raised them out of their nothingness. We Christians accordingly speak of the Christian community as that with the existence, vitality and historical power of which the possibility of religious life is for us indissolubly bound up. And it is therefore that we designate religion, because it is attached to human intercourse and its historical, personal root, as historical religion" (p. 64). Religion, in this view, therefore arises in the soul of man in particular conditions of time and space, under influences brought to bear upon him from without—under the influences, to the more specific, of other personalities which impress him as good. In the formal definitions which Fresenius frames (p. 63): "Religion is the experience which the morally thinking man makes, when the power of the good so encounters him that he must surrender himself to it utterly"; and (p. 65) "the Christian religion is the experience which the morally thinking man makes of the Person of Jesus, when the power of the good so encounters him in it, that he must surrender himself to it utterly."

With this conception of religion as evoked in man by a quite specific experience, which comes to him from without, the mystical contention that we must look within ourselves to find God stands obviously in direct contradiction. "It is the characteristic of all Mysticism," Fresenius remarks in bringing this contradiction to view, "that it maintains the immediate presence of divine life in man, which needs only to be recognized and felt—and it is therefore that in

all mysticism it is contemplation which self-evidently forms the best way to God—while historical religion has always presented itself as the *new* life, which comes into being by the action of person on person and is not already (even though hiddenly) present in man" (pp. 50-51). It is not strange therefore that Fresenius looks with alarm upon the irruption of mystical ideas which seems at present in progress and posits the problem which is raised by this irruption in such phrases as these—"whether we are to be saved from the religious exigencies of our day by giving our attention to historical religion, to the Gospel of Jesus as the Reformers understood it, or by sinking ourselves into the feeling of infinity and by speculatively contemplating that which lives in our souls by nature" (p. 54). For Fresenius emphasizes that what the Mystic finds in the soul is merely its natural endowment. "We have heard religion—or rather its mystical form—," he says, "compared with the contemplation of nature and art; what we experience and feel in the enjoyment of nature, in gazing on a beautiful painting, in listening to a symphony by a master, that—so we have been told—is essentially related to religion, or rather is religion's self, because it is the apprehension and feeling of the eternal and imperishable. But just as surely as the enjoyment of nature and art can evoke mysticism, just so surely is the infinite which is felt in it not the God of religion. For Christian piety at least, God is not the Eternal, Imperishable which we feel, but the Power for Good which comes into contact with us, above time and eternity, in the personalities who evoke confidence (*Zutrauen*) in us,—which Power is not maintained by us to be God, but manifests itself to us as God. Where, however, God is sought and found in indefinite feelings, in experiences of the infinite, there He is nothing but a name for the unknown and incomprehensible which arouses that feeling. Man then humbles himself before a power which he does not know, but which, if he will not give himself the lie, he postulates, and from which he then, since he cannot get along without them, arbitrarily forms conceptions—which perhaps, however are actually derived from historical religion" (p. 82).

Obviously the debate between the Ritschlian, as represented by Fresenius, and the Mystic turns primarily upon the question of what, when the Mystic sinks himself into himself, he finds there. The Mystic says he finds God. The Ritschlian says he finds nothing but an indefinite and indefinable feeling of the infinite which he arbitrarily dubs God. This question at once, however, passes into another: the question of the conception of God. To the Mystic, Fresenius intimates, God is simply Immensity; to the Ritschlian He is the Good: to the former therefore He is a mere thing, to the latter He is a Person,—for when we say "good" we say Person. As over against all Mystical phantasies, therefore, the Ritschlian stands for "the personal God, who drawing near to us in religious experience, calls us to ethical, personal life" (p. 88). This great transaction takes place, of course, at a given point of time and thus the Ritschlian stands for

what he calls "historical religion." "Thus over against *historical* religion which springs out of personal life-experiences in the social organism there stands history-less Mysticism which forgets the social organism in arbitrarily produced feelings and phantasies" (p. 89). That the contradiction of these conceptions may be felt in its full force, however, the phenomenism which rules the Ritschlian conception must be borne in mind. To this phenomenism Fresenius manages to advert even in this brochure (p. 73), speaking with some contempt of the old Lutheran dogmatists who still believe in a substantial soul (it is "the thing in itself" he remarks in parenthesis) and, over against this human soul, in a substantial God. As they did not find the real nature of man in his activities, he complains, so they did not find God "in particular activities, in historical acts and personal operations" but postulated a somewhat behind these activities of which they endeavored to frame some conception and which they sought afterwards to bring somehow into connection with historical facts. For the "soul" of man he would substitute a series of activities under the conception of "Life" (*Leben*), and correspondingly for the substantial God he would substitute a series of activities also known as "Life" (*Leben*). And as God consists only in His activities, of course He can be known only in His activities, and it is idle to seek Him as lying inert in the human heart.

It certainly were hard choosing between two such one sided conceptions of God—a God who is bare Immensity (or "Reality" as it is the irritating habit of the Mystics to call Him), or a God who is bare Activity. Fortunately we are shut up to no such option. Nor can the question of what may be found in the human soul be thought to be closed by the unfortunate fact that many of those who have turned their contemplation in upon it have found there apparently nothing but a vague sense of immensity. There are mystics and mystics. Indeed Fresenius, as he addresses himself to the study of mysticism and the possibility of there being a mystical element in religion is oppressed no more by the multitude of the mystics who require to be taken account of than by the immense variety of definitions of mysticism which claim attention. *Quot homines, tot sententiae*. To ease his task Fresenius selects three recent writers of importance, whom he considers fair representatives of divergent types of Mystical thought and endeavors to derive from a study of them a working notion of what Mysticism stands for at the moment at least. These are Friedrich von Hügel, Nathan Söderblom, and Georg Klepl. To the first of these thinkers "Mysticism is the specifically Catholic ideal of piety" (p. 10); to the second, it is "the essential content of Christianity, and that precisely of Protestant Christianity" (p. 28); to the third (he does not employ the term) it is the abiding basis of all possible religion in these sophisticated times. As the result of his induction Fresenius strangely arrives at the conclusion that, as a phenomenon in the Christian Church at least, Mysticism is distinctively Catholic or at least Catholicizing. He had no doubt thrown Söderblom

out of consideration, somewhat arbitrarily one would think, because of his identification of mysticism with the general supernatural element in Christianity. But one would suppose that Klepl—who does not, however, consider himself a Mystic—was as far as possible from a Catholicizing conception of religion.

The truth seems to be that Fresenius has not in the end been able to emancipate himself from his traditional Ritschlian conception here. Ritschl, Harnack, Herrmann are cited in support of his finding (p. 85) and the volume closes with a quotation from the well-known pages of Harnack's *History of Dogma* (E.T. Vol. vi. p. 99) in which he warns Evangelical Christians off from too complete a sympathy with Mysticism—merely because of their delight in the warm spiritual life which it exhibits—on the ground that it is essentially Catholic and cannot be Protestantized. Despite so great an array of authority we cannot help thinking this finding a mistake. The Evangelical Christian may be well put on his guard against Mysticism—to which he cannot unreservedly give himself, as Harnack truly observes, "if he has made clear to himself what evangelical faith is"; and no doubt the legalism and formalism of the Romish teaching have ever been powerful contributory causes to the production of Mysticism in the Catholic Church. But it finds its impelling cause clearly elsewhere and therefore it is not even exclusively an intra-Christian phenomenon. We can scarcely deny the name of Mystic to Plotinus or Jaláda 'd 'Din, to Greek or Persian, Muslim or Hindu saint. In the actual definition of Mysticism to which Fresenius comes, if it be considered merely as a definition of Mysticism within the limits of the Catholic Church we may nevertheless find our way. "Mysticism," says he, "is the ideal of piety which is necessarily formed on the basis of a legalistic, Catholic or Catholicizing conception of religion, by men, weary of the burden of ecclesiastical tradition and cold formalism, which seek after a personal experience and assurance of faith, and, utilizing religious tradition and customs as means to their end, find the goal of their search in an indefinite and indefinable feeling of the eternal which is arbitrarily maintained to be God" (p. 83-84). *Mutatis mutandis* the same might be said for Mysticism in the Protestant Churches, or for Mysticism among the Mohammedans or the Hindus. Everywhere Mysticism avails itself of the forms of religion and the theological formulas under which it grows up as means: everywhere it lays hold of the sense of the immense and the eternal which it finds in the soul. It remains still a question, however, whether its discovery of God through this feeling of the immense and the eternal is altogether arbitrary.

To go at once to the root of the matter, what Mysticism really is, is, at bottom, just natural religion. That its form has been given it so prevailingly—perhaps we ought to say, constantly—by the influence of Pantheizing thought may be treated here as accidental; though it must be confessed that it has much the look, historically, of an essential characteristic, in which case we should have to define Mysticism as pantheizing natural religion. Meanwhile we are not to be driven or

tempted from the position that men are by nature religious and will in any event have a religion; that there has been ineradicably implanted in them a *sensus deitatis* (as Calvin has taught us to call it) which inevitably becomes a *semen religionis*. Fresenius himself is compelled to allow the presence in man of "a religious disposition, or an inborn religious capacity" which provides the psychological possibility of religion (p. 60); and he freely admits that this "capacity for religion" has enabled multitudes to become actually religious under influences wholly unknown to us (p. 16). His contention only is that it must be called into action by influences coming from without and of a personal-ethical kind: it never, according to him, functions independently so as to produce religion. The Mystic, on the contrary, insists that it normally effloresces into actual religion whenever opportunity is given it to function. The difference here is fundamental and rests on divergent ontologies. If it be reduced to the single question of whether God approaches man only from without, through the medium of other personalities acting upon him by the way of a so-called "ethical" appeal; or rather Himself forms a part of man's spiritual environment in contact with Whom man exists and of Whom he has immediate experience, we must pronounce the Mystic certainly in the right. And this we may surely do without prejudice to complete rejection of the entire Pantheizing coloring of the common (or shall we say constant?) Mystical presentation. The mischief of Mysticism lies not in its claim to find God through the ineradicable natural instincts of the soul but in its persistent effort, being natural religion, to substitute itself for supernatural religion, that is to say, for Christianity. The relation of Christianity to natural religion seems to be very frequently, we might even say commonly, misconceived. They are not two religions, lying side by side of one another, of which one must be taken and the other left: whether with the Ritschlian we take Christianity (or rather, what they mistake for Christianity) and leave natural religion, or with the Mystics we take natural religion and leave Christianity. As what is called special revelation is superinduced upon and presupposes what is called general revelation, and these two form one whole, so Christianity is superinduced upon and presupposes natural religion and forms with it the one whole which is the only sufficing religion for sinful man. Although Mysticism is not Christianity, therefore, Christianity is mysticism. There are multitudes of Mystics who are not Christians, but there is no Christian who is not a mystic,—who does not hold communion with God in his soul, and that not merely as the God of grace by virtue of whose recreative operations he is a Christian, but as the God of nature by virtue of whose creative, upholding and governing operations he is a creature. We may or may not be able to make out a historical claim to the name of Mysticism to express this Christian mysticism the name may be preëmpted by something essentially different and any attempt to rescue it to this nobler usage may be productive only of confusion. We may think it futile to distinguish as has often been attempted (von Hügel quotes the distinction from Rauwenhoff, as

Charles Hodge quoted it from Nietzsche) between *Mystik* and *Mysticismus*, as designations respectively of the "white" and the "black" Mysticism. But the name apart, the thing lies at the very foundation of the Christian religion: there is no Christian religion where there is no inward communion with God.

As Christianity is mysticism without being Mysticism, so also is it a historical religion without being "Historical Religion" in the sense of Fresenius and his school. In calling religion "historical" Fresenius and his school mean nothing more than that its origin in every individual case is to be sought and found not in some innate disposition of the man but "in his own history," that is, as he explains (p. 21), "in the experiences of his life, in the effects of living personalities, in occurrences which can maintain their right before his clear ethical judgment." Their minds are not at all on the great historical occurrences by which the God of Grace, has intervened in the sinful development of the race by redemptive acts,—the incarnation, the atonement, the outpouring of the Holy Ghost—but merely on the life experience of the individual man, in the course of which, they affirm, religion is brought to him as one item in the temporal series of his experiences. Of the great redemptive acts of God by which Christianity is constituted and by virtue of which, lying at its heart, it is a "historical religion" they will know as little as the Mystic himself. To them, too, all religion, inclusive of Christianity, as a, or the, religion, is independent of all occurrences of the past and is purely a present experience of man. They differ with the Mystic here only in making it an experience, not of man's native life of feeling, but of his presently acting ethical will.

When remarking on this matter Fresenius carefully explains that "the deepest difference" between von Hügel the Mystic and Herrmann, the advocate of "historical religion," "lies here in this: that Hügel seeks to assign its place in the soul-life of man to religion as a given entity (psychological method), while Herrmann exhibits its origin in the spiritual ethical life of man and establishes it as a power which works from person to person and is therefore historical (historical, systematic method)" (p. 21). So eager is he not to be misunderstood, by the use of the term "historical" here to imply some recognition of the historical elements of Christianity as that term is ordinarily understood, that he attaches a note to the word to explain that he, like Wobbermin (*ZThK.* 1911), distinguishes between the two German terms *geschichtlich* and *historisch* and applies only the former, but never the latter, to his Christianity. To him Christianity has ceased to be a "historical" (*historische*) religion and the "faith" which he calls by that name is absolutely independent of all "historical" (*historische*) facts. This includes even the fact of Jesus. We must not be misled here by the place which "the Person of Jesus" holds in the "Christianity" of Herrmann and of course also in that of his pupil Fresenius. Fresenius has been at pains to explain to us that it is the *geschichtliche* Jesus, not the *historische* Jesus, that is here in question. It is a matter of indifference to him and all those of his way of thinking

whether there ever existed any *historische* Jesus: all that is important is that we shall have a genuine "experience" of Jesus, that He should come to us *geschichtlich*, that is, in a real encounter with our soul. This constitutes Him to us the point of inspiration needed to awaken us to religious life and it is indifferent to us whether He really ever lived on earth (*ZThK.* 1912, pp. 244-268.) Not merely have the incarnation, the atonement, the outpouring of the Spirit—all the redemptive acts of God—gone; the "historical Jesus" may go too. On no fact of the past whatever can Christianity rest: it is purely for each man an experience of his own.

Certainly no Mystic could cut himself more completely loose from the historical elements of Christianity than is done here. And, by virtue of the fact that all that makes Christianity that specific religion which we call Christianity lies precisely in these historical elements, the neglect or rejection of them is the rejection of Christianity. The whole life work of Herrmann may have been to show how a man of our day may still be a Christian; but unfortunately he has done this by adapting what he calls Christianity to the point of view of the "man of our day," and the outcome is that he solves the problem by dissolving Christianity. The "historical religion" which Fresenius offers us is therefore no more Christianity than the Mysticism of the most extreme of the Mystics, and brings us not a single step closer than it to a real Christianity. Of course if the whole difference between Mysticism and "historical religion" were reduced to the single question of whether Christianity is the product of the native religious sentiment or comes to man from without and is embraced by an act of his own ethical will, we should have unhesitatingly to give the right to "historical religion." We have not had to wait for the Ritschlian school to learn that faith comes by hearing; or that as believing implies hearing so hearing implies a preacher. By virtue of the very circumstance that Christianity is a historical religion and is rooted in facts which have occurred in the world and through which the redemption which has come into the world has been wrought out, it must be communicated. And nothing is more sure than that there can be no Christianity apart from the working upon the heart of these historical facts as proclaimed, appreciated and embraced in confident faith. The action of the ethical will in laying hold upon the Saving Christ is of the essence of Christianity and there is no Christianity without it.

What Fresenius brings into contrast in his discussion is, then, merely two extremely one-sided conceptions of religion: the religion of the mere feelings and the religion of the bare ethical will. Neither has any claim to the name of Christianity. For Christianity is a historical religion and neither of these conceptions of religion has any essential connection with history. The religion of the mere ethical will is just as purely a merely natural religion as is the religion of the mere feelings. The Christian may therefore stand by and watch the conflict of these standpoints with interest indeed but without concern. Each tendency—"Mysticism," "Historical Religion,"—is engaged in validat-

ing elements of the religious life, which enter into and find their due place in Christianity. But not only is each fatally one-sided in its exclusive insistence upon its own element of religious experience, but both in combination fall far short of even a complete account of natural religion; and neither has any place whatever in its system of thought for that supernatural religion which alone can avail for the needs of sinful men. The problem which presses on us is not whether, in the religious conflicts of our time, we should turn for rest and peace to "Mysticism" or to "Historical Religion"—to the religion of the feelings or to the religion of the ethical will: but whether there is not some more comprehensive religion which will take up into itself and engage the whole man, intellect, sensibility and will alike, and meeting him in his actual condition of weakness and corruption and guilt, rescue him from his lost state and renew him in all the elements of his being, to present him to God a new man. After all said Christianity remains the only religion which meets the case.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

The Church of To-morrow. By JOSEPH HENRY CROOKER. Boston: The Pilgrim Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 272. \$1.00 net.

Here is a serious endeavor to set forth what the Church must be in order to fulfill its supremely important task. The author is in no personal danger of incurring the stigma of being a Calvinist, a Trinitarian, or possibly a Christian. His suggestions relative to Christianity are in fact the vital defect of the book. He has much to say in reference to the dignity of man, but makes no intimation of the deity of Christ. For example, when declaring of the church that "Its great task is to reveal man to himself as the Son of God and open within him the deep and everlasting source of Eternal life," he never intimates that the church is "the pillar and ground of the truth" relative to the incarnate, crucified, risen, divine Christ in Whom is Life Eternal. Nevertheless he has much to say that is not only interesting, but of practical value, and some things which to-day need strong emphasis. In the first chapter, dealing with the method of the church, it is maintained that there is far greater need of unity in spirit than of unity in organization, or uniformity in ritual or unanimity in creed. The church of to-morrow must adopt principles of coöperation and comity. The task of the church is shown to be spiritual; it is "to feed the roots of life." In opposition to certain socialistic and other false views, it is shown that the true function of the church does not consist in bettering social economic and physical conditions, but in creating right hearts and producing moral character. It is next suggested that in carrying out this task there must be stimulated a sufficient and efficient thought of God, "the tap-root of religion."

This can best be done by maintaining public worship, and nurturing the spirit of prayer. The next chapter emphasizes the possible power of the pulpit and the need of preserving its prophetic character. The last chapter sounds out a call to the pew to support the pulpit and to strengthen the church by active participation in various forms of strictly religious service.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Pulpit and the Pew. By the REVEREND CHARLES H. PARKHURST, D.D., LL.D. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 195. \$1.50 net, postage 10 cents extra.

This volume contains the "Lyman Beecher Lectures delivered 1913, before the Divinity School of Yale University." In commendation it may be sufficient to say that they merit a place in the valuable course of which they form a part. They possess a marked individuality, and are characterized by the pungent epigrams, human interest, and vivid illustrations, which have made popular the public utterances of the author. The whole field of homiletics has been so frequently traversed by previous lectures on this same foundation that the present series suggests a conscious limitation and an intentional avoidance of some of the more usual topics relative to the art of preaching. The long experience of the distinguished metropolitan pastor would have assured a welcome from his hearers and readers had he chosen to discuss such obvious matters as the intellectual, social and spiritual life of the minister, the sources and structure of the sermon, or the relation of preaching to pastoral duties. It may also be felt that the treatment of the themes selected is at times too limited, and lacking in concrete and comprehensive instruction. However, there is so much of originality and value in the discussions as to suggest some of the reasons why the author has maintained, for more than thirty years, in a conspicuous New York pulpit, a place of such influence and power. The subjects of the lectures are as follows: "The Preacher and his Qualifications"; "Pulpit Aims"; "The Pulpit's Estimate of the Pew"; "Love Considered as a Dynamic"; "Ministerial Responsibility for Civic Conditions"; "Responsibility of the Church to the Life of the Town"; "Dealing With Fundamentals"; "The Sanctuary and Sanctuary Service."

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Spiritual Health in the Light of the Principles of Physical Health.

By HOWARD FOSTER WRIGHT, D.B., M.D., D.O. New York: The Shakespeare Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 142. \$1.00.

In accordance with the suggestion made by Professor Drummond in his "Natural Law in the Spiritual World," an endeavor is here made to show how therapeutic principles can be applied in spiritual healing. The writer who is a reverent Christian, and a practitioner of Osteopathy, seems to fall into the common error of identifying laws which are merely similar. He presents certain interesting illustrations, but seems tempted to treat analogies as established facts. It is, however,

gratifying to find one who is investigating science in the light of Christian faith, and is interested in healing both the bodies and souls of men.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The China Mission Year Book. Being "*The Christian Movement in China*" 1913. Edited by REV. D. MACGILLIVRAY, M.A., D.D. Shanghai: Christian Literature Society for China. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 430, 55, ccxxxvi.

Even a brief review of this volume indicates, as possibly no other publication can, the vastness and diversity of the Christian missionary work being done in China. This is the fourth year of its issue, and the rapidly increasing number of subscribers indicates an ever wider appreciation of the great value of this exhaustive and careful compendium of missionary enterprises and interests in the new republic. The titles of a few of the thirty-five chapters may indicate the wide field covered by this year-book: "General Survey," "Missionary Conferences of 1913," "Revolution in China," "Progress and Fruits of Christianity," "Evangelistic Work," "The Chinese Press," "The New Education," "Woman's Work," "Sunday School Work," "Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations," "Christian Literature," "Bible Translation and Circulation," "Roman Catholic Missions." The various appendices relate to a large number of missionary facts and statistics including a "directory of missionaries" arranged by missions, by provinces, and alphabetically. A careful index makes it possible to readily refer to practically any subject in connection with the evangelization of China.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Function of Teaching in Christianity. By CHARLES B. WILLIAMS, PH.D., Professor of New Testament Greek and New Testament Theology, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, Fort Worth, Texas. Nashville, Tenn.: Sunday School Board, Southern Convention. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 260. \$1.00 postpaid.

The purpose of the author, as the title of this volume indicates, is to show the prominence and function of teaching in the Christian religion. In *Part I* he endeavors to show that Jesus, and the New Testament writers regarded Christianity as a school of thought and action. Jesus, the twelve apostles, Paul, and the bishops or elders of the early church were all teachers of religion. *Part II* considers the various classes of modern Christian teachers, such as parents, Sunday School teachers, teachers in schools, colleges, universities and theological seminaries. *Part III* sets forth the various functions of these Christian teachers, in directing the religious thinking of the world, and in leading the young to Christ as Saviour and Lord, in training Christians in lives of sacrifice and service, in suggesting methods of social betterment, in stimulating effort for the evangelizing of all nations.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Reports of the Boards and Permanent Agencies of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. 1913. Philadelphia: Witherspoon Building. Copies in paper covers sent free to ministers; but in Cloth 35 cents each. To other persons 40 cents in paper and 65 cents in cloth.

Few books of equal size are received annually by every minister of our Church, and few are less valued in comparison with their real worth. It is not to be expected that the long pages of financial returns will attract very close attention, but large sections of these volumes contain material of deep interest, carefully prepared illustrations, and matter which is of great value to all who desire to have an intelligent understanding of the vast work done by the various boards and agencies of our church. It may be well to commend to the thoughtful consideration of our pastors and other church workers the reports last issued. A valuable feature which appears again at the close of this volume is the combined statistical report, with the names of the churches and of the clerks of sessions. The church is to be commended for its loyal support of its Boards, but there is still need of stimulating wider interest by spreading information as to these various lines of missionary and benevolent service.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Letters to Edward. By MALCOLM J. McLEOD. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 224. \$1.00 net.

To those who believe that the custom and art of correspondence have disappeared before the killing haste of modern life, these letters will come as a pleasing surprise. They were written, with no thought of publication, by a prominent New York pastor to a young friend in the ministry from who he was separated by illness and finally by death. As a memorial of this friendship they possess a deep human, and even a pathetic, interest. They are characterized by kindly humor, keen criticisms, and shrewd observations. They discuss a wide variety of topics, from golf and Muldoon to higher criticism and church unity. In a realistic way they reveal the unique and difficult conditions under which a modern metropolitan pastor must labor, and the methods by which one of these pastors is winning deserved success.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Wheel-Chair Philosophy. By the REV. JOHN LEONARD COLE. New York: Eaton and Mains. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 154. 75 cents net.

The lessons this recital sets forth were learned in the school of pain and disappointment and anguish. They are not the expressions of fancy but the facts of personal experience. One who has suffered from a distressing accident, and has known the sustaining power of Christian faith, and the joy of answered prayer, here gives at least the partial explanation of the message of the Apostle Peter, that the trial of faith is "more precious than gold which perisheth, though it be tried by fire."

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CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Devotional Life of the Sunday School Teacher. By J. R. MILLER, D.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Cloth, 16mo; pp. 110. 50 cents net.

As the author himself says: "The real power in Sunday-School teaching is not in methods, important as it is to have the best of these, nor in equipment, valuable as this is, but in the teacher's own spiritual life. 'Not by might nor by power, but by my Spirit,' is the divine revealing of the secret of power in all Christian work." With such a true conception in mind, Doctor Miller has left this little volume as a legacy to his fellow workers, and has emphasized the need and possibility of being under the continual and complete control of the Holy Spirit, if one is to be efficient as a teacher of spiritual truth. Such an experience is to be attained not only by prayer and the study of Scripture, but by a constant abiding in Christ and complete surrender to His Spirit. The manuscript of this volume was found among the papers of the author after his death. It is peculiarly characteristic and will be highly prized by the host of Doctor Miller's friends, for he was himself a devoted Sunday School worker, and was known as the most popular devotional writer of his age. This book reveals the secret of his power and will do much to perpetuate the influence and the inspiration of his life.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Learning to Teach from the Master Teacher. By JOHN A. MARQUIS, D.D., LL.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Board, 16mo; pp. 79. 35 cents net.

These chapters first appeared in the pages of *The Westminster Teacher*. They constitute primarily a message for Sunday School teachers. From the study of the methods and characteristics of Christ helpful suggestions are made in relation to the importance of the teacher's calling, the object which should be held in view, the method of gathering hearers, the need of a full knowledge of one's subject, the possibility of success in spite of discouragements, and the enthusiasm and personal magnetism which this high calling demands. This little volume is full of practical and inspiring suggestions for the modern teacher and throws into clear relief the divine skill and power of Christ.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Sevenfold Unity of the Christian Church. By the RT. REV. A. C. A. HALL, D.D., Bishop of Vermont. London and New York, Longmans Green and Co. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 63. 75 cents net.

This book contains the substance of addresses delivered at Retreats in the Autumn of 1910. It comprises an exposition of the seven unities described in the opening verses of the fourth chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians. At a time when the subject of the reunion of Christendom is so much discussed it is of interest and help to read such a statement of the vital spiritual unity which already unites in one body all the followers of Christ. It is only by recognizing an

emphasizing this existing unity that the various divisions of the Christian Church can be brought more closely together; and such a thoughtful and sympathetic discussion as this volume contains will do much toward promoting the larger sympathy and coöperation which all who love our Lord truly desire.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Men of the Gospels. By LYNN HAROLD HOUGH. New York: Eaton and Mains. Cloth, 16mo; pp. 98. 50 cents net.

These delicately drawn miniatures portray with fascinating power the chief features of several familiar New Testament characters. Among those passed in review are John the Baptist, Simon Peter, John the Beloved, Thomas, Judas, the Rich Young Ruler, Nicodemus, Caiaphas, Pilate, Herod, the Centurion at the Cross, and the Master Himself. The portrayal is vivid, original and suggestive.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Habeeb the Beloved. By WM. S. NELSON, D.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 102. 75 cents net.

As Dr. Stanley White suggests in his introduction to this excellent story, the author not only sketches the character of his hero, but he lifts the curtain and reveals to us Syria, and enables us also to see how the work of the missionary in an oriental country is conducted. We can understand also the difficulties and hardships which a Protestant Christian may have to endure at the present day in the very land in which our Saviour was born. The book also indicates to us the transforming power of the Bible and more definitely of Christ whom the hero of the story found revealed in the Gospel. This little volume narrating the real experience of a Syrian Christian will not only prove of interest to the reader, but will suggest the need of missionary activity in that eastern land.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Mornings with The Master. By T. S. CHILDS,* D.D., Author of "Heritage of Peace," "Is Expiation a Fiction?" "Difficulties of the Bible as tested by The Laws of Evidence," "The Lost Faith," etc. Washington, D. C.: William Ballantyne & Son. 1913. Duod; pp. 108.

We have in this attractive booklet thirty-one brief but very helpful meditations, each on some familiar verse from Scripture, and each followed by an appropriate hymn or religious poem. Such aids to devotion are usually as commonplace as they are numerous. This is a distinct exception. It is, perhaps, unique in its class. Certainly the reviewer has found it most helpful, and specially along the lines that in these days need most to be emphasized. Clear in thought, chaste in style, writing out of an unusually long and deep experience, Dr. Childs

* Just deceased.

has succeeded, as few do succeed, in giving his readers the very marrow of the Gospel. Not least worthy of praise are the poetical selections. We could wish that all who love the Lord Jesus might share our enjoyment of this little book.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

GENERAL LITERATURE

The Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary. Referring to the notice of this Dictionary in the January, 1914, number of this REVIEW, the managing editor writes us that "the editors of the New Standard Dictionary do not prefer the forms *fizl* and *abuze* as inadvertently stated in the notice. . . . These forms are recorded, it is true, but the New Standard Dictionary's preferences are *fizzle* and *abuse*." Our statement was: "The simplified form is given the preference. Thus the word *fizzle*, given first, is defined under *fizl*; *abuse* under *abuze*." This statement evidently conveys an incorrect impression, regarding these two words, although it states the fact. The pairs are bracketed and the definitions naturally follow the second or subsidiary spelling, which in these two instances is the simplified spelling. However, the reviewer does not see why *abuse* is not quite as good a spelling as *surprize*, which is given the preference. At least it is put first. The position of the Dictionary in this matter is stated in the introduction: "In the spelling of words this dictionary generally prefers the simpler form when two ways of spelling the same word are used by acknowledged authorities," Introductory, p. xii. A further use of the Dictionary confirms and increases our estimate of its very great excellence.

JOSEPH H. DULLES.

Princeton.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, January: CHARLES W. GILKEY, Function of the Church in Modern Society; D. D. LUCKENBILL, The Hittites; ERNEST D. BURTON, Spirit, Soul, and Flesh. II In the Old Testament; R. H. STRACHAN, Idea of Pre-Existence in the Fourth Gospel; FRANK C. PORTER, Source-Book of Judaism in New Testament Times; J. M. POWIS SMITH, The Deuteronomic Tithe; RENDEL HARRIS, St. Luke's Version of Death of Judas; EDGAR J. GOODSPEED, The Freer Gospels.

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, January: HENRY A. STIMSON, Twentieth Century Congregationalism; GEORGE O. LITTLE, Addition to the Sum of Revelation, Found in Book of Esther; WILLIAM H. BATES, Religious Opinions and Life of Abraham Lincoln; EDWARD M. MERINS, The Jews and Race Survival; HAROLD M. WIENER, Studies in the

Septuagintal Texts of Leviticus, III; JOHANNES DAHSE, Is the Documentary Hypothesis Tenable? I; F. J. LAMB, "Studies in Theology" and Hume's "Essay on Miracles"; LESTER REDDIN, Christ's Estimate of the Human Personality.

Church Quarterly Review, London, January: ARTHUR C. HEADLAM, Emperor Constantine and the Edict of Milan; H. L. GOUDGE, Resurrection of Our Lord and the Relation of the Eucharist to the Mysteries; Separation of Church and State in France; W. R. MATTHEWS, Mysticism and the life of the Spirit; W. A. WIGRAM, Severus of Antioch; R. DEBARY, Natural Fruitfulness of Religion; HAROLD HAMILTON, Essentials of a Valid Ministry; ARTHUR C. HEADLAM, Notes on Reunion: the Kikuyu Conference.

Constructive Quarterly, New York, March: WILLIAM SANDAY, The Constructive Quarterly from Within; T. R. GLOVER, Unity in the Spiritual Fact; CARDINAL MERCIER, Towards Unity; BISHOP GORE, Place of Symbolism in Religion; FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL, Specific Genius and Capacities of Christianity, Studied in Connection with the Works of Prof. Ernst Troeltsch; A. VON SCHLATTER, Attitude of German Protestant Theology to the Bible; WILLIAM A. CURTIS, Faith and Its Place in the Christian Religion; PETER GREEN, Faith: Its Nature and Work; MICHAEL MAHER, Nature of Divine Faith: A Catholic Account; ARCHBISHOP PLATON, Faith as it is Understood by an Orthodox Divine; W. TEMPLE, Education and Religion among Working-Men; F. HERBERT STEAD, The Labour Movement in Religion; T. EDMUND HARVEY, John Woolman.

East & West, London, January: HENRY RUNDLE, Medicine and Missions; HENRY S. HOLLAND, The Call of Empire; FRANK NORRIS, China and the Missions of To-Morrow; A. F. EALAND, Raison d'Être of Foreign Missions; E. R. MCNEILE, Truth and Error in Theosophy; The Anointing of the Sick; DR. GAILOR, Problem of the Racial Episcopate in America; A. D. TUPPER-CAREY, Intercessory Prayer in Behalf of Christian Missions; A. CROSTHWAITE, Hindu Hopes and their Christian Fulfilment.

Expositor, London, January: JOHN E. MCFADYEN, Old Testament and the Modern World; T. WITTON DAVIES, Words "Witch" and "Witchcraft"; W. EMERY BARNES, David's "Capture" of the Jebusite "Citadel" of Zion; B. W. BACON, Apostolic Decree against *πορνεία*; D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, Transmission of the Gospel; ALEXANDER SOUTER, Pastoral Epistles, Titus; J. B. MAYOR, Miscellanea; JAMES MOFFATT, Exegetica. *The Same*, February: H. A. A. KENNEDY, St. Paul and the Conception of the "Heavenly Man"; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Studies in Christian Eschatology, The Christian Hope; T. R. GLOVER, Discipline in Prayer; ALLAN MENZIES, Epistle to the Galatians; A. E. GARVIE, Notes on the Fourth Gospel; RENDEL HARRIS, Some Remarks on the Text of Apocalypse 3:17; EDWIN A. ABBOTT, Miscellanea Evangelica: a Reply; T. H. BINDLEY, A Study of 1 Corinthians 15; C. ANDERSON SCOTT, Early date of "Galatians": A Reply.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, January: JAMES IVERACH, Epistle to

Colossians and Its Christology; A. E. GARVIE, Can Literature of a Divine Revelation be Dealt with by Historical Science?; JOHN MACASKILL, A Swiss Shorter Catechism; W. ARTHUR CORNABY, Chinese Side-lights upon Scripture Passages. *The Same*, February: J. RENDEL HARRIS, The Blood-Accusations against the Jews in Southern Russia; JAMES IVERACH, The Epistle to the Colossians and its Christology; E. D. STARBUCK, The Psychology of Conversion.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, January: WILLIAM R. ARNOLD, Theology and Tradition; D. C. MACINTOSH, What is the Christian Religion?; W. S. ARCHIBALD, Religion in Some Contemporary Poets; JAMES Y. SIMPSON, Fitness of Environment; JOHN E. LE BOSQUET, The Modern Man's Religion.

Hibbert Journal, Boston, January: F. C. S. SCHILLER, Eugenics and Politics; J. B. BAILLIE, Self-Sacrifice; ELIZABETH MACADAM, Universities and the Training of the Social Worker; M. D. PETRE, Advantages and Disadvantages of Authority in Religion; R. L. ORR, Scottish Church Question; W. A. CURTIS, Value of Confessions of Faith; HUBERT HANDLEY, Ought there to be a Broad Church Disruption?; A. W. F. BLUNT, The Failure of the Church of England; J. ARTHUR HILL, Changing Religion; HENRY C. CORRANCE, Bergson's Philosophy and the Idea of God; T. RHONDDA WILLIAMS, Syndicalism in France and Its Relation to the Philosophy of Bergson; CHARLES W. COBB, Certainty in Mathematics and in Theology; J. E. SYMES, The Johannine Apocalypse.

Hindustan Review, Allahabad, January: Is Caste Essential to Hinduism?; S. A. W. KHAN, Proposed Amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code; BENOT K. SARKAR, Data of Ancient Indian Zoology, I; LEOPOLD KATSCHER, Education in Japan; S. AMBRAVANESWAR, Revolutionary France and Romantic Revival; E. M. WHITE, Women and Hinduism, II; S. RANGANATH, Chapter in Indian Economic History; SARADA PRASAD, Political Crimes in India; The Honorable Nawab Syed Mahomed Sahib; SUCHET SINGH, Commercial Education for Indian Youth.

Interpreter, London, January: EVELYN UNDERHILL, Mysticism and the Doctrine of the Atonement; WILLOUGHBY C. ALLEN, "What Think Ye of Christ?"; A. H. MCNEILE, Two Recent Theories about the Epistle to the Hebrews; EDWARD G. KING, Exposition of Ephesians 4:16; J. E. SYMES, Four Epistles to the Philippians; A. C. BOUQUET, The Case for the Sacraments; H. E. B. SPEIGHT, Michael Servetus; B. K. RATTEY, Apocalyptic Hope in the Maccabean Age; G. HENSLOW, Proofs of the Christian Religion.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin, January: CHARLES J. CALLAN, What Is Faith?, I; J. MACRORY, Occasion and Object of the Epistle to the Romans; J. KELLEHER, Land Reform; GARRETT PIERSE, Scriptural Theories of a Forgotten Father of the Irish Church; MATTHEW A. POWER, The Testing of Christ by the Devil; W. H. GRATTAN-FLOOD, The Dawn of the Reformation—A Reply; THOMAS GOGARTY, Rejoinder.

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, January: JOSEPH REIDER,

Prolegomena to a Greek-Hebrew and Hebrew-Greek Index to Aquila; MORRIS JASTROW, The So-Called Leprosy Laws; J. N. EPSTEIN, Two Gaonic Fragments; ISRAEL FRIEDLAENDER, The Rupture Between Alexander Jannai and the Pharisees; S. SCHECHTER, Reply to Dr. Büchler's Review of Schechter's 'Jewish Secretaries'.

Journal of Biblical Literature, Boston, December: GEORGE V. SCHICK, Stems Dûm and Damâm in Hebrew; GEORGE A. BARTON, "Higher" Archaeology and the Verdict of Criticism; PHILLIPS BARRY, Apocalypse of Ezra; PAUL HAUPT, Names of the Months on S. P. ii, 263.

Journal of Theological Studies, London, January: C. H. TURNER, Canons Attributed to the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381, together with the names of the Bishops, from two Patmos MSS; ROSE GRAHAM, Relation of Cluny to Some Other Movements of Monastic Reform; MARTIN RULE, Queen of Sweden's 'Gelasian Sacramentary'; C. L. FELTOE, Saints Commemorated in the Roman Canon; M. R. JAMES, Apocryphal Ezekiel; J. L. JOHNSTON, Mysticism in the New Testament; G. H. WHITAKER, Chrysostom on 1 Cor. i.13; N. HERZ, Exaggeration of Errors in the Massoretic.

London Quarterly Review, London, January: P. T. FORSYTH, The Man and the Message; A Poet's Tragedy; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Ritschlianism Old and New; T. H. S. ESCOTT, Vicissitudes of the English Novel; ALFRED E. GARVIE, Freedom of Christian Thought; W. H. S. AUBREY, Industrial Unrest; JOHN S. BANKS, Augustine as Seen in His Letters; JOHN TELFORD, One of England's Noblest.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, October: EDWARD T. HORN, British Rule in India; PAUL H. HEISEY, Psychology of the Religious Revival; PRESTON A. LAURY, Jeremiah, 7.21-23; VON BEZZEL, Ministry of Service as the Christian Solution of Social Problems; H. E. JACOBS, George Frederick Spieker; T. KNAPPE, Dangers of Liberal Theology to the Lutheran Faith; GEORGE W. TRABERT, Will Israel as a Nation Accept Christ?; ADOLF HULT, Return to Scriptural Faith; OTTO L. SCHREIBER, Early Ecclesiastical Schools; MARTIN L. WAGNER, The Sunday School, and How Best to Maintain It. *The Same*, January: H. E. JACOBS, Principles of Theology; LEANDER S. KEYSER, Renaissance of Protestantism; ED. KÖNIG, Canaan and the Babylonian Civilization; JOHN W. HORINE, Religious Instruction in our Colleges; J. C. F. RUPP, Holy Spirit in Christian Theology; W. JENTSCH, Shakespeare's Attitude to the Bible; L. FRANKLIN GRUBER, Version of 1611: Propriety of calling it the "Authorized Version" or "King James Version"; W. J. FINCK, The Orphan House in the Salzburger Colony; Suppression of Opium in China against British Resistance; J. A. WEYL, Spirit of the World in the Church.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, January: FREDERICK H. KNUBEL, The Logos; H. G. BUEHLER, The Bible in School and College; J. M. HANTZ, A Conception of the Laws of Conscience; LEANDER S. KEYSER, Christ's Witness to the Old Testament; D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, The Bible of the Jews; G. ALBERT BETTY, Lutheran Hymnology; CHARLES W. SUPER, The Dispensation of Justice; FRANK WOLFORD, Our Young

Men of the Future Ministry; JOHN WARNECK, The Special Endowment and Responsible Task of the Lutheran Church for World-Wide Missions.

Methodist Review, New York, January-February: W. F. WARREN, Comparative Religion, So-Called; R. T. STEVENSON, Lear-Pessimist or Optimist; J. M. DIXON, Gypsies and Religion; R. O. EVERHART, Engineering and the Millennium; F. C. LOCKWOOD, Burns: The Lyrist; DANIEL DORCHESTER, Christian Paganism; E. A. SCHELL, The Retention of the Philippine Islands; J. R. SHANNON, George Meredith, The Preacher's Poet-Novelist; JOHN LEE, Ulster Protestants and Rome. *The Same*, March-April: FRANKLIN HAMILTON, Life-Girding and the New Vision of the American University; J. A. GESSINGER, The Master Spirits; J. B. THOMAS, Dogmatization of "Evolution"; G. R. GROSE, Frederick Denison Maurice; J. A. FAULKNER, Dante the Theologian; MARY B. HOUSEL, Blue Bird Folks and Fancies; O. L. JOSEPH, Authority of the Church; PHILO M. BUCK, Edmund Rostand, The Tergiversist; J. SUMNER STONE, The Wandering Jew; S. G. AYRES, Sources of American Methodist History.

Methodist Review Quarterly, Nashville, January: P. T. FORSYTH, Christianity and Society; JOHN TELFORD, Annals of a Yorkshire Family; J. A. BAYLOR, Conference Evangelism; J. C. GRANBERY, Snapshots of Europe in Transition; RUTH W. ALEXANDER, Music and Religion; THOMAS CARTER, Keeping Step with God; W. K. MATTHEWS, Some Features of Higher Education in Germany; NINA H. ROBINSON, Woman and Women and Suffrage; JOHN W. SHACKFORD, A Demand upon the Christian Church and Her Ministry for a New Leadership; J. F. MORELOCK, Law Enforcement; R. E. DICKENSON, Alfred Tennyson and the Message of "In Memoriam"; D. E. CAMAK, Religion that Cares.

Monist, Chicago, January: BERTRAND RUSSELL, On the Nature of Acquaintance; FREDERICK G. HENKE, Wang Yang Ming, a Chinese Idealist; RICHARD GARBE, Christian Elements in Later Krishnaism and in Other Hinduistic Sects; A. H. GODBEY, Ceremonial Spitting; LEONARD T. TROLAND, Chemical Origin and Regulation of Life; PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN, Economy of Thought; KARIN COSTELLOE, Answer to Bertrand Russell's Article on Philosophy of Bergson.

Moslem World, London, January: JOHN TAKLE, Islam in Bengal; CHARLES T. RIGGS, Constitutional Government in Turkey; GEORGE SWAN, The Tanta Mûlid; PERCY SMITH, Plea for the Vulgar Arabic; S. M. ZWEMER, Dying Forces of Islam; ANDREW WATSON, Our Only Gospel; ROBERT THOMSON, Conditions in Bulgaria; L. V. SÖDERSTRÖM, Mohammedan Women in China; FRIEDRICH WÜRZ, The Bethel Conference.

Philosophical Review, Lancaster, January: ARCHIBALD A. BOWMAN, Problem of Knowledge from the Standpoint of Validity; JOSEPH A. LEIGHTON, Truth, Reality, and Relation; DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH, Hocking's Philosophy of Religion; W. P. MONTAGUE, Unreal Subsistence and Consciousness.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, January: JAMES STALKER, Christology of the Ancient Church; DOROTHY SCARBOROUGH, Religion in Recent American Novels; HENRY C. VEDDER, Dr. Wilkinson's Epics; WALTER LOCKE, St. John The Baptist; HENRY C. MABIE, The Baptist Message to Continental Europe; O. OLIN GREEN, Value of Art to the Preacher; J. L. ROSSER, Paul's Valuation of his Ministry; SALLY N. ROACH, The Education of Love.

Union Seminary Review, Richmond, December-January: J. S. LYONS, The Business of the Church; R. M. RUSSELL, The Mission of the Church; THERON H. RICE, The First Gospel; G. B. STRICKLER, Testimony of Christ to the Old Testament; J. GRAY MACALLISTER, Teachings of Great Features of the Bible; C. ALPHONSO SMITH, Presbyterians in Educational Work in North Carolina since 1813.

Yale Review, New Haven, January: HENRY A. BEERS, The Dying Pantheist to the Priest; ROBERT HERRICK, The Background of the American Novel; ARTHUR L. CORBIN, The Law and the Judges; WILLIAM OSLER, Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy; FREDERICK LYNCH, Peace and War in 1913; HENRY S. CANBY, Noyes and Masefield; WILLIAM E. HOCKING, Significance of Bergson; H. D. SEDGWICK, Bocaccio, an Apology.

Bilychnis, Roma, Gennaio: ASCHENBRÖDEL, "Boanerges" o i Gemelli celesti; ROLAND D. SAWYER, La Sociologia di Gesù. Gesù e lo Stato; Religione ed arte. Il nuovo Tempio Valdese a Roma; ROMOLO MURRI, Religione e Politica; ERNESTO RUTLI, Vitalità e vita nel Cattolicesimo; WILFRED MONOD, Una domanda attuale.

La Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Enero-Febrero: ALBERTO COLUNGA, Crisis de la crítica Pentateuco; JOSÉ D. GAGO, Las Cortes y la Constitución de Cádiz; FRANCISCO MAREN-SOLÁ, La homogeneidad de la doctrina católica (con.); IGNACIO G. MENÉNDEZ-REIGADA, Un novelista de hogaño.

Recherches de Science Religieuse, Paris, Janvier-Février: ALBERT CONDAMIN, L'influence de la Tradition juive dans la version de saint Jérôme; MARIUS CHAINE, Le canon des livres saintes dans l'Eglise éthiopienne; HIPPOLYTE LIGEARD, La crédibilité de la Révélation d'après saint Thomas; PIERRE ROUSSELOT, Réponse à deux attaques; LOUIS LAURAND, Deux mots sur les idées religieuses de Cicéron; LOUIS MARIÈS, Un commentaire de Didyme publié sous le nom de Diodore; AUGUSTIN NOYON, Notes bibliographiques sur quelques théologiens du moyen âge.

Rendiconti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei, Roma, Gennaio: CONTI ROSSINI, I Mekan o Suro nell'Etiopia del sud-ovest, e il loro linguaggio; CASTALDI, Il discorso contro l'Aristo di Filippo Sassetti; DUCATI, Sulla cronologia della idria di Midia e dei vasi affini; GABRIELI, Indice alfabetico di tutte le biografie contenute nel Wāfi-bi-l-wafayāt di al-ṣafādī nell'esemplare fotografico dell'on.

Revue Bénédictine, Paris, Janvier: G. MORIN, Qui est l'Ambrosiaster Solution nouvelle; P. BLANCHARD, Un monument primitif de la Règle cistercienne; U. BERLIÈRE, Les évêques auxiliaires de Liege; G. MORIN,

L'opuscule perdu du soi-disant Hégésippe sur les Machabées; DE-BRUYNE, Une lettre inédite de s. Pierre Damien.

Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, Lausanne, Janvier: GEORGES VOLAIT, Sur l'objet de l'histoire de la philosophie; EMILE LOMBARD, Freud, la psychanalyse et la théorie psychogénétique des névroses; MAURICE GOGUEL, Les études sur la quatrième évangile.

Revue de Théologie et des Questions Religieuses, Montauban, Décembre: Rapport de M. le doyen Doumergue sur l'année scolaire 1912-1913; E. BRUSTON, La Prophétie du Serviteur de l'Éternel dans le second Ésaïe et l'idée de la Rédemption; ANDRÉ ARNAL, Le Professeur Auguste Wabnitz; H. CHAVANNES, La Relativité des lois physiques et une hypothèse eschatologique à en tirer; CH. BRUSTON, Les Prophètes d'Israël et les religions de l'Orient; CH. BRUSTON, Le Fondateur de l'Église luthérienne de Paris, Jonas Hambræus; JACQUES DELPECH, Le Christianisme en Corée.

Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, Paris, Janvier: M. DEMUNYNCK, Introduction générale à l'étude psychologique des phénomènes religieux; M. S. GILLET, Les harmonies de la Transsubstantiation: le sacrement de l'Eucharistie; M. JACQUIN, Le "De corpore et sanguine Domini" de Pascase Radbert; M. D. ROLAND-GOSSELIN, Ce que saint Thomas pense de la sensation immédiate et de son organe.

Theologische Studiën, Utrecht, XXXII Jaargang, Aflev. 1: TH. L. W. VAN RAVESTEYN, Jeremia 4:5-6:30; D. PLOOY, Minucius Felix een Modernist?

Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Innsbruck, XXXVIII Band, 1: HEINRICH MAYER, Geschichte der Spendung der Sakramente in der alten Kirchen-provinz Salzburg, II; BERNARD DUHR, Der Olmutzer Zensur-Streit.

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The Princeton Theological Review

JULY, 1914

GENESIS *

Our study of Genesis is purely homiletic. Questions of higher and lower criticism, of text and unity and authorship, do not concern us here. It is our purpose simply to inquire how the book as it lies before us may be studied in the closet and treated in the pulpit, and how the truth which it is designed to teach may be most clearly and effectively presented.

Genesis means beginning. The origin of all things is here disclosed—the heavens and the earth, man, sin, salvation, arts, industries, society, government, civilization, the church.

Genesis portrays the beginning as the Revelation portrays the end of all things. One unveils the eternal past, the other the eternal future. Scripture opens and closes with the vision of paradise. Here is the earthly paradise, soon forfeited by sin; here is the heavenly paradise, the home of the children of God, from which they shall go out no more forever. Here is man created, fallen; here is man redeemed, restored. Here is God the Creator, with the world in rebellion against Him; here is God the Redeemer, with the universe prostrate at His feet. Here the divine purpose is declared, the divine promises are given; here purpose and promises are fulfilled.

The account of the creation is not scientific but pictorial. So far as we can see, this is the only way in which the story could be told so as to convey essential truth, and at the same time be understood by men of every age. If it had been written in terms of modern science, it would have

* A lecture delivered at the Princeton Seminary Summer School of Theology on June 3, 1914.

been unintelligible for thousands of years, and would be in need of frequent revision.

The universe is called into being by the free and deliberate act of God. It is the product of His will alone. It is not self-made, the result of eternal forces operating upon eternal matter. Nor is it a necessary and eternal evolution, God unfolding Himself. It is a divine creation. Materialism and Pantheism alike are contradicted by the opening words—In the beginning God created. His agents were His word and His Spirit. In the light of the New Testament His word is seen to be the eternal Son, by whom were all things made.

This is the picture presented—the earth is a chaotic mass of matter, waste and void, covered with water, and shrouded in the darkness of a starless night. Over it broods the Spirit of God, like a bird upon its nest—the Spirit who in the beginning of the new dispensation descended upon Jesus in the form of a dove. Then we see the universe taking shape in the hands of its Maker. By what methods and forces He executed His design, during what ages of time He wrought from matter up to man, we are not told. We are led back of second causes to the Great First Cause. God made the firmament; God made the sun, the moon, the stars; God made the living creatures of the earth; God made man. How He made them, we are not told. That is the question science seeks to answer. God made, says the Scripture; how did God make? science inquires. And no theory of development or evolution is contrary to Scripture so long as it recognizes that the forces and processes of nature are instruments in the hands of God—are God's ways of working. All that Scripture affirms is, God made; man may discover how, if he can.

The interest of the writer is not scientific but religious. He dismisses the material creation in a few words, and hastens to his chosen theme. It is the story of human life that he is eager to tell. The world is only the stage on which man shall play his part. Sun, moon, and stars are created to

give man light and to mark for him the changing seasons. All plant life is given him for food. All living creatures are put under his feet, and he is given dominion over all the works of God's hands. When man appears, the plot unfolds rapidly. The larger part of the Bible history of man is comprised within this book.

It is the story of man that Genesis undertakes to tell. Our analysis of the book is determined therefore by the course of the strange, eventful history of mankind. What are the great epochs, the turning-points? Who are the great men, the representative men, of this long and critical period?

In all the course of human history there are four men, and only four, who may be called representative in the full sense of the term. They gathered up in themselves the fortunes of the race, and shaped its destiny. Three of them appear in Genesis: Adam, the father of the race; Noah, the father of the new world; Abraham, the father of the faithful. In Adam the race was born, in Noah the race was preserved, in Abraham the race is redeemed. And all the covenants and promises are fulfilled in Christ.

The narrative of Genesis gathers about these three men—Adam, Noah, Abraham. With each of them is associated a great event, marked by a promise, and attended or followed by a sign. We have then as the basis of our study three men, three events, three promises, three signs.

I. ADAM, WITH WHOM THE RACE BEGAN

Creation ends, history begins, with man. God takes counsel with himself, Let us make. Man has a double nature. His body is fashioned of the dust, his spirit is the breath of the Almighty. On one side he is akin to the brute, on the other side to God—half dust, half Deity. This double nature, so far as we know, belongs to man alone. God and the angels are pure spirit. The animals have body without spirit.

Man was made in the image of God. In what respects?

First—in mental capacity. He is endowed with reason. We must beware of exaggeration here. There are those who teach that man's whole nature, body and soul alike, is derived from the lower animals. He began life no better than a brute, and has been steadily climbing upward. Certainly this is not in accord with the place given man in the Scripture.

On the other hand it has been taught that Adam was possessed of mental gifts and powers far beyond those that are found in the greatest of his sons. Robert South has given classic expression to this view in his sermon "On the Creation of Man in the Image of God." "He (Adam) came into the world a philosopher. . . . Study was not then a duty, night watchings were needless; the light of reason wanted not the assistance of a candle. . . . All those arts, rarities, and inventions, which vulgar minds gape at, the ingenious pursue, and all admire, are but the relics of an intellect defaced with sin and time. . . . And certainly that must needs have been very glorious, the decays of which are so admirable. He that is comely, when old and decrepit, surely was very beautiful when he was young. An Aristotle was but the rubbish of an Adam, and Athens but the rudiments of Paradise."

In fact man was endowed with capacities of the highest order. In all the centuries of his history he has acquired no new senses, faculties, powers of mind or body. All that man has accomplished has been wrought through the powers lodged in Adam. All progress, all arts, inventions, industries, civilizations, lay potentially in him. But his powers were latent, undeveloped and untrained.

Second—in moral character. He was created pure and holy, without taint of sin.

Third—in freedom. That lies at the root of moral character. So essential is freedom to the image of God that God conferred it upon man knowing how grossly it would be abused. To be godlike man must be free.

Fourth—in immortality. In this too he reflects the image of God, who is from everlasting to everlasting.

Fifth—in dominion over the creatures. Thus point by point and power by power the nature of man answers to the nature of God. Thus magnificently endowed man was placed in paradise. As man bore the image of God, so Eden bore the image of heaven.

God gave man then the two greatest gifts that God could bestow—capacity and opportunity. He began his career with powers kindred to those of God himself, and in an environment where those powers might operate most easily and efficiently.

His education began at once in three directions.

First—labor. Labor was not the primal curse. It does not date from the fall, but belongs to man as he bears the image of God, for “my Father worketh even until now and I work”, said Jesus (John v. 17). A life without labor would not bear the image of God. To till the ground was his task before and after the fall, though under widely different conditions.

Second—language. The first recorded act of man after his creation was the giving of names to the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air. Language is essential to thought, beyond the rudimentary stages of it. It is the only method of conveying thought in any large and adequate degree. Here too man reflects the likeness of God, for God reveals Himself and accomplishes His will through His word.

Third—society. It is not good for man to be alone. As he bears the image of God he is a social being. No helpmeet was found for him among the animals. Shall not God suffice? But God is pure spirit, and man is body and spirit. He craves, he needs, visible and tangible companionship. Woman is fashioned, man's other self. The home is established, society begins. The social nature of God is manifested in the Trinity; the social nature of man in the family—father, mother, child.

The great event associated with Adam is the fall. Here we are confronted with the darkest and most mysterious page in history.

The law of development is conflict. That is true of our physical and mental powers. They are developed, strengthened, disciplined, by grappling with difficulties and hindrances, wrestling with tasks that test the utmost of their strength. The arm grows strong by matching itself against the law of gravity; the mind by laying hold of hard problems. Strength is won only by struggle. The law prevails no less in the sphere of morals. Man is good by nature, he must become good by choice. He must put his virtue to the test. Sooner or later the question will arise whether his own will or the will of God shall be the law of his life. Temptation puts the question before him. In the purpose of Satan temptation is seduction; in the purpose of God temptation is opportunity.

He was put to the test under the most favorable conditions. His nature was pure, his will was free. Every want was supplied. He was bound to God by every tie of self-interest, of duty, of gratitude. He was put on his guard. The precise point of danger was indicated. That tree—there lies your peril. Beware of it.

He was tempted by Satan. The suggestion of evil came from without. Sin did not originate with man. So far as we are told, it had its birth in the courts of heaven, in the breast of an archangel.

The tree illustrates the elements present in every temptation—an object desirable, accessible, forbidden. The fruit appealed to appetite, to ambition, to the craving for knowledge—at once to the sensual and to the spiritual nature. It lay within reach of the hand. And though it was forbidden, it was guarded only by a command.

It was not wrong for man to seek the gratification of his senses, to covet knowledge, even to aspire to be like God. All this was his birthright. All that Satan promised God designed man to have. But God would have man inherit these things, as His son; Satan would have man seize them, as His rival. It is characteristic of sin to seek the right thing in the wrong way. Everything belongs to

man; God gave it to him in the beginning. But there are right and wrong ways of taking possession of his own. For every instinct, passion, appetite that belongs to human nature, as God created it, God has provided lawful means of gratification. To use them is health and happiness. Sin proposes unlawful means, and they issue in disease and death. Man plucked the fruit before it was ripe, and it made him sick unto death.

The immediate consequences of the fall were those that wait upon all sin—shame and fear and judgment. But in wrath God remembered mercy. And man went forth from paradise with a skin upon his back, a tool in his hand, a woman by his side, a promise in his heart, to suffer the penalty of his sin, to win the dominion of the world, to fight his way to holiness and peace. Thus he entered upon the long way that leads to Bethlehem, to Calvary, to the kingdom eternal in the heavens. The days of innocence and peace are past, the days of struggle and trial have begun.

The Promise. Observe that the promise was not given directly to fallen man. It was contained in the curse pronounced upon the serpent; even as Christ, in whom all the promises are fulfilled, was made a curse for us. "I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." To man the creature was given the promise of dominion; to man the sinner was given the promise of salvation. The promise is in three parts. (a) The conflict: enmity between man and the serpent. Satan's friendship was man's undoing; only through treading Satan under his feet shall man be restored. (b) Triumph: he shall bruise thy head. (c) Suffering: thou shalt bruise his heel. Man shall conquer, but he shall be sorely wounded. All Scripture, all history, is the unfolding of this primal promise—is the record of the struggle, the triumph, the suffering of man in Christ.

At once the prophecy entered upon its long career of fulfillment. The race divides at the fountainhead. The

line is drawn between the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent. On one side is the family of Cain. To them the world owes the mechanic arts; the trades; the fire; the forge; the fine arts; the tent that gives man the freedom of the globe; the use of animals to bear his burdens and minister to his wants. Profoundly interesting are the few words that record the story of that earliest civilization, the foundation upon which all later civilizations have been reared. But the growth of vice and crime kept pace with the progress of the arts. On the other hand the family of Seth kept alive the knowledge of God. Cain built a city, Seth founded a church. "Then", in his day, "began men to call upon the the name of the Lord" (iv. 26). That was the origin of formal public worship, of the visible church in its earliest mode of organization.

With Chapter V the history starts afresh. The family of Cain disappears. The historian is done with them. They have played their part, and are soon swept away with all their works. "Adam lived a hundred and thirty years, and begat a son in his own likeness, after his image; and called his name Seth." And the story goes on to trace the generations of Adam from Seth alone, as though there had never been another son. It is the line of the covenant, the promise, the Christ.

The Sign was the cherubim, and the flame of a sword which turned every way to keep the way of the tree of life. It was the sign of a lost paradise. Man can never regain his estate of innocence. If there is for him a paradise, it lies before and not behind. The tree of life is no longer accessible. If man shall enter into life, it must be by some other way.

Of this section the dominant note is sin. The darkness is relieved indeed by gleams of light—the promise in the Garden, the faith of Abel, the worship of Seth, the godly walk of Enoch. But it is a gloomy picture. He who in the beginning pronounced all things *very good*, repented that he had made man (vi. 6).

II. NOAH, IN WHOM THE RACE WAS PRESERVED

The great event of his history was the flood. Thus far men had been punished one by one. Now the general guilt provokes a common judgment. Noah and his family alone escape. God cares only for righteousness. The works of men—arts and cities and civilizations—are buried beneath the waves. The righteous alone are delivered.

The Promise given to Noah when he came forth from the ark was threefold: (a) the grant of dominion over the creatures was renewed; (b) the seal of sanctity was set upon the life of man, and it was declared that he who sheds man's blood shall be punished; (c) assurance was given that the world shall not again be destroyed, nor the race of man be blotted out at a stroke.

The Sign was the rainbow. It must have been a familiar sight to men from the beginning. Hitherto it had been a natural phenomenon, henceforth it is a gracious sign. It is an apt symbol of the divine mercy, this bow painted upon the clouds, the light of heaven breaking through and illuminating the darkness of earth, this many-colored arch spanning the horizon, binding earth and sky together. In the vision of Patmos John saw a rainbow about the throne of God (Rev. iv. 3). "Righteousness and justice are the foundation of his throne" (Psa. lxxxix. 14; xcvi. 2), mercy is the rainbow arch that shines above it.

Of this section the dominant note is judgment. But as there are gleams of light amid the darkness of man's sin, so there are signs of mercy amid the terrors of God's wrath.

Righteous Noah and his family alone survive. They have witnessed the most awful judgment that could fall upon a guilty race. They have been marvelously delivered. They have learned that righteousness alone avails with God. Surely now the world is about to enter upon an era of righteousness and peace. How can men turn again to sin after such a terrific display of God's justice, after such a gracious manifestation of God's favor?

Two acts of righteous Noah, and only two, are recorded

after he came forth from the ark. First he built an altar and offered burnt offerings in token of gratitude that his life and the lives of his household had been preserved. Then he planted a vineyard, drank of the wine, and was drunk—the first drunkard known to history. The new world gets a bad start.

It may be true, as is often assumed, that Noah was ignorant of the intoxicating properties of wine, though it is not easy to believe that the sons of Cain with their genius for discovery and invention and wickedness had no knowledge of the natural process of fermentation. In any case the narrative, with its unsparing fidelity to truth, discovers righteous Noah lying in a drunken stupor within his tent; while his youngest son mocked his nakedness and shame, and in the person of Canaan is pronounced accursed. A drunkard, a mocking son, a cursing father—this is unpromising material from which to fashion a new world. Scarcely have the waters of the deluge ceased to cover the earth before man turns again to sin.

Soon there fell upon man a second judgment, not now of destruction but of dispersion. Inevitably sin drives men asunder. They turn every one to his own way. And men shall never be united until they are all one in Christ. Over against the curse of Babel is set the promise of the cross—"I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto myself" (John xii. 32).

But no judgment can deter men from sin. Soon a new form of wickedness appears, more arrogant and presumptuous than any that had gone before. With all their ingenuity the sons of Cain have not exhausted the possibilities of evil. This new and deadly sin is idolatry. Hitherto men have been content to defy God, now they seek to dethrone Him. They fashion their own gods, and in place of the Maker of heaven and earth they set up images of wood and stone, bow down before them and worship them. It is clear that the most terrible judgments that God can inflict will not restrain men from the ways of sin. If mankind is not

to be left to perish in its guilt, some other way must be found. Judgment has its place, but judgment alone is not sufficient to accomplish the divine purpose. From the beginning judgment and grace have been blended in God's dealing with men. Thus far judgment has been more conspicuous, but mercy triumphs over judgment.

III. ABRAHAM, IN WHOM THE RACE IS REDEEMED

The new way begins with Abraham, in whom the race is redeemed. A new era opens with him. If the Jewish nation began with Moses, the Jewish race, the Jewish church began with Abraham. In him God chose a single people, separated them from the world, entered into covenant with them, revealed to them His will, committed to them His word, gave to them His Son. With Abraham the kingdom of God on earth enters upon the stage of regular, orderly, continuous development. He was the founder of the church in its organic, visible, enduring form. There were true worshipers before Abraham. There were those in his own day who served Jehovah. The mysterious figure of Melchisedec confronts us, of whom the writer to the Hebrews declared that he was greater than Abraham; for Abraham gave him tithes and received his blessing; and "without any dispute the less is blessed of the better" (Heb. vii. 7). But Melchisedec exercised no influence upon the fortunes of mankind, fills no important place in history; as according to the record he had no ancestry so he left no spiritual posterity—a figure majestic but solitary. Not in character, in influence, in the place he holds in the unfolding of the kingdom of God, is he pronounced greater than Abraham; but only in his typical significance—only as he foreshadowed the Christ who is both Priest and King.

How great was this man Abraham who bears the titles, Father of the faithful and Friend of God. "They who are of faith, the same are sons of Abraham" (Gal. iii. 7), whether under the old covenant or the new. "If ye are Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, heirs according to promise" (Gal. iii. 29).

The great event in Abraham's life was the call to leave his home, and journey to the land of Canaan. The name of Abraham is the greatest in the history of the church until the coming of Him whose name is above every name; and his call was the most momentous event in human history between the flood and the birth in Bethlehem. God separated Noah by destroying the world, He separated Abraham by calling him out of the world. There was danger that the knowledge of the true God should be lost in the flood of idolatry that overspread the earth. Abraham himself was reared in an idolatrous household. "Your fathers dwelt of old time beyond the River, even Terah, the father of Abraham, and the father of Nahor: and they served other gods" (Josh. xxiv. 2). When Abraham turned his face toward Canaan, the first of that great company who have left home and kindred for conscience' sake, he bore in his own person the fortunes of the kingdom of God. Through him was the knowledge of the truth preserved; and the three great religions which maintain the unity of God, the Jewish, the Christian, the Mohammedan, all derive their descent from him.

Eleven chapters are devoted to the earlier history of the race. All the remainder of Scripture, Old and New Testament alike, is the story of the seed of Abraham, his seed according to the flesh, and his seed according to the Spirit.

The Promise given to Abraham was threefold: (a) the land of Canaan was given to him and to his seed for an everlasting possession. (b) his seed shall be multiplied as the dust of the earth, as the stars of the heaven; (c) "in thee, in thy seed, shall all the families of the earth be blessed" (xii. 3; xxii. 18).

Noah was called out of the world that the world might be destroyed; Abraham was called out of the world that the world might be saved. The immediate purpose of his call was to save him from the world, the ultimate purpose was to save the world through him.

Observe how the promise of the seed of the woman keeps

narrowing down, through Abraham, through Isaac, through Jacob, through Judah, through David, to Christ.

What was the Sign granted to Abraham? Circumcision was established as the token of the covenant. It signified separation, consecration. But the promise given to Abraham was a promise of worldwide blessing. That promise is fulfilled in Christ. Is there a sign that answers to the promise? Separation, and the circumcision by which it was signified, were only for a time. Abraham was called out of the world that all the world might be blessed in him. There is a sign that answers to this promise. It was the sign of Isaac his son stretched upon the altar, and delivered in the instant of death.

"Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day", said Jesus to the Jews; "and he saw it, and was glad" (John viii. 56). Upon what occasion this vision of the Coming One was granted to Abraham we are not told. But the event to which it naturally belongs was the offering of his son to God. In that hour we may believe, Abraham caught a glimpse of the heavenly Father, who should offer his Son a sacrifice for the sin of the world. His faith did not falter, nor his obedience fail, in presence of the sorest trial that human hearts may know. God's covenant was made with him in Isaac, and now Isaac is to be put to death. How then shall the covenant be fulfilled? He did not know. He believed and obeyed, "accounting that God is able to raise up, even from the dead" (Heb. xi. 19). It was a bold flight of faith. The resurrection of the dead had never been known since the world began. No promise of it was given. But Abraham believed that in some way the covenant would be kept even though Isaac should be slain. And his faith was rewarded by the vision of the Savior. Through his own experience he was drawn into sympathy with the heart of God, and caught a glimpse of the depths of that divine love from which his own father-love was kindled. The altar that he built for Isaac was a sign of the cross. Isaac was a type of Christ—the only son of prom-

ise, heir of the covenant, offered in sacrifice, accepted of God, restored to life.

The dominant note of this section is redemption. Mankind shall be blessed in Abraham, and his seed shall possess the earth. Sin, judgment, salvation, are the great themes with which the book of Genesis is concerned.

The remaining history, however interesting and important, is only the unfolding of the covenant made with Abraham. Isaac and Jacob and Joseph simply continue the line of development which began with him.

We have then, as our analysis of the book, three men, three events, three promises, three signs. There is Adam, father of the race; the fall; the promise of the seed of the woman; the flaming sword, sign of a lost paradise. There is Noah, father of the new world; the flood; the promise of safety; the rainbow, sign of a spared world. There is Abraham, father of the faithful; the call; the promise of worldwide blessing; the offering and deliverance of Isaac, the sign of a coming Savior. In each case the promise answers to the need. To Adam in his sin is given the promise of a Savior; to Noah under the shadow of a great judgment the promise of safety; to Abraham separated from the world the promise of worldwide blessing. Here is man fallen, punished, redeemed. Here is God, Creator, Judge, Savior. How poor and weak is man as he appears upon these earliest pages of history, yet of what immeasurable capacity for good as for evil. What he is we see, but it doth not yet appear what he shall be. How just and holy and good is God, who will by no means clear the guilty, whose judgments are swift and sure and terrible; yet He is long-suffering, merciful, gracious, and has found a way, though at infinite cost, to save guilty and rebellious man.

To Him be all the praise.

Harrisburg, Pa.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

MISCONCEPTION OF JESUS, AND BLASPHEMY OF THE SON OF MAN

It is, perhaps, not always appreciated how great a popular excitement was roused when, as Mark puts it, "after that John was delivered up, Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the Gospel of God, and saying, The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God is at hand" (Mk. i. 14, 15). It is not the fault of the Evangelists if it is not fully understood. Mark, for example, adverts no less than eight times before he reaches the middle of his third chapter to the enthusiasm which attended Jesus wherever He appeared. We shall perceive how nearly this constitutes the main subject of these opening chapters of his Gospel, if we will but read consecutively the passages in which it is spoken of. "And the report of Him went out straightway everywhere into all the region of Galilee round about" (i. 28). "And at even when the sun did set they brought unto Him all that were sick, and them that were possessed with devils. And all the city were gathered together at the door" (i. 32, 33). "And they found Him and say unto Him, All are seeking Thee" (i. 37). "Insomuch that Jesus could no more openly enter into a city, and was without in desert places; and they came to Him from every quarter" (i. 45). "And when He entered again into Capernaum after some days it was noised that He was in the house. And many were gathered together so that there was no longer room for them, no, not even about the door . . . and when they could not come nigh Him for the crowd, they uncovered the roof where He was" (ii. 1, 2, 4). "And He went forth again by the seaside, and all the multitude resorted unto Him" (ii. 13). "And Jesus with His disciples withdrew to the sea; and a great multitude from Galilee followed: and from Judea, and from Jerusalem, and from Idumea, and beyond Jordan, a great multitude hearing what great things He did, came unto Him. And He spoke to His disciples that a little boat should wait on Him because

of the crowd, lest they should throng Him" (iii. 7-9). "And He cometh into a house, and the multitude cometh together again, so that they could not so much as eat bread" (iii. 20).¹ We may almost fancy that we can observe the crowds which thronged Jesus ever increasing in number and persistency under our eyes: they gather at the door (i. 32-34); there is no longer room even at the door (ii. 2); they are so continually with Him that He has no opportunity even to eat (iii. 20). But we note that, already at i. 45 (*cf.* i. 37), they had not only made the city inaccessible to Him, but had populated the very desert to which He withdrew; and at iii. 9 (*cf.* iv. 1) they so thronged Him even on the open sea-shore as to compel Him to take refuge in a boat and speak to them thence. The agency by which this great public agitation was created was not merely the proclamation that the Kingdom of God was at hand, but the manifestation of its actual presence in the abounding miracles of healing which were performed (Mat. xii. 28, Lk. xi. 20).² Disease and death must have been almost eliminated for a brief season from Capernaum and the region which lay immediately around Capernaum as a center. No wonder the public mind was thrown into a state of profound perturbation, and, the enthusiasm spreading, men flocked from every quarter to see this great thing, questioning with one another what it all meant.

Meanwhile, there were necessarily many who were not drawn into the movement but remained rather, whether momentarily or permanently, merely spectators of it. Of these there were in particular two classes who nevertheless could not look with indifference upon the wave of popular

¹ So, consecutively, iv. 1, v. 21, 24, 27, 31, vi. 34, vii. 24, 33, viii. 1, ix. 14, 25, x. 1, 4, 6.

² *Cf.* E. von Dobschütz, *The Expositor*, VII. ix (1910), p. 334: "This 'is come' (ἐφθаве) must mean something more than the usual 'is at hand' (ἤγγικεν); it is the solemn declaration that the Kingdom is present in Jesus' activity; His casting out of devils proves that the powers of the Kingdom are at work." *Cf.* also H. J. Holtzmann, *Synoptiker*,³ p. 243.

excitement sweeping through the land as it rose to its crest. These were those who felt responsible for Jesus Himself on the one hand, and on the other those who felt responsible for the religion of the community,—for we must bear in mind that the movement was from first to last a distinctly and intensely religious one. The circle of Jesus' relations (perhaps we may take the word for the moment in a rather broader sense than that of its current usage) and the body of the constituted religious guides of the people must each have been compelled to form at once a preliminary judgment upon the movement, and to act upon it. Nor was it likely that in either case this judgment would be favorable. Inevitably, in each case alike, it would be the expression of anxiety not to say of irritation. It is this natural judgment of what we may call the two interested classes that Mark records for us when, as he tells of the concourse of the crowd again to Jesus on His return to Capernaum after His second circuit in Galilee (Mk. iii. 20), he adds: "And when His relations heard it, they came forth to take charge of Him, for they said, He is out of His mind. And the scribes who came down from Jerusalem said, He hath Beelzebul, and it is by the prince of the demons that He casteth out the demons" (Mk. iii. 21, 22). The two judgments are as opposed as are the springs of emotion out of which they rise. It is pity that we hear the echoes of in the one; anger in the other. Jesus' relations, who, it must be observed, had a mere hearsay knowledge of the movement which was sweeping over Galilee in His train—He had not yet been to Nazareth (Mk. vi. 1),³—judged from the reports of His conduct which had reached them that He was not altogether Himself, and were prepared to take the responsibility of restraining Him. The scribes, who had heard His words and witnessed His works, could not deny that a supernatural power was operative among them; but, being unwilling to accredit this to a divine, ascribed it rather to a

³ Lk. iv. 16ff. seems to be a different visit (implied also in Mt. iv. 12, 13) which took place before His Galilean ministry had fairly begun (*cf.* Meyer, on Mt. xiii. 53).

demoniac source, and thus sought to break the influence of Jesus with the people. The two have in common only that they pass an unfavorable judgment upon the movement as a whole.

The naturalness of this unfavorable judgment in each case,⁴ in the circumstances in which it was formed, has not prevented its being appealed to, in each instance, in disproof of the supernaturalness of Jesus' person and ministry. It is urged that, if Jesus was really a divine person and His ministry was accompanied by obviously supernatural effects, such as are narrated in the Gospels, it would be inconceivable that those who stood nearest to Him and knew Him best, should have pronounced Him out of His mind. And it is urged again that, in His defence of Himself from the charge of the scribes that He was possessed of a demon and wrought His wonders by the power of the evil one, Jesus so far from asserting that He was a divine person actually contrasts Himself with the divine Spirit as one to speak against whom were a venial sin while to speak against the Spirit is unpardonable blasphemy—obviously because the Spirit is divine. That we may form a right estimate of these representations, we should look a little closely at the relevant passages.

I

It is Mark alone who tells us of the judgment passed upon Jesus by His relations. The words in which he does it are these: "And He cometh home, and the crowd cometh together again, so that they were not able even to eat bread. And when His relations heard it they came forth to take charge of Him; for they said, He is out of His mind."

The opening words, which we have rendered: "And He cometh home," are translated by many rather: "And He

⁴ Cf. A. Schweitzer, *The Expositor*, November 1913, p. 449, who remarks of them: "This only means, however, that the former [the scribes] wished at all costs to discredit Him with the people, and that His relations noticed a change in Him and could not understand how He could come forward as a teacher and prophet."

cometh into a house."⁵ This statement is then explained as the fundamental statement of the passage, preparing the way, and setting the scene, for the whole remainder of the chapter. Thus a certain emphasis is made to fall on Jesus' actual entrance into a house. We certainly should not in this case, however, expect the ambiguous simple *ἐρχομαι* to be used,—the *εἰς* following which might indeed be ordinarily best rendered "to" (compare "unto," Mat. ii. 11, viii. 14, ix. 23, 28, Mk. i. 29, etc.). His actual entrance into the house may thus even be left in some doubt (compare Mk. v. 38, 39: "and they come to the house . . . and entering it . . ."). The more precise *εἰσερχομαι* we may feel sure would have been employed had this been the meaning which was intended to be conveyed, especially if the emphasis which is assumed in the interpretation in question falls upon it (compare Mt. x. 12, xii. 4, 29, Mk. ii. 20, iii. 27, vi. 10, vii. 17, 24, ix. 28, Lk. ix. 4). Moreover it is not easy to find an adequate reason in the immediate context for so formal a statement that Jesus did so simple a thing as to "come into a house". We may say⁶ that Jesus went into a house obviously to seek rest and to take food (verse 20): but his need of these things seems to supply no sufficient reason for so formal a record of so slender a circumstance as His going into a house. It is customary, therefore, to go further afield and to seek the real reason of the record in the preparation it gives for the subsequent narrative, the eye being particularly fixed on the statement of verse 31, that His mother and brothers "stood without."⁷ Thus, however, an extraordinary method of

⁵ James Moffat, who in 1901 (*The Historical New Testament* p. 280), had correctly rendered: "Then He comes home," has substituted for this in 1913 (*The New Testament: A New Translation*): "They went indoors." This would exactly render the words in a different context: and the implication of "home" is in it. But it misses the point here.

⁶ With B. Weiss (1878).

⁷ B. Weiss *in loc.*: "He goes into a house, because it was in a house that the incident took place which the narrative has in mind (cf. verse 31)" (Meyer on Mark, ed. 6, 1878); "Emphasized in con-

composition is ascribed to the evangelist. We are to suppose that, having begun an account of Jesus' relations to His family with iii. 20, 21, Mark suddenly breaks off and thrusts in a long account of His relations with the scribes, only to return without warning again to His family at iii. 31, leaving all the sutures unclosed. We are to treat the whole narrative enclosed in verses 22-30, in other words, as a parenthesis, and to expound verses 20, 21 immediately in connection with verses 31ff., as if the intermediate section were not there—although it grows naturally out of, and forms a natural whole with, verses 20, 21.⁸

Such results as these would seem to be a sufficient indication that a false start has been taken when we render the opening clause: "And He cometh into a house." In point of fact the phrase may in itself just as well mean: "And He cometh home" (compare viii. 3, 26 with defining pronouns and ii. 1, v. r. pregnantly with verb of rest: vii. 17,

trast to His sojourn at the sea-side or on the mountain-top (verses 7, 13), because the scene, iii. 31 ff. takes place in a house and Mark wishes to prepare for this," (Meyer on Mark, ed. 8, 1892; ed. 9, 1901); "Prepares for the narrative of iii. 31 ff., which what immediately follows, therefore, only introduces," (*Die vier Evangelien*, 1900, p. 186.)

* The difficulties arising from this construction become flagrantly apparent in the course of A. Loisy's skilful efforts to overcome them (*Les Synoptiques*, I. pp. 696 ff.): "To consider only the present order of the texts, it might be said that Mark, having deliberately neglected (not been ignorant of) a fact which did not have in itself any particular prominence, substituted for it, in preparation for an incident which he intended to recount after the discourse of the Saviour [to the scribes], the mention of a judgment passed upon Jesus by His own family, which, though less unfavorable than that of the Pharisees, does not fail to exhibit in a sufficiently startling light, the relations of the new preacher with His own people. The *mise en scène* is the sufficiently natural preamble of the incident concerning the family of Jesus: what is secondary is the connection of the disputation with this incident and the artifice which has permitted Mark to neglect the teaching of the possessed man which in the common source of the Synoptics served as the introduction to the disputation. . . . What is said of the family does not attach itself without some embarrassment to the context: but this is a piece of unskilfulness which belongs to the redaction, arising possibly from the fact that the preamble, though conceived with a view to the anecdote, does not belong to the traditional basis of the narrative."

ix. 28 where *εἰς οἶκον* is connected with *εἰσερχομαι*, are different—render “indoors”); and this sense is strongly recommended by the context. Jesus had been at the sea-side (verse 7) and on the mountain (verse 13): He now returns “home,” that is to say, to Capernaum (compare i. 21, ii. 1). The narrative is composed of circuits out from Capernaum and returns to Capernaum, as the center of Jesus’ active work: this is one of the points at which His return to His base of operations is intimated, and, as on the former occasions (i. 32, ii. 3; compare i. 45 where R.V.mg. questions whether *εἰς πόλιν* may not be “the city,” as indeed A.V. had boldly translated it⁹), the crowd immediately gathers. In this case, the close connection which has been assumed between iii. 20 and iii. 31 falls away; the misleading prominence into which the simple opening statement of verse 20 has been thrown is removed; and that statement resumes its natural place as only one of the numerous intimations in this narrative of Jesus’ alternating excursions from Capernaum and returns to it (i. 21-35; ii. 1-13; iii. 1-7; iii. 20; iv. 1).

The chief interest of this determination lies in its bearing on the interpretation of the phrase in verse 21 which we have translated “His relations”. If verses 20, 21 were not written specifically in preparation for verses 31ff; verses 22-30 are not a parenthesis; and verses 31-35 record a new incident: then the phrase “His relations” in verse 21 does not find its explanation in “His mother and His brothers” of verse 31—as is very commonly represented—but must be independently interpreted. This phrase,¹⁰ in Greek

⁹Render “into town”.

¹⁰For discussions of the meaning of the phrase, see especially Fritzsche *in loc.* and F. Field, *Notes on the Translation of the N. T.*, p. 25 (he argues for the meaning “household”). For the usage of the phrase in the papyri, see J. H. Moulton, *The Expositor*, VI, vii, p. 118, viii, p. 436; *Prolegomena*, etc., pp. 106-7; *The Expository Times*, xx, p. 476. At *Prolegomena*, pp. 106-7, he says: “Οἱ παρ’ αὐτοῦ is exceedingly common [in the papyri] to denote ‘his agents’ or ‘representatives.’ It has hitherto been less easy to find parallels for Mk. iii. 21 where it must mean ‘his family’; see Swete and Field *in loc.* We

writers generally, bears ordinarily the meaning of "legates", "representatives", and it still commonly occurs in the papyri in the sense of "agents," "representatives." By the side of this usage, however, there is found another, less common but nevertheless constant, in which it bears the sense, either broadly of "adherents", "followers", or more narrowly of "household", "family" or kindred". It is obvious that it is in this latter general sense that it is employed in our passage, but it is not easy to fix the exact limits of its connotation. That Jesus' disciples—His adherents, followers—are not intended, is clear, since a contrast is drawn with them (verse 20, *αὐτοῖς*). Our English versions—Authorized and Revised,—render the term "friends," not badly if it be taken, as it obviously is intended to be, in a personal, rather than an official sense.¹¹ The margin of the Authorized Version proposes instead the narrowed "kinsmen," following in this the Wycliffite "kynnesmen" and the Genevan "kynesfolkes". The modern versions continue the same line: George R. Noyes, "relations"; James Moffat, 1901, "relatives"; *Twentieth Century New Testament*, "relations"; Samuel Lloyd, "kinsmen"; James Moffat, 1913, "family".¹² It can scarcely be doubted that this is practically what is meant, though too restricted a sense should not be insisted upon.¹³ Obviously those are intended who bore such a relation to Jesus that they felt themselves responsible for Him, and that they would naturally be looked to by others to take charge of Him in the contin-

can now cite G H 30 (ii./B.C.) οἱ παρ' ἡμῶν πάντες, B U 998 (ii./B.C.) and Par. P. 36 (ii./B.C.)."

¹¹ F. C. Conybeare, *Myth, Magic and Morals*, 1909, p. 72 insists *suo more* that the rendering "friends" is a "falsification of the text" with the intention of "deceiving English readers who cannot read Greek". The rebuke administered to him by J. H. Moulton, *The Expository Times*, xx, p. 476, is richly deserved.

¹² But Weymouth, *The Modern Speech New Testament*, retains the A. V., "friends." Weizsäcker renders "die Seinigen"; Th. Zahn, *Forschungen*, etc. VI, p. 332, "die Angehörigen," as also P. W. Schmiedel, *cf.* note 40 below.

¹³ *Cf.* Swete's note.

gency of His needing to be kept under some restraint. We might think, in the varying circumstances which would render each natural, of His clansmen, of His fellow-townsmen, of His responsible friends, of His blood-kinsmen, of His household, of His family, of His parents, of His brothers.¹⁴ In the absence of closer contextual definition, only the known circumstances of Jesus' case could supply us with confident guidance in fixing upon the precise persons intended. All that is intimated here is that His natural guardians were inclined to judge Him to be out of His mind, and were prepared to take measures to put Him under the restraint required by His sad condition. Who these natural guardians were we can only conjecturally supply from our further knowledge. There are some who feel quite sure that His mother could not be included among them, because they find it difficult or impossible to believe that she should have so cruelly misjudged Him.¹⁵ There are others, on the contrary,¹⁶ who are prepared to assert confidently, if not even violently, that His mother was included among them; sometimes, apparently, for no other reason than that thus the passage may be exploited as inconsistent, say, with the representations of the Infancy-chapters of Matthew and Luke or in general with the doctrine of the supernatural origin of Jesus. Too great confidence on either part seems misplaced. The passage itself gives us no guidance; and general considerations appear indecisive.

It is important to observe, however, that the judgment formed as to His condition by Jesus' friends or kinsfolk—according to our broader or narrower understanding of the phrase—was founded on hearsay evidence only. "When His relations *heard* . . .", we read. The meaning can

¹⁴ Theophylact defines: οἱ οἰκεῖται αὐτοῦ, with οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς πατρίδος and οἱ ἀδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ as alternatives.

¹⁵ Th. Zahn, *Forschungen*, etc., VI, p. 332: "We are scarcely to think of Mary among them . . . the word, ἐξέστη, is not suitable in the mouth of the mother, and the intention to use physical force against the madman is attributable only to the men not to the women."

¹⁶ Conybeare, as above.

hardly be, merely, that as soon as they heard that He had come home, they went forth to lay hands on Him. Nor does it seem likely that the meaning is merely that they went forth to lay hands on Him when they heard that, on His coming home, a multitude had gathered about Him. The article before "multitude" is probably genuine; and, if genuine, should not be neglected. And, in any event, the "again" has its rights. What appears to be meant is that His relations were moved to their action by the reports which reached them of the great excitement that had been raised by His ministry throughout Galilee, a culminating manifestation of which was seen in this renewed gathering of the crowd at His house.¹⁷ The reports which had reached them of the thronging multitudes that attended His whole work in Galilee and of the popular enthusiasm which followed His movements, led them to suppose Him to be laboring under over-excitement and to undertake the duty of putting Him under restraint.

If His friends, however, had not themselves witnessed His work and knew of its effects only from hearsay, it is not likely that they were living in Capernaum which was the center of His activity and the seat of the most constant popular enthusiasm. On the other hand, in His circuits out from Capernaum He had not yet visited Nazareth (Mk. vi. 1, Mt. xiii. 54).¹⁸ If Nazareth was the home of His friends here mentioned, therefore, their dependence on rumor for knowledge of His work and its effects, is in harmony with what we read in Lk. iv. 23ff.,¹⁹ Mk. vi. 5, Mt. xiii. 58. It is, indeed, frequently supposed that not Jesus alone, but His

¹⁷ Cf. A. B. Bruce, *in loc.*: "not to be restricted to what is mentioned in verse 20; refers to the whole Galilean ministry with its cures, and crowds, and constant strain."

¹⁸ We have already noted (note 3) that Luke iv. 16ff. seems to record an earlier visit to Nazareth before His systematic Galilean ministry had begun. Besides Meyer's note at Mt. xiii. 53-58 (E. T. p. 372) cf. Godet's notes on Lk. iv. 23 (E. T. I, p. 238) and John ii. 12 (E. T. II, p. 19). Luke iv. 23 of course offers a difficulty for this view.

¹⁹ Cf. Godet, I, 237: "This speech betrays an ironical doubt respecting these marvellous things which were attributed to Him."

family also, had removed from Nazareth to Capernaum at the very beginning of His ministry (Jno. ii. 12).²⁰ This, however, is little likely in itself; ²¹ and it would compel us to suppose either that their settlement at Capernaum was quickly abandoned ("and they remained there not many days"²²), or that by Jesus' friends in our present passage, not "His mother and His brethren and His disciples" are intended, but some broader circle of those responsible for Him. If Jesus' "friends" in the responsible sense of our passage were dwelling in Capernaum—especially if these "friends" be understood as precisely His mother and brothers, constituting His "household"—it would be inexplicable that His returning "home" should not have been to their house; and not only would their personal lack of acquaintance with His work or movements ("when they heard") be inexplicable, but the action ascribed to them ("they went forth") would be inappropriate. It would seem that we must think of the "friends" in question as living somewhere out of the path of His work hitherto, and away from the "home" to which He returned from the sea-side and mountain-top. The elimination of His disciples—who belonged to the party which returned from Cana—from the "friends" of our present passage is not only required by the situation in our passage itself, but is in harmony with the statement of Jno. ii. 11, that they already believed in Him. For, a certain measure of unbelief is, of course, implied in the judgment passed on Him by His "friends" here. If His brothers are meant, as seems intrinsically probable, this is in harmony with Jno. vii. 5, from which we learn that they remained unbelieving until the end.²³ The phrases of Jno.

²⁰ So Wieseler, De Wette, Tholuck, Ewald: cf. esp. Th. Zahn, in *loc.* (p. 163 and note 3) and *Forschungen*, VI, p. 331.

²¹ Cf. Meyer's note on Jno. ii. 12 (E.T. I, p. 149).

²² Cf. Westcott's note on Jno. ii. 12: "This is perhaps mentioned to show that at present Capernaum was not made the permanent residence of the Lord, as it became afterwards."

²³ Cf. Swete's note: "The family of Jesus was doubtless inspired by a desire for His safety, but their interpretation of His enthusiasm implied want of faith in Him, cf. Jno. vii. 5; the Mother perhaps was overpersuaded by the brethren."

vii. 3-5 form, indeed, a very pungent commentary on our passage.

The measure of the unbelief—we designedly use the milder term, instead of the stronger, “disbelief”—which is implied in the judgment and action of Jesus’ “friends” recorded in our passage is deserving of some consideration. That we may form an estimate of it it would be well to ascertain with some exactness what is really meant by the term, “He is beside Himself.” Many insist that there is no real difference between this judgment upon Jesus and that expressed by the scribes in the words, “He hath Beelzebub” (verse 22).²⁴ Madness, it is urged, was explained as demoniacal possession, and to say that one was mad was all one with saying that he was possessed.²⁵ On the face of it, however, this view is untenable. Possession and insanity are not clearly identified in the Evangelical narratives. It is not even intimated that they were constantly associated.²⁶ In our present passage they even seem to be

²⁴ E.g. H. J. Holtzmann (p. 12), who remarks that Theophylact already explains correctly: δαίμονα ἔχει.

²⁵ Cf. E. Renan, *Vie de Jesus* 1863, p. 263, note 4 (E.T. of the twenty-third and final ed. 1913, p. 273, note 3): “This phrase ‘Thou hast a demon’ (Mt. xi. 18, Lk. vii. 33, Jno. vii. 20, viii. 48 ff., x. 21 ff.) should be rendered by ‘Thou art insane,’ as it is said in Arabic *medjnoun enté*. This verb, *δαμονᾶν* has also in the whole of classical antiquity the sense of ‘to be insane.’” In the text, however, it is said: “But here again the difficulties must not be exaggerated. The disorders explained by possessions were often very slight. In our day, in Syria, people are regarded as insane or possessed by a demon (the two notions are the same, *medjnoun*) who have only some little eccentricity (*bizarrierie*).”

²⁶ The physical accompaniment of possession mentioned in Mt. ix. 32, Lk. iv. 14 is only dumbness, in Mat. xii. 22, blindness and dumbness, in Lk. xiii. 10-17, curvature of the spine; Cf. also Mt. xv. 22, Mk. vii. 26, xvi. 9, Lk. iv. 33, viii. 2 in none of which cases is insanity indicated. Only in a single instance is mania expressly intimated, and that only by its contrasting state (Mk. v. 15, Lk. viii. 35, cf. 2 Cor. v. 13). W. M. Alexander, *Demonic Possession in the New Testament*, 1902, upholding the thesis that “all cases designated ‘demonic’ belong to the category ‘Lunacy or Idiocy’” (p. 147), establishes his diagnosis in only three cases (Mk. i. 21-26 = Lk. iv. 31-37; Mt. viii. 28-34 = Mk. v. 1-17, Lk. viii. 26-37; Mt. xvii. 14-20 = Mk. ix. 14-29, Lk. ix. 37-43);

expressly distinguished. Mark clearly desires to contrast the judgments passed on Jesus by His friends and His enemies, as, though both uncomprehending, yet the pitying and the condemnatory judgment. Even, however, should we identify all mental alienation with possession, the degree of alienation implied in any given instance would still remain undetermined; the effects of the possession would naturally be very varied, and might on occasion involve only the slightest, perhaps the most temporary unbalancing. In any case, therefore, we are thrown back upon what is actually said.

The term employed²⁷ in the present passage is not a strong one and need not imply a serious state of mental disturbance. The fundamental implication of the word is no more than that the subject is thrown out of his normal state into a condition of strong, perhaps ungovernable, emotion. The emotion in question may be of the most varied kind, but commonly in the New Testament usage of the word (uniformly except for our present passage and 2 Cor. v. 13) it is that of amazement, perhaps with a suggestion of bewilderment.²⁸ In the special usage

and in two of these only with difficulty and at the cost of the enlargement of the category of "lunacy" by the addition of "and idiocy." He then applies this diagnosis, without express warrant from the text, to all other cases of possession. John x. 20 need not be read as identifying all possession with lunacy, but may only identify this particular case of lunacy with possession as its cause: cf. Jno. vii. 20, viii. 48.

²⁷ J. H. Heinrich Schmidt in § 174 of his *Synonymik der Griechischen Sprache* deals with the terms which designate a perverted state of mind (he had dealt in § 147 with these which express a mental deficiency, especially ἀφρων and ἄνους). He divides them into three groups: (1) Words which in the first instance designate the violent utterances of a disturbed mind; (2) words which express more the inward disorder by which the soul is carried away by senseless passions; (3) words which rather describe the soul which thinks and feels in a disturbed manner. Ἐξίστημι (ἔκστασις) is not included in his lists; but this may be in part because he leaves to one side such terms as require the addition of a φρενός or φρενῶν, or some contextual indication, to define the meaning; and confines himself to such as bear in themselves their significance.

²⁸ Mt. xii. 23; Mk. ii. 12, v. 42, vi. 51; Lk. ii. 47, viii. 56, xxiv. 22;

illustrated by our present passage (*cf.* 2 Cor. v. 13), in which it expresses that state of mental aberration which we also describe as "not one's self", it need not import more than an overwrought condition in which it might be thought that the prudent conduct of life would be unlikely and could become impossible. In this general sense, it occurs nowhere else in the New Testament except in 2 Cor. v. 13, where (to say nothing of demoniacal possession) it certainly does not suggest either raving madness or irrational insanity, but describes on the contrary an ecstatic state in which the Apostle saw a ground for much glorying (xii. 1).²⁹ We need not imagine, then, that Jesus' friends saw in Him a maniac; we need only understand,—what surely would not be unnatural in men who had as yet at least no sense of the nature of His mission—that they were led by the reports which had come to them to believe that He was in a state of exaltation which endangered His health and safety and needed some soothing hand to guard Him from Himself.³⁰

Acts ii. 7-12, viii. 9, 11, 13, ix. 21, x. 45, xii. 16 = "amazed"; Mk. iii. 21, 2 Cor. v. 13 = "demented". *Cf.* ἑκστασις: Mt. v. 42, xvi. 8; Lk. v. 20; Acts iii. 10 = "amazement"; Acts x. 10, xv. 5, xxii. 17 = "trance". *Cf.* Art. "Amazement" in Hastings' *DCG*.

²⁹ *Cf.* C. F. G. Heinrici, *Das zweite Sendschreiben des Apostel Paulus an die Korinther*, 1887, pp. 227f.: "The fundamental sense of ἐξίστημι, to be out of oneself, as this is brought about through the experience of an overmastering impression, makes the word equally suitable for describing conditions of very high emotions, like amazement, joy, terror; and emotions which lie beyond the limits of sound mental life (ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι . . . ἐντὸς ἑαυτοῦ γίνεσθαι), whether of the nature of insanity or of rapture. In the latter sense σωφρονεῖν is the technical contrast to ἐκστῆναι, and it is accordingly introduced here for the purpose of indicating experiences which had for the Apostle a significance similar to that of the rapture which is described later. In this connection the expression then suggests that ecstatic conditions which remain, in their content and source, obscure for the estimate of all others, cannot be the subject of boasting before others . . . The key to the full understanding of the contrast of ἐκστῆναι and σωφρονεῖν is supplied, however, only by the detailed description of the ecstasy in the polemic concluding sections, which has been mentioned, (xii. 1) . . ."

³⁰ *Cf.* A. Loisy, *Evang. Synopt*, I, p. 698: "They do not say that—"

That they felt His condition to be serious, may be inferred from the fact that they were prepared "to lay hold upon Him". Yet exaggeration must be shunned here too. The term, no doubt emphasises in its ground-idea the thought of force, even of violence; but, beginning thus with the notion of taking forcible possession of, it came to be employed also of simply taking possession of, with the idea of force quite out of sight, and ended by meaning merely to obtain, to get (Acts xxvii. 13), and, indeed, merely to cling to (Mat. xxviii. 9, Acts iii. 11), to retain, to hold (Mat. vii. 3, 4, 8, 9, 10). There is no need in our present passage to emphasise the idea of violence, as if His kinsmen wished "to seize" Jesus.³¹ Even "to lay hold upon Him" is too strong a rendering. "To get Him" is nearer to what it intended; and the idea is not so much to put Him in ward as to take Him in charge. Of course, the idea of compulsion underlies everything: His relations were acting under the impression that He was in need of kindly control and were prepared to protect Him from Himself. But it is the idea of protection which dominates the statement, rather than that of compulsion.

Jesus had lost His mind, the word which the Evangelist employs not having this precise meaning in the usage of the New Testament, but being used to designate every transport of astonishment, of admiration, of stupor, of enthusiasm; but they believed Him to be in a state of mystical exaltation, which made Him lose the real sense of life and of His own condition." A. B. Bruce, *in loc.*, goes to an extreme when he says: "In the opinion of His friends, He was in a state of excitement bordering on insanity." Perhaps the English word "transport" presents as fair a rendering of the term here as can be found.

³¹ H. J. Holtzmann: "Their purpose is to apprehend Him; to possess themselves of Him, κρατ. αὐτ., like vi. 17, xii. 12, xiv. 1; they would seek out the morbidly overstrained member of the family who had become strange and incomprehensible to them, and, no doubt for His own advantage, but still forcibly, withdraw Him from public life." Wohlenberg: "In order to seize Jesus (κρατῆσαι), to possess themselves of Him, if not to take Him into custody, yet in some sense forcibly to apprehend Him; cf. xii. 12, xiv. 1, 46." B. Weiss: "In order to apprehend Him, possess themselves of Him. . . . In spite of the strongly colored expression of Mk. we are by no means to think of a hostile act (Klostermann), but at the most of a kindly compulsion, which they thought to exercise in His own interest to protect Him in the keeping of the family from further crowding."

Such a judgment upon Jesus' activities, and such an attitude towards His person, were inevitable for those of His kindred who, feeling responsible for Him, were yet ill-informed concerning His person and work. There were some of His kindred, no doubt, to whom such a judgment and attitude would have been at this stage impossible. James and John were of His kindred,³² and there may have been others of those closest to Him who, with them, already, in the full sense of Jno. ii. 11, "believed on Him". But it is not necessary to pronounce this judgment of His work and attitude toward His person incompatible with any measure of faith in Him; or even with a high degree of faith in Him if imperfectly informed whether of what was to be expected of Him or of what He was actually doing. There is no compelling reason for insisting that His mother was of the number of those of whom it is said here that they were led to believe that He was "beside Himself" and in need of some protective care. But neither does there seem to be any compelling reason for assuming that she could not possibly be of their number.³³ Mary too (like John the Baptist, Mt. xi. 2ff.), may have had searchings of heart before she adjusted herself to the Great Reality; and, in the meantime, as she had exercised control over her son in His infancy (Lk. ii. 51), so in the first days of His ministry she may have fancied that she saw indications that He still required her motherly care. There would be implied in this, not "a total unbelief in His pretensions, but only an imperfect view of them".³⁴ Where no belief in

³² As Wohlenberg reminds us.

³³ So, e.g. Wohlenberg: "From all that we otherwise know of Mary, His Mother, it must be taken as absolutely excluded that she should come forward in any way antagonistically to Jesus."

³⁴ The words we have quoted are from the excellent comment of J. A. Alexander on Mk. iii. 21, where, however, he is speaking not of Mary but of Jesus' friends in general, to whom is to be attributed also absence or deficiency of faith. "This," says Alexander, was "a very natural and intelligible state of mind at this stage of the history, and on the part of those whose spiritual or religious feelings were less strong and well-defined than their natural affections or humanity." With Mary also in mind, he repeats in his comment on verse 31, that

His pretensions existed such an attitude towards Him as is here intimated, was, as we have said, not only natural but inevitable. His unbelieving brothers, however kindly, must have thought Him in some sense out of His mind, and must have faced the duty of casting around Him some protection.³⁵

Natural, however, as the judgment of Jesus and the attitude towards His person which are here recorded, are in the circumstances and to the persons to which they are ascribed, the critics have laid hold upon them as representing a point of view regarding Jesus, or at least regarding Mary, which is inconsistent with the supernaturalistic tradition of Jesus. On this ground they seek to account for the fact that this section appears in Mark's Gospel only. It was omitted by Matthew and Luke, they tell us, because not consonant with their point of view. In what respect Mark's point of view as to the person of Jesus, or his reverence for Jesus, differs from that of Matthew and Luke, it is meanwhile difficult to perceive. The mere presence of this passage in one of the Evangelists is proof enough that it contains nothing contradictory to the reverence for Jesus' person which is common to them all.³⁶ Nevertheless P. W. Schmiedel gives this passage a place among his nine "pillar-passages" which he pronounces absolutely credible, as preserving traditions of the real Jesus, precisely on the ground that they make assertions

"nothing could be more natural or pardonable than precisely such solicitude, which is perfectly compatible with true faith and affection, but imperfect views both of His person and mission."

³⁵ Cf. G. Salmon, *The Human Element in the Gospels*, 1907, p. 203: "To the Christian reader it is shocking that any one should be able to suppose that our Lord was out of His mind; yet, if we consider the circumstances, we perceive that the idea was one most likely to occur as it has often done since, when followers of His who were afterwards venerated as saints, had judgments passed on them by sensible men of the world. It is in itself perfectly credible that our Lord should have made the impression commonly produced by one who steps completely out of the beaten track."

³⁶ Cf. F. Loofs, *What is the Truth about Jesus Christ?* 1913, pp. 114 ff.; *Princeton Theological Review*, XI, 2 (April, 1913), pp. 254 ff.

about Jesus which could not have been invented by His worshipping followers, and must therefore have thrust themselves upon this or that Evangelist merely by the force of their undeniable authenticity. This is evidenced, he declares, by the fact that they have been omitted by others of the Evangelists as offensive to their reverence for Jesus.³⁷ On this view, Matthew and Luke are supposed to have had this statement before them and to have omitted it, because it seemed to them derogatory to Jesus' dignity that those nearest to Him should, even at the outset of His ministry, have been led to fear that He might be beside Himself; and Schmiedel labors³⁸ to show that Matthew's narrative, for example, retains signs of having been consciously adapted from Mark's. It is more usual, however, to suppose that Mark's statement has been omitted by the other Gospels (presumed to be later than Mark and to be in large part based on it) in the interests of growing reverence for Mary as the mother of our Lord, rather than directly of reverence for Jesus.³⁹ And, indeed, Schmiedel himself when dealing with the passage at large lapses into this point of view.⁴⁰ In a passage like this, it is suggested,

³⁷ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1881; cf. *Princeton Theological Review*, XI, ii (April, 1913), pp. 204 ff.

³⁸ Coll. 1847-1848.

³⁹ H. J. Holtzmann may serve as a typical instance (*Synoptiker* p. 68): "Mark in the most significant way stands alone with the notice in verse 21, since Matthew and Luke already are unable to reconcile themselves to this conception of Mary, and therefore the reparation to be spoken of at Lk. ii. 48." Accordingly at p. 323, he follows Pfleiderer in supposing that the "Behold thy father and I have sought thee" of Lk. ii. 48 is a reminiscence of Mk. iii. 32, "Behold thy Mother and thy brothers seek thee," and serves the further purpose of counteracting what is said in Mk. iii. 21 (not in Luke) together with its consequences in iii. 31-35 (Lk. xviii. 19-21) and to soften the shadow thrown by it on Mary.

⁴⁰ *Das vierte Evangelium gegenüber den drei ersten*, 1906, p. 18: "We must observe moreover the rôle which *Jesus' Mother* plays in the miracle at Cana. Although Jesus had never before worked a miracle (Jno. ii. 11) she knows beforehand that He is going to work one and says to the servants, although she is rebuffed by Him, 'Whatever He bids you, do.' How entirely different it is in Mark! Here (iii. 21) Jesus' kinsmen (*Angehörigen*) go out to lay hold of Him because they

Mark accordingly preserves an earlier and truer tradition of the attitude of Jesus' kinsfolk to His person and work than can be found in the later Gospels, whether John or Matthew and Luke. It must be borne in mind, however, that, according to John also, the brothers of Jesus did not believe in Him (Jno. vii. 6), and must therefore have held much the view of Him which is placed on the lips of Jesus' kinsmen in our present passage. The attitude of Mary towards Him alone, can come into question; and it is upon it, accordingly, that the contrast between Matthew and Luke, with their "Infancy chapters" in which Mary's supernatural information as to her son is exploited, and Mark, which has nothing of this kind, is insisted upon.

The whole case hangs on the suppositions that Mary was included among the kinsmen of Jesus mentioned in Mk. iii. 21, and that the judgment upon Jesus there ascribed to His kinsmen would be impossible to the Mary of the opening chapters of Matthew and Luke. We have seen that neither supposition is necessary, or, indeed, in the presence of any good reasons to the contrary, even reasonable. We may accept the statement of Mk. iii. 20, 21 as intrinsically self-evidencing and therefore "absolutely credible" as a genuine historical fact, without any fear of discrediting thereby either the Infancy chapters of Matthew and Luke or the historical tradition of the supernatural Jesus which constitutes the substance of all the Evangelical records. The attempts to account for the absence of this statement from Matthew and Luke as deliberate omission on dogmatic grounds are accordingly altogether ineffective and the endeavor to discover in the narratives of Matthew and Luke hidden signs of acquaintance with⁴¹ and conscious alteration

said, 'He is beside Himself.' Who these kinsmen were we very soon learn (iii. 31-35): His mother and His brothers come to Him and call Him out of the house. And it is only from their purpose to put a stop to His work and to confine Him to His home that His rude answer finds its explanation: 'Who is my mother and my brothers? He who does the will of God, the same is my brother and sister and mother.'"

⁴¹ We do not doubt that the incident recorded in Mark iii. 20-21 was

of Mark's text are too flimsy to justify notice. The entire fact is that we are indebted to Mark for a piece of information altogether natural in itself and consonant with the entire body of facts recorded in the other Evangelists, which nevertheless they do not also preserve for us. This might be inexplicable if we were compelled to suppose that each Evangelist has told us all he knew, or all he knew which he thought "fit to print". But it is just what we should expect on the supposition—which is the only tenable one—that each Evangelist, though serving himself, to a very great extent, with common sources of information, has yet set down in his Gospel from the general store, only what commended itself to him as suitable for his purpose and adapted to advance his particular object in writing.

The naturalness and, indeed, inevitableness of the judgment that Jesus was out of His mind on the part of men not ill-disposed towards Him but yet unable to accept His claims for Himself at their face value, is illustrated by the return to this judgment by a type of modern unbelief. A large literature has in recent years grown up around the suggestion that Jesus was more or less of unsound mind. Whether He is explained as a paranoëic lunatic or merely as a visionary ecstatic, it is inevitable that those who cannot see in Him the Divine Being He proclaimed Himself to be, should think His lofty estimate of Himself too lofty and should seek the account of His too lofty estimate of Himself in some—greater or less—mental derangement. We can scarcely look upon a like judgment among His contemporaries as strange when we are so familiar with it to-day; or urge its existence among His contemporaries as evidence of anything more than it witnesses to to-day. In simple fact, Jesus' career was not that of an ordinary man: and the dilemma is inevitable that He was either something more than a normal man or something less. We, like His contemporaries,—and His contemporaries like us—have known to the authors of both Matthew and Luke, as was much else which they (as writing freely, each for his own particular end) do not record.

only the alternatives: either supernatural or subnormal, either Divine or else "out of His mind".⁴²

II

It is again Mark alone who records the extreme expression of the hatred of the scribes towards Jesus in their ascription to Him of demoniacal possession.⁴³ All three of the Synoptics, however, report the charge made by His enemies that it was by the aid of Beelzebul, the prince of the demons, that He cast out demons.⁴⁴ The solemn warning against blasphemy against the Holy Spirit which Jesus founded upon this charge, occurs—in one form or another—in all three Gospels, though in this connection only in Matthew and Mark,⁴⁵ while in Luke it appears in another context.⁴⁶ As it is solely with this warning that we are now concerned, we transcribe it in its three forms. "Verily, I say unto you, All things shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, their sins, and their blasphemies wherewithsoever they shall blaspheme; but whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit hath never forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin. Because they said, He hath an unclean Spirit" (Mk. iii. 28-30). "And everyone who shall speak a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven unto him; but unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven" (Lk. xii. 10). "Therefore I say unto you, every sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men, but the blasphemy against the Spirit shall not be forgiven. And whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven unto him; but whosoever shall speak against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven unto him,

⁴² Cf. what is said with respect to W. Heitmüller's hesitations and difficulties in the *Princeton Theological Review*, XII, ii (April, 1914), pp. 315 ff.

⁴³ Mk. iii. 22-30; Cf. Jno. x. 20, vii. 20, viii. 48.

⁴⁴ Mt. xii. 22-27; Mk. iii. 22-30; Lk. xi. 14-23; the parallel, Mat. ix. 34 is not genuine.

⁴⁵ Mt. xii. 31, 32; Mk. iii. 28-30.

⁴⁶ Lk. xii. 10.

neither in this world nor in that which is to come" (Mat. xii. 31, 32).

Let us begin by looking at Mark's account.

Mark alone, as we have said, records the opprobrious judgment of the scribes upon Jesus and His work, that He was possessed by Beelzebul. This is formally due, probably, to the circumstance that Mark alone introduces his account of this incident in contrast with the judgment passed upon Jesus by His friends: here is the judgment passed upon Him by His enemies. It is intimated, however, that there is a closer connection between this opprobrious judgment of His enemies and Jesus' warning concerning blasphemy against the Spirit than merely that it formed the formal occasion of the discourse of which the warning is a part. Mark expressly tells us that it was precisely because the scribes attributed demoniacal possession to Him that Jesus was led to give His solemn warning (verse 30). That is to say, it was precisely in this ascription that their blasphemous words against the Holy Spirit culminated, or, at least, that their words approached most dangerously the unpardonable sin of blasphemy against the Spirit. It might infer a dangerous approach to blasphemy against the Spirit by whom He wrought His mighty works to say that He wrought them by means of Beelzebul. But He was able to argue that question. The assertion that He in whom the Holy Spirit dwelt beyond measure was possessed (instead) by an unclean Spirit, advanced so far beyond this, however, that not argument but quick warning was demanded.

The solemnity with which Mark represents Jesus as introducing the declaration regarding blasphemy is marked by its opening formula: "Verily, I say unto you . . . " And the weight given to it by this solemn opening formula is sustained throughout in the stately march of its words. The declaration begins with an impressive proclamation of the forgivableness, in the wide mercy of God, of all human sin. The words are so arranged as to throw the emphasis

upon the universality of this forgivableness:⁴⁷ "Verily, I say unto you, that *all things* shall be forgiven to the sons of men"—a solemn periphrasis for the mere "to men". Then this universal "all things" is more closely defined according to its nature, all "acts of sin;" and then the specific sins now more particularly in mind are brought to sight,—all "the blasphemies wherewithsoever they may blaspheme." The effect is to create a most moving sense of the amplitude of the divine forgiveness. All the acts of sin which the sons of men may commit; all the blasphemies wherewith they may blaspheme: all these may be forgiven. It is with the force of a great contrast that the single exception is then brought in: all, all is forgivable except this one thing: "But whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost"—the particular form of the designation is chosen which throws the emphasis on His quality of *holiness*⁴⁸—"hath not forgiveness". This was startling enough: but it is rendered even more so by the addition emphatically at the end, of the awful words—"for ever:" "hath not forgiveness—for ever". And then the already strained emphasis is still further enhanced by a repetition of the declaration of the hopelessness of this sin, in the negative form: "But is guilty of an eternal sin",—a sin, that is, which can never in all eternity be expiated or remitted. At the end, the Evangelist adds under the influence of the dread solemnity of the whole, the justification of this terrible warning. "Because," he says, "they said, He hath an unclean spirit." Because they accused Him of being possessed by an unclean spirit, He thus in awe-inspiring words warns them that blasphemy against that Spirit which is holiness itself, by whom He was really informed, is an eternally unforgivable sin.

The terms "blaspheme", "blasphemy", are obviously em-

⁴⁷ Meyer: "The order of the words places them so far apart as to place a great emphasis on πάντα." So also Weiss, Holtzmann and others.

⁴⁸ Τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον; cf. Swete *in loc.*: "The repeated article brings the holiness of the Spirit into prominence."

ployed in this passage in their highest sense of irreverent and impious speech with respect to the Divine Being. The words, no doubt, are capable of employment in a more general sense, to express any reviling or calumniating speech against men. They are actually used in this general sense in the New Testament, including (though with Jesus only as their object) the Synoptic Gospels (Mat. xxix. 39, Mk. xv. 29, Lk. xxii. 68, xxiii. 39). As the discourse of which it forms the climax has its start in a defamatory speech concerning Jesus, it might be colorably contended that they bear this more general sense in our passage.⁴⁰ But the extreme elevation of the language scarcely admits of this lower interpretation of the terms on which the whole turns as on its hinge. Why should such solemn assurance be given that among all the sins which will be forgiven the sons of men shall be included even (the "and" has a slight ascensive force) "the railings wherewith they may rail"—unless those "railings" possessed some special heinousness, as, for example, sins against the majesty of God? Otherwise, this sentence, in other respects so impressive in diction, would end on a sad anti-climax. It would be equivalent to saying: All their robberies and adulteries and murders shall be forgiven to men, yea even whatever bad language they may use. A similar incongruity would be created with the succeeding context, were the general sense of the terms insisted upon here. The heightening of the sin of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit would lose its force if the contrast against which it is thrown up were nothing more than detraction of our neighbors. The full effect of the passage becomes apparent only when we recognize that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is set as unforgivable over against other—not merely slanders but—veritable blasphemies, described as capable of being pardoned. Moreover the terms "to blaspheme", "blasphemy", when used absolutely, had acquired a technical meaning practically equivalent to these terms in our current Eng-

⁴⁰ They are so explained, for example, by Wellhausen *in loc.* A parallel to the passage so understood is found in 1 Sam. ii. 25.

lish,⁵⁰ and they cannot be taken in a lower sense here without violence. No simple reader could possibly understand them in any other sense than that of insults to the Divine Being.

It is, no doubt, a startling result of distinguishing blasphemy against the Holy Spirit from blasphemies against God in general, that thus the Holy Spirit is set over against God in general and blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is declared more unpardonable than general blasphemy against God. Startling as this result is, however, it must just be accepted; it is impossible to believe that the contrast in our passage lies only between blasphemy against God and slander against fellow-men—as if what were said were, You can calumniate your fellow-men and it may be forgiven, but if you blaspheme God there is no forgiveness—for ever. We must not be stumbled by the indications of a Trinitarian background in Jesus' speech. Such indications pervade His speech in much greater measure than is commonly recognized. They are present, indeed, in all the expressions of His divine self-consciousness, and we should not forget that it is in His words that the Trinitarian formula finds its most precise enunciation in the New Testament (Mt. xxviii. 19). Meanwhile, what is necessary to recognize at the moment is only that Jesus here declares that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit specifically, not blasphemy in general, is unforgivable; and that He declares this with an emphasis which can only be understood as singling this sin out among all sins as a sin of very singular heinousness. The reason of this seems to reside in the fact that the holiness of God is especially manifested in the Holy Spirit. His designation here is accordingly so phrased as to throw His holiness particularly into prominence: "But whosoever shall blaspheme against the Spirit, that Holy One."⁵¹ Because the holiness of God is peculiarly mani-

⁵⁰ The verb: Mt. ix. 3, xxvi. 65; Mk. ii. 7; Jno. x. 36, but *cf.* Lk. xxii. 65; and the noun: Mt. xii. 31, xxvi. 62; Lk. v. 21; Jno. x. 33, but *cf.* Mt. xv. 19; Mk. vii. 22.

⁵¹ Τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, not τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, as in Lk. xii. 10 or the

fested in the Spirit, whose very name is Holy,⁵² insulting words spoken against this Holy Spirit are a peculiarly heinous sin.

Mark reports only the contrast which Jesus drew between blasphemy of specifically the Holy Spirit and blasphemy in general. He communicates no specific declaration with respect to the pardonableness of blasphemy against Jesus' own person. The inference to be drawn from this omission may be variously conceived. It may be said that Jesus (according to Mark's conception) never thought of injurious words spoken against His person as "blasphemy". Conscious of His (mere, perhaps sinful) humanity, and setting Himself in all His thought in contrast with God, as a humble creature of His hands, He cannot speak of "blasphemy" with reference to Himself, but only with reference to God, inclusive of course of the Holy Spirit. He can contrast blasphemy against the Holy Ghost and blasphemy against God in general, but not "blasphemy" against Himself and blasphemy against God, the Holy Spirit. Or, more subtly seeking the same end—the presentation of Jesus as in His own estimate of Himself, merely a human being—it may be said that Jesus identifies here opprobrious words against Himself with blasphemy against the Holy Spirit and means to declare that they are the unpardonable sin.⁵³ The occasion of His remarks was the ascription to Him of demoniacal possession, and the attribution of His miracles

simple τὸ πνεῦμα of Mt. xii. 31 (but in the more emphatic repetition of verse 32 τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον as in Mk. iii. 29).

⁵² Cf. Is. lvii. 15.

⁵³ Cf. H. J. Holtzmann, *Synoptiker*³ 1901, p. 128: "Here, therefore, in contrast with Mt. xii. 32; Lk. xii. 10 the unforgivable sin consists precisely in blasphemy of Jesus, who, no doubt, possesses His power of exorcism through the Spirit, Mt. xii. 28." Similarly cf. P. W. Schmiedel, *Protestantische Monatshefte* II (1898) p. 304: "With Mark, blasphemy of the Messiah is thought to be by no means forgivable, since he expressly indicates (verse 30) as the occasion of the declaration, the contenton of the opponents from verse 22 that Jesus was in collusion with Beelzebub or even possessed by him, and therefore wishes to say that there lies in this a blasphemy of the Holy Spirit working in Jesus."

to Satanic agency. This He declares to be unpardonable blasphemy, because He really has within Him the Divine Spirit and works His miracles by the Spirit, that is to say, by "the finger" of God. To vilify Him is unpardonably to blaspheme the Holy Spirit within Him by whom all His works are wrought. That the injurious words spoken against Him when it was declared that He was possessed of a demon are represented by Him as blasphemy (or as coming very near to blasphemy) of the Holy Spirit is indeed clear: that is precisely what Mark affirms in verse 30. But this does not identify all opprobrious words against His person with blasphemy against the Holy Spirit: it rather distinguishes between His person and that of the Spirit, the point of the warning being that such words against Him as these particular words approached to the unpardonable sin because they expressly assailed not Him but the Spirit working in Him. In Mark's report, therefore, there is no express reference to blasphemy against the Son of Man and if it is included at all it must be included in the general reference to "the blasphemies wherewithsoever the sons of men blaspheme"; and these all, with the sole exception of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, are expressly declared to be forgivable. Since only blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is unpardonable, then, of course blasphemy against His own person is already declared to be pardonable and there is no clamant need of explicating further so obvious a fact. With this understanding of the implications of the passage it stands in harmony with the conception of Jesus' person which underlies the whole of Mark's Gospel (*cf. e.g.,* xiii. 32) and with the more explicated assertion of his companion Evangelists in this place, both of whom speak of a blasphemy of the Son of Man which—like these undefined blasphemies spoken of by Mark—is pardonable. Unless there is some decisive reason why this should not be included in these, it is only reasonable to see it in them.⁵⁴ Mark in that case does not explicitly adduce blas-

⁵⁴ *Cf. Meyer (E. T., I, p. 59):* "The less is it to be said that Mark places on a par the blasphemy against the Person of Jesus (Mt. xii.

phemy against the Son of Man as pardonable only because its pardonableness is already sufficiently asserted in the emphasized declaration that all blasphemies, with the sole exception of that against the Holy Spirit, are pardonable.

Let us now look somewhat closely at the reports of the other Evangelists.

Luke gives the declaration its most compressed form, and places it in a wholly different connection from that in which it appears in Mark and Matthew. It may well be, indeed, that he is recording a different utterance of Jesus' of the same general purport. There is no intrinsic reason why Jesus may not have made such a declaration more than once. In any event, however, the declaration given by Luke is of the same general contents as that given by Mark and Matthew.

It is not a little difficult to be quite sure of the exact reference of the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost which is spoken of in Luke's report. On the face of it the declaration is quite general, that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit shall not be forgiven; and no closer definition is supplied by the context. We may conjecture that the reference is to blasphemy of the Holy Spirit speaking in the disciples when put upon their trial (verses 11, 12),⁵⁵ or that the denial of the Son (verse 9) is here declared to be, when the act not of His enemies, but of His disciples, not merely "speaking a word against the Son of Man", but actually the unpardonable sin of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, operative in them.⁵⁶ But such conjectures have little to support them.

There is a certain parallelism between the two clauses of verse 10 and those of verses 8, 9, which may warrant us in taking the two pairs of antitheses together as alike under 31 f.) and that against the Holy Spirit (Köstlin, p. 318), or that he has 'already given up' the former blasphemy (Hilgenfeld). It is included in fact, in verse 28." This note is retained by Weiss.

⁵⁵ So J. Weiss. Cf. Th. Zahn who broadens it to include the whole witnessing work of the disciples.

⁵⁶ So Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis* II, 2, p. 342. Cf. especially G. L. Hahn's note.

the influence of the solemn opening phrase: "But I say unto you" (verse 8). In that case, we have here two combined encouragements and warnings:

(1a) "Every one who shall confess Me before men, him shall the Son of Man also confess before the angels of God:

(1b) But he that denieth Me in the presence of men, shall be denied in the presence of the angels of God.

(2a) And every one who shall speak a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him:

(2b) But unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven."

Thus a gnomic character attaches to these twin declarations which lends them great impressiveness and gives to each member of each of them almost equal force. We must, it seems, assume, then, that our Lord advancing, in verse 10, to the climax of His combined encouragement and warning, makes two declarations of generally equal importance,—that to wit, blasphemy against His own person will be forgiven, and blasphemy against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven. Closer definition wherein either blasphemy against His person or blasphemy against the Spirit consists is lacking, and would perhaps be out of place in such crisp, proverbial utterances.

We have spoken of "blasphemy" in both clauses, because it seems quite clear that the variation in their language, from "every one who *shall speak a word* against the Son of Man" in the former, to "to him who *blasphemeth* the Holy Ghost" in the latter, is without significance (cf. Mat. xii. 32, where "speak against" is common to both clauses).⁵⁷ Obviously the contrast between the two cases consists not in any difference in the nature of the offence committed, but in some difference in the persons against whom the

⁵⁷ Godet (E. T., II, p. 93) on the contrary emphasises the difference, as if the forgivableness of the "speaking a word against" the Son of Man depended on the precise point that this was not a "blasphemous" word.

offence is committed. What is in effect declared is that an offence will be forgiven when committed against the Son of Man which will not be forgiven when committed against the Holy Spirit. There is undoubtedly suggested here a certain subordination of the Son of Man to the Holy Spirit,—if we cannot say exactly in dignity of person, yet in the heinousness of the sin of blasphemy when committed against the two respectively. The ground of this distinction is in no way intimated unless it be hinted by the designations by which the two persons are described—"the Son of Man" and "the Holy Spirit". It is difficult to discover, however, in these designations, the desired implications of lowliness on the one hand and of exaltation on the other. "The Son of Man" is an exalted title and is employed to suggest the humiliation rather than the humility of Jesus' life on earth; the form of the title "the Holy Spirit" here is not (as in Mark iii. 29) that which most strongly emphasises His holiness and consequently His exaltation. Perhaps it would be wise to read the two designations, therefore, so far as simply denotative and not to seek in them for subtle contrasting connotations.

It is meanwhile easy also to misinterpret the contrast in dignity between the two persons involved in the differing treatment of blasphemy against them. It is of immense significance that Jesus should have thought it important to assure his followers that blasphemy against His person could be forgiven.⁵⁸ It would be bathos to say that every one who spoke a word against a man could be forgiven but not he who blasphemed the Holy Ghost. A high sense of the dignity of His person underlies the mere adduction of the case of blasphemy against Himself as a sin that might be forgiven. Otherwise that might go without saying. No doubt the immediately preceding declaration that those who denied Him would be denied before the angels of God (verse 9) somewhat prepares the

⁵⁸ And if we consider to "speak a word against" something less than to "blaspheme" the implication is even more striking.

way for such a further declaration. But that cannot empty of its significance the setting side by side of the Son of Man and Holy Spirit as if they had something in common which required that any difference in dealing with sins against them should be expressly notified. The title "Son of Man" moreover is taken up from verse 8 where it is a title of dignity. The effect of its repetition in verse 10 is clearly to aggravate the sin of speaking against Him: the reason why this sin is forgivable cannot be, therefore, that it is a little sin. It is the greatness of the grace of Jesus which is celebrated in this promise of forgiveness as truly as it is the heinousness of the sin of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit which is emphasized in the refusal of forgiveness for it in the succeeding clause. We cannot say, then, that the difference in the treatment of blasphemy against the Son of Man and against the Holy Spirit is rooted in an intrinsic difference between the two persons. It must rest on some other ground, and those seem to be led by a right instinct who seek it in the humiliation of the Son of Man in His servant-form on earth,⁵⁹ and the culminating manifestation of the holiness of God in the Holy Spirit,—though these things rather underlie the compressed statement before us than find expression in it. It is abundantly clear at all events that there is no depreciation of the dignity of the person of Jesus in the contrast that is drawn between blasphemy against Him as forgivable and blasphemy against the Holy Ghost as unforgivable. That it is possible to blaspheme the Son of Man, itself means that the Son of Man is divine.⁶⁰

All the more clear is it that it is not intended to declare that it is only blasphemy against the Son of Man among blasphemies which is capable of forgiveness. The gist of the declaration is not that only blasphemy against the Son of Man is forgivable, but that only blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is unforgivable. It is the latter, not the for-

⁵⁹ Mt. xx. 28; Mk. x. 45.

⁶⁰ Cf. A. B. Bruce *in loc.*

mer, which is singled out as unique in its treatment. Blasphemy against the Son of Man takes its place, therefore, as one of a class,—the class of forgivable blasphemies. Wherever it may rank within this class, it has its place in this class. In substance of meaning, accordingly, the declaration of Jesus reported by Luke is identical with that reported by Mark. When Mark makes Jesus declare that "all the blasphemies wherewithsoever the sons of men blaspheme," except that against the Holy Spirit, are forgivable, blasphemy against Jesus' own person is naturally included among forgivable blasphemies. When Luke reports Jesus as declaring that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit alone is unforgivable and even blasphemy against the Son of Man may be forgiven, it is necessarily implied that all other blasphemies are forgivable. The essence of both statements is that there is no blasphemy that is unforgivable except that against the Holy Spirit. One explicitly contrasts with this as forgivable, all other blasphemies; the other, even blasphemy against the Son of Man. The ultimate content of both contrasts is the same.

The most notable characteristic of Matthew's report of our Lord's declaration is its comprehensiveness, by which it is markedly distinguished from the compressed report of Luke. In substance, it combines the reports of Mark and Luke; but it does this in language so different from theirs that it is impossible to suppose that one Evangelist is directly dependent upon another. Matthew is obviously giving us an independent report of the substance of what was said by Jesus.

Matthew alone introduces the declaration by an illative particle, connecting it with the preceding discourse. The connection appears to be with the entire preceding discourse. It was because the Pharisees accused Him of casting out demons by Beelzebul, and because this was obviously absurd, and it was clear to every single eye that it was by the Spirit of God that He was casting out the demons (and therefore in Him the Kingdom of God had

come upon them), that He solemnly ("I say unto you") warns them against blasphemy of the Spirit. This warning is couched in language of intense impressiveness, and is so ordered as to throw the heinousness of blasphemy against the Spirit into the most poignant emphasis. It contains a double declaration of the unforgivableness of this sin. The former of these is more general in character and contrasts this blasphemy with other blasphemies in general (verse 31). The latter advances to a more pungent assertion and contrasts it specifically with blasphemy against the Son of Man, as more heinous than even it. The effect of the whole is to isolate the sin of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit with even startling distinctness and energy as the only sin which is entirely and forever incapable of pardon.

The former member of this striking declaration is clothed in language of extreme and impressive simplicity. "Every sin and blasphemy," we read—the addition "and blasphemy" descending from the genus to the particular species under discussion, and the combination of the terms focussing attention on the sinfulness of blasphemy: "Every sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven to man, but the blasphemy"—"*the* blasphemy", isolating the particular blasphemy under discussion—"the blasphemy of the Spirit shall not be forgiven". "Blasphemy" in the first clause is evidently used in its technical sense and imports insult to the Divine majesty: and "the blasphemy of the Spirit" is separated from this only as a particular from the general. Every term employed is the simplest and most direct attainable, and the construction is wholly free from rhetorical heightening. The simple abstract "sin" is used, instead of the more unusual derivative "acts of sin" of Mark; the simple "blasphemy" instead of Mark's emphasized "the blasphemies wherewithsoever the sons of men blaspheme." The universal "every" is attached simply to its substantives instead of separated from them for increased emphasis. We have the simple "to men" instead of the solemn "to the sons of men" of Mark. Even the simplest designation of the Holy Spirit possible is em-

ployed—the mere “the Spirit”. The statement takes on, indeed, something of the baldness of a legislative enactment: there is not a superfluous particle in it, and not a single rhetorical flourish. It just simply states a fact of tremendous significance, and leaves it at that: “Every sin (including blasphemy) shall be forgiven to men; but blasphemy of the Spirit shall not be forgiven.”

To this naked statement of fact, there is adjoined, now, a repetition which is something more than a repetition. It adds nothing in substance to what was said in the preceding statement. But it adds a great deal to it in tone and effect. It has the nature of a startling specific application of a general doctrine, with the effect of carrying the general doctrine home with tremendous force. All is said when it is said, “Every blasphemy shall be forgiven except blasphemy of the Spirit.” But this all is said with quite new energy when it is added: “Even if anyone blasphemes the Son of Man, he shall be forgiven, but not if he blasphemes the very Spirit of holiness—no, not for ever.” The “and” by which this second member of the declaration is connected with the first, is not merely copulative, nor merely consecutive (“and so”). What follows is not merely an illustration of the general principle or a consequence drawn from it. The “and” has an ascensive force and introduces what is in effect a climax. Perhaps its force may be brought out by rendering it by some such term as “yea”: “Every blasphemy shall be forgiven; yea if one blaspheme the Son of Man. . . .” It is not merely *an* instance which is adduced; but *the* instance, which will illustrate above every other instance the incredible reach of the forgiveness that is extended, and which will therefore supply the best background up against which may be thrown the heinousness of blasphemy of the Spirit which cannot be forgiven. The blasphemy which cannot be forgiven when even blasphemy of the Son of Man is forgiven, must be heinous indeed.

That “whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of Man” is just a periphrasis for “whosoever shall blaspheme

against the Son of Man" is obvious. There would be an anticlimax if it were made to mean anything less than blasphemy. To declare that every blasphemy shall be forgiven and then add in climacteric illustration of this declaration that even the speaking a word against the Son of Man—which is something less than blasphemy—shall be forgiven would yield only bathos. The progress of the argument requires us, therefore, to take this "speaking a word against the Son of Man" as itself blasphemy in the sense of the preceding declaration. We rise here, not sink, in the definition of the sin. The progress consists in a change, not in the matter of the sin, but in the adduction of an object by which its heinousness is heightened. And, we must add, the heightening is, in the nature of the case, to the extreme limit. Blasphemy against the Son of Man is the extremity of blasphemy which can be forgiven. Beyond that limit, it becomes unforgivable. It is not a little sin, then, which is adduced; it is the greatest of forgivable sins. And therefore the title of dignity, "Son of Man", is employed to designate the object on which it terminates. To blaspheme the Son of Man is a sin so dreadful that it might be thought unforgivable; and the heinousness of the unforgivable sin may be estimated when it is perceived that it is more heinous than this. Clearly the Son of Man is not mere man: it is only because He is not mere man, indeed, that "speaking a word against Him" is blasphemy.

That by "speaking a word against Him" just blasphemy is meant is clear also from the employment of this same phrase in the next clause of blasphemy of the Spirit. For, that this clause must repeat the last clause of the first member of the declaration is beyond dispute: and we do not rise to our climaxes by weakening our expressions. And in this second member all the other expressions are heightened: Jesus designates Himself "the Son of Man" here for the first time in this context; the simple "Spirit" of the former member of the declaration gives place here to the solemnly emphatic "the Spirit, the Holy One"; the simple negative,

"shall not be forgiven" of the former member is expanded here to the awe-inspiring, "shall not be forgiven, neither in this world, nor in that which is to come". It would seem, then, that the periphrasis, "to speak a word against", is treated as a more, rather than a less, impressive way of saying "to blaspheme" than the word itself: it is the thing, not the term, that is condemned, and apparently it is felt that the thing is more precisely, and therefore more forcibly, expressed by the periphrasis than by the simple word, which, after all, is very fairly defined by the periphrasis.

By the employment of this periphrasis in this passage with respect to blasphemy against the Holy Spirit we are aided in determining the precise nature of the sin which our Lord pronounced unforgivable. It would seem that it is just speaking injurious or insulting words against the Holy Spirit; such words as are illustrated,—or at least approached—by the opprobrious attribution of acts of the Holy Spirit to Beelzebul. Matthew does not say, as Mark says, that our Lord has particular reference to the ascription to Him of demoniacal possession. What he says is that our Lord was led to give this tremendous warning to the Pharisees, because they declared that it was by Beelzebul, the prince of the demons, that He was casting out demons, this being in effect an identification of the Holy Spirit by whom He wrought His cures with the foul spirit. He bids them, therefore, to beware. The mercy of God is very wide; every sin and blasphemy may be forgiven to men—except only blasphemy of the Spirit; yea, though one speak a word against the Son of Man it may be forgiven; but if one speak against the Spirit, that Holy One, it shall not be forgiven—to all eternity.

The comprehensiveness of Matthew's report of Jesus' declaration, embracing as it does the substance of both what Mark and what Luke reports, affords a temptation to look upon Matthew's report as artificially made up from a combination of what is reported by the other evangelists. We have already pointed out, however, that the divergence of

the language in Matthew's report from that of Mark's and Luke's respectively, renders this hypothesis untenable. If there ever were three reports purporting to give the substance of a single utterance—and actually giving it in complete harmony—which bore decisive marks of literary independence of one another, these three reports do. Nevertheless the temptation to explain the three as two divergent reports in Mark and Luke, and a conflation of them in Matthew, has proved too strong for the Synoptical critics to resist.

Which of the two brief divergent reports is to be held the more original, the critics are less agreed. Wellhausen is sure that Mark, along with Mt. xii. 31, has preserved in substance the original form, and that what was meant by it is that railing against men may be forgiven but not blasphemy against God. According to this view Jesus did not declare blasphemy against His own person to be pardonable, the version of Luke and Mt. xii. 32 resting upon a misunderstanding of the underlying Aramaic phrase for "man" which transmuted it into a title of the Messiah, "the Son of Man", used as a personal self-designation by Jesus.⁶¹ The fundamental assumption here is, of course, that the reason why Jesus did not declare blasphemy against His person to be pardonable is that He never could have connected the idea of blasphemy with that of "speaking a word against" Himself, conceiving of Himself, as He did, as merely a human being.⁶² P. W. Schmiedel, on the other

⁶¹ Cf. Arnold Meyer and Lietzmann as cited by P. W. Schmiedel, *Protestantische Monatshefte*, II, 1898, p. 304; also *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1848, note 1.

⁶² N. Schmidt, *The Prophet of Nazareth*, p. 112 has a similar view, although he takes Mt. xii. 32 as preserving the original saying, in which, he supposes, *bar nasha*, in the sense of "man", stood in the place now occupied by "the Son of Man", in the sense of Jesus, the Messiah: "He was careful to distinguish between an attack upon a fellow-man and a denunciation of the Spirit that operated in Him, saying: 'If any one speaks against *bar nasha*,—i.e. man—that may be pardoned him, but he that speaks against the Holy Spirit can have no pardon.' No one in the audience could have understood him to say, 'you may blaspheme the Messiah with impunity, but not the

hand, is equally sure that the original form has been preserved by Luke, or rather by the fuller Mt. xii. 31, 32, while Mark represents a dogmatic alteration of this in the interests of the dignity of Jesus' person, men having come to entertain so high an opinion of Jesus' person that it offended them to have it said that blasphemy of even the Holy Spirit would be more unpardonable than blasphemy of Him.⁶³ According to this view Jesus declares speaking a word against Him to be pardonable because He conceives Himself to be only human, while the Holy Spirit is a periphrasis for God: the upshot of His teaching being just that we may speak against men and be forgiven but we cannot blaspheme God and expect pardon. The pathways over which the two interpretations would travel are different; the goal which they reach is the same; Jesus was only human and spoke out of a purely human consciousness.⁶⁴

Holy Ghost.' The distinction is clearly between the divine spirit and the human instrumentality." C. G. Montifiore, *Synopt. Gospels* II, 624, says quite impartially that this interpretation seems "very strained".

⁶³ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1848: "In their worship of Jesus it must have appeared to them in itself the greatest possible blasphemy to say that blasphemy against Jesus could be forgiven."

⁶⁴ Cf. the discussion of the opposing views in Schmiedel's article in the *Protestantische Monatshefte* II, 1908, pp. 303-307: an excellent brief account of them is given by S. R. Driver in Hastings' *BD* IV. p. 588, at the close of his article on the "Son of Man". E. von Dobschütz, *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* 85 (1912) p. 340, is sure that we have two reports here, but will not decide which is the more original, contenting himself with remarking that the double attestation gives us peculiar surety that something of the sort was said by Jesus: "When we read in the Mark-tradition (Mk. iii. 28 f.; Mt. xii. 31), 'All sins are forgiven to the sons of men and the blasphemies wherewithsoever they blaspheme', but he who blasphemeth the Holy Ghost has no forgiveness forever'; but on the other hand in the Q-tradition (Lk. xii. 10; Mt. xii. 32), 'He who speaketh anything against the Son of Man, that will be forgiven him, but he who speaketh against the Holy Spirit, to him it will not be forgiven (neither in this nor in the future world)'; it is clear that we have before us two conceptions and also two translations: *bar nasa* is in one taken collectively, "sons of men," in the other as the well-known personal self-designation of Jesus. The one is a modification of the other, although it is not altogether easy to say in what direction the theology of the community has worked here; it is clear, however that through

So sure is Schmiedel that Mt. xii. 31, 32 presents to our view a purely human Jesus, that he includes this passage among those "pillar passages" which he announces as the foundation stones of a truly scientific knowledge of Jesus,—on the precise ground that they could never have been invented by worshippers of Jesus (as all the Evangelists were) but must have come to them as part of an authentic tradition of a human Jesus. This true tradition, he contends, was altered by one or another of the Evangelists in accordance with their later worship of Jesus.⁶⁵ Jesus here, he tells us, is represented as frankly ranging Himself with men, speaking against whom is pardonable; and as separating Himself from the Spirit of God to speak against whom is unpardonable.⁶⁶ That the passage in Matthew will not bear the meaning which Schmiedel puts upon it, we have already seen. Jesus does not place Himself there among men, and subordinate Himself to God in His essential nature. He does not say there that calumny of men may be forgiven but never blasphemy against God. What He says may be forgiven is precisely blasphemy, in its strict sense. He declares that speaking a word against His person is blasphemy in the strict sense; and that this may be forgiven only because blasphemy may be forgiven.⁶⁷ And

this double attestation a declaration of Jesus to His Pharisaic opponents as to unpardonable sin is assured."

⁶⁵ *Encyc. Bibl.* col. 1881; cf. col. 1848 (d and note 1). See *Princeton Theological Review*, April, 1913, pp. 204, 252.

⁶⁶ The following is Schmiedel's most lucid statement of his view of the bearing of the passage (*Das vierte Evangelium*, etc., p. 33): "In John Jesus knows, then, nothing higher than Himself, the bliss or misery of men for time and eternity is determined by whether they believe or do not believe in His divine origin. In the Synoptics, He knows something higher than Himself. He says in Mt. xii. 31, 32: 'Every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven to men, but blasphemy against the Spirit will not be forgiven. And whosoever speaks a word against the Son of Man, it will be forgiven him; but whosoever speaks a word against the Holy Ghost, it will not be forgiven him, either in this world or in the next.' Therefore He places His person below the Holy Spirit, i.e. below the holy work which He advocates." Cf. Karl Thieme, *Die christliche Demut* I. 1906, p. 139.

⁶⁷ W. Beyschlag, *Die Christologie des Neuen Testaments*, 1866, p. 24,

though He subordinates Himself to the Holy Spirit, at least in manifestation, to this extent, that blasphemy against Him may be forgiven but blasphemy against the Holy Spirit not, it is illegitimate to interpret this as implying a subordination of Himself to the Spirit in intrinsic dignity of person: blasphemy against God may also be forgiven but blasphemy against the Holy Spirit not. It may be difficult to determine precisely why blasphemy against the Spirit is made unpardonable and blasphemy against the Son of Man not: no doubt the reason lies in some discrimination in the modes of divine manifestation in the two persons. But this difficulty affords no reason for cutting the knot by representing Jesus as definitely subordinating Himself—and God also—in dignity of person to the Holy Spirit.

It has been frequently remarked that it is only in the two passages, Mt. xii. 32 and Lk. xii. 10, that (as, for example, H. J. Holtzmann expresses it), "a distinction is had written—no doubt with wrong suggestions, but for the final matter very justly, as we think—as follows (we use Bruce's rendering): "Let us consider the relation here indicated between the Son of Man and the Holy Ghost. It is a relation of distinction; and yet of close connection. The distinction is that in the Son of Man the revelation of God to man is in mediated, and, so far, veiled form; therefore may be misunderstood, so that the blasphemer may always have the benefit of the prayer, 'Forgive them, they know not what they do'; but in the Holy Ghost the revelation is made immediately, inwardly, therefore unmistakably; therefore there is no excuse for the blasphemer. At the same time the Holy Ghost is not thought of as above the Son of Man but in Him. The Son of Man is the man who has the Spirit of God in His entire fulness, whose inmost though unrecognized essence is the Holy Spirit, the man whose human appearance is the absolute revelation of God. To this corresponds the fact, obvious in the text, that the blasphemy of the Son of Man is represented as the most heinous of pardonable sins." A. B. Bruce, *The Humiliation of Christ*, 1881, p. 227, quotes these statements only unsuccessfully to contravert the view that the passage teaches that "offences against the Son of Man are pardonable, but that is all; such sins form the extreme limit of the unforgivable." He supposes that Jesus rather means to say "with characteristic magnanimity" that sins against Himself are easily forgivable, because not more heinous than sins against any other good man, and due to the same general cause; and he adopts the view that Jesus' warning turns precisely on this,—that the Pharisees in their injurious imputations were "not sinning against *Him*, but against the Holy Ghost."

made between the Spirit as the higher power (*Instanz*) and Jesus as the human vehicle of the Spirit." A somewhat bizarre writer, on that ground, insists that these passages—which, he considers, represent the original form of the declaration—are a Montanistic interpolation into the Gospels, since (as he is reported) "only Montanism places the revelation of the Spirit, the Paraclete, above that of the Apostles of Christ." We cite this extraordinary opinion, not, as we well might, as an example of the lengths to which this kind of criticism can go,—in principle, it is just as sound criticism as that of many who seem to be pillars,—but in order to introduce Schmiedel's, as it seems to us, instructive rejoinder to it. "Certainly," Schmiedel replies, "Montanism was the first to place the Holy Spirit above Jesus—after Jesus Himself. Some effort is made to form an appropriate idea of Montanism: but of what Jesus thought of Himself, none at all. 'Where elsewhere in the Synoptic tradition can anything similar be found?' I should have thought we would have been thankful to find it only once. A pearl does not cease to be genuine merely because it exists in only one example. . ."⁶⁸ Possibly. But meanwhile, it is thus allowed that in this interpretation a meaning is assigned to the passage which is unexampled elsewhere in the Synoptic Gospels, and indeed in the entirety of the Christian literature of the first age; a meaning, that is, so unexpected that surely it cannot be entertained unless it is unassailably shown to be the real meaning of the passage. How little that is the case we have already seen. What Schmiedel is actually doing in his interpretation of the passage is, therefore, importing into the Gospels a conception which is wholly alien to them; and also which, as he expressly admits (for this is the very principle of his criticism), stands in direct contradiction to their whole drift. A human Jesus must be found at all hazards, and if violence is required to find Him in the Evangelical tradition, then violence must be used.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ *Protestantische Monatshefte*. II. (1898), p. 305.

⁶⁹ Into the detailed attempts to account for the divergent forms of

Meanwhile it is unquestionable that the passage contains difficulties. It is not easy to separate clearly blasphemy of the Son of Man from blasphemy of that Holy Spirit by which He wrought His great works of healing upon the possessed. It is not easy to understand in what blasphemy of the Son of Man is a less heinous sin than blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, or why the one is more pardonable than the other. It is not easy indeed to be perfectly sure, precisely in what the unpardonable blasphemy of the Holy Spirit consists, or whether our Lord means to convict His opponents of having committed it. We may, of course, form conjectures on these matters; and these conjectures will, no doubt, be more or less plausible; and they may seem to be supported with more or less convincingness by this or that assertion or suggestion of the text or context. The passage itself, however, scarcely gives us decisive instruction on these matters; and on most of them opinions may lawfully differ. They are in any event subjects of perpetual investigation and most of them continue to be zealously debated by the commentators.⁷⁰ Many commentators, for example, are eager to make it clear that our Lord does not charge His opponents with having committed the unpardonable sin of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, but only warns them against committing it.⁷¹ This carries with it, of course,

the whole passage as given by the three Synoptics, on the Two-Document hypothesis, in its mechanical interpretation, we do not enter. We cannot look upon a discussion like that of Burton Scott Easton, "The Beelzebul Sections", *The Journal of Biblical Literature*, XXXII (1913), pp. 57-73 as anything more than highly refined speculation without any possibility of attaining valid results.

⁷⁰ A good brief *résumé* of the main discussion may be read in Carl Clemen's *Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde*, 1898, pp. 89 ff.

⁷¹ For example, Th. Zahn, *Das Evangelium des Matthäus*, 1903, pp. 460-466, closing with the statement (p. 466): "Jesus does not yet treat the Pharisees here as such as have already committed the sin against the Holy Spirit, but as such as need to be warned of this ultimate step which they have it in mind to take." Compare the statement on p. 461: "No doubt the Pharisees called the Power by which Jesus healed the possessed, an evil spirit, whereas that Power was in fact the Spirit of God; but they did not blaspheme the Spirit for they did not recognize Him in the Power which worked through Jesus.

denial that merely to accuse Jesus of working His healings of demoniacs by the aid of Beelzebul, or even of being possessed by Beelzebul, constitutes the unpardonable sin. And the way having thus been opened, a wide field lies open for conjecture as to what does constitute that sin. Despite these deeper mysteries, however, the main implications of the passage are sufficiently clear, and among these implications this one must rank among the clearest—that He who authoritatively makes this great declaration of the relative heinousness of sins, and calmly announces what sins shall and what sins shall not be forgiven, whether in this world or in that which is to come, does not mean to proclaim Himself a mere man, when He declares that he who speaks a word against Him may be forgiven, but not he who speaks a word against the Holy Spirit. Whatever may be the reason for treating blasphemy of the Son of Man as more pardonable than blasphemy of the Holy Spirit, that reason cannot be found in a sheer difference in the intrinsic dignity of the two persons.

The judgment of unbelief on Jesus, we have found occasion to remark, is inevitably that He was mad. As inevit-

They rather concluded from the behavior of Jesus, which in their judgment was godless, lawless, and immoral (ix. 3-11, xii. 2-10) that this man wrought these, in themselves, beneficent and praiseworthy miracles by the aid of evil spirits, and thus they blasphemed the Son of Man. This blasphemy would become a blasphemy of the Holy Spirit, however, if they persisted in it, after Jesus had shown them the irrationality of their inference. When and in the measure in which they must recognize that the Power by which Jesus heals is a holy Power, every inimical word against Him becomes a sin against the Holy Spirit." So also G. Wohlenberg, *Das Evangelium des Markus*, 1910, p. 115: "That the scribes have committed such blasphemy the Lord does not say. It may even be judged that even their accusation that Jesus had Beelzebul and cast out the demons through the prince of the demons, or as it is said in verse 30, that He had an unclean spirit, does not yet necessarily involve that terrible sin. For the question continually presents itself, how far uncomprehending but well-meant zeal has coöperated here; how far the conscience has been unpricked, unconcerned, when they so dreadfully accused the Lord." For earlier writers to the same effect, see C. Clemen, as cited, p. 91 note.

ably the judgment of active disbelief on Him must be that He was wicked. Not only in His own day but throughout all time the alternatives constantly stare us in the face—*aut Deus aut non sanus; aut Deus aut non bonus*. If in our own time the latter alternative has retired somewhat into the background, and that which imposes itself upon the consciousness of contemporary criticism is that between a Divine Jesus and an "ecstatic" Jesus, as it is euphemistically called,—a paranoëic Jesus, as it really would amount to—that is doubtless in part because, in the languid sceptical temper of our times, and their preoccupation with abstract questions of pure history, little occasion or place has been left for the play of the more violent emotions about our historical findings. At bottom, however, disbelief, when it works itself out, must not merely neglect Jesus but condemn Him: and the ravings of a Nietzsche may serve to keep us in mind that the ultimate alternative is always that of the Pharisees and Scribes. Either Jesus has come forth from God, or we can scarcely avoid declaring Him possessed of the Evil One. He makes or mars the world.⁷²

⁷² Compare the striking closing pages of the fourth of Liddon's Bampton Lectures on *The Divinity of our Lord, etc.*

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

THE PAPYRUS OF ELEPHANTINE

Ever since the French savants went to Egypt with Napoleon in the latter part of the eighteenth century, the public has been startled from time to time by the announcement of one important discovery in the field of archaeology after another. The Rosetta stone, discovered in 1799 by a French officer named Boussard, was transferred to the British Museum in 1801. It contains an inscription by Ptolemy V, Epiphanes, and his wife Cleopatra, in hieroglyphic, demotic, and Greek,—the last two being versions of the first. By comparing the manner of writing the proper names in this trilingual inscription, a portion of the unknown Egyptian alphabet was made known by means of the Greek; and so little by little the literature of the ancient Egyptians was revealed, until at present a large part of their documents has been interpreted. In like manner, the vast literature of the Assyrians and Babylonians has been deciphered by means of the trilingual inscription of Behistun,—an account of the founding of the Persian Empire by Darius Hystaspis, made doubtless at his command on the rocks near Hamadan, the ancient Ecbatana, on the highway between Nineveh and the highlands of Iran. The monuments of these great nations, both because of their intrinsic value and because of their bearing upon so many important questions of archaeology, anthropology, philology, history, and religion, have so engrossed the attention of the reading public, that the less numerous and in some respects the less important discoveries among the Phoenicians, Arameans, and others, have been perhaps too much neglected. And yet, it may be said with truth, that probably few if any discoveries either in Egyptian or Assyrio-Babylonian have a greater value in their bearing upon philology and religion at least than the comparatively meagre number of inscriptions that have been found written in the languages of these politically less imposing peoples. The Aramean documents especially are of great value because of the light that they throw upon

the script, grammar, lexicography, literature, history, and religion of the ancient Hebrews. To all students of the Hebrew Scriptures, they take a rank inferior in results at most to that of the Babylonian and Greek.

Now, the greatest discovery ever made in Aramaic has recently been published under the editorship of Professor Eduard Sachau, Professor of Arabic and Aramaic in the University of Berlin, and Principal of the Imperial Institute of Diplomacy and Languages in the same city. It is the purpose of the writer to give in this article a short and popular account of the contents of this publication.¹

From time to time since 1901 Aramaic papyri and ostraca (an ostrakon is an inscription upon a fragment of pottery) have been found at Assuan, a city on the east bank of the Nile about 550 miles south of Cairo, and on the island opposite this city called by the Egyptian and Aramean, Yeb, and by the Greeks, Elephantine. A number of these papyri were published by Professors Sayce and Cowley of Oxford in 1906, with a bibliography by Ricci of the papyri and ostraca published up to that time. The sensation caused by this publication was followed by the announcement in 1907 to the Berlin Academy that the Germans at Berlin had come into possession of a large number of newly found documents from the same place and time. In 1908 Professor Sachau published three of these papyri and it was announced that the others would shortly appear. Owing to the difficulty of piecing the fragments of some of them together on account of their having been broken into small and partly illegible portions, the publication of the volumes containing all the documents in the possession of the German government was delayed until about October 1 of 1912. The writer of this article was given a presentation copy with the request that he present to the American public the materials contained therein, and with the right

¹ *Aramäische Papyrus und Ostraka aus einer jüdischen militär-Kolonie zu Elephantine des 5. Jahrhunderts vor Chr.* Bearbeitet von EDUARD SACHAU mit Lichtdrucktafeln. Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1911.

to use the plates and translation as he thought best. With this end in view, we shall proceed to show some of the most important revelations of these documents as to the civil and military administration and history of the Persian Empire, and as to the religion, names, literature, and customs of the Jewish colony of Elephantine, closing with a translation of a few of the more important papyri.

THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

Much light is thrown by the papyri upon the civil administration of the Persians. The chief governors, next to the king, are called *pihats*; and, just as we would have expected from what we know of the Greek, Babylonian, and Hebrew sources, these pihats could be rulers of very large provinces, or countries, such as Egypt or Bactria, or of small provinces or even cities, such as Samaria and Jerusalem. That the Babylonian word Pihat, which was adopted by the Hebrew and Assyrian writers of the Old Testament, was the official equivalent of the Persian satrap is determined by the fragment of the Aramaic version of the Behistun Inscription of Darius Hystaspis, found among the papyri, where it occurs as the translation of the old Persian word for satrap. Some at least of these governors are designated also by the title *mar*, or lord; though Professor Sachau thinks that this latter title was reserved for governors who were of blood royal, such as Arsames, governor of Egypt. We know from the Behistun Inscription as well as from Herodotus, Xenophon, and others, that the Persian kings were in the habit of appointing members of their families to be rulers of the most important of the satrapies.

The citizens of Yeb were called lords of the city or lords of the regiment, both of whom together probably formed the class which are elsewhere called freemen, sons of freemen, or lords of Yeb. Beneath these in station come the slaves.

Between the dominus, or lord, and the people and acting as intermediaries between them were officers of different nationalities, such as Hananiah a Jew, and Wachpar'amchi

an Egyptian, to whom Arsames sent his edicts or decrees for transmission to the free citizens and soldiers. Occupying a subordinate position to these officers were the scribes, such as Nebu'kab, a man with a Babylonian name, and 'Anani a Jew. The latter of these is called also a lord of command, or chancellor.

To the civil administration belonged, further, the judges of different jurisdictions and names, of whom the duties cannot be clearly defined. For example, there were judges of the city and judges of the king, though it is not clear whether these were the same or different persons. With these judges, the commander of the army of Syene sat on the judgment seat, but probably only in certain cases. In other cases, another officer called sagan (*i.e.*, deputy), sits along with the judges. This sagan is evidently the equivalent of the Assyrian shakin, who, as Canon Johns has shown, had along with his other functions certain ones of a judicial nature. As the Assyrian shakin was an officer corresponding to the Persian satrap, it is fair to assume that in Egypt also the sagan was a sort of satrap, who united with his other governmental duties the right to sit in at least some judicial cases. In addition to his judicial functions, the sagan appears in the papyri as the head of the guild or trades union of the carpenters. It is likely that each of the guilds had a similar head, who probably represented the unions in their dealings with the government and the courts.

Two other classes of judges are mentioned in the papyri, one called perhaps ultores or avengers and the other the *tiftin*. The latter were probably the same as the sheriffs of Daniel iii. 2.

Beside these officials, four or five others are named, including bookkeepers, treasurers, and scribes, of whom the respective duties are not defined. Nevertheless, the very occurrence of the different names of officials shows that the Persian administration was thoroughly organized, and the variety of the contracts and rescripts shows that this admin-

istration covered every department of public and private law and government.

Of the Persian kings after Cambyses and before 400 B.C., all are mentioned in these papyri except the false Smerdis and Xerxes II and Sogdianus. The false Smerdis reigned in the sixth century whereas the earliest of these papyri dates from the twenty-seventh year of Darius Hystaspis, 494 B.C. Xerxes II reigned only forty-five days and his successor Sogdianus only a little more than half a year; so that we could hardly have expected any papyri from their reigns. The years are dated according to the years of the king, which is the usual method of dating employed by the kings of Egypt, Assyria, and Babylon, and in fact, by all the ancients outside of Greece and Rome, before the time of the Ptolemys. We have but one inscription from the reign of Darius Hystaspis, that numbered thirty by Professor Sachau. This is one of the best preserved of the papyri and is noteworthy for spelling Darius with exactly the same consonants that are employed in the Old Testament and in the Persian of the Behistun inscription.

THE ARMY

It was hitherto supposed that the standing army of the Persians with which they garrisoned the principal cities and fortresses of the subject nations was composed entirely of Persians and of their near kindred the Medes, Hyrcanians, and Bactrians. In Egypt alone there is said to have been an army of occupation numbering 120,000 men, and the wonder has been that so small a country as Persia, containing at most 2,000,000 population, could have furnished so many soldiers, even when these allied races were drawn upon for their contingents. The papyri, however, have shown that the old view is untenable, and that in certain cases at least these garrisons were composed of troops gathered from the subject races who were favorable to the Persian overlords in preference to the other dominant powers. For the army at Yeb is called Judean and its in-

dividual members are described as Jews and Arameans; sometimes the same man being designated in one place as an Aramean, and in another place as a Jew. All Jews were probably regarded as Arameans, even if all Arameans were not Jews; or, they were called Jews because of their race and Arameans because of their language. The army of Yeb was divided into six regiments or corps of unknown size, each of them having its own commander and all under the command of a general-in-chief. The head officers have names that are either Persian or Babylonian. Possibly the regiments are named after the Persian and Babylonian officers who enlisted, or first commanded them; inasmuch as the regiment of Wagerat is mentioned as early as 470 and as late as 411 B.C., and the regiment of Nabukudurri as early as 460 and as late as 400 B.C. The employment of Babylonians in important positions in the army of Egypt is paralleled by the custom of Darius Hystaspis, who according to the Behistun inscription committed the leadership of his armies to men who were not Persians, such as Dadarshu the Armenian and the Medes Takhmaspada and Vinidafra. The subordinate officers of the Judean army at Yeb seem to have been wholly or in part of Judean nationality. This selection by the Persian rulers of Egypt of men of the different subject races to assist in the government of their great empire confirms the historicity of the statements made in the Biblical books of Daniel, Esther, and Ezra-Nehemiah, according to which Daniel and his three companions were advanced to high positions in the civil service by Darius the Mede and Cyrus, Mordecai by Xerxes, and Sanballat, Ezra and Nehemiah by Artaxerxes.

The fact that the Jews in Yeb continued to preserve their own worship in the midst of the heathen, and largely their own names, shows the precariousness of the argument for the influence of ancient Babylon upon the Israelites during the captivity. Eastern conditions cannot be judged by Western standards and traditions. The Copts in Egypt,

and the Mandeans and Fire Worshippers in Persia and India, have preserved their faith intact for centuries in the midst of dominant and hostile creeds and nations. So, also, it seems to have been with the Israelites in the most ancient as well as in more modern times.

PROPER NAMES

The vast number of proper names found in the papyri which are not found at all in the Bible (especially when taken in connection with the large number of proper names found on the monuments of Babylon and Syria) will compel a complete revision of the theories of Hebrew proper names as propounded by Gray, Nestle and others. Especially does it compel us to reject the extreme view of Cheyne that the Hebrew proper names of the Old Testament have been corrupted beyond recognition in the process of the transmission of the text. For here are found a multitude of names whose reading is beyond question but yet that are just as impossible when judged by ordinary rules and roots as most of those which are so summarily rejected and revised by some of the critics of the modern schools of textual criticism.

PASSAH

One of the most interesting of the papyri is number six, written in the sixth year of Darius Nothus, *i.e.*, 417-418 B.C.; because it contains an evident reference to the Jewish feast of the Passover. It seems to be an edict of Darius the king of Persia directed to the Jews through the satrap of Egypt permitting the Jews of Elephantine to observe their spring festival. It is probable, as Professor Sachau suggests, such a decree was not issued every year and that the issuing of it in this particular year shows that the feast had not been observed before this time by the Jewish colony at Yeb, either because they did not know of it or because they had not been allowed to observe it. The decree was sent to Hananiah, a Jewish officer of Arsames' entourage, to be made known by him to one who is called his brother and

to his companions of the Jewish army. This Hananiah may possibly have been the brother of Nehemiah the governor of Jerusalem who is the hero of the Biblical book bearing this name. The edict directs the people to be clean (ceremonially) and to take heed to themselves from the fifteenth to the twenty-first of the month Nisan, to do no work, to abstain from anything leavened from sundown of the fifteenth to the twenty-first, to enter their closets and seal them between the days. Directions were given also as to what they should drink.

ACHIKAR

Those of the papyri that will doubtless attract most attention are the eleven containing portions of the didactic teachings of the wise Achikar. These teachings were embodied in a tale of a wise man named Achikar and the scene is laid at the court of Sennacherib and Esarhaddon, kings of Assyria from 704 to 665 B.C. This story has been found in whole or in part preserved for us in Syriac, Arabic, Armenian, Ethiopic, Greek, and Slavonic. The apocryphal book of Tobit refers to it as the well-known story of the ingratitude of a man to his foster father. In the Greek biography of the fabulist Aesop, the story of Achikar seems to have been changed into an account of Aesop at the court of the Babylonian king called Lykeros. The Greek didactic poet Democritus is said to have combined with his own works a translation of the stele of Achikar. This translation he called "Ethical Babylonian Sayings". From the mention of a "stele", it is supposed by Professor Sachau that the proverbs of Achikar may have been published upon steles, like the columns of victory of the Assyrian, Babylonian, Moabitic, Egyptian and Persian kings; or rather like that containing the code of Hammurabi, or the boundary stones of the Babylonians. Theophrastus and Strabo both knew about Achikar and an image of him, denoted as (Ac)icar(us), is found upon a mosaic discovered in Treves.

The Aramaic fragments of the Achikar story now first known and published by Professor Sachau are palimpsests, the original writing having apparently been some kind of reckonings or accounts.

BEHISTUN

One of the most surprising revelations of the papyri is that there was an Aramaic translation of the Behistun inscription of Darius Hystaspis. It is a well known fact that this great king of Persia made an inscription in the Persian, Susian and Babylonian languages upon the rocks a short distance from the city of Ecbatana, the capital of the old Median empire. It was not known, however, until these papyri were discovered that a translation of this inscription had been made into any other language except these three. But, now, we can well believe that the mighty second founder of the Persian Empire not merely inscribed the record of his conquests on the rocks at Behistun, but that he also translated this record into the other tongues of the empire, and certainly at least into Aramaic, which was at that time the *lingua franca* of a large part of his people; and that he probably disseminated this particular record of his fame throughout the whole extent of his dominions. Unfortunately, only a few small fragments of the Aramaic version of the inscription have been preserved. Still, these are sufficient to restore in large measure the lacunae of the Babylonian recension which has been preserved in a very imperfect condition on the rocks of Behistun. It is thought by Professor Sachau that the Aramaic is a translation of the Babylonian; but the present writer is of the opinion that it is more probable that on the contrary the Babylonian is a translation of the Aramaic, inasmuch as there is evidence of an Aramaic idiom in the Babylonian, but none of Babylonian idioms in the Aramaic. Both of these recensions differ from the Persian and Susian texts in that they give after the account of some of the battles the numbers of killed and prisoners. The difficulty of recording and transmitting with accuracy numerical statements in the system of

notation in ancient times is manifest from the fact that the Babylonian and Aramaic versions differ in numerous instances in the statement of these numbers. In one case the Aramaic has 5000 when the Babylonian has only 500. This difficulty of recording and reading the signs employed for numerical notation throws great light upon the many variations in numbers found in the text of the parallel passages of the Old Testament.

TRANSLATION OF A LETTER²

Unto my lords Yedonyah, Uriyah, and the priests of the god YHW, Mattan bar Yoshibyah and Neriya bar . . . thy servant Ma'uziyah. Peace to our Lord. . . . May you receive mercy from the God of Heaven. And now: After Waidrang, the chief of the army, had come to Abydos, he made me a prisoner because of a jewel that was found stolen in the hands of merchants upon a setting (or possession) of Tsecha and Chor, the servants of 'Anani. They labored with Waidrang and Chomufi under the protection of the God of Heaven, until I was freed. Now, behold, they came thither to you. As for you, see concerning them what they wish, and whatever Tsecha and Chor may request from you, do you oppose them so that they may not discover something that is bad for you. (The priest) of Chnum has been against us ever since Hananiah has been in Egypt until now.

And what you shall do to Chor . . . do ye. Chor is the servant of Hananiah. . . . What they lose and what they do not lose is the same to you. He said to me: Send a letter before. . . . The loss of a treasure is laid upon him in the house of 'Anani. What you do to him will not be hid from 'Anani.

To my lord Yedonyah, Uriyah and the priests of the Jews of (Yeb) Ma'uzzi bar Tsecha.

PETITION TO A LORD

Thy servants, Yedonyah bar Gemaryah by name 1, Ma'uzzi bar Nathan by name 1, Shema'yah bar Haggai by

² P. 57.

name 1, Hosea bar Yathom by name 1, Hosea bar Nathum by name 1, altogether 5 men, Syenites, who in the fortress of Yeb are settled(?), speak thus: If our lord (command?) and the temple of the god YHW which (was?) in the fortress of Yeb be built again (?) as it was before then a nest of doves, (and) a goat as a burnt offering(?) shall not(?) be made there; but incense, meal offerings etc. And our lord Oris (or Odis) shall make(?) a gift(?) to the house of our lord of a thousand(?) Artabes of barley.

LIST OF NAMES

As an illustration of the lists of names with which some papyri are filled we may present the list in papyrus 20. It will be seen that most of these names are Jewish, such as are found in the Old Testament.

Achyō bar Nathan, Nathan bar Ma'uziyah, Chur bar Banayah, Machse bar Yahotal, Chanan bar Pachnum, Shalum bar H., Piltai bar Neboittim(?), Kushi(?) bar 'Azzur, Petechnum bar Churi, Re'uyah bar Zekharyah, Menachem bar Mattan, Pechnum bar Zakkur, Chaggai bar Mikhayah, Didi bar Uri bar Machse, Shewa bar Zekharyah.

RECORD OF A LOAN⁸

One of the best preserved of the papyri is the record of a loan, given in papyrus 28. Since this record is not merely of general interest as an illustration of the laws of contracts in use at that time but shows also that women could act as agents in such matters, we shall give a complete translation of it.

On the 7th of Kisleu, that is, on the 14th day of the month Thoth in the year 9 of the king Artaxerxes, Yehochan, the daughter of Meshullakh NshN in the fortress of Yeb spake as follows to Meshullam the son of Zakkur a Jew of the fortress of Yeb: You have given me a loan of four pounds of silver, *i.e.*, four according to the standard measure of the king. I will pay you interest at the rate

⁸ P. III.

of two challurs a pound per month, *i.e.*, the whole loan at eight challurs per month. If the interest be added to the capital, I will pay you interest on this addition at the same rate as on the original capital.

If the turn of the year come, and I shall not have satisfied your claim upon the capital and its interest according to the conditions of this contract, then shall you have the right, O Meshullam and thy sons, to seize as pledge for thy (debt) whatever thou shalt find in my possession, a house of bricks, silver and gold, bronze and iron, servant and maid, barley and spelt, and every kind of provisions, until I shall have fully paid the capital and interest. And during this time I shall not have the right to say to thee: I have satisfied thy claim upon the money and its interest, so long as this contract is in thy hand.

Also I shall not have the right to accuse thee before the magistrate and the judge, saying: "Thou hast taken a pledge from me", so long as this contract is in thy hand.

And if I die without having satisfied thy claim upon the money and its interest, then shall my sons pay to thee this money and its interest. And if they shall not pay to thee, O Meshullam, this money and its interest, then wilt thou have the right to seize all provisions and other pledges that thou shalt find in their possession, until they shall have paid fully capital and interest; while they shall not have the right to accuse thee before the judge as long as this contract is in thy hand.

The scribe Nathan bar 'Anani has written this according to the dictation of Yahocham. Witnesses of the contract: Hosea bar Delagadol, Hadowyah bar Gedalyah, Achyo bar Pelatyah, Azur bar Achyo.

The heading reads: "This is the silver record which Yehochan daughter of Meshullakh caused to be written for Meshullam bar Zakkur."

LETTER TO THE GOVERNOR OF JUDEA

To our lord Bagohi, the governor of Judea, his servant
Yedonyah and his companions the priests in the fortress o

Yeb. May the God of heaven greet our lord often at every time and give thee favor in the eyes of king Darius and the sons of the royal house yet a thousand times more than now, and give thee long life. Be happy and strong at all times. Now thy servants Yedonyah and his companions say thus: In the month Tammuz in the year 14 of king Darius, when Arsham went forth and went to the king, the priests of the god Chnub made a conspiracy with Waidrang, who was prince here, to the end that the temple of the god Yaho, that was in the fortress of Yeb, they should take away. Thereupon this accursed Waidrang sent a letter to his son Nepayan, who was general of the army in the fortress of Syene, containing the following: Let the temple in the fortress of Yeb be destroyed. Then Nepayan brought Egyptians and other soldiers. They came to the fortress of Yeb with their implements; they tore it down to the ground, and broke in pieces the stone pillars which were there. Also, it came to pass that they destroyed the five stone gates, built out of cut stone, which were in that temple, the wooden doors of the same, the brazen hinges of the doors, and the roof of cedar beams. All that was there they burnt with fire. And the golden and silver basins and all the things that were in that temple have they taken and appropriated. Already, in the days of the kings of Egypt, our fathers built that temple in the fortress of Yeb. And when Cambyes came to Egypt, he found that temple built. And the temples of the gods of Egypt they tore down, but that temple no one injured. And when they had done thus, we and our wives and our children put on mourning and fasted and prayed to Yaho, the God of heaven, who with regard to that dog Waidrang made known to us as follows: They shall take the chain from his feet (that is, perhaps, execute him and cast his body away), and they shall destroy all the treasures that he has won, and all the men who shall have attempted to do evil to that temple shall be killed and we shall look upon their destruction.

Also, before this, when this evil was done to us, we sent

a letter to our lord, as well as to Yehohanan and his companions, the priests in Jerusalem, and to Ostanēs the brother of Anani, and to the nobles of the Jews. (In response), not a single letter have they sent to us.

Thus, since the month of Tammuz of the 14th year of king Darius unto the present day, we have worn mourning and fasted; our wives have been like a widow; we have not anointed ourselves with oil, nor have we drunk wine. Nor have we from that time until the present day, in the 17th year of king Darius, offered meal-offerings, incense-offerings, and burnt-offerings in that temple. Now then, thus say thy servants, Yedonyah and his companions and the Jews, all of us citizens of Yeb, as follows: If it please our lord, mayest thou think on the reconstruction of that temple. Since it has not been permitted to us to build it again, do thou look with favor upon the recipients of thy benefits and favors here in Egypt: let there be sent from thee a letter in regard to the rebuilding of the temple of the god Yaho in the fortress of Yeb, even as it was built before. In thy name will they offer the meal-offering, the incense-offering, and the burnt-offering upon the altar of the god Yaho, and we shall at all times pray for thee, we and our wives and our children and all the Jews here present, if thus it be done, until that temple be built again. And a work of righteousness will it be for thee before Yaho the god of heaven, greater than that of a man who offers him a burnt-offering and sacrifices of the value of a thousand talents of silver. And as respects the gold, we have sent a message and informed thee. Also, all these items of information we have sent in a letter in our own name to Delyahyah and Shelemyah, the sons of Sanballat the governor of Samaria. Also, we would inform thee, that Arsham has learned nothing of all this that has been done to us.

On the 29th of Marcheshwan in the year 17 of king Darius.

SELECTION FROM THE ARAMAIC VERSION OF THE BEHISTUN
INSCRIPTION

Thus speaks Darius the king: A man whose name was Umishu, my servant, a Persian, I sent to Armenia. I said: Go, smite this rebel army. Then, Umishu went to Armenia to meet it. The rebels assembled and went to meet Umishu to make battle. Afterwards, they fought a battle at a place called in Assyrian Atcitu. Ormuzd aided me. With the help of Ormuzd my army slew that rebellious army. On the 15th of Anamaka the battle was fought. They killed among them 2024 (Aramaic 2034). A second time the rebels assembled and went to meet Umishu to make battle. There is a place in Armenia called Antiyara. There they fought a battle. Ormuzd aided me. With the help of Ormuzd my army slew the rebels. On the 30th day of Iyyar, they fought a battle. They slew among them 2045 and took 2559 alive (Aramaic 1575). Afterwards, Umishu did nothing, waiting for me, till I should come from Media.

SELECTIONS FROM THE STORY OF ACHIKAR

The thorn-bush sent the following message to the pomegranate tree, saying: The thorn-bush says to the pomegranate tree: How very numerous are thy thorns for him who touches thy fruit! The pomegranate tree answered and said to the thorn-bush: Thou are nought but thorns to him who touches thee.

A panther met a goat while it was naked. The panther said to the goat: Come and I will cover thee with my skin. The goat answered and said to the panther: What have I done, that my skin should cover thee? Take it not from me.

Draw not thy bow and shoot not at the righteous, lest God help him greatly and cause it to return against thee.

Thou hast drawn thy bow and hast shot at one who was more righteous than thou. This is a sin against our God.

Watch thy mouth from every place of observation and harden not thy heart; for a word is a bird, etc.

Withhold not thy son from the rod, if thou art not able to deliver him from it.

Conceal(?) not the word of a king. It is healing. Let thy word be soft when the king speaks. He is brighter and stronger than a knife.

Princeton.

R. D. WILSON.

GOSPEL HISTORY AND CRITICISM*

The four Gospels contained in the New Testament are the primary literary sources of our knowledge of the life and teaching of Jesus Christ. Other sources, whether Christian, pagan or Jewish, add little or nothing that is authentic. The rest of the New Testament either by what it presupposes or by express allusion agrees with the Gospels in respect both of the factual basis of Christian faith and of its significance. The Gospels however are historical narratives, biographical in form. Except the Acts of the Apostles, which is also historical in form and in a measure biographical, the remaining books of the New Testament are epistles or letters devoted to the exposition of Christian doctrine and to practical admonitions; and there is one prophetic writing. The fundamental agreement of these elements is an important fact, the historical implications of which are worthy of careful analysis.

The nature of this agreement concerns matters which separate the canonical Gospels from other representatives of their type. The Jesus of the New Testament lived the life of a normal man, free from pathological conditions whether of mind or body. Those elements of His person which distinguish Him from other men do not impair this quality. He lived among men the life of a man and did not cease to be man though free from any consciousness of sin, for this is an exception not to the type but to its condition. There is no trace of sin in Jesus; yet in His life and teaching the fact of sin in human experience, its effects upon man in the present and in the future is recognized and made the subject of His earnest concern. His sinlessness is not the innocence of ignorance but the purity of holiness—that quality of nature which is the accompaniment of its positive determination to good. Yet sinless and holy, Jesus lived among men sinful by nature and subject to the consequences

* The substance of lectures delivered in the Princeton Summer School of Theology in June, 1913. Part I.

of sin. And He did this fully conscious of the conditions which surrounded Him. His reaction upon them must therefore have singular significance for the interpretation of His life. This did not manifest itself in isolation. Jesus was not a holy ascetic. It did not exhaust itself in righteous indignation and prophetic denunciation or in the milder tones of moral precept. The Gospels disclose two distinctive elements in Jesus' attitude toward sin: sympathy with sinful men, and the exercise of authority over sin itself. These qualities moreover find expression in a life consciously devoted to the discharge of a definite function. This function the Gospels describe in terms of a religious expectation which had its roots in the Old Testament and its more immediate expression in the prophetic activity of John the Baptist. This expectation had as its content an era of blessing from God to men and as its mediator the anointed of the Lord, the Messiah. The ground of this expectation was the sense of the relation between God and the Jewish people during their history, quickened and informed from time to time by prophetic utterances. This relation was believed to rest ultimately on a covenant graciously made by God with the people. The covenant took the form of a promise of blessing from God and on the part of the people of life under law in conscious subjection to the will of God. Traces are not wanting moreover that this covenant presupposes and is but a more particular form of an earlier covenant of wider scope with promise of good to the human race and that it emerged historically as a means to this larger end.

The Gospels represent Jesus as consciously undertaking and in all His activity fulfilling the function of the Messiah. His life therefore, itself free from sin but in close relation with sinners and with sin, is set forth in terms of a religious expectation fraught historically with profound meaning both for the Jewish people and for mankind. It is purposive in a twofold sense, in that it stands related to this expectation and implicates a philosophy of history

which to providence adds a gracious activity of God on man's behalf; and in that it was directed consciously toward the realization of the end which the expectation involved. Jesus' life as Messiah is thus set upon a background which involves the revealing activity and the gracious purpose of God. The former is regulative and gives knowledge of the content of the latter which is made effectual in and through Jesus. This activity moreover has in addition to its present significance an explicit reference to the future and moves toward an end in which the final issues of the present order, the world and all its values, are to be determined.

The same sources which tell of the normal human life of Jesus and of His vocational consciousness attribute to Him a unique origin, a sense of peculiar and intimate relation to God, the possession and exercise of superhuman knowledge, power and authority, and an issue of His life in contravention of the processes which usually follow death. In different forms but clearly and unmistakably the New Testament writings witness to the deity of Jesus and represent His life upon earth as a real incarnation of a preëxistent and divine person, as being part of and taken up into the experience of an infinite and eternal person.

These three things,—a normal human life, a definite vocational consciousness and a divine nature in personal union with the human—constitute the essential elements in the New Testament portraiture of the person of Jesus. The account which is given of His life however centers about and is controlled by its vocational end. The final cause of the incarnation is the purpose which Jesus set before Himself in His vocational consciousness, and the means to the realization of this end His passion. This appears in the early reference to His passion, in the central place assigned to it in the Apostolic gospel, in the prophetic anticipation of it by Jesus, and in the full and detailed account of it in the Gospels. Its significance is definitely indicated before it occurred and is afterwards expounded.

In the discharge of His vocation Jesus lived the life of a religious teacher and inculcated the truths concerning God and man and their mutual relation, especially in the ethico-religious or spiritual sphere, which disclose His conception both of the ultimate values of life and of the nature of the work He was seeking to accomplish. He was a prophet with a message. But His message like His life and His death was a means to an end; and this was realized in bringing men into relation with Himself. For His vocation was fundamentally that of a saviour; and this He fulfilled not simply in what He was or in what He taught or even in what He did, but in Himself in all the fulness of His life and work, so that they truly are saved from sin and its power whom Jesus saves unto God and His favor.

The Gospel story is the story of a saviour who came out of the infinite world, who lived as man among men under the conditions of time and space, whose vocation as saviour concerned the ultimate realities, the supreme values of life, the timeless and eternal which is constituted for man by his relation to God, who in the discharge of this function passed through the mystery of the passion and entered again the eternal world as the all powerful, ever present Lord, the source of life to men, the object with God Himself of the faith and worship of those who through Him and in Him are made partakers of the salvation which He accomplished—members of the kingdom of God, possessors and heirs of its blessings in time and in eternity. The Gospel story, in short, tells of the origin of the Christian religion in the life and work of a divine saviour under conditions of time and space in which timeless and eternal relations and values were established by Jesus. Its distinctive quality consists in the combination of the historical and the eternal. It implicates the supernatural not simply in its message about God but specifically in its account of the person and work of Jesus. And the record of this, the historical setting of Jesus' life,—His teaching, His works, His death, the final issue in the resurrection and exaltation—is set forth in the

Gospels. In the Epistles as in the Apostolic preaching the significance of Jesus' person and work for the spiritual welfare of men and the means by which and the processes through which His work becomes effectual are unfolded. The substantial agreement of the two records shows plainly that the essential elements of the Gospel portraiture of Jesus entered into the faith of the primitive Christian community and gave its distinctive character to the Christian religion.

But all this was long ago and the story of it has been transmitted in a process which has deeply influenced and at times itself been strongly affected by the forces which have determined the development and character of Western civilization and culture. It still possesses profound interest and supreme value if true. What are the tests of its truth? Ultimately its correspondence with reality. But how may this be determined? One test, but not the only test, is that of criticism. For the record of this story is preserved in documents—the Gospels—and these may be subjected to the methods and principles by which other historical documents are tested in respect of their origin and character. There are other tests based on the causal judgment, historical continuity, personal experience. A final judgment will embrace them all; but each may be treated separately and attain reasonably secure results in its own sphere.

CRITICISM

The introductory discussion will have served sufficiently to indicate the character of Gospel history, to show how deeply the supernatural is involved in it, to make evident what far reaching and profound issues depend upon its truthfulness, and to point out the important place which criticism holds among the tests by which this may be determined.

Criticism of historical documents is broadly divided into two spheres, the lower or textual, and the higher or literary and historical.

TEXTUAL CRITICISM

Textual criticism is concerned with the text of a document; and in the case of the Gospels whose text has been transmitted by the process of copying its object is the establishment of a text approximating as closely as possible the text of the autographs. To this end it gathers the available materials, the manuscripts, the versions, and the patristic citations; it ascertains, compares, analyses and organizes the phenomena, formulates principles for estimating their relative value, reconstructs the history of the text in the various stages and forms of its transmission, and finally produces a text. The results of this process are embodied in the great critical texts of the New Testament, especially in the texts of Tischendorf, of Westcott and Hort, and of von Soden.

Recent work in this field has not yet resulted in any essential modification of Westcott and Hort's theory of the history of the text. Their view has indeed been subjected to thorough testing in all its elements, but it has stood the testing well. Their theory still remains the best account of the history of the text, their principles have commended themselves as sound, and their text is still the best critical text of the New Testament. The comprehensive work of von Soden has just been completed,¹ but it will be some time before its value can be accurately ascertained.² Von Soden's analysis of the history of the text—based on a larger array of evidence, especially in the sphere of the later manuscripts, and better editions of some of the versions and patristic writers—shows nevertheless a fairly close approximation to Westcott and Hort's theory in its broader features. It differs chiefly perhaps in its account

¹ *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, 1902-1913. The fourth volume contains the text and critical apparatus. The text has also been issued with a condensed apparatus—*Griechisches Neues Testament. Text mit kurzem Apparat (Handausgabe)* 1913.

² Cf. Bousset, *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1903, 324 ff.; 1907, 69 ff.; 1908, 672 ff.; *Theologische Rundschau*, 1903, 431 ff.; 1908, 380 ff.; 1914, 143 ff., Lietzmann, *Zeitschrift f. d. Neutest. Wissenschaft*, 1907, 34 ff., Lagrange, *Revue Biblique*, 1913, 481 ff.

of the origin of the Western text, in emphasizing the Egyptian provenience of the Neutral text and its derivation from a critical recension, and finally in allowing a place to all the different forms of the text in reconstructing the original text.

Beside critical investigation of the available materials, discovery has made its contributions in this sphere. The Washington manuscript, purchased by Mr. Freer of Detroit in Cairo on December 19, 1906, has just been issued in facsimile³ together with a critical study of its text by Henry A. Sanders.⁴ The manuscript is old—of the fourth or fifth century—and contains the four Gospels with some breaks⁵ and in the Western order—Matthew, John, Luke, Mark. The most striking feature of its text was observed soon after its purchase and has been widely discussed. The text of the Gospel of Mark is unique in that it alone of the manuscripts of the Gospels contains an addition to the long ending of this Gospel hitherto known to have formed part of its text in some early manuscripts only from a statement of Jerome's.⁶ The addition however does not strengthen but rather weakens the argument for the genuineness of this ending.

Other discoveries have contributed indirectly to the work of textual criticism. The papyri and ostraca from Egypt and Greek inscriptions from countries around the Mediterranean have increased our knowledge of the *Koinē*, or that

³ *Facsimile of the Washington Manuscript of the Four Gospels in the Freer Collection*, 1912.

⁴ *The New Testament Manuscripts in the Freer Collection*, Part i, *The Washington Manuscript of the Four Gospels*, 1912. The manuscript has been collated with the Oxford 1880 edition of the *Textus Receptus* by Sanders, *op. cit.*, pp. 143 ff., and with the text of Westcott and Hort by Goodspeed in the *American Journal of Theology*, 1913 (xvii), pp. 395 ff., 599 ff., and 1914 (xviii), pp. 131 ff, 266 ff.

⁵ The two lacunae caused by loss of leaves are Jn. xiv. 25b-xvi. 7a; Mk. xv. 13-38a; cf. Sanders, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁶ *C. Pelag.* ii. 15 (Vall. ii. 758): in quibusdam exemplaribus et maxime in graecis codicibus iuxta Marcum in fine eius evangelii scribitur postea, quum accubuissent undecim, etc.

form of the Greek language which was commonly spoken and written in the Graeco-Roman world from the time of Alexander until about the fifth century after Christ. This has not merely taught us to estimate more truly the historical continuity of the Greek language; it has enlarged also our understanding of the lexical and syntactical phenomena of the New Testament. The results of these discoveries have been gathered and organized by Deissmann,⁷ Thumb,⁸ Moulton,⁹ Milligan,¹⁰ and others,¹¹ and are of great value especially when supplemented by the work that has been done on the grammar of the Septuagint by Helbing¹² and Thackeray¹³ and by the contributions of those who, like Dalman,¹⁴ Wellhausen¹⁵ and Zahn,¹⁶ approach the study of the language of the New Testament from its Aramaic background. The significance of these linguistic phenomena is both general and particular. It increases the accuracy of our knowledge of the forms of the language in which the New Testament was written; and then in the papyri contemporary documents have been preserved from the time of the autographs and through the following centuries in which the New Testament manuscripts were written. By a comparison of the forms preserved in the papyri and the inscriptions with the forms found in the manuscripts—especially in matters of orthography—light may be thrown on the local origin of a manuscript or a type of the text.¹⁷

⁷ *Bibelstudien*, 1895; *Neue Bibelstudien*, 1897; *Bible Studies*, 1901; *Licht vom Osten*, 1909; *Light from the Ancient East*, 1910.

⁸ *Die griechische Sprache im Zeitalter d. Hellenismus*, 1901.

⁹ *Grammar of New Testament Greek*, 1906.

¹⁰ "Lexical Notes from the Papyri" (in collaboration with Moulton) in the *Expositor* since 1908; *St. Paul's Epistle to the Thessalonians*, 1908; *Selections from the Greek Papyri*, 1910.

¹¹ Wilcken, *Griechische Ostraka*, 1899; *Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, since 1901; Mitteis-Wilcken, *Papyrusurkunde*, 1912.

¹² *Grammatik der Septuaginta*, 1907.

¹³ *A Grammar of the Old Testament in Greek*, 1909.

¹⁴ *Die Worte Jesu*, 1899.

¹⁵ *Einleitung in d. drei ersten Evangelien*,² 1911.

¹⁶ *Einleitung i. d. Neue Testament*,² 1906.

¹⁷ Moulton, *op cit.*, p. 41, says: "Another field for research is pre-

HIGHER CRITICISM

Higher criticism of the Gospels is of two kinds, literary and historical. Both presuppose and build upon the results of textual criticism as this in turn presupposes knowledge of the language in which the Gospels were written. The two are in reality simply two methods of study. The literary criticism treats of the literary form of each Gospel both in itself and in its relation to the form of the other Gospels with a view to understanding its literary character and discovering as far as possible its literary genesis, i.e. its sources. Historical criticism seeks to understand the Gospels in the light of the environment in which each was written and ultimately to judge of their historical trustworthiness. The two methods are distinct and each is guided by its own principles. But the latter not infrequently presupposes and makes use of the results of the former. The final decision toward which the whole critical process moves is made in this sphere, not in isolation but comprehensively, and its principles must be adequate to its function. These may be *a priori*, having their origin and justification in some theory of truth—in a philosophy; or they may be *a posteriori*, springing from and grounded in historical evidence. As a matter of fact, to prove sufficient for their task, they must and do combine both elements. And as there can be no historical criticism—or no solution of its final problem—which is uninfluenced by *a priori* principles, the results in this sphere of criticism must be understood and estimated in the light of the theoretical principles which underly them. Coming as these do from an ultimate theory of truth, or in the historical sphere from an ultimate philosophy of history, they necessarily reflect an attitude of thought—a disposition or predisposition—which influences the judgment in the decision which is reached

sented by the orthographical peculiarities of the NT uncials, which, in comparison with the papyri and inscriptions, will help to fix the provenance of the MSS, and thus supply criteria for that localizing of textual types which is an indispensable step towards the ultimate goal of criticism."

concerning the historical problems of the Gospels. The most fundamental of these problems concerns the transcendent or supernatural element in history to which the Gospels bear witness. If the principle or standard by which the historical trustworthiness of the Gospels is judged be naturalistic in the sense of eliminating the possibility of the supernatural in history on theoretical grounds—to whatever general theory this may be related, whether materialistic or idealistic in its absolutist or pluralistic forms—the final judgment must be negative and the Gospels be held either partially trustworthy or completely untrustworthy. *Tertium non datur*. But if the principle be supernaturalistic in the sense of allowing the possibility of the supernatural or the miraculous in history, the judgment may be positive. *Tertium datur*.

There was a time when the former alternative in this issue of principle was considered axiomatic in much of the historical criticism of the Gospels and was made the boast of those who called their method scientific and claimed freedom from presuppositions.¹⁸ Then there came a reaction, emotionalistic rather than logical, which granted the premise but sought escape from the conclusion by a theory of religious values in which the substance or essence of the Gospel—the ethico-spiritual teaching of Jesus—was separated from its incidental and formal supernaturalism.¹⁹ But signs are not wanting that the real significance of the alternative is finding recognition. The naturalistic premise is not so readily taken for granted as an axiom requiring no defense. In fact it is sometimes denied and the validity of the supernatural premise affirmed by those who show little appreciation of its implications.²⁰ Others have dis-

¹⁸ So generally by the representatives of the Tübingen school.

¹⁹ In the Ritschlian school.

²⁰ P. W. Schmiedel, *Encyclopedia Biblica*, "Resurrection- and Ascension-Narratives," iv. 4040: "The present examination of the subject will not start from the proposition that 'miracles are impossible'.

Such a proposition rests upon a theory of the universe (*Weltanschauung*), not upon exhaustive examination of all the events which

cussed it in its religious and philosophical aspects, and Bousset²¹ in particular has done an important thing—whatever may be thought of his own theory—in calling attention to the necessary emergence of the issue in the development of criticism and to its crucial significance for the solution

may be spoken of as miracles. Even should we by any chance find ourselves in a position to say that every alleged miraculous occurrence from the beginning of time down to the present hour had been duly examined and found non-miraculous, we should not thereby be secured against the possibility of something occurring to-morrow which we should be compelled to recognize as a miracle. Empirically, only so much as this stands fast—and no more—that as regards present-day occurrences the persons who reckon with the possibility of a miracle (by miracle we here throughout understand an occurrence that unquestionably is against natural law) are very few, and that present-day occurrences which are represented as miraculous are on closer examination invariably found to possess no such character.

The normal procedure of the historian accordingly in dealing with the events of the past will be in the first instance to try whether a non-miraculous explanation will serve, and to come to the other conclusion only on the strength of quite unexceptionable testimony. Needless to say, in doing so, he must be free from all prepossession. He must accordingly, where biblical authors are concerned, in the first instance, look at their statements in the light of their own presuppositions, even though in the end he may find himself shut up to the conclusion that not only the statements but also the presuppositions are erroneous."

²¹ *Theologische Rundschau*, 1909, pp. 419 ff., 471 ff.: "The answer to the question concerning the a priori of all religion in the spiritual life of man is also the justification of religion and in its totality belongs to the sphere of purely philosophical investigation from which finally all simply empirical-historical elements must be excluded" (p. 435). And again: "But this will remain, as Troeltsch rightly perceived, the fundamental problem of our present theology (Systematik), the question concerning the religious a priori and its grounding in the totality of the reason. Thus Otto rightly grasped and estimated the situation: 'We seek to-day again on all sides for the religious a priori. Supernaturalism and Historicism fail to supply the standard and principle of the true in religion. The history of religions increases amazingly (wächst ins Ungeheure). But how can mere description of religions become a science of religion when it remains a history of religions. In fact how can it become even a history of religion unless it first possesses in itself, if only dimly perceived, a principle by which the historical material is selected, not to say, organized.'" Cf. *Biblical and Theological Studies*, 1912, p. 312, n. 13.

of the ultimate problem of historical criticism and the further progress of its work. Strikingly enough and with genuine insight into the character of the issue he entitled his discussion "the religious a priori"; for the problem is broader than the historical criticism of the Gospels. It is broader than Christianity; for it concerns the validity of religion and of the religious view of the world. It is bound up with the issues of theism—the reality and character of God and His relation to the world. As God is the object of true religion, religion itself on its subjective side will have one or another meaning, one or another value, as this issue is decided.²²

²² The influence of the naturalistic principle upon history especially in the religious sphere and with particular reference to Christianity, by which the supernatural is excluded as a cause in the origin and consequently from any part in the explanation which history as a science gives or can give of it as of all other religions, may be seen in writers who differ widely in their interpretation both of Christianity itself and of its constituent factors. Loofs (*What is the Truth about Jesus Christ?*, 1913, pp. 83 f.) says: "Thus, historical science is often in a position to recognize a fact upon contemporary evidence, although it is not known by what it was caused. If there is a possible cause to be presumed, our ignorance regarding this cause does not matter. But where we cannot find any cause which, according to our experience, is possible, then every conscientious historian is prevented from speaking of a historical fact. Hence when historians are forced by credible reports to recognize a fact as having really occurred, they must assume causes lying within the sphere of our experience. From this it follows that historical science, when investigating the life of Jesus, must take into consideration the supposition that it was a purely human life and that nothing happened in it which falls outside the sphere of human experience. Giving up this supposition would mean that the life of Jesus, or this or that event of his life, is incommensurable for historical science. . . . No description of the life of Jesus that recognizes supernatural factors is purely historical. An author treating his subject in some chapters as a historian would do, but elsewhere emancipating himself from the analogy of human experience, will produce a mixture of history and assertions of faith. . . . Every one who undertakes the task of writing a life of Jesus comparable to historical biographies and, like these, requiring scientific consent of the reader, is forced to suppose that his life was a purely human one. If, on the contrary, the life of Jesus cannot be understood as a purely human one, then historical science may give from its sources evidence to this or that of the doings of

The philosophical aspects of the ultimate problem which this issue involves have been set forth by James Ward in

sufferings or sayings of Jesus, but to do full justice to his person is beyond its limits." This manifestly erects the analogy of human experience into a test of the possible in the realm of historical science although reserving for faith a sphere of the real in history but beyond the principles and bounds of historical science. J. Weiss is equally explicit about the limits of historical science. He says (*Archiv. für Religionswissenschaft*, 1913 (xvi), pp. 425 f.): "Its task [i.e., the task of historical science—die Geschichtswissenschaft] will always remain, to show that the later manifestation is the necessary result of its antecedent and the fruit of its environment. . . . As investigation [Forschung] and in its detailed study, it must be indifferent not only toward the idea that possibly supernatural revelation may have introduced a new beginning but also toward the more modern conception that an unaccountable factor may be present in the emergence of a unique personality [Individualität]. It will attempt, in one way or another, to coördinate in the totality of causal relations also the original; it would deny itself as science if it should stop short of this." Even more explicitly and with perception of its implications Maurenbrecher states the same limiting principle. He says (*Von Nazareth nach Golgotha*, 1909, pp. 13 f.): "Our entire scientific work is directed toward this end, to understand the process of development purely from within [rein aus sich selbst heraus], to avoid every kind of supersensible causality. Modern psychology recognizes no supersensible influences under which man's consciousness stands; it recognizes only the natural and regular interrelations of this consciousness itself. For it religion also is only an immanent part of man's historical development, which has become and was not made, which grew and was not given. Religious impulses like others do not develop otherwise than according to the general laws which underlie all spiritual growth. They arise from pre-religious motives and emerge within the religious development from lower to higher forms. At no point of the development have we the right to suppose extra-human, supersensible powers to have been active in the religious conceptions and feelings of mankind. Rather is it everywhere the task of a psychologically informed exposition of the history of religion to show the natural and regular development in which the higher forms of religion sprang out of the precedent lower forms by means of purely human, intra-historical powers. As to every other form of religion so also to Christianity the psychologically schooled interpretation [Betrachtung] dare apply no other standard. As everywhere [else], so also here we must seek to understand the creations of history as those of the individual consciousness solely by means of common human motives and in relation to other manifestations of religious development. Every conception of a supersensible cause of religious feeling or of a supernatural origin of a particular historical form of religion is, over against the psychologically [inter-

his recent Gifford lectures.²³ Its wide range and the significance of its negative or agnostic solution are vividly portrayed in a striking passage at the conclusion of the introduction to Miss Jane E. Harrison's brilliant and—so it appears to one who has knowledge of the subject—incautiously speculative study in the social origins of the Greek religion.²⁴

preted] development of the history of religion, hopelessly lost. It is nothing other than a more refined form of the myth which on its lower levels dominates the whole thought of religion and whose nature consists in this, that beside the grounds in consciousness itself for that [i.e., the religious] feeling or conception in man it seeks other causes which belong to an external miraculous and magical world. To strip off this mythical manner of thought [Denkweise] and to interpret the human consciousness purely from within [ganz aus sich selbst heraus] is just the task imposed upon a scientific interpretation of the history of religion. . . (p. 17). When we cease considering it [die Religion] what it claims to be in accordance with its own mythical manner of thought, there will cease also the narrowness of the judgment which regards the one religion as true and all others as false. Rather all religions which have been at all influential in history are proven false; for each operates with objects which in reality simply do not exist [einfach nicht da sind]. Yet, on the other hand, when differently viewed each religion was true; for each is a part of the striving of mankind for the meaning and value of life, for selfrespect and human worth." Still Maurenbrecher himself insists (p. 22) that there is reason enough in the fatal neglect of the information contained in the only sources of our knowledge of the beginnings of Christianity—the Christian tradition embodied in the New Testament—without which, and in the event of its proving untrustworthy, nothing that is capable of proof can be known, to suggest the need both of caution in regard to this preliminary question [concerning the trustworthiness of the Christian tradition] and of not prejudging it on the basis of certain general judgments.

²³ *The Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism*, 1911.

²⁴ *Themis. A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion*, 1912, pp. xviii f. Cf., Farnell, *Hibbert Journal*, 1913 (xi), p. 453: "The task of *Themis* is to apply the theories of these distinguished thinkers [i.e., Bergson, Durkheim, Hubert, Mauss, Marett] to the minutiae of Greek religion and mythology with a boldness of imagination that might often dismay their authors, as the audacity of the pupil is sometimes an embarrassment to the teacher. . . . What first impresses one in this singular treatise is the extraordinary dogmatism of the tone. Miss Harrison possesses a creditable amount of learning; but no scholar in Europe possesses enough to be allowed so much dogmatism unchallenged."

I have come to see in the religious impulse a new value. It is, I believe, an attempt, instinctive and unconscious, to do what Professor Bergson bids modern philosophy do consciously and with the whole apparatus of science behind it, namely to apprehend life as one, as indivisible, yet as perennial movement and change. But, profoundly as I also feel the value of the religious impulse, so keenly do I feel the danger and almost necessary disaster of each and every creed and dogma. For the material of religion is essentially the uncharted, the ungrasped, as Herbert Spencer would say, though with a somewhat different connotation, the unknowable. Further, every religious dogma errs in two ways. First, it is a confident statement about something unknown and therefore practically always untrustworthy; secondly, if it were right and based on real knowledge, then its subject-matter would no longer belong to the realm of religion; it would belong to science or philosophy. To win new realms of knowledge out of the unknown is part of the normal current of human effort; but to force intellectual dogma upon material which belongs only to the realm of dim aspiration is to steer for a backwater of death. In that backwater lies stranded many an ancient galley, haunted by fair figures of serene Olympians, and even, it must be said, by the phantom of Him—the Desire of all nations—who is the same yesterday, to-day and for ever. The stream of life flows on, a saecular mystery; but these, the *idola* of man's market-place, are dead men, hollow ghosts.

A theistic view of the world—a belief in God—will not of itself solve the fundamental problem of Gospel criticism; but this view—and this alone—permits of an affirmative judgment. On any hypothesis or belief in respect of this ultimate issue, however, the historical evidence for the trustworthiness of the Gospels, in its various forms, must be investigated and its value determined; and this is the primary function of historical criticism. In discharging it, there is need of minute accuracy, detailed consideration of the different phenomena, and a clear and comprehensive exhibition of the facts with a view to their organization under some unifying principle. This preliminary work should be accomplished in a purely objective manner. But as every science has need of working hypotheses, so historical criticism brings to its investigation of the Gospels an interpretative theory which in practice seldom escapes the influence of the choice of alternatives involved in the ultimate issue concerning the supernatural. Being the reaction

of mind upon certain phenomena, it is generally purposive; and knowledge of the end toward which the investigation moves²⁵ may affect its results even in the preliminary statement of fact. It should, however, be possible to keep the two things separate or at least to recognize and discount the influence of the issue of principle in the phenomenal or factual sphere while freely admitting and indeed maintaining that this issue is and must be determining in the ultimate appreciation or evaluation of the facts, in their explanation and in the final estimate of their significance.

THE GENETIC PROBLEM

The preliminary work of historical criticism in the phenomenal sphere is essentially genetic. The original or approximately original text of the Gospels being given by the lower criticism and the content of the Gospels being known, it is the function of historical criticism to investigate the origin both of the Gospels and of their content in respect of its formal and of its material aspects. In doing this it makes use of the results of the literary criticism in so far as these may be well grounded. It makes inquiry also concerning the historical background of the Gospels in the matter of place, time, life, thought, institutions and persons mentioned in or presupposed by them. It investigates severally the evidence for their authorship, date, place of writing, purpose, original language, readers and general characteristics by careful consideration of the available evidence whether from early tradition or internal indications. The Gospels moreover are representatives of a type of literature and their relation not only one to another but to other representatives of the same type must be determined.

When this work has been done and the conclusions reached which the evidence seems to justify, criticism is

²⁵ Cf. Gunkel, *Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis des Neuen Testaments*, 1903, p. 70: "Thus these parallels supply us with the final proof that the infancy history of Jesus is a legend, of which indeed we were already long ago convinced (wovon wir freilich schon lange vorher überzeugt waren)."

ready to raise the final genetic question,—the question of cause, which of necessity passes beyond the phenomenal sphere of facts about the Gospels into the sphere of explanation of the Gospels as literary facts, the sphere in which judgment is passed on their trustworthiness or truth. And the content of the Gospels being what it is and including the supernatural, the solution of this question must be made in relation to the fundamental issue of principle. If the causal explanation of the content of the Gospels be a reality corresponding to their narrative, the literary embodiment of this will have a sufficient explanation and the judgment of trustworthiness may be justified. But if this be not the case, the solution of the genetic problem must be sought in some theory of the origin of the content of the Gospels under influences which were creative rather than reproductive in relation to the factual basis upon which they rest. And if this be the judgment of historical criticism, the Gospels cannot be trustworthy in the high sense of being consistently truthful; they can only be either partially trustworthy or completely untrustworthy.

The well assured results of historical criticism in the phenomenal sphere make the hypothesis of complete untrustworthiness unreasonable. Only two theories are really possible,—entire truthfulness or partial trustworthiness. The latter may approximate the merely logical possibility of entire untrustworthiness; but the evidence for certain historical elements in the Gospels can be set aside only by an historical skepticism which equally invalidates all knowledge of the past.

These being the alternatives, the genetic problem presses with peculiar force on the partial theory; for, in addition to the necessity which it shares with the opposing view of accounting for the genesis of the Gospels as literary facts, it must separate, in the matter of content, the trustworthy from the untrustworthy elements and adequately ground its principle of separation. And it must also discover the forces and indicate the processes which were operative in

the production of the untrustworthy element. This in particular requires explanation since on this theory it has no basis in fact. It is a difficult task; but it is necessary to the consistency of the partial theory. Its importance has long been recognized, but the efforts to meet it have not yet attained any considerable degree of success. Strauss sought to solve it by means of his mythical theory; but there are few if any representatives of the partial theory to-day who would defend this view in its entirety or adopt the results of Strauss' application of it to the Gospels. Confident as he was of the validity of his theory, Strauss did not fail to see the difficulties which attended its results. His insight has been justified by later efforts and newer theories so that his statement is still true of the partial theories generally.²⁶

The boundary line, however, between the historical and the unhistorical in records, in which as in our Gospels this latter element is incorporated, will ever remain fluctuating and unsusceptible of precise attainment. Least of all can it be expected that the first comprehensive attempt to treat these records from a critical point of view should be successful in drawing a sharply defined line of demarcation. In the obscurity which criticism has produced, by the extinction of all lights hitherto held historical, the eye must accustom itself by degrees to discriminate objects with precision; and at all events the author of this work wishes especially to guard himself in those places where he declares he knows not what happened from the imputation of asserting that he knows that nothing happened.

A similar appreciation of the difficulties that confront the partial theory appears in a recent brochure of Johannes Weiss'.²⁷

²⁶ *The Life of Jesus* (translated by George Eliot), 1906, pp. 91 f.

²⁷ *Jesus von Nazareth Mythos oder Geschichte?* 1910; pp. 114 ff. Loofs also, speaking of the miracles recorded in the Gospels, says (*op. cit.*, p. 127): "Exaggeration, insufficient acquaintance with the so-called natural laws, and wrong interpretation of metaphorical language undoubtedly helped to form our tradition. But we cannot clearly mark off the share they had in it and separate what is credible from what is incredible." W. Haupt, discussing the Gospel tradition of the words of Jesus, says (*Worte Jesu und Gemeindeüberlieferung*, 1913, p. 168). "It is false to picture the tradition as a mechanical,

The tradition with which we have to do is indeed—and that is the difficulty—anything else but a dry historical narrative about ordinary, daily occurrences. It is, even in its most primitive elements, penetrated with the miraculous; from the baptism of Jesus to the empty grave (Mk), not to say from the supernatural birth to the breaking of the seals of the tomb (Mt), what occurs naturally is interwoven with a series of miracles. And we still stand to-day, as in the days of [the old controversy between] supernaturalism and rationalism [i.e. the stage of historical criticism prior to Strauss] before the question: how are these two elements related to each other? This is the question of questions: is the supernatural only a stratum loosely superimposed and easily removed, or is it bed-rock? In other words, has a story not indeed commonplace but heroic been heightened into the divine, being gradually covered by legend with miracle growths? Or is it originally a history of the gods which, in order that it might be made convincing and credible, has been given the necessary setting in space and time and a measurably historical embodiment? . . . Of what avail is it to separate the earlier from the later strata, since the miraculous, though moderated, still reaches into the very earliest stratum? . . . There is, so it seems, no choice for one who does not occupy the standpoint of supernaturalism. These stories together with their entire setting must be rejected as legendary or recourse must be had to naturalistic explanation. . . . It is however too simple a solution to reject the setting because of the miracle. A solution must be found in which the non-miraculous traits will receive just treatment. To many this seems impossible. . . . But he who has the duty of really interpreting the sources cannot rest satisfied with this.

Weiss himself takes refuge in the naturalistic interpretation of Paulus. The Gospel narratives of miracles in many instances have their origin in misunderstood natural phenomena. But he supplements this theory especially in

extremely accurate reproduction of carefully guarded words of Jesus. Rather these lived only in so far as they touched the important and burning questions of the community. Where however such contact existed, where a word of Jesus was of significance for the questions of the community, there it became not so much dead capital but like a shoot that puts forth buds; it was enlarged, new thoughts derived from it, new regions illumined by it. And what the community, under the impression of an original word of Jesus, thus won in new insight, this circulated frequently again as a word of Jesus. The boundary between the original possession and the new acquisition was fluctuating; and even then it was often no longer possible to separate the original from the later accretion."

the matter of Jesus' healing activity by the help of modern psychology. He concludes, after illustrating his method:²⁸

But all these attempts proceed on the assumption that the Gospel tradition is rooted in history, that it grew in the soil of the history of Jesus, that it goes back to the eye-witnesses of the life of Jesus and is chronologically so near it that historical reminiscences may be reckoned with.

The "line of demarcation between the historical and the unhistorical" in the Gospels can, as Strauss said, be drawn only with difficulty and with little precision. The separation of the trustworthy from the untrustworthy elements cannot be made on purely literary grounds if the miraculous be untrustworthy—for this extends back into the earliest sources—or on purely historical grounds if only the miraculous is untrustworthy—for the evidence is the same as that which accredits the non-miraculous. For "one who does not occupy the standpoint of supernaturalism" there seem to be but two alternatives; complete rejection of the natural with the supernatural elements, or acceptance of the natural and a historically arbitrary rejection of the supernatural or the equivalent—a naturalistic interpretation of it. The evidence from the phenomenal sphere of historical criticism seems to Weiss to require the choice of the latter. The issue of principle, however, remains. But Weiss like Strauss—though probably for different reasons, as Strauss is explicit in grounding his point of view upon the Hegelian philosophy—has chosen the negative and is shut up to the partial theory.

There are then these three views which may be designated the positive, the partial, and the negative or—as they are sometimes called—the conservative or traditional, the liberal, and the radical. The fundamental issue between the positive on the one hand and the partial and negative on the other is the supernatural; that between the partial and the negative is the purely natural elements in the Gospels, the one maintaining their validity in isolation from the supernatural elements, the other insisting that the union of the two

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 125.

invalidates both. And each of these views is concerned with the genetic problem. The positive offers an adequate solution if its premise is true; the partial is beset with the difficulty of separating the historical from the unhistorical; the partial and the negative have in common the task of discovering the forces which were productive of the unhistorical which, according to the one, constitutes part of, and according to the other, the whole of the content of the Gospels.

THE GENETIC PRINCIPLE

Apart from the fundamental issue of principle, the genetic principle seeks to explain historically the origin of the unhistorical elements in the Gospels however these may be defined. It is an evident fact that the Gospels are Christian documents. They were written by Christians and for Christians. They had their origin in a community constituted by its common faith. It is therefore possible that the faith and life of the community may have influenced the Gospel story. The particular form of this influence may be differently conceived; but in general this faith and the influence it may have exerted on Gospel tradition is the genetic principle which the partial and the negative theories share in the explanation of the unhistorical elements in the Gospels. The two views differ in regard to the origin and essential content of this faith, but they are agreed in maintaining for it a creative influence in the production of the Gospel story. The partial theory, finding a substantial element of natural occurrences in the Gospels which is historically trustworthy, seeks the explanation of the origin of primitive Christian faith in a human Jesus, a religious teacher of some distinction, who possibly claimed for himself the vocation of Messiah but who was subject by nature to and did not transcend the limitations of humanity. The negative theory discovers no historical elements in the Gospels and explains the origin of Christian faith in the distinctive quality attributed to its object. This was never

mere humanity subsequently transformed by apotheosis into deity but from the first deity incarnate in human form. To it this quality however shows that the object of Christian faith is mythological, for such an object can never have existed. The natural occurrences recorded in the Gospels, the historical setting of the earthly life of such a mythological person, are but the background upon which the story is sketched and the person himself simply a personification. The positive theory holds that each of these views is right in its central affirmation and wrong in what it denies. It maintains that Jesus was, as the Gospels witness, a true man—but not a mere man; and that in Him a divine person was incarnate—but not as a mythological personification.

The genetic principle is differently named; it manifests itself in a number of ways; and its application to the Gospels yields a variety of results. In the older Rationalism prior to Strauss it was conscious or unconscious deception which, in the Romantic movement, took the form of Essene influence. In Strauss it was the mythical theory, the unhistorical elements in the Gospels having their origin in an unconscious fiction which grew as legend in the Christian community but was chiefly mythical, not in the sense of a history of the gods but as the clothing of a fact in an idea. This process was stimulated and informed chiefly by Old Testament Messianic prophecy. In the Tübingen school the party factions of the early Church were held to have affected the form and content of the Gospels, Matthew being the Gospel of the Jewish Christian party, Luke of the Pauline, Mark representing a later stage, and John the final synthesis of opposing elements in a higher unity. This tendency criticism moreover was combined with an allegorizing interpretation of the Gospels.²⁹ Weizsäcker³⁰ distinguishes a creative from a reproductive element. Schmiedel³¹ finds

²⁹ Cf. Weinel, *Ist das "liberale" Jesusbild wiederlegt?* 1910, p. 9.

³⁰ *Das apostolische Zeitalter*, 1892, p. 393.

³¹ *Encyclopedia Biblica*, ii. p. 1872; cf. Warfield, *PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, 1913, pp. 195 ff.

in conformity to faith grounds of suspicion of invention, that being held certainly historical which is in contravention of Christian faith. Menzies³² enumerates an aetiological, an apologetic, and a devotional motive. Bowen³³ names it "Messianisation"; and Bacon³⁴ has developed the theory of "pragmatic values". Others discover traces of ecstatic elements in Jesus Himself and account for His influence in terms of an abnormal, psycho-pathological constitution.³⁵ Representatives of the negative view have recourse either to the creative literary activity of an individual³⁶—the original Evangelist—under the ethico-religious influences and tendencies of the Graeco-Roman world of the second century, or to mythological impulse having its origin

³² *The Earliest Gospel*, 1901, pp. 15 ff. Menzies says (*ibid.*, p. 19): "But if we allow that the Gospel tradition was not made up of pure reminiscence, but was modified by the impulse to find in the life of Christ explanations of Church arrangements, by the interest of defending the Christian position, and by the desire for edification, are we driven to the conclusion that the tradition was an entirely unhistorical formation, and that it is not based on actual reminiscences at all? Such a conclusion would be most illogical. . . . The simple fact of the earlier account is surrounded in the later with a veil of wonder; details which might appear too rustic and plain are omitted; the figure of the Saviour is raised more and more above the earth; the story is made always more edifying, more impressive. These phenomena, of which the study of the Synoptic Gospels shows manifold instances, do not point to the conclusion that the facts on which tradition operated were themselves invented. On the contrary the facts were often too real for the tradition to use. They did not at first quite suit the purpose of the Christian community, but had to be changed in the unconscious process of transmission before they could be used."

³³ *The Resurrection in the New Testament*, 1911, pp. 402 ff. Similarly also W. Haupt (*op. cit.*, p. 149): "Pious faith let rays from the glory of the returning Christ fall on suitable places in the earthly life of Jesus and thus created certain points at least that made clearly evident the Messiahship of its Lord. The few reminiscences of the deeds of Jesus that were retained were Messianically illumined; there began the process of a gradual Messianization of the life of Jesus."

³⁴ *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1910, pp. 41 ff.

³⁵ Cf. Schweitzer, *Die psychiatrische Beurteilung Jesu*, 1913; "The Sanity of the Eschatological Jesus" in the *Expositor*, 1913, 6, pp. 328 ff., 439 ff., 554 ff.; Holtzmann, *Lehrbuch d. neutest. Theologie*,² 1911, pp. 412 f., n. 1.

³⁶ Bruno Bauer, *Kritik d. evang. Geschichte*, etc.

in some nature or historical myth and interpreted in terms of an early cult, the Gospels being the personification and dramatization of a socio-religious movement among the lower classes in the Graeco-Roman world.³⁷

Bacon³⁸ gives the following account of his theory of "pragmatic values":

The theory . . . is called the theory, or better, method, of "pragmatic values", because it starts from the principle that the beginnings of gospel story were not biographies or books, but anecdotes, and were rehearsed not in the abstract endeavor to make up history, but for the concrete and particular occasion, the narrator having in mind that special practice or belief of his own church which at the time was in immediate need of explanation or defense. The inference from such a postulate must be, of course, that we must seek first the practice and belief of the church, resorting to the oldest and best authenticated literature for it. We must take the greater Pauline Epistles and make as it were a cross-section of primitive Christian faith and practice from what we here see before us (as, *e.g.*, in the Corinthian correspondence), and apply this standard to the later formulated narrative literature. . . . Under the theory of "pragmatic values" early church practice and Gospel anecdote reciprocally illuminate one another.

As thus outlined the theory is not so much a principle of differentiation as of construction; only in its application the question must be raised,—are the "anecdotes" and "agglutinated sayings,"³⁹ whose organization into the Gospel story was occasioned by such a practical interest, true and faithful reminiscences.

Heitmüller⁴⁰ in his article on Jesus Christ presents the principle and its results with clearness. After stating, in general agreement with Schmiedel, the principle of contradiction—that those elements of Gospel tradition may be accepted as trustworthy which are not in accord with the faith of the early Christian community—and maintaining

³⁷ On the "Entpersönlichung des christlichen Urdatums" cf. Holtzmann, *op. cit.*, p. 419, n. 2.

³⁸ *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1910, pp. 41 f., 53 f.

³⁹ *Harvard Theological Review*, 1908, p. 68.

⁴⁰ *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, iii. p. 361; reprinted in his *Jesus*, 1913, p. 40.

that the earliest sources of the Gospels do not go back of but reflect the view of Jesus that was current in the Palestinian Christian community between 50 and 70, Heitmüller says:

Our scrupulousness must be especially active against all the things that were especially dear to the early Christians; to which belong the faith in Jesus' Messiahship, His approaching return, the whole subject of so-called eschatology (the Kingdom of God), the passion and resurrection, and the miraculous power of Jesus. Where the heart and the theology or the apologetic of the early Christians were especially interested, an influence on historical tradition or construction must be feared.

Weinel,⁴¹ after criticising the extreme views of Wrede and Wellhausen, says:

The entire tradition concerning Jesus is Christian, including Mark—in fact Wellhausen's Urmarkus has Christian traits; and the Christian must be stripped off from the portraiture of Jesus before He can Himself be found. But still only the Christian in a particular sense. Jesus was certainly no Jew, but something new; the Christian is to be denied to Him only in so far as it concerns ideas—representations and tendencies—which only the later church could have had.

And so Weinell, after insisting on a more thorough literary criticism, formulates the following principle:⁴²

For this [i.e. historical criticism] the sole standard by which the authentic is to be separated from the unauthentic is the principle: only such traits of the tradition are to be rejected as unauthentic which cannot have had their origin in an interest of Jesus but only in an interest of the church. This principle [however] is not to be broadened to include the other that wherever the church had an interest but where there is no reason that Jesus also should not have had it, the tradition is to be declared altogether unauthentic. But since the process is always one of separation, the proof must rather be brought that the particular interest can only have emerged later.

There is need, however, according to Weinell, to separate not merely the authentic from the unauthentic but the essential from the authentic; and the principle of this is "originality".⁴³

⁴¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 28; cf. also pp. 29 ff.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 30 f.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 38; cf. also p. 55.

Not what Jesus shared with His people and His time—this naturally is very often the authentic in the tradition; but what separated Him from His people and His time, that is His, that is the essential in Him and in His preaching.

The results of the application of these theories to the Gospels differ in detail, but they fall within the limits of the two views,—the partial and the negative. In regard to the adequacy of the principles and the validity of the results, it does not follow that the representation of Jesus is untrustworthy because the Gospels are Christian documents or unhistorical because it agrees with primitive Christian faith. It must be shown that the primitive idea of Jesus can not have been true, that the interests or values which manifest themselves in the early Church and are discernible also in the Gospels can not have been valid also for Jesus.⁴⁴ And finally the results attained by these principles must be subjected to the test of sufficient reason. Do they explain the origin of the Gospels in the religious movement of which they form a part? Do they give a satisfactory explanation of the Christian faith itself to which creative powers of such significance are attributed and which as an effect demands an adequate cause. But any and every theory of the Gospels must be brought to the test of fact and only that theory will accredit itself which the facts permit and which in turn explains the facts. The evidence must be heard, whether literary or historical, and the well established conclusions in the phenomenal sphere will determine certain limits within which a judgment of value apart from theoretical considerations may be justified. Otherwise we may experience the misery of those of whom Harnack⁴⁵ writes who, taking their knowledge of New Testament criticism at second hand,

are like reeds swaying with the blasts of the most extreme and mutually exclusive hypotheses, and find everything in this con-

⁴⁴ Cf. Warfield, *The Lord of Glory*, 1907, pp. 146 ff.; PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, 1913, pp. 261 ff.

⁴⁵ *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, 1907, pp. 3 f., n. 2; *The Sayings of Jesus*, 1908, p. xiii.

nection which is offered them "very worthy of consideration". To-day they are ready to believe that there was no such person as Jesus, while yesterday they regarded Him as a neurotic visionary, shown to be such with convincing force by His own words, if only they are rightly interpreted—which words, by the way, have been excellently transmitted by tradition. To-morrow He has become for them an Essene, as may be proved likewise from His own words; and yet the day before yesterday none of these words were His own; and perhaps on the very same day it was accounted correct to regard Him as belonging to some Greek sect of esoteric Gnostics—a sect which still remains to be discovered and which with its symbols and sacraments represented a religion of a chaotic and retrograde character, nay, exercised a beneficial influence upon the development of culture. Or rather, He was an anarchist monk like Tolstoi; or, still better, a genuine Buddhist, who had, however, come under the influence of ideas originating in ancient Babylon, Egypt and Greece; or, better still, He was the eponymous hero of the mildly revolutionary and moderately radical fourth estate in the capital of the Roman world. It is evident, forsooth, that He may possibly have been all of these things, and may be assumed to have been one of them. If therefore one only keeps hold of all these reins, naturally with a loose hand, one is shielded from the reproach of not being up to date, and this is more important by far than the knowledge of the facts themselves, which indeed do not so much concern us, seeing that in this twentieth century we must of course wean ourselves from a contemptible dependence upon history in matters of religion.

We may turn then to the phenomenal sphere of criticism and consider the evidence bearing on the historical origin and trustworthiness of the Gospels apart from a particular solution of the issue of principle and its influence on the genetic theories. We shall approach the Gospels and seek to understand them from their own point of view and premises "in the light of their own presuppositions"—and reserve the final decision for the sphere of values in which the data and conclusion of the phenomenal sphere must be weighed and estimated in the light of the Christian faith and its ultimate grounds.

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THE AUTHORITY OF HOLY SCRIPTURE

It is part of the confessional system of all the Protestant Churches that Holy Scripture is invested with divine authority and that in virtue of this fact it is "the only infallible rule of faith and practice". The truth of this statement may be seen by a consideration of the following citations. The *Confessio Fidei Gallicana* (1559), Article V, "We believe that the Word contained in these books (the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments) has proceeded from God, and receives its authority from him alone, and not from men. . . . Whence it follows that no authority, whether of antiquity, or custom, or numbers, or human wisdom, or judgments, or proclamations, or edicts, or decrees, or councils, or visions, or miracles, should be opposed to these Holy Scriptures, but, on the contrary, all things should be examined, regulated, and reformed according to them." The *Confessio Helvetica Posterior* (1566), Cap. I. 2, "And in this Holy Scripture the universal Church of Christ has, fully explained, whatever belongs both to saving faith and to life pleasing to God. . . . 3, We believe therefore that in these Scriptures are to be sought true wisdom and piety, the manner of reforming and governing the church, etc." The *Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England* (1571), Article VI, "Holy Scripture conteyneth all thinges necessarie to saluation: so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proued therby, is not to be required of anye man, that it shoulde be belieued as an article of fayth, or be thought requisite as necessarie to saluation." The *Formula Concordiae* (1576), *Epitome Articulorum* I, "We believe, confess, and teach that the only rule and norm, according to which all dogmas and all doctors ought to be esteemed and judged, is no other whatever than the prophetic and apostolic writings both of the Old and of the New Testament." The *Westminster Confession of Faith* (1647), I, 4, "The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testimony

of any man or church, but wholly upon God (who is truth itself), the Author thereof; and therefore it is to be received, because it is the word of God."

There can be little doubt that the religious practice of the majority of the adherents of the Protestant Church is in accord with these confessional statements. The aggressively missionary and evangelistic section of the church maintains the authority of Scripture unimpaired, because, apart from other valid reasons, those who are engaged in the practical work of the Kingdom of God are soon convinced that the only word that will conquer the world for God is the word that possesses divine authority. Again it cannot be doubted that the multitudes who hear the Scripture read from Sabbath to Sabbath receive it as an authoritative statement of the Divine will. But it is also true that there is considerable doubt as to the validity of the orthodox position. The basis for Christian work is sought not directly in the command of God but indirectly in the needs of humanity. Not infrequently the text for the homily is stated only to be corrected and made the point of departure for a lesson that is ethical rather than religious. The views that take the Bible books as historical sources for the understanding of Christianity, not very different from other sources, and who see in the prophets and apostles, as Schlatter puts it,¹ interesting characters from ancient religious history, or religious geniuses, have been popularized, and have contributed to the belief that in Scripture we have to deal with man's enlarging discovery of God, not with God's progressive revelation of Himself to man. There are many who agree with Harnack that in the development of modern science we have the greatest word that God has spoken to men since the Reformation² and who accept the authority of Scripture only so far as their concept of the teaching of science will permit them. Furthermore the methods of investigation become more and more technical and for this reason beyond the

¹ *Das Christliche Dogma*, 1911, p. 400.

² So Süsskind in the *Theologische Rundschau*, 1914, p. 5.

ability of the "plain" man to criticise. He finds himself therefore in the position of being forced to accept results which he finds uncongenial to his faith, because of his inability to attack the methods by which they are obtained. So like the one whom Thomas Aquinas describes, *ne ab infidelibus derideatur*, he keeps silence, unwilling to oppose science and yet desiring to maintain unimpaired his faith in the authority of Scripture. What we face then is perhaps not a complete abandonment of the authority of Scripture, but a shifting, so to say, of the centre of gravity, which results in emphasizing, beyond Scripture, other authorities to govern faith and practice. It may not therefore be amiss to consider once more the whole subject of authority, that topic of perennial interest, the theory of which, as Balfour remarks,³ "has been for three centuries the main battlefield whereon have met the opposing forces of new thought and old".

It can be shown⁴ that from the dawn of Christianity the authority of Holy Scripture has been practically recognized. Jesus and His Apostles upheld it. The early Christians died by thousands rather than part with their copies of it. Even of the Middle Ages, which we consider so dark, von Dobschütz says, "The Bible was the leading norm, and it was recognized as such." It was not however until the time of the Reformation, under pressure of the controversy with Rome, that the doctrine of the authority of Scripture was definitely formulated.⁵ Over against the Romish doctrine of the church, the Reformers placed the doctrine of the Properties of Holy Scripture. These as finally recognized were four: Authority, Necessity, Perfection, and Perspicuity. The question at issue was not so much whether Scripture possessed authority as whether this authority should be considered first, above the church. The Reformers' position

³ *The Foundations of Belief*, 1895, p. 213.

⁴ Cf. Ernst von Dobschütz, *The Influence of the Bible on Civilization*, 1914.

⁵ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, 1906, I. pp. 476-493, "Het Gezag der Schrift".

may be seen by reference to the Confessional statements already quoted as well as by examining the following quotation from Calvin,⁶ "But since we are not favored with daily oracles from heaven, and since it is only in the Scriptures that the Lord hath been pleased to preserve his truth in perpetual remembrance, it obtains the same complete credit and authority with believers, when they are satisfied of its divine origin, as if they heard the very words pronounced by God himself. . . . But there has very generally prevailed a most pernicious error, that the Scriptures have only so much weight as is conceded to them by the suffrages of the Church; etc." To the same effect Turretine⁷ "*Colligimus scripturam sacram non esse librum humana industria elaboratum, sed specialis Spiritus Sancti ductu concinnatum, adeoque vere divinum et autopiston.*" The view then was that while the Church can bear testimony to Scripture it cannot place authority in Scripture any more than the demonstrations of the geometer can confer upon the figures he describes the properties they bear. Holy Scripture therefore is the supreme authority to which all others must bow.

What is the ground and what is the nature of this authority? The ground is found in the fact that Scripture is inspired and in virtue of this fact bears a unique relation to God. The meaning of inspiration has been frequently stated, so frequently indeed that it has become the custom to dismiss it with the remark that "it is presupposed", often however to leave doubtful what kind of inspiration is presupposed. Hence for the sake of clearness let us cover in brief outline the well trodden ground.⁸ Inspiration is, it should be carefully noted, in the first instance neither a theory nor an hypothesis in the sense in which these words are usually employed, as mental forms used in guiding in-

⁶ *Institutes*, Book I, Ch. vii. 1.

⁷ *De S. Scr. auctoritate*, Disp. 2, § 5.

⁸ Cf. Warfield, "The Oracles of God", *Pres. and Ref. Review*, 1900; Bavinck, *Ger. Dog.*, 1906, p. 406, "De Theopneustie der Schrift"; Schlatter, *Das Christliche Dogma*, 1911, § 96, "Die Inspiration der Schrift".

duction, but a fact which includes in itself a number of other facts. It is the essential attribute of Holy Scripture without which Holy Scripture would cease to be Holy Scripture and as such it presents itself to our faith to be intelligently confessed. The doctrine of inspiration is simply the intelligent apprehension of the fact of inspiration with all that it implies. What then is meant by asserting with 2 Tim. iii. 16 that Scripture is *θεόπνευστος*? We translate the word, not "God-breathing", but "God-breathed"; not "inspirata quia et quatenus inspirat", but "spirat Deum et inspirat, quia a Deo inspirata". We note next that the word is one of that circle of concepts employed by the Christian religion which become emptied of all meaning unless there is presupposed the immanence of God. The meaning of the divine immanence is that the outgoing power of God maintains His creation in existence from moment to moment and manifests itself through all that happens. The world however is not only one but many, hence, while the maintaining power is one the things maintained are diverse. So the Christian following Scripture confesses one Holy Spirit, but traces His work in such events as the coming of wisdom, knowledge, and art, in the world at large; and in revelation and inspiration, regeneration and spiritual gifts in the church in particular. "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit." Inspiration is thus not isolated from the other outgoing works of God, as if it alone were an activity of the Spirit, the others not; nor is it to be identified with them. Wherein is it different? In this, it is the work of the Spirit in virtue of which it can be said that Holy Scripture is "what is spoken by the Lord through the prophet". Here then are two things to be considered if we would grasp the meaning of inspiration: the divine activity of the auctor primarius, the instrumental activity of the auctores secundarii. Now it has been said that the Christian theologian is the man who thinks of things "under the aspect of eternity", which implies in large and small an earnest effort to keep the divine proportion. This lays upon us the duty of understanding in-

spiration in such a way that no violence is done either to the primary or to the secondary author. This rules out certain views of inspiration in which the Spirit's work is obscured or made secondary; such as, that inspiration is an awakening of religious feelings in the hearts of prophets and apostles, under the influence of which they composed Scripture; or that inspiration simply means that the church has approved what has been written before; or that in so far as the Scriptures do not contain what we call error they may be considered inspired. In all such views a human will intervenes between the divine will and the effect, the Holy Spirit has been denied His right. On the other hand all so-called mechanical theories, in which the secondary authors are thought of as torn loose from their environment and time, made unconscious and involuntary instruments, do violence to the secondary authors. It may be said that here is a great difficulty, but it is no greater than that of understanding the work of creation and providence, in one of which God gives the world a separate but not an independent existence, and in the other God maintains the world not in violence to but in harmony with the nature He has created. So in inspiration God makes use of the prophet and the apostle, neither annihilating his personality nor ignoring his environment, both of which He had prepared and controlled for this very purpose, but using all so that the result is "God's word through the prophet" for the salvation of His people.

This view of inspiration enables us to make clear certain matters often misunderstood or altogether ignored. Says one, "I can agree that where there is a definite command to write, what is written may be termed God's word; but what of the greater part of Scripture where there is no such command?" The answer is that the *impulsus ad scribendum* is to be more widely interpreted and that there is a necessity, on our view of God and the world, for so doing. Writing is a divinely ordained method of making spoken words the permanent possession of the whole world. The

prophetic call would imply the use of all the means necessary to accomplish the end in view. Again, we are enabled to understand how all the usual helps to composition: investigation, comparison, sources, etc., should have been used by the authors of Scripture; how each spoke the language and used the character of thought to which he had been accustomed; how all the ordinary literary forms: prose, poetry, history, epic, drama, oratory, letters, etc., should have been employed. The Scriptures did not arise outside but within history, and consequently the Spirit availed Himself of all as instruments serviceable for the end in view. Once more we can understand why Scripture in place of repelling investigation, really invites it. As Christ once commanded Thomas, "Reach hither thy finger, and see my hands; and reach hither thy hand, and put it into my side", so Scripture does not forbid either historical or dogmatic criticism; but further, as Christ also said, "Be not faithless, but believing", so Scripture desires that this criticism shall lead men to the Scripture not away from it.⁹ There is one thing, however, that this theory, contrary to the opinion of many, does *not* allow and that is that Scripture is fallible. Here it is not otherwise than with the confession of the mystery of Christ's person. We may confess all the details of His humiliation, acknowledge all the characteristics of His humanity, but if we see in Him sinfulness, He is and can be no longer our Saviour.¹⁰ He becomes a man like the rest of us

⁹ Cf. Schlatter, *Das Christliche Dogma*, p. 408. "Die historische Kritik produziert willkürliche Gebilde, setzt an die Stelle des Geschehenen Konjekturen und bedeckt die Schrift mit wissenschaftlichen Dichtungen. Die dogmatische Kritik ist von der Gefahr begleitet, dass das Urteil durch unsren leeren und falschen Willen bestimmt sei und die Geltung der Schrift gerade da ausser Kraft setze, wo der Gehorsam gegen sie für uns die dringende Wichtigkeit hätte."

¹⁰ Cf. Professor Emerton, *Unitarian Thought*, 1911, p. 165, "'Tempted at all points as we are and *not* without sin' would seem to be the logical result from the doctrine of the complete humanity of Jesus. From this conclusion the Unitarian does not shrink. He is ready to admit with the utmost frankness that in all probability Jesus had his moments of opposition to the divine will which constitute the

and the good He does us is the good, not of the sinless only begotten Son of God, but of a human being coördinate with other human beings. So of inspiration, if it does not render the Holy Scriptures infallible their authority is no longer divine but human. What Leckie overlooks,¹¹ when he argues that since it does not destroy human authorities to be fallible, it ought not to destroy divine authority, is that the very point of difference between divine and human authority is that while the latter may be fallible the former cannot be. As soon as our faith discovers fallibility in a supposed divine authority, straightway the authority takes its flight to some other resting place; as Leckie escapes from the fallible Scripture to the infallible Christ. Similarly Principal Forsyth¹² says "For that age (the Reformation) the whole Bible was equally inspired. . . . But now we do not so read the Bible." According he takes refuge in something else which is divine and which for him possesses infallibility, "God's redeeming work in Christ".

The nature of the authority of Holy Scripture is to be understood by reference to the fact that the present dispensation of God is gracious. God is sovereign and does exercise His sovereignty; God is and will be the judge of him who rejects Christ. At present however the divine method is one of entreaty and gracious invitation. The nature of the authority of Scripture is in accord with the characteristics of the present "year of love". He who comes into contact with Scripture is in the presence of "the new world of God" created for him by the Holy Ghost through the medium

attitude of 'sin'. Even our meagre and laudatory accounts of him give abundant support for this view." The result of this view for the "Saviourhood" of Christ is, page 172, "The Unitarian welcomes the whole conception of the 'salvation' of the race through a human interpretation of the divine to men. . . . The person of Jesus thus takes its place in Unitarian thought as one in a long line of revealers to men of the law by which they are called upon to live. He was not the first; he will not be the last."

¹¹ *Authority in Religion*, 1909, Chapter IV, "Authority and Infallibility".

¹² *The Principle of Authority*, 1913, p. 320.

of literary forms. This new world overflowing with the beauty of the divine life asks the aid of no secular arm nor civil power, seeks the help of no ecclesiastical might beyond that of faithful presentation; it does not rule by power or might; but invites a free and willing recognition which it itself brings to pass in an ethical way through the working of the Holy Spirit whose instrument it is.

The authority of Holy Scripture interpreted in this way has always had to maintain itself against opposing views. The reason is not far to seek. The exercise of faith, someone has said, is part of the cross which we carry in this world, and the bearing of the cross is not easy. All through the ages there have been stumbling blocks in the way of a humble acceptance of Holy Scripture and it is nothing wonderful that men have forsaken it for other bearers of divine authority under whose rule they imagine the task will be easier. Now since our thought embraces a world of action of which the individual is one limit, and humanity the other, it follows that when the authority of Scripture has been abandoned as untenable, now the individual, now the community is taken to be the seat of divine authority. The latter view is represented by the Church of Rome, the former by the varying nuances of the theology of consciousness.

The history of the Church of Rome has been an oft told tale and our only reason for repeating it here is the desire to account for its rise by the working, now beneath the surface, now above, of the effort to establish a visible society as the bearer of divine authority and so to make headway in the present world. There are two periods in the growth of the Church of Rome: the first when its course was almost merged in the general growth of the church universal; the second when it gathered to itself all that was its own and began an independent development which has continued to our own day. Let our method be that of summoning the witnesses, bearing in mind the fact that there is reciprocal action between great men and the times in which

they live. If they influence them, they in turn are also influenced by them. So the concept of the church gradually came to contain the qualifications of unity, sanctity, catholicity, and apostolicity.¹³ The first two arose naturally in contact with the physical oppression of the persecuting heathen and the intellectual attack of the Gnostics. The latter two are found first in the epistle of Ignatius of Antioch to the Smyrnaeans,¹⁴ "wherever Christ Jesus is, there is the catholic church," and "See that ye all follow the bishop, as Jesus Christ the Father; and the presbytery, as the apostles." In themselves these expressions seem of no very great moment, but they mean this: the church was becoming conscious of itself as a unity embracing many individual churches, and this unity was using as organizing concept, the hierarchy. Our next witness is Cyprian (Bishop of Carthage, died 258) from whom we receive clear information concerning the advance of catholic ecclesiasticism. Individually the bishops are rulers clothed with divine authority; collectively they are leaders of the catholic church. Of the church as a visible organization he says, "He cannot have God for his Father, who does not have the church for his mother." In the Lord's supper the bishop does what Christ did: offers His body and blood. In finding a basis for the unity of the church, Cyprian uses the words in Mat. xvi. 18, 19, and says "super unum (Dominus) aedificat ecclesiam et . . . ut unitatem manifestaret, unitatis eiusdem originem ab uno incipientem sua auctoritate disposuit". Our next witness is Augustine (354-430) who is an example of how deeply spiritual utterances may yet be used in the service of a crass materialism. In his view the church is catholic because it extends over the whole earth as Christ had willed that it should do. It is before the individual Christian, "Evangelio non crederem nisi me catholicae ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas." Its decision is decisive in matters of faith. How the decision was to be given Augustine does not

¹³ Cf. Köstlin, *Realencyklopädie f. prot. Theol. u. Kirche*, x, pp. 332 ff.

¹⁴ *Patr. Apost. Opp.*, Geb. Har. u. Zahn, Editio minor, 1902, p. 109.

tell us. The answer still lay below the horizon. To Vincent of Lerins (about 440) we owe next the *norma sensus catholici*, one must not depart from *quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est*. This norm not only tended to exclude the reforming efforts of individuals but also raised problems for later ages to solve: how is a consensus obtained and how can that which was concealed from the older church become catholic truth?

"The world and affairs," said Wendell Phillips, "have shown me that one-half of history is loose conjecture, and much of the rest is the writer's opinion." Here however we are not dealing in conjecture. We have before us, emerging as it were from the mist, the mountain tops by which we can trace the hidden hills in their windings until they come up beneath our feet. The first period of development prepared the material which the second period rapidly fabricated into the papal monarchy. Pope Leo I (died 461) claimed for the chair of Peter a "*cura universalis ecclesiae*". Perhaps he did not mean that the earthly head of the church had the function of revealing truth and imparting salvation but the time was favorable for such a development. It was a period of great illiteracy and glowing imagination. The people of western Europe desired a heavenly presence in an earthly garb: the Lord sacrificed in the mass; the Lord living in His vicar; the Holy Spirit imparted in the ordination of the clergy; the gifts of the Spirit in the sacraments. The church met these expectations more than halfway. Under Gregory VII (1020-1085) and Innocent III (1161-1216) the activity of the Roman See in securing rights and building better ideals among peoples naturally violent was remarkable in its success and contributed in no small degree to enhancing the authority of the church. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) supplied the needed reflective justification for the accepted papal supremacy and infallibility, and the power of the keys claimed by the individual priest.¹⁵ It will be noted that the papal concept of

¹⁵ *Summa*, Sec. 2, Quaest. 1, art. 10.

the church is not yet a dogma, not yet sanctioned by church decision. The time was not yet ripe since political power and national feeling opposed it as well as the individual bishop's pride in office. The papal view however continued to make headway. Silvester Prierias (1456-1523) put the matter as follows: "ecclesia universalis essentialiter est convocatio . . . omnium credentium, virtualiter ecclesia Romana et pontifex maximus; ecclesia Romana repraesentative est collegium cardinalium, virtualiter autem pontifex summus". These utterances refer to the struggle that was arising as to whether the bishops collectively or the Pope officially was the organ of divine authority. The Council of Trent (1545-1563) did not decide the question but after several centuries more of struggle the papal theory triumphed in the *Constitutio Vaticana*, "Pastor aeternus", of July 18, 1870. It thus belongs to the dogma of the Roman Catholic Church that the organ of divine authority is the church, not the church in general however but "sharpened" so to speak in the Pope of Rome who in his official position is infallible "in definienda doctrina de fide et moribus".

We are not concerned with the many subtle distinctions by which the dogma of papal infallibility is upheld,¹⁶ nor shall we trace the growth of the concept further. It seems to have been formed largely under the influence of practical motives. Our survey however would be incomplete were we not to notice how the concept impresses contemporary Romanists. For this purpose let us examine Wilfrid Ward's justification of churchly authority.¹⁷ In the *Hibbert Journal* article the position taken is briefly as follows: "Those who know" build up a body of special knowledge to which the individual should defer. If genius stirs within him he should strive to correct and develop corporate knowledge, not to destroy it. In addition to reason man possesses conscience

¹⁶ Cf. Professor P. J. Toner's article on "Infallibility" in *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. VII.

¹⁷ *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1903, "The Philosophy of Authority in Religion", *Men and Matters*, 1914, essay on "The Conservative Genius of the Church".

which also tells him of a vast world of reality. Conscience uttered its voice in holy men but most fully in Jesus Christ. This utterance of conscience is the revelation which it is the function of the Christian church to preserve. The authority of the church consists then in possessing the corporate reason of the society exercised on the highest existing knowledge of the particular subject-matter. The revelation of Christ is the highest point attained in spiritual knowledge, yet its application to the world is a necessarily continuing process. This also is the function of the church and here again the individual must seek to help and not hinder. In the essay cited from *Men and Manners* the work of the church in promoting progress is sketched in the following way: "The first process, of resistance, is the work of authority, of Rome itself; the second, of assimilation, is the work of individuals, authority only tolerating it and not necessarily helping it, until it is so far tested that authority can more or less ratify what individuals have initiated." Thus Ward's position seems to be that of Clough:

"Old things need not be therefore new,
O brother man, nor yet the new.
The souls of now two thousand years
Have laid up here their toils and fears
And all the earnings of their pain.
Ah yet, consider it again."^{17a}

The utterances of Father Tyrrel on authority were so radical that they caused his excommunication. Nevertheless, as he tells us,¹⁸ he always considered himself "a member of the church according to the spirit". Father Tyrrel defines authority in a spiritual inward sense. "All she (the church) can say to me is, 'If you love me, keep my commandments', if I do not keep her commandments, she can say, 'You do not love me'; but she cannot coerce or

^{17a} Quoted by Leckie, p. 14.

¹⁸ In *Through Scylla and Charybdis, or the Old Theology and the New*, 1907, p. 81.

threaten me."¹⁹ His personal experience must have convinced Father Tyrrel that he had interpreted the authority of the church wrongly. Much as he disliked the "dictatorship of the Papacy" he had no desire to take refuge in the "anarchy of Liberal Protestantism", and so he gives out another interesting utterance, that authority is that which comes from "an agreement of individual minds". This again seems not the historical position of the Roman Catholic Church.²⁰

The authority of the church is therefore *auctoritas* or prestige. In this respect the Romish concept of authority is true to the genius of the great empire whose place she assumed. The subtle working of this notion is revealed in every department of her activity. Such features of the first age of the church as form material for prestige are retained, the others ignored. Such Scripture passages as Matthew xvi. 18, etc., where more than one meaning is possible, are always interpreted so as to enhance the prestige of the church. Prestige depends on recognition and so the methods of the propaganda *in partibus infidelium* are guided by the effort to gain the latter: whether it be the assumption of mandarin power in China, or costly buildings in the United States, imposing ritual, elaborate street parades, and official masses on public holidays. It would be a mistake to suppose that a concept of authority gained in this way is devoid of spiritual value. On the contrary it can satisfy such minds as those of Cardinal Newman at the one extreme and of the simple-minded Catholics at the other, whose faith we are told by one who ought to know,²¹ is of "an intensely supernatural character". But to the Calvinist whose view is diametrically opposed to this concept of authority²² there are some things which not even

¹⁹ *Mediaevalism: A Reply to Cardinal Mercier*, 1908, p. 65.

²⁰ Cf. Professor Lobstein's moralizing article on the "lessons" of Modernism for Protestantism in the *Hibbert Journal* for October, 1912.

²¹ George Coore in his article on "Modernism and the Catholic Conscience" in the *Hibbert Journal* for Jan. 1913.

²² As Melchior Leydecker said: "Inter nos et adversarios . . . hoc

God can do. He can not give His glory to another without ceasing to be God. For this reason, when the authority of the Church of Rome is earnestly reflected upon with the resolve to take all the data into consideration, which as we remarked in the foregoing ought to be the guiding principle of that "reflecting" faith which intelligent Christians should possess, it reveals itself at base as not different from that of other human societies.

We turn now to the examination of those views which recognize authority in the dicta of the believing consciousness. This notion has existed from the beginning of the Christian church but it will be most profitable to study it in those modern representatives in whose thought it has been most carefully elaborated. So we will begin with Schleiermacher (1768-1834) who developed the religious implications of the philosophy of Schelling and his associates. Against his predecessor Kant (1724-1804) who reduced religion to morality, and his contemporary Hegel (1770-1831) who considered it as thought not completely developed, Schleiermacher vindicated for religion an independent position, placing its seat neither in the understanding nor in the will but in feeling. In the second of his *Reden über die Religion* published in 1799, "Über das Wesen der Religion", we find religion described as an immediate consciousness on the part of the finite, of all being in and through the infinite, a thought which recalls Spinoza. This consciousness is neither knowing nor doing but feeling for an infinite which at this stage in Schleiermacher's development is not conceived as personal deity but is simply the world thought of as a whole. Thirty years later, in the *Glaubenslehre* published in 1830, we find this same view presented with greater precision. The feeling which is the essential feature of religion is differentiated from all other feelings in that it goes out upon the infinite God²³ and is not

est discrimen, quod nos a deo incohemus, illi a se ipsis. Cf. also Hastie, *Theology of the Reformed Church*, 1904, Ch. II, "The Protestant Principle of the Reformed Church stated and authenticated.

²³ *Glaubenslehre*, §3 "Die Frömmigkeit, welche die Basis aller kirch-

so much aesthetic as ethical in nature. Now pious feelings may be described, and the description guided by concepts. Thus a system of propositions concerning feeling may be formed into a "Glaubenslehre" but since these are merely descriptive of what by definition has no logical value, the system they compose is not to be considered scientific. On these principles the church is for Schleiermacher the "community of the pious".²⁴ In describing its origin we must employ the concepts of Election and Participation in the Holy Ghost, the latter conceived simply as the common spirit of the pious community. The church expresses itself in literary form in the Scriptures which thus are the first of the long series of Christian writings²⁵ differing from the rest merely in coming first and for this reason exuberant with the spirit of youth.

What becomes of authority in the system of Schleiermacher? At first glance it would seem that there was no place for it, since religion is based on feeling, and, as the history of thought proves, it is no easy task to show that this feeling must, *qua feeling*, apart from other non-affective considerations, have precedence over that. Schleiermacher deals with the problem by pointing out that we are here concerned with truth and error in the religious sphere,²⁶ conse-

lichen Gemeinschaften ausmacht, ist rein für sich betrachtet weder ein Wissen noch ein Thun, sondern eine Bestimmtheit des Gefühls oder des unmittelbaren Selbstbewusstseins". §4 the differentia of religious feeling is "dass wir uns unsrer selbst als schlechthin abhängig, oder, was dasselbe sagen will, als in Beziehung mit Gott bewusst sind".

²⁴ §115 "Die Christliche Kirche bildet sich durch das Zusammentreten der einzelnen Wiedergeborenen zu einem geordneten Aufeinanderwirken und Miteinanderwirken".

²⁵ §128 "Das Ansehn der heiligen Schrift kann nicht den Glauben an Christum begründen, vielmehr muss dieser schon vorausgesetzt werden um der heiligen Schrift ein besonderes Ansehn einzuräumen".

§129 "Die heiligen Schriften des neuen Bundes sind auf der einen Seite das erste Glied in der seitdem fortlaufenden Reihe aller Darstellungen des christlichen Glaubens; auf der andern Seite sind sie die Norm für alle folgenden Darstellungen".

²⁶ Cf. what is said in §153 under the caption "Von der Irrthumsfähigkeit der sichtbaren Kirche in Bezug auf die Untrüglichkeit der

quently that in dealing with feeling we must find a substitute for the cognitive expressions, truth and error. This substitute is found in the concepts of purity and impurity. When however is a feeling pure? The answer is when it, like the religious feeling of Christ, tends completely to its object.²⁷ The feeling of the church falls far below this but the tendency is towards a greater purity.²⁸

The thinker who clears up his system completely always runs the danger of clearing it away. Schleiermacher's effort to find authority in feeling, even by making the feeling of our Lord the norm, was felt as an unsatisfactory solution. Man in his religious life cannot live on feeling alone, but on every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God. So the task was set for Schleiermacher's followers of retaining what he had made a permanent possession of Christian thought and supplying what he had failed to establish. So far as the problem of authority is concerned this consisted in retaining the Christian consciousness as its basis but in avoiding the mysticism of Schleiermacher by introducing more historical and therefore less subjective sanctions. This work was carried out by Ritschl (1822-1889), and his successors. Ritschl's aim, as one of his expositors says,²⁹ was to replace the theology current in his day, based as it was

Unsichtbaren": "Wie in jedem Theil der sichtbaren Kirche der Irrthum möglich, mithin auch irgendwie wirklich ist: so fehlt es auch in keinem an der berechtigenden Kraft der Wahrheit".

²⁷ Cf. §110.3 "Von Anfang seiner Menschwerdung an Christus sich auf alle Weise naturgemäss aber stetig und ununterbrochen in der organischen Vereinigung mit dem ihn beseelenden Princip zum Dienst desselben entwickelte; keinem Andern aber, der seine Persönlichkeit aus dem Gesamtleben der Sündhaftigkeit mitbringt, eine solche vergönnt ist."

²⁸ §153.1 "Daher es auch in jeder Kirchengemeinschaft Einzelne wenigstens giebt, die sich über die herrschenden Irrthümer erheben und die Keime einer bestimmenden Entwicklung der Wahrheit in sich tragen," and §155 "Alle Irrthümer, welche sich in der sichtbaren Kirche erzeugen, werden durch die in derselben immer fortwirkenden Wahrheit aufgehoben."

²⁹ Const. von Kugelgen, *Grundriss der Ritschlschen Dogmatik*, 1903, p. 19.

on a speculative interpretation of consciousness, with one firmly grounded on a positive interpretation of the history of salvation. Like all great thinkers Ritschl with his powerful genius is a gathering place of thought, into which set the tides of the past and from which issue those of the future. For our present task however it will be sufficient to select those of his thoughts which bear on the question of authority, and first his view of religion. Religion for Ritschl is a very real and definite sphere of human experience. Man is conscious of spiritual freedom and yet knows that he is dependent upon nature, the sum total of the objects and forces that environ him. Nevertheless nature is not the ultimate fact; it has a spiritual Author. In this is given the possibility of a *religious* escape from the world in that man may assure his spiritual freedom by means of fellowship with God. Religion therefore as a concrete thing is composed of all the human activities, institutions, etc., originating in the conflict of which man is aware and in which he desires that he and not the world may conquer by availing himself of God. Now revelation refers to all the means by which man may enter into fellowship with God, and for this reason religion and revelation are correlative terms. Where is this revelation to be found? Ritschl is more interested in Christianity than in any other religion and so he answers that the Christian revelation is in Jesus of Nazareth, the Son of God, the founder of the Kingdom of God, a "Kingdom of Ends" to which all else in the universe is as means, and in which man attains his spiritual freedom. This forms what may be called the religious data of experience on which theological reflection is to work. Ritschl however is not content with making his theology a mass of descriptive assertions like that of Schleiermacher, nor, under the influence of Kant, does it seem to him possible to make theoretical judgments concerning the religious life and the objects which it contains, so he avails himself of the distinction between judgments of truth and judgments of worth, claiming the latter as the material of theology. Historically

this distinction arose in Kant's separation of theoretical and practical reason. In the former we have the constant forms of sense perception, space and time, which serve as *principia individuationis*, and the constant categories of the understanding, cause, substance, unity, and plurality, by which the individuals of sense perception become the ordered world of the understanding. In the latter, the practical reason, an analogous solution would be the development of a system of pure volitional *norms* to do for the world of will what the pure *forms* had done for the world of intellect. What the volitional norms are Kant never satisfactorily enunciated. He died leaving the problem as a legacy for his intellectual children. Ritschl seized on the distinction but it always remained a distinction for him and nothing more, and the failure to analyze clearly the difference and to demonstrate a principle of authority in judgments of worth, if indeed such can be, is responsible for the unavoidable appearance of arbitrariness in the selection of the concepts by which he organizes his system. Take for example his famous definition of Christianity: "Das Christentum ist die monotheistische, vollendet geistige und sittliche Religion, welche auf Grund des erlösenden und das Gottesreich gründenden Lebens ihres Stifters in der Freiheit der Gotteskindschaft bestehe, den Antrieb zu dem Handeln aus Liebe in sich schliesse und in der Gotteskindschaft wie in dem Reich Gottes die Seligkeit begründe."³⁰ Why are these concepts selected as of constitutive worth? They do not include all the data of Christianity. Wherein consists their authority for Christians? To Ritschl, as to many of his adherents, such questions may have appeared to belong to those "ungereimte Fragen" on which the sage of Königsberg poured such scorn, but, unreasonable or not, his system of thought contained no answer to them, and without an answer religious experience had no authority beyond looking into the mirror of experience and seeing itself. For even if I say that Jesus is the object but assign

³⁰ *Recht. u. Ver.* III. 14.

normativity merely to that which I select from his portrait because of its worth to me, how in the last instance have I gone beyond myself?

Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht. The subsequent development of Ritschlianism supplies all the criticism that is needed of the attempt to find an authority in judgments of worth. Let us pause a moment to consider the general problem. It may perhaps be granted with Garvie³¹ that to accuse Ritschl of illusionism or solipsism, as his first critics did, is extreme, for judgments of worth do not deny the existence of an object but assume it. But when Garvie proceeds to remark that the standard of worth is not subjective but objective, it is pertinent to ask what is the meaning of objective in this connection. He gives no clear answer to the question. Furthermore, investigation has shown that the concept of worth is much more subtle than it was supposed to be at first. Worth is an attribute neither of subject nor object but a functional relation between the two.³² This definition is not adequate however, for as has been pointed out³³ meaning is also a relation of subject and object. Hence meaning may be regarded as a genus capable of division into two species, logical (or cognitive) and affective-conative. Value may then be taken as affective meaning, and purpose as conative meaning. The attempt has been made to ascertain whether there can be any absolute worth. Reflection shows that account must be taken of the "dispositional concept" so-called or the tendencies of the subject which make his worths this or that. These dispositional concepts are the product of individual and social causes so complex that they are not easy to analyze. Investigation nevertheless while not yet complete seems to show that all affective-conative values are dispositional values subject to empirical laws of mutation and hence neither in the indi-

³¹ *A Handbook of Christian Apologetics*, 1913, p. 48.

³² Cf. Meinong, *Psychologisch-Etische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie*, 1894, p. 29; Ehrenfels, *System der Werttheorie*, 1897, p. 65.

³³ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology etc.* XI. 7, "Value in its Relation to Meaning and Purpose", J. S. Moore.

vidual nor in the social consciousness absolute in any proper sense of the term. In fact unless we take account of logical or cognitive worth, the very point which by assumption the Ritschlians exclude from the field, no absolute authority is to be found. But when logical or cognitive work is excluded, an empty place is left, which the Ritschlians attempt to fill by means of the other kinds of worth. This is the procedure of the ordinary unreflective or so-called evangelical popularized Ritschlianism of Great Britain and the United States. The Virgin Birth of our Lord has no cognitive value but great affective-conative value; Jesus died like any other man but "His soul keeps marching on"; the Resurrection of Jesus is an event about which we cannot be certain but the assurance is that His power is greater now than it ever was, that we understand Him better, etc. The work of Herrmann, Kaftan, and Wobbermin, is not of this unreflective character but the futility of their efforts to satisfy the demand of faith for an absolute authority while keeping merely to affective-conative values would seem to show that the self-created *impasse* cannot be surmounted. Thus Herrmann finds in the "inner life" of Jesus, the religious ethical greatness of the historic Savior, the other member for the support of our judgments of worth. Our affections go out to Him, our purposes to the worthy end, the Kingdom of God. At first sight this view is exceedingly charming clothed as it is in all the eloquence which the author knows so well how to employ. Further reflection however suggests some difficult questions. Why on the terms of the system has Jesus the position he has? Why should Christianity be isolated from the other world religions? Why, surrendering the distinctive position of religion gained by Schleiermacher, should Herrmann make it a department of the ethical? Kaftan also attempts to find an authority for religious experience. He recognizes a special revelation prepared in Israel and culminating in Christ and the sending of the Spirit.^{33a} He at once however

^{33a} *Dogmatik*, 1901, p. 34.

robs his position of any advantage it might have by interposing faith as the medium through which the revelation must come to validity. Revelation becomes then that from which faith may take what it pleases under the guidance of the practical ideas of the Christian religion, which are arbitrarily determined to be Atonement and the Kingdom of God. Finally Wobbermin recognizes that the content of our religious-ethical consciousness implies an objective authority which is to be found in the person of Christ who stood in unbroken fellowship with the Father and whose experience was never disturbed by sin. But this Jesus is known out of the sources from which a historical-psychological method is to derive the norms of a religious ethical life. Authority is thus placed in the validity of the method or if transferred to the content which the method discovers it is no more than ethical.

The worth-judgments of Ritschlianism therefore seem to be just as troublesome and just as indispensable as the *Ding an Sich* of Kantianism; retain it and it is the one thing that cannot be explained; exclude it and the system ceases to exist. Professor Troeltsch carries the development to its logical conclusions.³⁴ Religion is to be looked on as a universal expressed in the historical religions and to be investigated by the religious-historical method. The elaboration of this method is Troeltsch's special contribution to the advance of theological thought. Its application may be seen by the following considerations. Christianity is not to be separated from the other religions³⁵ but is to be classed with them. Nevertheless it is Troeltsch's wish to demonstrate that Christianity must come first and so the task is to find a norm by which to rank the various religions. This norm arises by assuming hypothetically the standards of Christianity and applying them sympathetically to the

³⁴ Cf. Troeltsch, *Gesammelte Schriften*, II. Zur religiösen Lage Religionsphilosophie und Ethik. Tübingen, 1913. Also Süskind in *Theolog. Rund.* Jan. and Feb., 1914, "Zur Theologie Troeltschs".

³⁵ "Es kann im Christentum kein anderes Wunder enthalten sein als im sonstigen Geschehen."

other religions. At once worths and ideals are recognized which involuntarily arrange themselves in series from highest to lowest. The only assumption in this we are told is that of the ability of our reason to recognize value when it is seen. The result of the investigation is that Christianity is found to be the highest religion hitherto developed and as such the basis for future developments. It cannot however be shown to be the absolutely unsurpassable religion. Now since in this there is no authority such as religion requires, it is not surprising that Troeltsch turns next to the problem of the religious a priori. The aim is to discover a specifically religious a priori different from the logical, the ethical, the aesthetic a priori, or in other words that the religious consciousness possesses its own specific law. Troeltsch's formula is "*Das Apriori ist die aus dem Wesen der Vernunft heraus zu bewirkende absolute Substanzbeziehung, vermöge deren alles Wirkliche und alle Werte auf eine absolute Substanz als Ausgangspunkt und Massstab bezogen werden.*" This is clear enough as it stands but nevertheless discussion has arisen not so much perhaps as to what Troeltsch has in mind but as to what his words imply. Some, so Süsskind informs us, think that it is analogous to what Kant called the "Metaphysical tendency of the spirit." He himself however does not agree with this interpretation but allies Troeltsch's meaning with the concept of "purity" in Schleiermacher already mentioned in the preceding which consists in the relating of all that is and takes place to the activity of the universe or to the divine in its omnipresent efficiency. Is it then logical or psychological? If the latter we have not advanced beyond the preceding concept of authority, if the former it is not easy to see why the development has not returned to rationalism.

We have now traced the concept of authority as presented in the three historically important views of its ground and nature. Let us now reflect on the problem of whether a choice may be made between them. Let us put before our-

selves, for now we are in position to do so, what authority really means. "*La définition*", says Professor Doumergue, "*contient tout le système*". True! But we should end with it, not begin with it. Various definitions of authority are presented for our consideration by those who have written on the subject. Stanton³⁶ defines authority as "that principle which is exhibited in all reasons for receiving, or assenting to, a truth, if such there be, which are external to the man himself, to his own observation, reasoning, or intuition, or which, if revealed internally, lie beyond the reach of his own verification." Sterrett³⁷ flip-pantly enough makes authority equivalent to the "must" which Patrick told the priest he had left behind when he came to the new country. Monod³⁸ borrows a definition from M. Edmond Scherer, "*Tout ce qui détermine une action ou une opinion par des considérations étrangères à la valeur intrinsèque de l'ordre intimé ou de la proposition énoncée.*" Sabatier³⁹ defines authority as "the right of the species over the individual". Leckie⁴⁰ says "Authority is a power not self produced, which rules belief or conduct." Iverach⁴¹ calls authority "a power to enforce obedience". Forsyth⁴² apparently gives no formal definition but evidently considers it as that which has the right to rule the individual.

The remark has been made⁴³ that the term authority "is used with the greatest indiscrimination, so as to include all the grounds, valid or invalid, for the acceptance of any content as true. In view of this the great need is a critique that will enable us to determine the place and value of authority in a scheme of knowledge and belief." If we understand Professor Ormond correctly his contention is

³⁶ *The Place of Authority in Religious Belief*, 1891, p. 12.

³⁷ *Reason and Authority in Religion*, 1891.

³⁸ *Le Problème de l'autorité*, 1892.

³⁹ *Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*, Eng. Trans., 1904.

⁴⁰ *Authority in Religion*, 1909.

⁴¹ *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, "Authority".

⁴² *The Principle of Authority*, 1913.

⁴³ Professor Ormond, *Foundations of Knowledge*, 1900, p. 355.

that authority is not what he calls an "end-category"; its claim must be legitimated by grounds. Therefore our consideration of the term will be incomplete unless we notice the field of authority and the grounds on which it bases its claim in each field. Authority is to be seen in the methods and the results of science. In this field a body of positive knowledge has been built up the power of which to command assent is well nigh irresistible. The ground of this authority is truth, an assertion which is not invalidated by the difficulty of reaching a satisfactory definition of truth. For men do not waste time in defining that which has absolutely no relation to the subject in hand. A second field of authority is government, the expression of the collective will, which with its laws and offices we all regard as the highest authority in a certain great sphere of action. At first we may think that this authority is based on might but to reflection this reveals itself as not a final explanation; the might must be directed by the good. Here again there has been endless discussion of the meaning of the good but without causing most men to believe that the good exists both in the abstract and the concrete, and without invalidating the authority of government guided by the good. We also recognize authority in ethics and here it is the authority of the "ought". Once more men differ with respect to that which confers upon the "ought" its power to command, but once more the discussion is not a proof that the ought has no authority; rather that the domain of the human spirit is so vast that no one formula can exhaust it. Is it that the ought represents the voice of the reasonable, the universal, self? Or is it that which will bring happiness to all concerned? Is it the will of the compact majority, liable to change but authoritative as long as it lasts? Or is it the side of the expanding self, the one constant thing which it is our duty to follow through each changing moment of our life? Not every grounding of the authority of the ought has equal claim to recognition but each in its way is not intended to weaken the authority of duty but rather to strengthen it.

These considerations enable us to think clearly concerning authority in religion. Here again there must be authority⁴⁴ and here again we may ask what is the ground of this authority. The unanimous answer is that it must be a divine authority. This calls for explanation however, if we are to grasp exactly the meaning of our assertions. We shall present one view of their meaning. Religion is a relation between God and man. God however is not an object to be investigated by man at man's good pleasure; God must take the initiative and enter into relation with man. God must make Himself known and this activity of God is His Revelation. Thus religion implies revelation. Now Christians believe that in virtue of the work of Creation and Providence, the entire world and all that takes place in it form a standing revelation of God. Notice that both Creation and Providence are standing activities, the former of which is the explanation of miracle, miracles being a creative way of God's making Himself known. For the Christian then all experience is capable of religious interpretation for it may lead him to God. It may also lead him away from God, because, since the world, as we have said, has been given a separate, if not independent, existence, there is the possibility of seeing the creature and ignoring the Creator. This is what *has* happened and so Christians know that they are sinners in need of salvation. They also believe that God has come near to them in order to save them, a revelation not different in source from the other mentioned above: no more supernatural, no more miraculous, no less providential, but with a special aim: to bring about the salvation of God's people.

The authority in religion therefore must be the authority

⁴⁴ Cf. Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, III, 73, "es hat in der Welt keinen starken religiösen Glauben gegeben, der nicht an irgend einen entscheidenden Punkt sich auf eine äussere Autorität berufen hatte. Nur in den blassen Ausführungen der Religionsphilosophen oder in den polemischen Entwürfen protestantischen Theologen wird ein Glaube konstruiert, der seine Gewissheit lediglich den eigenen inneren Momenten entnimmt."

of God Himself—no other will suffice. The revelation of God wherever seen will also possess authority because it is the expression of God Himself, hence for Christians the authority of the true, the good, the ought, goes back to God the Creator and Preserver, and from Him as source obtain their power to control. For the same reason, and, considering our need, in a more urgent degree, the special revelation alluded to above will possess authority.

These considerations enable us to understand the confessional statements concerning the authority of the Holy Scripture. Its authority is not merely that it contains the true, that it expresses the good, that it instructs us concerning our duty; so do many other things; nor is it that it contains the original records of Christ for us to examine and retain what will stand our proving; but it is that *it itself forms a part of the special revelation*, prepared by the Holy Spirit in the manner we have already described, to be the permanent possession of the people of God. It possesses authority as source, not repetition; not merely as means of grace but as means of revelation; not merely the record of what grace did for far off peoples in the distant centuries, to be used by us as an occasional stimulus for feeble devotion; but the revealing to us personally, here and now, of that God whose word liveth and abideth for ever.

As a matter of course many objections are offered to this view. Some characterise it as Bibliolatry and others reëcho Lessing's gibe about the "Paper Pope". Proof is demanded, but in questions of fact the only proof possible is the presentation of the fact that the occurrence in question took place. Many are not content however; they point to the indirect testimony: that the "circumstances" of Scripture make it impossible for us to allow its claim of supreme authority as our forefathers did; that there are many internal contradictions; that many scripture books are not authentic; that we cannot reconcile scripture history with profane history; that we can no longer hold to creation or miracles; that the life and morals of the scripture characters are often very

bad; that it is full of myths and superstitions; that the original texts are lost and that those we have are not infrequently suspicious, and so on through all the familiar list. Scripture however still survives and the century of the fiercest attack has been the century of its farthest reaching conquests—not however by the aid of those who had lost faith in its authority but in the hands of those who upheld it.⁴⁵

So we see many repeating in inverse order the procedure of which our Lord complains in John v. 39, 40. The Jews acknowledged the authority of Scripture but rejected that of Jesus Christ; the men of today acknowledge the authority of Christ but reject that of Scripture. Must we not however, if we come to Christ, come through Scripture? And if we bow to the authority of Christ, must we not also bow to the authority of the Book of the Spirit of Christ? If we yield however we must do so with all our heart. It must not be the obedience of those who say that although the Scripture is full of ineptitudes, errors, misconceptions, anachronisms, childish views; although it is merely the story of how the race groped up after God, nevertheless we still resolve to hold to it in view of the great good it does in the world. That is similar to the attitude of those who say that Jesus Christ was a poor weak sinful ignorant man like the rest of us, but notwithstanding we may still respect Him in view of His good intentions and the effect He has produced. Doubtless such an attitude is better than open enmity. But the homage that is due to God and to His Word *in carne* or *in litteris simplis* is not the condescending respect of benevolence but the implicit obedience of the creature to the Creator.

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⁴⁵ Cf. "The Word and the World" by J. Hope Moulton, in *The International Review of Missions*, Jan. 1913.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

SAMUEL ROLLES DRIVER*

Dr. Driver died on the 26th day of February, 1914, in the sixty-eighth year of his age. He was born in Southampton on October 2, 1846, and was educated at Winchester College and New College, Oxford. In 1874, while Fellow of New College, he published *A Treatise on the Use of the Tenses in Hebrew*, which attracted the immediate attention of Hebrew students to his scholarship. By this book he first made his name. Whatever one may think of the desirability of speaking of the moods and tenses of the Hebrew verb, Dr. Driver's vast collection of examples and happy arrangement of them have splendidly exhibited the methods by which the Hebrews expressed those thought-relations which the Greeks more sharply distinguished by the moods and tenses of their verb, both alone and in combination with particles. The appearance of this book was followed by his appointment in 1875 to be Tutor of Hebrew in New College and by his choice for membership in the Old Testament Company for the revision of the Authorized Version of the Bible, a position which he retained until the completion of the work in 1884. He was now known as a proficient Hebrew scholar, and in 1882 was made Regius Professor of Hebrew and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford, in succession to the celebrated Dr. Pusey.

In 1891 Dr. Driver gave to the public *An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*. In its pages he made the first definite announcement of his attitude towards the three schools of Old Testament criticism, and his allegiance to the school of Graf-Wellhausen. There had been previous indications of the trend of his thoughts; for in a modest little book entitled *Critical Notes on the International Sunday-School Lessons from the Pentateuch, 1887*, in the introductory remarks he definitely accepted the literary analysis of the Pentateuch and the book of Joshua into the four sources known as

* *The Life-Work of Samuel Rolles Driver*. A sermon preached in Christ Church Cathedral on March 8, 1914, by W. SANDAY, D.D., F.B.A., Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1914. Pp. 12. Price sixpence net.

J, E, D, and P, but he used great caution in referring to the dates of these writings (so also in *Contemporary Review*, Feb. 1890, pp. 217-219, and 229; comp. *Journal of Philology*, 1882). In 1890 his *Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Samuel* appeared. This work is really an introduction to textual criticism, using the books of Samuel to illustrate method; but in the comments on the text some evidence is given that the author has adopted the Grafian dating of the Pentateuchal codes and assigned P to a time after Ezekiel (see 2 Sam. vi. 1; viii. 18; xv. 24, 27). It was in the *Introduction*, however, where Dr. Driver was first explicit in regard to his acceptance of Graf's theory of the origin of the Pentateuch. In this volume he also commits himself to the late date and unhistorical character of the Book of Daniel, and pronounces his judgment upon many of the minor problems that engage the attention of students of the Old Testament. The book at once took its place as the leading introduction to the Old Testament for English readers. Within a year three editions were exhausted and a fourth was published, the ninth Edinburgh edition came from the press towards the end of 1913, and a thirteenth New York edition in 1910. Mainly through this publication, but with his reputation enhanced by the *Commentary on Deuteronomy*, 1895, and the three volumes in the *Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges*, Dr. Driver became the most influential representative of the school of Graf-Wellhausen in Great Britain and throughout the English-speaking world. In the opinion of Professor Kautzsch of Halle it was chiefly Dr. Driver who "conquered England for the scientific criticism of the Old Testament" (*Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1897, col. 42).

Though Dr. Driver sometimes found himself unable definitely to accept critical views which were propounded while the *Introduction* was passing through its repeated editions, yet he "deemed it only proper to notice and describe them, so far as space permitted" (*Introduction*,^a p. xv). All of them, however, and some notable ones, did not obtain mention (Cheyne, *Founders of Old Testament Criticism*, pp. 294 f, 303 f, 372; Siegfried, *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1892, col. 124). A friend of Dr. Driver's, and a fellow-worker in the field of

Old Testament criticism, has expressed his disappointment at some such omissions, and has attributed Dr. Driver's silence on these matters to a possible feeling on his part that theories which he omitted to mention or neglected to discuss were "critical extravagances with which time might be left to deal" (A. S. Peake, *Expositor*, 1914, p. 397). This is a surmise, the suggestion of one who knew Dr. Driver well, and it is not unreasonable, especially when along with the limitations of space a chief characteristic of Dr. Driver's is remembered. He had no leaning to mere speculation; he always sought for tangible evidence. The lack of such support fully accounts for the omission of reference to a theory in the pages of the *Introduction*. It certainly and justly ruled out some views that originated not far from Oxford itself.

Naturally, then, Dr. Driver did not belong to the radical section of his school. Both Professors Cheyne and Kautzsch have spoken of him as being at times too cautious. It is quite possible that, as Professor Cheyne asserted, in consequence of Dr. Driver's "long devotion to the more exact, more philological study of the Hebrew Scriptures" he "could not see his way as far nor as clearly as those critics of a wider range, who had entered on their career at an earlier period" (*Founders of Old Testament Criticism*, p. 260). But the main reason for Dr. Driver's moderation ordinarily was found in one or both of two causes, in the lack either of tangible evidence of some sort or of a manifest compulsion of the theory. To use his own words, he made it his "aim to avoid speculation upon slight and doubtful data" (*Introduction*, p. ix or vi). Where the two grounds for an opinion were wanting, he allowed full weight to impressions. For example, he thought that the literary phenomena of the early books of the Bible indicated their composite origin, and therefore he accepted that view. He knew that archaeology, so far at least as it has yet spoken, does not declare the existence of the patriarchs, but only testifies to the correctness of the historical background, and therefore he denied the authority of archaeology at the present time to speak as a witness for the personality of the forefathers of Israel. But on the other hand he was impressed by "the amount of personal incident and detail in the patri-

archal narratives" and regarded these features as justifying the opinion "that Abraham, Isaac and Jacob [and Joseph] are historical persons, and that the accounts which we have of them are in outline historically true" (*Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*, articles Jacob and Joseph). Notwithstanding the goading of Professor Cheyne that he date the Book of Ruth after the beginning of the exile, he declared that "it seemed" to him "that the general beauty and purity of the style of Ruth point more decidedly to the pre-exilic period than do the isolated expressions quoted to the period after the exile."

Characteristically, then, Dr. Driver was not an innovator, but a judge (Peake, *Expositor*, 1914, p. 397), calm, cautious, careful. Possibly the chief limitations to the finality of his judgments are the narrowness of his gaze, which was fixed too exclusively on the literature of the Old Testament and in its historical range did not extend sufficiently beyond the confines of ancient Israel; and coupled with this, strange though it may seem in view of the long lists of words which formed the basis for many of his arguments, an occasional incomplete induction of facts.

Dr. Driver "came to the New [Testament] as a disciple and a believer" (J. Hope Moulton, *London Quarterly Review*, 1914, p. 310). His own confession of faith regarding the New Testament is found in the preface to his *Introduction*, in each edition from the first to the last. "While in the Old Testament," to quote his words, "there are instances in which we can have no assurance that an event was recorded until many centuries after its occurrence, in the New Testament the interval at most is not more than 30-50 years. Viewed in the light of the unique personality of Christ, as depicted both in the common tradition embodied in the Synoptic Gospels and in the personal reminiscences underlying the fourth Gospel, and also as presupposed by the united testimony of the Apostolic writers belonging almost to the same generation, the circumstances are such as to forbid the supposition that the facts of our Lord's life on which the fundamental truths of Christianity depend can have been the growth of mere tradition, or are anything else than strictly historical." (For references to "the God-man" and to "the central truths of Christianity," see

Sermons, pp. 186, 199, and *Christianity and Other Religions*, pp. 40, 44.) And among Dr. Driver's favorite hymns were "Jesus, Lover of My Soul" and "Just as I am, without one plea, But that Thy blood was shed for me".

Dr. Driver married in middle life, in 1891. Four children, two sons and two daughters, blessed the union. Dr. Sanday, his colleague and intimate friend, gives a beautiful picture of his home life. "Absolutely simple, absolutely sincere, absolutely without guile, single-minded and at the same time humble-minded, the Bible and the Home were the two centres of his being, and in both he had the fullest satisfaction. A happier or more united home could not easily be. Beyond the little vicissitudes of everyday life, undisturbed by external events, not wholly without and yet with less rather than more of the common lot of sorrow and trouble,

'Along the cool sequester'd vale of life
He kept the noiseless tenour of his way.'

It was such a career as a scholar would wish for himself, such a career as those who loved him may rejoice to look back upon, now crowned and made perfect in death" (p. 5).

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JOHN D. DAVIS.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

The Problem of Christianity. Lectures Delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston, and at Manchester College, Oxford. By JOSIAH ROYCE, D.Sc. (University of Oxford), Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Vol. I, pp. xlv, 425; Vol. II, pp. vi, 442.

The philosophy of Professor Royce has always had a religious side, in fact has been to a large extent a philosophy of religion. One of his earliest works was *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*; another, *The Conception of God*,—a symposium in which Royce took the principal part. His well-known Gifford Lectures, *The World and the Individual*, deal largely with religious problems. In the volumes before us, however, our author treats for the first time in extended form the Christian religion distinctively, though he had previously published some articles on the subject in periodicals.*

It may be said at the outset that it would probably be difficult for any one to realize the full import of these lectures who did not know something of Professor Royce's previous works and in general of his philosophy. Some of the books which he has published in the last few years may be regarded as forming a transition from the more purely philosophical works to the present one. We refer to *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, *William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life*, and his Bross Lectures on *The Sources of Religious Insight*. Professor Royce in the preface to the present work refers to the second-mentioned volume as containing the assertion, "that the spirit of loyalty is able to supply us not only with a philosophy of life, but with a religion which is free from superstition, and which is in harmony with a genuinely rational view of the world." (I, vii.) And in the Bross Lectures, one of which was on *The Religion of Loyalty*, the promise was made that in a future discussion he would, if possible, "attempt to apply the principles there laid down to the special case of Christianity". "The present work redeems that promise according to the best of my ability" (I, viii). The work before us, therefore, is not one that is independent of Royce's general

* An article of his on the Incarnation and the Atonement in the *Harvard Theological Review*, Oct. 1909, was adequately considered in this REVIEW, July, 1911, by Prof. Willis J. Beecher. Articles in the *Atlantic Monthly*, February and March, 1913, are substantially chapters in the work before us.

system, but rather the culmination of it in the interpretation put upon what is declared to be the highest religion known, Christianity. We shall not be surprised, therefore, to find that Professor Royce calls his views as to the nature of the Christian religion "novel views", inasmuch as he has not derived them from an impartial, objective study of historic Christianity, but has confessedly applied to this Christianity a ready-made framework *vis.*, The Philosophy of Loyalty. We may remark, however, that the views of the Harvard professor are in reality not as novel as he seems to think.

The reader may ask what our author means exactly by the title of his book, *The Problem of Christianity*? Simply that he regards the Christian religion as a problem to be studied in order to discover its essence, to ascertain what truth there is in it (if any truth), and in what form (if in any form) Christianity is to win the world. For many reasons religion is a most important study, and Christianity is the most effective expression so far in history of the religious longing. We ought therefore to understand it. And when we have discovered what the essential features of Christianity are, the problem arises, Can such a creed be accepted by the "Modern Man"?

Confronting, therefore, the question, What is the creed of Christianity? Professor Royce asks whether we shall find the essence of the Christian religion simply in following the teaching, the personal example, and the spirit of the Master? If so, the problem for the modern man as to adherence to this is quite simple. But our author declares that this view as to the essential nature of the Christian religion cannot be held. He says: "Historically speaking, Christianity has never appeared simply as the religion taught by the Master. It has always been an interpretation of the Master and of his religion in the light of some doctrine concerning his mission, and also concerning God, man, and man's salvation,—a doctrine which even in its simplest expressions, has always gone beyond what the Master himself is traditionally reported to have taught while he lived" (p. 25). He goes on to say there can be no doubt that the Master uttered words that could not be fully understood until interpreted in the light of subsequent events,—and such interpretations deepened and enriched his sayings, such doctrines supplemented and fulfilled the view of life and salvation set forth by the Master. Yet he declares that after all we know little or nothing regarding the person of Christ. "Legends, doubtful historical hypotheses and dogmas leave us in this field in well known and to my mind simply hopeless perplexities. Hence this book has no positive thesis to maintain regarding the person of the Founder of Christianity. I am not competent to settle any of the numerous historical doubts as to the Founder's person and as to the details of His life" (p. xxvi). How, then, did the distinctive conceptions of Christianity originate? Professor Royce answers: "Historically speaking, the Christian Church first discovered the Christian ideas. The Founder of Christianity, so far as we know what his teachings were, seems not to have defined them adequately. They first came to a relatively full

statement through the religious life of the Pauline churches; and the Pauline Epistles contain their first, although still not quite complete, formulation. Paul himself was certainly not the founder of Christianity. But the Pauline communities first were conscious of the essence of Christianity. . . . Those I say are right who have held that the Church rather than the person of the Founder ought to be viewed as the central idea of Christianity (pp. xx, xxi). Professor Royce is very sure that the modern man, to be just to his own historical sense and to the genuine history of Christianity, cannot take any other view than this. The modern man must, therefore, decide whether in view of this interpretation of the essence of Christianity, he can be a Christian.

The author states his fundamental position with great distinctness as follows: "The thesis of this book is that the essence of Christianity, as the Apostle Paul stated that essence, depends upon regarding the being which the early Christian Church believed itself to represent, and the being which I call in this book the Beloved Community, as the true source, through loyalty, of the salvation of man" (xxvi). How then we may ask did the Christian community originate? What was its ultimate source? Was it not Jesus Christ? Professor Royce declares that this work "has no hypothesis whatever as to how the Christian community originated. . . . The historical evidence at hand is insufficient to tell us how the Church originated. The legends do not solve the problem" (xxviii). But no historical student, we may remark, can pluck the Church out of mid-air in this way, and the author is compelled later to recede to a certain extent from this position.

The method pursued by Professor Royce in treating his subject in this work is as follows: First, to discover what are the essential features of Christianity; secondly, to discuss their meaning and the real truth at the bottom of their symbolic expression; thirdly, to ground this esoteric truth of Christianity in metaphysical reality by a philosophical investigation. The first two heads are treated together in the first volume entitled, *The Christian Doctrine of Life*; the third head is treated in the second volume, *The Real World and the Christian Ideas*.

I. What now in Professor Royce's judgment may be regarded as the essential features of Christianity? "They are all of them ideas that came to the mind of the Christian world in the course of later efforts to explain the true meaning of the original teaching regarding the Kingdom of Heaven" (I, p. 35). These Christian ideas are as follows:

1. "The salvation of individual man is determined by some sort of membership in a certain spiritual community,—a religious community, and in its inmost nature a divine community, in whose life the Christian virtues are to reach their highest expression, and the spirit of the Master is to obtain its earthly fulfillment. In other words: There is a certain universal and divine spiritual community. Membership in that community is necessary to the salvation of man" (p. 39). 2. "The individual human being is by nature subject to some overwhelm-

ing moral burden from which, if unaided, he cannot escape" (p. 41).
3. "The only escape for the individual, the only union with the divine spiritual community which he can obtain, is provided by the divine plan for the redemption of mankind. And this plan is one which includes an Atonement for the sins and for the guilt of mankind" (p. 43). These then are the three central ideas of Christianity in Professor Royce's judgment. Let us see what he makes out of them.

1. Taking up the first idea, our author carries back the germ of the spiritual community in union with which man is to reach salvation, to the teaching of the Master as to the Kingdom of Heaven. This Kingdom is, to be sure, within the individual, yet the Master clearly indicates that it has also a social meaning. The early Christian community under the guidance of the Apostles soon organized the Christian Church, which was to stand for and represent visibly this Kingdom of Heaven. The true followers of the Master were in this Church and the Divine Spirit was its guide. An essential part of the earliest Christianity was a doctrine or faith regarding this Church—its meaning, office, and value. This fact Royce thinks it is impossible to deny. History shows the realization of this idea of the Church to be fluent and baffling; and we witness the tragedy of non-attainment that so often befalls a great idea. How poorly the Church has often represented such an ideal spiritual community we know. But for this imperfection human nature itself is responsible.

And now the question arises, Is this doctrine itself reasonable? Professor Royce answers, it is both reasonable and universal. What actually is the ideal here in question? Even from the non-Christian side of it we must regard man as a social being, living in communities which have a varied life. The community is, indeed, a kind of organism or unit which the individual man cannot be without, and to which he ought to feel himself devoted—to love as a precious worthy being nobler than himself. Such a spirit of devotion and love we can call Loyalty. Here Professor Royce brings out his great word, the instrument with which he works over so much of his material. He proceeds to show the breadth and depth of the term as applied to different phases of life in the community in general, as he had done previously in his work, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*. Individual man at last learns the meaning of the Brotherhood of all the loyal, and that he ought to serve an ideally universal community. His motives would be, evidently, both esthetic and ethical.

Let us turn back to the Christian Church. How did this ideal of loyalty to a universal community find a place in it according to Professor Royce? The Master taught the doctrine of Christian *love* as the most distinctive thing about the Kingdom of Heaven. This love was not according to the Master's conception a passive self-abnegation, but positive and heroic; not merely altruistic, but the true expression of self and of confidence in God and in the triumph of these principles. Yet Jesus left many aspects and details unnoticed, and the Apostle Paul offers as his contribution a new and third "being", in addition to God

and one's neighbor. "This new being is a corporate entity,—the body of Christ, or the body of which the now divinely exalted Christ is the head. Of this body the exalted Christ is also for Paul, the spirit, and also, in some new sense, the lover. This corporate entity is the Christian community itself" (p. 92), and this community is the Church, which "is more concrete and less mysterious than any individual man". It is, then, this being called the Church which Christ loves, and in union with which each member finds his salvation. It should be noted just here that the term salvation for our author means attaining the true goal of life,—practically an ethical conception. It has no eschatological reference whatever. To this Church each member displays that loyalty which Royce defines as "the thorough-going practical and loving devotion of a self to a united community" (p. 114). We must not think, however, that our author believes that the true Church today is visible, for it is still an invisible Church; and in fact, as we shall see later, is not even limited to those acquainted with Christianity. This is the Church which displaces Christ as the center of the Christian religion in flagrant violation of all history,—the testimony of friend and foe and the Christian Church itself. Professor Royce, we are afraid, lacks the historic sense. His previously conceived philosophy of loyalty ingeniously applied to the Christian Origins is responsible for this strange result.

2. Let us come to the second of the three central ideas of Christianity, the moral burden of the individual, and our author's exposition of it. Paul teaches us that the individual loaded with guilt cannot save himself; his tainted nature forbids him, and he needs Divine help. This was the experience of the Apostle, and the doctrine has come down in the Church through the ages. Paul's theological coloring was wrong with reference to this. The teaching of tradition and his own Rabbinical lore led him astray; but he was right as to the facts of the moral burden, and his report of those facts was eloquent and true. This view of life with its moral evil is indispensable, says Professor Royce, for every religious and moral view of life.

But what is the inner meaning and the truth of this moral burden? Our author replies: Our self-consciousness about our conduct is generated by our social environment, our self-knowledge is a social product, our social ideals are due to this, and our very moral self is born of social contrasts and oppositions. The moral tension between our moral self and conduct, and the standards, codes, and customary laws of the community produces unrest, and cries for relief. Social training and discipline intensify the tension, and so increase the moral burden of the individual. The tension is made greater by man's natural spiritual self-assertion over against what seems to him "a vast impersonal social will". Culture also increases this tendency to individualism in opposition to the collectivism of the social environment. And so the burden grows. Therefore conflict arises with a divided self-will, and the individual exclaims: "O wretched man that I am!" This Professor Royce believes "is the deeper sense and truth of

the doctrine of the inherent moral taint of the social individual". The conception of "law" is explained as follows: "Comparing our doings with the standards that the social will furnishes to us, in the form of customs and rules, we become aware both of what Paul calls, in a special instance, 'the law' and of ourselves either as in harmony with or opposed to this law" (p. 133). Professor Royce knows, of course, as well as any one that this esoteric interpretation is very far removed from Paul's conception of law, which was the law of God. This interpretation of the inner meaning of Paul's idea is a most singular metamorphosis. On the whole we prefer the Pauline interpretation of the Pauline idea with its depth of meaning to the lighter touch of Professor Royce. We even fancy that the Apostle Paul, could he return in the flesh, and listen to this enlightenment as to the profound and occult meaning of his own words, which was hidden from his eyes, would at this point rend his garments.

But what is the remedy for this state of affairs? Paul's answer, Professor Royce remarks, is simple. "To his mind a new revelation has been made, from a spiritual realm wholly above our social order and its conflicts. Yet this revelation is, in a new way, social. For it tells us: There is a certain divinely instituted community . . . its indwelling spirit is concrete and living, but it is also a loving spirit. It is the body of Christ. The risen Lord dwells in it and in its life. It is as much a person as He was when He walked the earth. And He is as much the spirit of that community as He is a person. Love that community; let its spirit, through this love, become your own. Let its Lord be your Lord. Be one in him and with him and with His Church. And lo! the natural self is dead. The new life takes possession of you. You are a new creature. The law has no dominion over you. Paul's doctrine is that salvation comes through loyalty. Loyalty involves an essentially new type of self-consciousness, the consciousness of one who loves a community as a person" (pp. 157, 158). We humbly dissent from this view of our author, either as being Paul's own doctrine or the cryptic significance of that doctrine, though our humility is somewhat mitigated by our conviction that they that be with us in this dissent are more than they that be with Professor Royce. The gospel which Paul preached and which has been the power of God unto salvation ever since, has not been loyalty to any community or Church, but was expressed in the words of Paul when he declared, "For I determined to know nothing among you save Jesus Christ and Him crucified."

But Paul has a doctrine of salvation by divine grace; and Royce must now explain to us, and incidentally to Paul, the true meaning of this. In order to explicate it, our author describes a little further the Universal or Beloved Community. "Any highly organized community . . . is as truly a human being as you and I are individually human. . . . The difference between the individual human beings of our ordinary social intercourse, and the communities, is a difference justly characterized, in my opinion, by speaking of these two as

grades or levels of human life" (pp. 166-167). We catch here, we think, a glimpse of Professor Royce's absolute monism, which would regard individuals, or a complex of individuals, as equally personal centers of consciousness in the one monistic reality. But what is grace according to Paul? It is the power, says Professor Royce, that gives to the Christian convert the new loyalty, loyalty to the Beloved Community, which may be called the Realm of Grace. And the love which can be given to this community could not possibly be given to "a detached human individual". It is the divine grace which creates the Beloved Community and arouses in man a love for it, and this divine grace came through Jesus Christ. He died for it and is now identified with its spirit or "being". Christianity has tried to identify the "being" of this ideal community with the "being" of God. Again we remark it is obvious that the identification of all these "beings" with one another is on the basis of Professor Royce's philosophy. We would also venture to say that no one can understand Paul's doctrine of divine grace who misses out the depths of Paul's doctrine of sin.

Professor Royce now proceeds to show, acknowledging to a certain extent indebtedness at this point to Percy Gardner and to Professor Troeltsch, that the doctrine of Christ's deity and that of the Trinity were worked out through the principle of loyalty to the community. Christ was the Spirit of the Church, He was its body, God was its Being, loyalty to the Church saved—therefore arose the dogmas of how these divine natures and "beings" were correlated. There is no doubt, of course, that doctrine in the Christian Church developed in harmony with religious experience, but this is very different from the doctrine of Professor Troeltsch.

3. But our author decides to look more closely at the significance of sin and guilt in order that he may consider more definitely the third Christian idea, *viz.*, the way of getting rid of the moral burden. Can we simply rid ourselves of sin by turning around and leading a new life of love in the spirit of Jesus? What did Jesus say on this point? Royce tells us he made sin a matter of the heart, and whatever is at variance with love to God and man is sin. A persistence in sin without repentance and faith means destruction. Did the Christian Community later introduce any new idea as to the means of escape from sin? Professors Royce answers, No; and declares that it was "but an inevitable development of the original teaching of the founder and of these early reports about his authority to forgive, when the Christian community later conceived that salvation from personal and voluntary sin had become possible through the work which the departed Lord had done while on earth. *How* Christ saved from sin became hereupon a problem. But *that* he saved from sin, and that he somehow did so through what he won for men by his death, became a central constituent of the later Christian tradition" (p. 231). The two traditional theses of Christianity just here our author declares to be: "First, by no deed of his own, unaided by the supernatural consequences of the work of Christ, can the wilful sinner win forgive-

ness. Second, the penalty of unforgiven sin is the endless second death" (p. 225). Can the modern mind accept these theses? No, is the reply, it is manifestly hostile to them; only the Christianity of the parables is acceptable to it. Is there any way of mediation? Professor Royce again comes to the rescue. Evidently the Church, he says, used imagery in its setting forth of the idea of sin and its penalty. Its imagination worked out many novelties which were of local, or heathen, or even of primitive origin. Therefore we must go below this to the underlying truth. And so Professor Royce again gives us his own interpretation of its esoteric meaning, as follows:

Every man who has his ideal and falls short of it knows himself to be wrong. Sometimes when he has deliberately in a conscious transgression betrayed his cause, he feels he can never forgive himself. He has committed what would be called in modern language the sin against the Holy Ghost. And so the man is plunged in despair. He may try to say, forget the past, do better in the future. But Professor Royce shows very well what a terrible feeling of treason the man has who is false to his moral vision and to his better self. Moreover, he has the overwhelming sense that what he has done is in "the hell of the irrevocable". The guilt is eternal. No new deed can destroy the past or avert its consequences. To this treason the man can never reconcile himself. He knows that he was once a traitor. This, says our author, is the essential meaning underlying the traditional doctrine of endless penalty for wilful sin.

But how can the traitor become in any way reconciled to himself and to his own moral world? How can he effect a tragic reconciliation with his own feeling of guilt? He does not find reconciliation, Professor Royce declares, in the penal satisfaction theory through Christ's sacrifice, nor in the moral theories of the atonement of Christ. Besides this, the traitor has been untrue, not only to himself, but to the community; he betrayed its cause, and his deed was fitted to wreck this community. How can he ever reconcile himself to this additional treason? And the community, too, how can it ever become reconciled to the traitor and his betrayal? It may forgive him, but how can it ever reconcile itself to him and to his treason? Royce insists that this is not a mere theological problem, but one in daily life. The reconciliation can occur only on certain conditions: 1. This treason shall furnish the opportunity for some loyal servant of the community so to act that a great good shall result which otherwise never would have come into existence. 2. "The world as transformed by this creative deed is better than it would have been had all else remained the same, but had that deed of treason not been done at all." But how are these conditions fulfilled in the Christian legends as to Christ's work? In this way: "Christian feeling, Christian art, Christian worship, have been full of the sense that somehow (and how has remained indeed a mystery) there was something so precious about the work of Christ, something so divinely wise (so skilful and divinely beautiful) about the plan of salvation—that as a result of all this

after Christ's work was done, the world as a whole was a nobler and richer and worthier creation than it would have been if Adam had not sinned" (p. 319). There are elements of truth in this, and we have always thought it should be at present a great comfort to Adam. It may also help us as we try to justify God's permission of sin both originally and now, and in general his mysterious providences; but how does it reconcile God to wicked men or wicked men to God? This idea of Professor Royce's is not new, though he has worked it out well, almost brilliantly. It is a part of almost every theodicy. The only strange part is that our author should fancy it could possibly be a substitute for a real atonement for sin.

But what does Professor Royce do with Christianity's idea of the special work of Christ? He declares that 'Christianity has expressed this, which is the true view, "in the symbolic form of a report concerning the supernatural work of Christ. . . . As a Christian idea, the atonement is expressed in a symbol whose divine interpretation is merely felt and is viewed as a mystery" (p. 323). Here we have again Professor Royce's doctrine of symbolism in Christian truth, of which he makes frequent use in different parts of his work. The method is not a new one. First get an *a priori* philosophical or ethical construction of what Christian doctrines ought to mean; then explain away their clearest meaning as being "symbolic". The Christian Church has not forgotten Hegel, and we recall Sabatier of more recent days.

4. Professor Royce now takes these three central ideas of Christianity and declares that they must be woven into a Christian doctrine of life, "that is, a coherent and comprehensive teaching concerning both the moral conduct of life and the realm wherein the highest good is to be hoped for, sought and haply won" (p. 329). Professor Royce intends this definition to indicate that in the Christian doctrine of life, ethical and religious ideas are blended. As a matter of fact, however, the religious part is almost completely ethicized. To explain his meaning more clearly the author notes some of the agreements and disagreements of Buddhism and Christianity, and a great deal that he says is well put. But he will find few to agree with him when he declares that the chief difference between Christianity and Buddhism is in the former's doctrine of the Beloved Community. The difference in the life and personality of the founders of the two religions he disposes of in the following summary fashion: "When we add to all these parallels the fact that each of these religions had an historical founder whose life later came to be the object of many legendary reports; and that the legends in each case were so framed by the religious imagination of the early followers of the faith in question that they included symbolism whereby a portion of the true meaning of each faith is expressed in the stories about the founder,—when I say we add this fact to all the others, we get some hint of the very genuine community of spirit which belongs to these two great world religions" (p. 338). Professor Royce elucidates further his idea of the Beloved Community by declaring that it is still hidden from our imperfect

human view. We cannot find it, and therefore the great obligation upon us in Christian morals is to create it. This differs, we may remark, very little from the general conception of our duty to bring about the most perfect Brotherhood of all men. The Christian doctrine of life, according to the author, is simply to live in accordance with the central Christian ideas as he has outlined them.

How does the modern mind view these ideas? The characteristically modern view of the meaning and destiny of religion contains three definite assertions: "1. No religion can survive unless it keeps in touch with men's conscious needs. 2. In the future, men's needs will be subject to vastly complex and rapidly changing social motives. 3. In the future religion as a power aiming to win and to keep a place in men's hearts, can no longer permanently count on institutional forces which have in the past been amongst its strongest supports" (p. 393). What is to be said then as to the future of Christianity? Its strength has always been in its ideas as outlined and interpreted in this book, says Professor Royce, and in these it must continue to lie. In other words if the modern mind is to accept Christianity in the future, it must not be the Church's but Royce's Christianity!

II. And now having completed this study of the Christian Doctrine of Life, Professor Royce comes to his second task which is to see whether it can be grounded in the world of reality. Our fathers regarded Christianity as a revelation concerning the origin and fate of the whole cosmos. The same problem is forced upon us. "We must consider what is the consistent position for the modern mind to accept when the inquiry arises: Has the Christian doctrine of life a more than human meaning and foundation? Does this doctrine express a truth not only about man but about the whole world and about God?" (II, 7). We may try to evade this problem, but the modern man will insist that we face it, especially since modern science has given us a new cosmology. Now we have found Christianity's central idea, continues Professor Royce, to be the Universal Community. Therefore our philosophical theology must depend upon the metaphysical interpretation and foundation of the Community. Modern social pluralism advances a true statement when it postulates the individuation of selves. Nevertheless the life of the Community as constituted by the Spirit is the main fact. The Community is the One and the Many; it has a history, a memory of the past, and a hope for the future. It is a unit and a reality. At the same time it is a psychological unity composed of many selves; it is a "compounding of consciousness". We have not space to follow Professor Royce here in details and it is not necessary, for we have his customary teaching, that the Community is a kind of entity or person with individual souls as units constituting a real life.

As applied to the Pauline churches, Professor Royce explains their community-nature on the principle of a supposed common memory of salvation in the Lord's death and resurrection, a common faith in Him, a common hope for the future, as well as a common life of deeds

in coöperation. No wonder each individual member exercised love and loyalty to this community. This Christian community constituted a single entity despite the multiplicity of its members. If now all mankind constitute the ideal community, and if the universe itself is a community, and if God is a community, then we should expect love and loyalty to a community to have a cosmic significance. Thus a metaphysical foundation is secured for this central Christian idea. No one, we suppose, in considering these views of the author would deny the reality of the Church of Christ as His Body, a living unity; but the absolute identification of this Community with the essence of Christ, of God, and of individual believers on a basis of Absolute Monism is something different. This is true especially as the Community displaces Jesus Christ as the center of the believer's love and loyalty—the historic figure of the Master disappearing in the legendary mists of the past. Royce evidently took his Monistic Idealism, postulating God in his own being as a great Community, including in His essence the substance of finite souls, and poured Christianity into this mould prepared beforehand.

Professor Royce now enters upon a discussion which he declares marks a distinct advance even in his general philosophy. He calls attention to the fact that up to the present point in these volumes he has been *interpreting* Christianity, the philosophy of loyalty, the nature of the Community, etc. It is time, he says, to ask what we mean by interpretation. What is it, and what do we gain by it? The answers to these questions he gives in chapters on The Nature of Interpretation, The Will to Interpret, and The World of Interpretation. For his views here he acknowledges his indebtedness to Charles Peirce. Cognitive processes are not merely perception and conception, but also interpretation; and Professor Royce uses this threefold process in a polemic way, against pragmatism. He declares that this triadic relation throws light upon all the principal issues before us. For example, while absolute pragmatism makes truth mutable by its dual process of cognition,—by this threefold process the past is immutable, and must be so, since it is due to an interpretation of objective realities. Therefore the sinful deed of the past, the traitor's betrayal of his cause, is irrevocable. We learn of the existence of our fellow men only through interpretation, and therefore become acquainted with social relationships and Communities. Thus we get a place for religion. That there is much truth in this contention of Peirce and Royce as to the importance of the cognitive process of interpretation we do not suppose will be doubted. Professor Royce's application of it, however, is another story.

The author proceeds to apply this principle of interpretation more closely to the Community. There are here three of us in this process of interpretation—I who interpret, you who are interpreted, and my neighbor to whom I interpret. These three therefore form a Community of Interpretation. The best interpreter of the spiritual unity of this community would be the one who best served it as servant of

all. Loyalty and love are in this community of interpretation; and the future Beloved Community is such a one. We catch the metaphysical implication of this line of thought when Royce adds: "And if in ideal we aim to conceive the Divine Nature, how better can we conceive it than in the form of the Community of Interpretation; and above all in the form of the Interpreter who interprets all to all, and each individual to the world, and the world of spirits to each individual" (II, 219). Note the Hegelian flavor of the following sentence: "In him the Community, the Individual, and the Absolute would be completely expressed, reconciled, and distinguished" (II, p. 220). The problem of the One and the Many would then find its ideally complete expression and solution in the Interpreter—God, and His Community.

Professor Royce still continues his insistence on interpretation in its relation to the fundamental character of the Community-concept. Even in discoveries in physical science, the discoverer appeals for confirmation to a scientific community, the existence of which can be known only through interpretation. In the same way the solution of the riddle of the universe is a work of interpretation, and the philosopher is only an interpreter of it to his fellow-philosophers. Professor Royce certainly ought to have at this point our approval in so far as he is battling against a subjectivistic pragmatism. And he is undoubtedly correct when he says: "Whether a philosopher calls himself realist or idealist, monist or pluralist, theist or materialist, empiricist or rationalist, his philosophy wherever he states it takes the form of saying: The true, the genuine interpretation of the antithesis (appearance and reality) is such and such" (II, 269). Professor Royce claims that this supports his idea of the basal nature of the Community-concept because an interpretation is real only if the appropriate community is real, and is true only if that community reaches its goal. Unless both the interpreter and the community are real, there is no real world. And so Professor Royce concludes that "the universe itself has the form and real character of a community of interpretation. . . . To the world then belongs an Interpreter of its own life. In this sense, then, the world is the process and the life of the Spirit and of the Community" (II, 275, 276).

It will be noted that our author has, by his reasoning, reached the metaphysical result that the real world itself is in its wholeness a Community. He had previously shown that the Christian doctrine of life is dominated by the ideal of the Universal Community. He purposes now to make explicit the relations between these two assertions, especially to make clearer what he calls the ground plan of the World of Interpretation. Royce does this especially through what is denominated The Doctrine of Signs—again acknowledging obligation, to a certain extent, to Peirce's theory of Signs. It is not necessary to follow him into the details of this as it is in the main only an amplification of what has been already given. In the treatment of it some good points are made against Bergson, James, and certain aspects of pragmatism.

Our author has now completed grounding his ideals of the Christian religion in a metaphysical basis and turns to a further justification of his whole account of the essence of Christianity. It might be asked, he says, whether the fragment of traditional Christian doctrine which is here interpreted and defended is worthy to be called a religion at all; and if so, is this religion Christian? Professor Royce answers by supposing that a Pauline Christian, a cultured Greek of Paul's day who had accepted Paul's Christianity, should come back to life to-day. Let us suppose that he first masters the modern world of learning and of culture, and then proceeds to examine present-day Christianity as compared with Paul's. He discovers: 1. The Lord has not come, nor the end of the world. 2. The Pauline angels and demons and even the Pauline conception of nature have passed away. 3. As to Christ's death and resurrection, he believed once that they were essential and historical truths; what shall he believe now? The problem for such a man is, how far in the light of modern knowledge he can still hold the old views. To make a long story short, he is compelled to accept the interpretation of Professor Royce as to what is essential Christianity. He is compelled to throw aside masses of ancient imagery and legend as mere symbols of deeper truth, but "the one thing by which he must hold fast is the Pauline doctrine of the presence of the redeeming divine spirit in the living Church. This doctrine in some form he must retain. If he can retain it, he will be in spirit a Pauline Christian however he otherwise interprets the person of Christ" (362). But how large must he conceive this Church to be? "The Church, however, must mean the company of all mankind in so far as mankind actually win the genuine and redeeming life in brotherhood, in loyalty, and in the Beloved Community. . . . The true Church is represented on earth by whatever body of men are most faithful, according to their lights, to the cause of the unity of all mankind" (pp. 367, 8). If now this Returned Guest from the other world asks as to the basis in metaphysical reality of this new Christianity, the author proceeds, as he himself explains, to ground him in the Roycean philosophy. The reader of this review will notice the minimum of content given to Christianity as compared with the maximum of breadth given to the Church!

We have attempted in this review to give the reader Professor Royce's line of thought as he develops his views concerning the nature of Christianity, as the modern man could hold it to-day, and concerning its metaphysical justification. We have indicated, as we have tried to do this, some criticisms at the salient points of the author's explication. Perhaps only a few words are necessary in conclusion.

We have intimated that Professor Royce's Absolute Monism was probably responsible (at least in part) for his transformation of the essence of Christianity. We have not meant to assert by this that all idealistic monists would accept these conclusions from the premises. Men like John Caird of the old country, Augustus H.

Strong of the new, and many others are witnesses to the contrary.

Attention should be called to the fact that in these volumes the author does not touch the subject of the Incarnation which he had previously treated in one of his articles. This omission is the more surprising, since the present work claims to synthesize the essential ideas of Christianity; and the article in the *Harvard Theological Review* presented the Incarnation as one of these essentials,—i.e., the incarnation as interpreted by Professor Royce.

We have noted the interpretation of the doctrine of the endless penalty of unforgiven sin as consisting in the feeling that the sinner was in the hell of the irrevocable. Yet as to the life beyond the grave for those who are not members of the Beloved Community, and even for those who are, our author is silent. In the present work he has no doctrine whatever as to the future life.

What is there absolutely new, it may be asked, in the views of our author as to the nature of Christianity? We are constrained to say, very little. There is some originality in Professor Royce's general method of treatment, in the application of his philosophy of loyalty, and in his explication of his metaphysical basis; but in the results reached as to the essence of the Christian religion—well, we have had them before. Others have also dissipated the figure of the historic Jesus into the mists of legend. Others have made either Paul or some part of the primitive Christian community the real founder of Christianity and of its Church. Others have symbolized away the Pauline ideas. Others have ethicized the conception of salvation by making it the attainment of the true goal of moral life in this world, and ignoring the world hereafter. Others have made Christianity to consist essentially in the brotherhood of all men in an ideal community filled with the divine spirit. Others have thought that a consciousness of sin was rooted originally in an antagonism between the individual's own will and conceptions, and those of the community. And others also have either ignored any doctrine of the Incarnation, or have volatilized it.

There are some things in this work, of course, that should win strong approval. Among them, Royce's vindication, as elsewhere, of a theism that gives him in his judgment a living and personal God. He also stands for the law of duty, the reality of ideals, and other fundamental ethical conceptions. He has also, while failing to reach any real doctrine of the Atonement, laid a basis for it in his vivid delineation of the guilty consciousness of the sinner. There is likewise much in these volumes in the way of suggestion and intellectual stimulus.

Royce's style of writing in this his latest work is, as in all his books, clear, strong, and sincere. In the present one, the diction impresses us as more carefully wrought out and the rhetoric as more ornate than in his previous volumes. The feeling is also deeper and the quality of power greater. There is, however, throughout an unfortunate amount of repetition both of thought and expression that hinders the flow of ideas and the progress of the reader.

The volumes are attractively bound, the letter-press and paper are excellent, and the work is furnished with an admirable index.

McCormick Theological Seminary. BENJAMIN LEWIS HOBSON.

Nature and Cognition of Space and Time. By REV. JOHNSTON ESTEP WALTER, Author of "The Perception of Space and Matter" and "The Principles of Knowledge". West Newton, Pa.: Johnston and Penney. 1914. 8vo, pp. 186.

This is a "discussion of the Nature and our Cognition of Space and Time grounded on the fundamental postulates of dualistic Realism". "It maintains the reality of space and time in contradiction to the Kantian hypothesis of ideality; space being held to be real as an independent entity, and time as an attribute or property of entities."

The discussion is clear, well-informed, up to date; and it conducts, as it seems to us, to the right conclusion. Indeed, we welcome it heartily as indicative of a tendency to return to the older realism from the Berkeleyan and the Kantian idealism, and also from what in strangely called the "new realism". We shall eagerly await the "psychological essay" which the author promises us in his "preface" under the title of "Subject and Object".

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Nietzsche, And Other Exponents of Individualism. By PAUL CARUS. Chicago, London: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1914. 8vo, pp. 150.

This is not a biography. It is rather a series of glimpses of the prophet of anarchy; his life, his character, his work, his influence. We are shown his "anti-scientific tendencies". We are given "Deussen's recollections of his youth". The "extreme nominalism" of his philosophy is pointed out. His "originality" is estimated as less than he himself thought it to be. The "quintessence of his philosophy", "the Overman", is described. His chief writing, "Thus spake Zarathustra" is quoted at length and commented on. The "contrast between his philosophy and his own habits of life" is so presented that we see him really to have been "a protest against himself". A chapter is given to his "predecessor" in the philosophy of individualism and egotism, Johann Caspar Schmidt. The doctrine of "ego-sovereignty" as introduced by the one and developed by the other is set forth. George Moore, the author of the "Confessions of a Young Man" is pointed out as "another Nietzsche", but is described as "coarse in comparison with him". His few "disciples" are named and their influence appraised. Power is shown to be his "principle of valuation". "Individualism" is rightly represented as his philosophy, his religion, his God. Eight full page portraits of Nietzsche are given, and the book concludes with a copious "Index".

We agree with Dr. Carus in his estimate: "Nietzsche was most assuredly very ingenious; he was very talented but he was not a genius in the full sense of the word. He was abnormal, titanic in his

pretensions and aims, and erratic. Breaking down under the burden of his own thought, he ended his tragical career in an insane asylum. The mental derangement of Nietzsche may be an unhappy accident but it appears to have come as the natural result of his philosophy. Nietzsche, by nature modest and tractable, almost submissive, was, as a thinker, too proud to submit to anything, even to truth."

We cannot agree, however, with the author when he would have us find "the truth" in "the over-God", "the superpersonal God", "the norm of scientific truth, the standard of right and wrong, the standard of worth." Such abstractions are meaningful only as they reflect concrete being. "The living God" is "the truth", and it is only in him that truth has reality. It was because Nietzsche had no theology that his philosophy was that of the madhouse long before he entered it.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

GENERAL THEOLOGY

Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, with the assistance of John A. Selbie, M.A., D.D., Professor of Old Testament Language and Literature in the United Free Church College, Aberdeen, and Louis H. Gray, M.A., Ph.D., sometime Fellow in Indo-Iranian Languages in Columbia University, New York. Volume VI; *Fiction-Hyksos*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1914. Large royal 8vo, double columns; pp. xvii, 890.

With this volume the first half of the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, as originally projected, is completed; and it has become somewhat impertinent to speak further of the quality of so well-known a work. It has nevertheless become ever more evident with each volume published that a great work in the anthropological survey of religion and ethics is being successfully accomplished in this *Encyclopaedia*; and, as we have turned over the pages of volume after volume, we have been led more and more to congratulate future students of this subject upon the rich and exact mass of data here accumulated for them. The present volume strikes us as in important respects even more satisfactory than its predecessors. There are inequalities no doubt in the authoritativeness of the articles, as inequalities are inevitable; but on the whole the volume impresses the reader who samples it here and there as especially satisfying.

The volume opens with *Fiction*, under which caption (certainly a somewhat unexpected caption to find a place in this *Encyclopaedia*) we have two articles of moderate length. The former is a no doubt serviceable compilation on Primitive, Oriental, and Graeco-Roman fiction which suffers from the necessity of covering so wide and diversified a field in such narrow space. It is written by Dr. Louis H. Gray whose name appears on the title-page for the first time as an

assistant editor, and who has contributed to the pages of the *Encyclopaedia* a number of articles, chiefly on Iranian and (American) Indian subjects. The second article on *Fiction* deals with Mediaeval and Modern Fiction in a somewhat more cursory manner. The closing article of the volume is a sober account in compressed space of all that is really known of the *Hyksos*.

The article in this volume to which a student of theology naturally turns first is, of course, that on *God*. This is a composite article of fifteen parts, covering more than sixty pages, and is purely a survey of the ideas of God held by various peoples and religions: the fundamental philosophical discussion is postponed to the caption *Theism*. The opening section, written by the late Andrew Lang, on Primitive and Savage ideas of God, confines itself to once more summarizing the evidence for "high-gods of low peoples". Professor D. J. Margoliouth, following immediately on this with an article on Pre-Islamic Arabian ideas of God, suggests, apparently without conscious intention, a new instance of the Creator, recognized but neglected in favor of subordinate deities, to which Mr. Lang's evidence points, in the Pre-Islamic Meccans (p. 248a bottom). On this follows an odd little article by J. D. Prince on the Assyro-Babylonian conception of God, the professed purpose of which is "to illustrate the real oneness of deity as conceived by the Assyro-Babylonians" (251b), "the henotheistic-monotheistic tendency of the Assyro-Babylonian religion". Its most striking characteristic perhaps is an apparently almost morbid preoccupation with parallels or quasi-parallels with Biblical religion. We are told that in the Assyro-Babylonian religion we can trace "the origins and evolution of that perfected Hebrew monotheism which was later to become the mother of both Christianity and Islam"; that perhaps even the idea of a Trinity may be found in it; that it brings before us an "all-powerful creative Word, which is here undoubtedly the prototype of the Logos of the Gospel of John"; that much of its religious poetry "reads like a Biblical psalm",—and the like; not one of which statements, we take leave to say in passing, though made with great confidence, is beyond dispute. What, by the way, is the exact meaning of this curious clause: "the Hebrew JHWH, whose name is most appropriately vowelled Jehovah, with the vowels of the Hebrew word *Adonai*, and equivalent in use to the word *Elohim*, literally 'gods'" (pp. 252-3)? The treatment of the Biblical and Christian Doctrine of God is entrusted to the competent hands of Dr. W. T. Davison, and a new attitude, at once more modest and more wide-minded, meets us as we proceed to it. It is a good sketch, somewhat over "modern" in tone, but informed with a true conservatism of spirit. It is merely a conventional statement, however, which meets us when we read (p. 258a): "There is no 'doctrine' of the Trinity in the New Testament. But there are in it all the materials out of which such a doctrine came inevitably to be built up, together with evidence of the way in which that teaching arose out of certain central facts of history and experience, proclaimed by the Apostles and accepted by all believers as

integral parts of the Gospel." These words seem scarcely consistent with what we read later on (p. 259b) of the Apostles: "The Apostolic writings attempt no metaphysical explanation of the new conceptions of God which unquestionably dominated the whole experience and life of the earliest Christians. The doctrine of Father, Son, and Spirit, as embodied in the baptismal formula implied trinity. The threefoldness of the Divine manifestation and operations as well as the underlying unity of the Divine essence, is recognized throughout the Epistles." And these later words are the more exact. The fact is that the doctrine of the Trinity is not explicitly taught in the New Testament, only because it is presupposed: it is possible to say therefore that it is not so much heard as overheard in its pages, but that too must be understood to mean that it is just assumed as already the common property of Christians—if, that is, we wish to be true to the records.

Next to the article, *God*, the student of theology is apt to turn to the article, *Gospels*. Here he will find nothing new: the article is by Dr. F. C. Burkitt; and Dr. Burkitt, has told us elsewhere all that he has told us here. From many of his opinions on the origin and significance of the Gospels we decidedly dissent. We do not believe that Luke drew from Josephus and is to be dated about A.D. 100, or that Matthew either is so late as that: we believe that all three Synoptic Gospels belong before A.D. 70. That disagreement carries with it many others. We cannot say for example that "the Gospel record passed through a full generation of pious reflection and meditation before it began to be written down and so fixed for all time" (p. 335b). That indeed can be said only on the further supposition that Mark, written according to Dr. Burkitt between 65 and 70 A.D., was absolutely the earliest essay at reducing the Gospel narrative to writing. And that also is in our judgment an utterly untenable notion. If Luke was written before A.D. 70, Lk. i. 1 ff. alone is needed distinctly to contradict it. And it can hold in any case only if we look upon Mark as the immediate source of the matter common to it and Matthew and Luke. This too we hold to be an untenable hypothesis: we must assume an earlier narrative Gospel from which Mark, Matthew and Luke alike draw. In that case we must postulate both a Narrative Source and a Discourse Source lying behind our three Synoptics, themselves all earlier than 70 A.D. and that "full generation" of interval between the events and the written record is no longer tenable. We dissent again when we read that "Mark contains the whole of a document which Matthew and Luke have independently used", though this is said to be "the one solid contribution made by the scholarship of the nineteenth century towards the solution of the Synoptic problem" (p. 336). There is no reason to believe that Mark has transfused into his narrative all that he found in the Narrative-source used so freely by all three. Nor can we agree that "a discussion of the general historicity of the evangelical narrative must start from Mark and not from Matthew and Luke" (p. 33). This is only

a corollary from Dr. Burkitt's erroneous critical conclusions. Correct them, and there remains no basis for such a pronouncement. There are manifest advantages in starting, for instance, from Luke. We know who Luke was; we know something of the opportunities he enjoyed for obtaining trustworthy information on the matters about which he wrote; we have from him a much more extensive document and can subject what he tells us to more external tests. But we need not go further. It is inevitable that Dr. Burkitt's entire article should need rewriting from any other viewpoint than precisely his own rather individual one. We agree heartily, however, when he writes as follows (p. 344a): "The history of Christianity was not a simple advance from an original unitarian 'philanthropy' to the ultimate recognition of the Deity of Christ. Naturally it took many generations of Christian thought to evolve a form of words which should satisfactorily define the exceptional nature of the Founder of the new religion in terms of current philosophical conceptions. But from the first there existed the sentiment of devotion, the temper of mind which was assured that no title was too high to give, no homage too high to pay, to the Son of God, who had been sent from heaven to overcome death and open the gates of everlasting life to those who believed on Him." We must recognize that Jesus was the Divine Son of God come to earth on a mission of saving mercy, which involved the giving of his life as a ransom for men—if, that is, we wish to be true to the records.

Immediately before the article *Gospels* a short article (two pages) is inserted on *Gospel*, by Mr. James Strahan. It is a good article and fairly covers its subject; but it is not without some shortcomings. The first and larger portion of it is taken up with an account of "the content of the Gospel", as preached by the disciples and by Jesus Himself. We are very truly told that it is now generally agreed that "the good tidings preached in the very earliest Apostolic Church was a gospel regarding the incarnate, atoning, judging, redeeming, glorified Christ"; and if we understand Mr. Strahan aright he wishes his readers to understand that he himself accords with the contention that there is no antithesis to be drawn between "the religion of Jesus" and "the gospel of Christ". But in his further remarks on the Gospel whether of the disciples or of Jesus Himself, he appears to permit the very core of it to slip through his fingers—what Dr. Denney has so strongly insisted on under the broad name of "the death of Christ": and the emphasis is shifted to the personality of Jesus, in the manner of the Ritschlians. Not what Christ *did* but what He *was*, we are led to believe is the essence of the Gospel: which is distinctly not the case,—if, that is, we wish to be true to the records.

Ernst Troeltsch gives us an interesting and instructive article on *Free-Thought* in which the origin of the Free-Thinking Societies is traced and the reason for their existence pointed out. The following sentences near the close of the article are suggestive: "It stands to reason that, if modern thought should continually prove unable to

remodel the Churches, and find itself totally incapable of coming to terms with them, it must find something to take their place. The alternative organizations which it has hitherto produced have been mainly imitations of the Church in one or other of its aspects, and a really sufficient substitute has not yet been found." It will probably be long before "modern thought" can invent a cement with the cohesive power of the blood of Christ: those who have shared the common great experience of redemption in the blood of Jesus do not need to be made into a society,—they are already and intrinsically one Body of which the Living Lord is the Head. Troeltsch writes also a characteristically profound (and somewhat heavy) article on *Historiography* in which he endeavors to reduce the whole historiographic process to an exact science, as the causal explanation of all happenings. With much that he says we are in the fullest accord. We grant that the truly scientific character of historiography must be strictly guarded, and we should not draw back when we are told that "the sole task of history in its specifically theoretical aspect is to explain every movement, process, state, and nexus of things by reference to the web of its causal relations." But somehow we do not feel greatly enlightened by Troeltsch's labored article, and are conscious of wishing for some things and some emphases which we do not find in it. There is a teleology in history as well as in nature and its unitary character cannot be preserved when this teleology is excluded: neglected it may be and yet present, but excluded it cannot be without chaos.

We observe with satisfaction a marked tendency in Professor George A. Coe's article on *Moral and Religious Growth* to recede from the extravagances which have attended most writing on this subject in the recent past. The "culture-epoch" and "recapitulation" theories of mental and moral growth, the exploitation of which has formed such a feature in a certain class of paedagogical theorizing, are repudiated (pp. 446a.b.), and the "puberty" theory of conversion is decisively rebuked (p. 448b). These are encouraging symptoms where encouraging symptoms are much needed.

This volume has its quota, naturally, of Biographical Articles. Passing by some Oriental names, we note here articles on Goethe, Green, Grotius, Halevi, Hegel, Heine, Heraclitus, Herodotus, Herder, Hesiod, Hillel, Hobbes, Homer, Hooker, Horace, Hume. They are in the main good and sufficing articles. One comes with a kind of shock on such names as Heine and Horace in such an *Encyclopaedia* and is inclined to ask if they also are among the prophets. The excellence of the two articles goes far, however, to reconcile us to their inclusion in a list of religious and ethical leaders, notable for the omission of names which we should have thought must have been included. Francis of Assisi will no doubt find some mention in the article or articles on *Religious Orders* where we are bidden to look for an account of the Franciscans. George Fox is dealt with in the article on *Friends, Society of*. But not to go out of the F's, might not Francis de Sales put in a claim to mention equal to that of Heine; Theodore Fliedner,

Sebastian Franck or August Hermann Francke, one almost equal to that of Horace? We note in passing the excellence of the summary of the religion and ethics of the Iliad and Odyssey given in the article on *Homer*, and the well-advised entire passing over of the literary question. We have been attracted too by the article on *Grotius*, although the author, Dr. G. C. Joyce, stumbles over the definition of "Satisfaction" in his account of Grotius' theory of the Atonement (p. 441). "Satisfaction" does not differ from "Solution" in offering something less in value than enough to meet the needs of the case (which would be in conflict with the very term, "*satis-factio*"), but something other in kind than what the bond requires. It is as Grotius puts it briefly, distinctively "a *refusable* payment"—a *payment* indeed, but a *refusable* payment. "Solution" is a payment which, because it is the exact thing nominated in the bond, cannot be refused; but "when another man pays for a debtor and *pays another thing than what was due*, a double act of will is required to liberate"—as Grotius elaborately explains, endeavoring to cover the Satisfaction of Christ in all its elements. Mr. Joyce's definition of "Satisfaction" confuses it with what is commonly, but not quite accurately, known as "*acceptilatio*", and thus assimilates Grotius here with the Scotists, which is unjust to him.

We have touched, of course, on only a few of the articles in this well-packed volume; and those we have touched on have been selected on no other principle than that we have been led by our natural interests to read them first. No doubt they will provide a fair sample of the whole; at any rate from the point of view of the student of theology. It must be borne in mind, however, that it is not to the student of theology merely, or indeed mainly, that this *Encyclopaedia* appeals. It may be enough to say of it here, therefore, that to the student of theology who would keep abreast of his science, too, it is indispensable.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

Der religiöse Unsterblichkeitsglaube. Sein Wesen und seine Wahrheit, religionsvergleichend und kulturphilosophisch untersucht. Von LIC. THEOPHIL STEINMANN. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1912. Pp. viii + 166. M. 3.60. Second edition.

The first edition of this work, published in 1908, limited itself to a description, according to the method of Comparative Religion, of the belief in immortality; the second edition (1912) is a reprint of the first with the addition of ninety pages given to a consideration of the "truth" of this belief.

The first half of the book is an interesting account of the "Phäno-

menologie" of immortality, or the ways in which this belief manifests itself concretely in the customs and institutions of religious life. Steinmann begins with the faith of the so-called primitive peoples in the continued existence of the soul after death; describes the changes caused in this faith by the belief in magic; explains how ethical concepts modify and extend it; and, finally, with many striking details, completes his exposition by showing in what ways it is transformed by the Christian faith in God, becoming a conviction of the future perfecting of a present fellowship with God.

This method of approaching the question shows that the centre of gravity, so to say, is not the proving of the "so-called immortality of the soul" (which Steinmann looks upon as a piece of traditional, popular metaphysics) but the meaning of the belief in immortality for the social and cultural life of man, together with what the belief implies. Steinmann is a "Kulturphilosoph" and his aim is to place before us the transcendent implications of the belief in immortality using the treasure of knowledge accumulated by Sociology and Comparative Religion.

Whether the Christian view is true or not—the topic of the latter half of the book—depends on the definition of truth. Our author, meaning by truth, fitness to form an integral part of a unified world view, endeavors to prove that the Christian belief in immortality, forming as it does an indispensable part of that social and cultural life of humanity, which, in turn, is an integral episode in the existence of the universe, must be true. The details of the proof are as follows. The social and cultural ego of modern civilization is described with great detail in its struggle for perfection, and the question is asked, apart from immortality has the struggle any meaning. One set of answers, ignoring immortality and reducing the meaning of the contest to the aesthetic (and therefore momentary) experience of him who is exercised thereby, is dismissed, because, overlooking the fact that our cultural conflict is under the law of duty and so must look beyond itself, it becomes unfruitful in a satisfactory explanation of spiritual progress. Other answers do not ignore the transcendent implications but assign wrong meanings to immortality; like Plato who exemplifies the mistake of conceiving spiritual perfection as a regress to the eternal of an eternal that in some way had become entangled in phenomena; and like Fries who represents those who confusedly interpret perfection as meaning that *sub specie aeternitatis* the ego is already complete. Our author's own opinion is (pp. 137 *seq.*) that in all the problems of cultural development the chief problem is that of the inner purification of the good will and the evergrowing development of personal life. No limits can be set to this development; the soul is rooted in a distant land; the belief in immortality is the symbol of this fact, and as such is indispensable in a consistent account of our universe.

Thus in the last analysis immortality is for Steinmann a postulate. In this he follows Kant, but, whereas the latter introduces it as part

of the logic of morality, the former sees in it an indispensable moment in the metaphysics of culture. He says many true and suggestive things but the question still remains whether the immortality that has been really effective in the life of humanity is that whose reality is based on a postulate or on faith in Him "who abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel".

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

The Miracles of Unbelief. By FRANK BALLARD, D.D., M.A., B.Sc. (London), F.R.M.S., Double Prizeman in Hebrew and New Testament Greek in the University of London, Author of "Haeckel's Monism False", "Theomonism True", "Clarion Fallacies", "Guilty", "The True God", "The New Theology", "The People's Religious Difficulties", "Does it Matter What a Man Believes?" "Does Faith need Reasons?" "Eddyism—A Delusion and a Snare", *The Christian Why Not?* Series, etc. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. 1914. Popular edition (the eighth). 8vo, pp. xvi, 382.

We welcome heartily this "popular" edition of this not undeservedly most popular apologetic work of the last quarter of a century. A full review of it will be found in the predecessor of *THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, for October 1901.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Fitness of the Environment. An Inquiry into the Biological Significance of the Properties of Matter. By LAWRENCE J. HENDERSON, Assistant Professor of Biological Chemistry in Harvard University. In part delivered as lectures in the Lowell Institute, February 1913. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. \$1.50 net.

The primary object of the writer of this book is to show that "the properties of matter and the course of cosmic evolution are intimately related to the structure of the living being and to its activities; they become therefore far more important in biology than has been previously suspected. For the whole evolutionary process both cosmic and organic, is one, and the biologist may now rightly regard the universe as biocentric."

The proof of this is given by a careful and thoroughly scientific study of what is meant by fitness and of the wonderful fitness of the environment to the living structures that exist in the world. After a short discussion of the greater environment we proceed to see that the chief elements that are concerned with the continuance or the very existence of life on this planet are carbon, hydrogen and oxygen; the latter two as they form water; the former as it becomes the chief element in the hydrocarbons and organic chemistry. The argument abounds in illustration, is remarkably clear, and is convincing. The material brought together is varied and the author while seeking proof from many fields shows a splendid working knowledge in them all.

His main argument is well sustained and those who in future are concerned with biological evolution must give more thought than before to the truly marvelous fitness of the environment in which this evolution takes place. The author convincingly shows that no other known elements could take the place of those found in the human body and that the conditions existing on this earth make possible the existence of life.

Unfortunately the book is not wholly scientific but enters the realm of philosophy in its attempt to show that the teleological argument has been removed by science from the universe.

Evolution is shown to account for the formation of the eye and the hand and to explain their formation in an entirely different way from that used by the writers of Natural Theology one hundred years ago. Nearly all that we can study scientifically can be explained mechanically, argues Professor Henderson, and with the belief in "vital force",—which has been shown to be non-existent,—the belief in any interference whatever with the laws of nature should be abandoned. All is a great mechanism. Its present form was conditioned by the laws of the universe. It is not the scientist's place to ask why the universe exists or how it came to be but only to show that all that we see now can be explained on the basis of the laws of physics and chemistry. There is no evidence of *purpose* which the scientist must consider. There is no need of such an hypothesis.

The author takes pains to admit that all can not yet be explained by merely mechanical laws. We do not know how life came to be. We do not understand why the system of repair exists in animals. Yet we have explained so much by purely physical laws that it is unscientific to believe that all the rest will not sooner or later be equally well explained in the same manner.

Mr. Henderson's chain of argument is not without breaks and is not wholly convincing. He recognizes this himself and at the end returns to the firm ground of science. But should his argument prove true; should all happenings now be shown to be such as would be explained by physical and chemical laws; should the process of evolution be so perfected that we could follow its steps from the original nebula to the highest man; even then would not the argument from teleology be so much the stronger? Would not this emphasize our need of the Gospel? It would most assuredly. For instead of a few cases of manifest purpose to be accounted for the whole universe would be an argument of astounding cogency. And the explanation offered in the gospel would be the only one large enough to explain the purpose of all, to explain how this marvelous fitness originated, to show to what end all is tending. At one time Calvinists feared evolution. They may now well rejoice in it. Evolution makes it certain that the God who exists is one God, of infinite wisdom, having a *plan* which He set to work in the beginning of time, carrying out His eternal decrees through unchanging laws with an evident purpose which has not only to do with life but with life in its highest sphere,—with selfconscious man. If we remember in addition that this God

is Himself Eternal and timeless, that He is present with all His creation in all its stages of development, that He can himself interpose and does himself interpose in the course of this development and that His care extends to the smallest details; we will then be in a position to welcome all new truth. For each new proof of the wonders in the earth and of their complex though perfect harmony will only serve to increase our understanding of God's greatness and our reverent wonder that He should have been mindful of us and visited us.

Cranford, N. J.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

Verso la Fede. Biblioteca di studi religiosi, N. 4. Edita dalla Direzione della Scuola Teologica Battista di Roma. 1913. Pp. xi, 223.

This is a collection of papers on theological and religious themes, written by Italian Protestant scholars, and published as a volume in the "Library of Religious Studies", in the expectation that it may serve to guide the thoughts of Italian readers into channels favorable to the claims of Christianity in its Protestant guise. We in America should feel great sympathy with these Italian brethren, who in their attitude towards religion stand between the ignorance, prejudice or bigotry of an ultramontane Romanism on the one side, and the rashness, conceit and shallowness of the average anti-clerical on the other. In Latin countries where the Counter-Reformation quenched the feeble light of free religious thought in the sixteenth century, Christianity has been so exclusively associated in men's minds with the claims, the personnel and the faults of the Papacy, that when a revolt from its unendurable thralldom drives them out of it, they are not wont to stop short of a complete reversal of all the faiths and principles they formerly professed. In this volume the figure of the pendulum is used, as it has so often been used, to illustrate the naturalness, but also (let us hope) the transient nature of this extreme revolt; and surely one of the most hopeful agencies in accomplishing an early approach of the pendulum to its normal, central point of rest, is the clear exposition of the Protestant doctrines to the view of minds at either extreme of the arc. It is a shock to some Latins to learn that there can be a Christianity that is not Roman Christianity. It is a sobering flash of lightning in a sky that has become all dark with the loss of God and immortality, that reveals to them a community of Christians who hold fast the fundamental verities of the religion of Jesus, yet abhor as they themselves do the errors of Papal doctrine and the vices of Papal society.

Such would be the effect of this booklet on many for whom it is intended. The subjects chosen are well selected to appeal to such readers. The first two papers are the longest, one on the Hegelian doctrine of the becoming and the absolute by Professor Mariano of the University of Naples, and the other on the immortality of the soul by Professor De Sarlo of the Institute of Superior Studies at Florence. We found the greatest pleasure in the article by Professor Luzzi on "A Modern Conception of Dogma", not only because of the writer's

skilful appeal in behalf of dogma in religion, but also because he has endeared himself to us Protestants of America, and especially to us in Princeton through his recent visit when he delivered a course of lectures on the Waldensian Church. The same body of Italian Protestants is represented in this volume also by the Waldensian pastor at Rome, Ernesto Comba, who writes on the fundamental theme, "The Question of Authority in Matters of Faith": its author, we think, goes too far in his assertion of individualism in formulating his view of authority; it is no longer the Protestant principle of the authority of God's Word, guaranteed to us by the "testimony of the Holy Spirit", but the individual religious consciousness crowned with a Papal tiara by Sabatier and his school.

If Protestant ecclesiastical bodies in Italy live as harmoniously together as their representatives collaborate on these pages, there must be a comity among these schismatic "sects" that puts to shame the hopeless division within the "one universal and indivisible" Church of Rome. A Wesleyan pastor writes on miracles, and a Baptist pastor on sin, and the general editor of the Library is a Baptist Theological professor. This is a satisfactory evidence of that true unity of the spirit, compared to which a constrained unity in outward organization marred by schism in the spirit is a mockery and a delusion.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Jesus the Christ: Historical or Mythical? A Reply to Professor Drews' Die Christusmythe. By THOMAS JAMES THORBURN, D.D., LL.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street; New York: Scribners. 1912. Pp. xix, 311.

It is scarcely to the credit of the scholarship of our age that it has been reserved for the twentieth century to entertain serious doubts of the historical existence of the most influential Figure in history. Jesus Christ has been the centre of controversy in every century of our era, but it has remained for our own to frame the question, Did Jesus live? as a proper subject for academic discussion. The controversy is not an edifying one from any standpoint, but as it is rife in theological circles, it is necessary to take account of it, and it is fortunate that one can do so under the competent guidance of Dr. Thorburn.

It is apparent that the "Christ-myth" theory is more than an eccentricity of criticism, or the frenzied attempt of a reckless scholar to attract attention to himself. The mythical theory is indeed the direct outcome—although parenthood may not be acknowledged—of that quest of the historical Jesus which has sought to find within or behind the Gospels a peasant-prophet reduced to the dimensions of mere humanity. When it is denied, as it is for example in Bousset's late work, *Kurios Christos*, that Jesus used of Himself even the favorite

title of "Son of Man", when "church theology", "schematic tendency", "interpolation", etc., are written over all the most characteristic features of the Gospel narrative, it is only natural that "Myth" should plumpily be written over the whole narrative, or else that its possible historical basis should be relegated to the region of the unknowable.

The rise of the mythical school has changed the battle between orthodoxy and liberalism into a three-cornered fight. Conservatives, Liberals and Radicals are now the contending parties, and at a given moment any two of these may be found fighting against the third. It is interesting to note that the Radicals agree with the Conservatives that the only Christianity that ever existed was a "Christ religion", or belief in redemption through the Son of God. Conservatism, in the meantime, has been cautious in its attitude toward the mythical movement, uncertain whether to welcome it as an ally, coming from an unexpected quarter, attacking the Liberals in the rear, and showing by a sort of *reductio ad absurdum* the impossibility of drawing a consistent picture of an historic Christ stripped of supernatural attributes; or whether to regard it simply as an expression of that spirit of which the Apostle John spoke, the spirit which denies that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh. (1 Jno. iv. 3).

Dr. Thorburn, after showing the historic antecedents of the new mythicism in the theories of Strauss and Bruno Bauer, divides his material into (1) the Historical Data and (2) the Mythical Data. Features of the Gospel narratives which testify to their trustworthiness are reviewed, and the testimony of Paul is marshalled with telling effect. Dr. Thorburn places a higher value upon the witness of Roman writers than does Loofs, for instance, in his recent Oberlin lectures. Of the passages in Josephus he regards Antiq. XVIII.iii.3. as so suspicious that no weight can be attached to it, but finds the other passage, Antiq. XX.ix.1, which speaks of "the brother of Jesus who was called Christ, whose name was James", a reliable witness to the historicity of Jesus. In speaking of the Jesus of Jewish tradition, Dr. Thorburn traverses ground more unfamiliar to the general reader, but, he believes, of great importance. While Jewish tradition is full of slander and hostile misrepresentation, it never breathes the slightest doubt of the historical existence of Jesus. Our author quotes the passage in the Talmud, "Simeon ben Azzai has said: 'I found in Jerusalem a book of genealogies; therein was written that *So and So* is an illegitimate son (*mamser*) of a married woman'". His comment is "that the Jews of the generations immediately succeeding Jesus acknowledged the actual birth, and, therefore, so far, the *historical character* of the Founder of Christianity." We might add here that this passage bears testimony also to the fact that there was something in His birth out of the ordinary, and witnesses "so far" to the Gospel narratives of the Virgin Birth, of the historical value of which Dr. Thorburn has a low estimate. At this point the author yields, in our judgment, more than is necessary to the contentions of the mythicists.

In the second part of his work Dr. Thorburn discusses "Pre-Chris-

tian Jesus-Cults", with special reference to the views of Prof. W. B. Smith; "The Dying and Rising Saviours of Ethnic Nature-Cults", showing the striking difference between the Christian stories of the birth and resurrection of Jesus and the heathen analogies; "Mythology and the Gospels" and "Christian Symbolism". In these chapters the theories of Drews and J. M. Robertson are reviewed. The difference between the nature-myths of the annually dying and rising vegetation gods, without historical reality, and associated with immoral or non-moral ideas, and the record of Christ who being raised from the dead dieth no more, is strongly brought out. This part of the book is especially valuable at the present time when the analogies between Christianity and other religions are being somewhat overworked.

We do not agree, as indicated, with all that Dr. Thorburn says, but we welcome his book as a scholarly, sane and, within its limits, comprehensive review of what is at best an unedifying controversy.

Lincoln University, Pa.

WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

The Book of Job. By HOMER B. SPRAGUE, Ph.D. Boston: Sherman and French Company. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 243. Price, \$1.25 net.

In his introductory essay the author attempts to prove that the Book of Job is not historical but an elaborate allegory designed to teach the solution of the mystery of undeserved suffering by the doctrine of Evolution, and the necessity of pain in rising from the lower to the higher stages of existence. Job is charged with serious inconsistencies which are excused on the ground that his sufferings affected his sanity, but allowed him occasional lucid intervals.

The main portion of the volume is occupied by a versified translation of the poetic portion of Job written in iambic meter. This translation attempts to approach more nearly to the original Hebrew than the Authorized or Revised Versions and to be at once more literal and more popular. To this translation are appended seventy pages of brief explanatory notes, designed to aid in the study of what the author terms "the first literary creation of Semitic genius".

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

Savonarolas Erzieher und Savonarola als Erzieher. Von DR. JOS. SCHNITZER, Professor an der Universität München. 1913. Protestantischer Schriftenvertrieb: Berlin-Schöneberg. 8vo, pp. viii, 141.

Believing, as he notes in his preface, that the study of Savonarola can be furthered more through specialized efforts than by comprehensive representations, Professor Schnitzer has made a happy choice in his present study of what he himself regards as "one of the most important and at the same time darkest sides" of the great Dominican

preacher's reform-labors; namely, his relation to the children. In Michael Savonarola, the reformer's grandfather, whose ethical and educational writings have been recently brought to light by Arnold Segarizzi, is found the real teacher of Savonarola. Though himself primarily a physician, he was profoundly religious and ever concerned for the moral welfare of Padua and Ferrara. Particularly in Ferrara, where court-life was a moving scene of unrestrained worldliness, his protest was as vigorous as it was unrelenting (pp. 5-12). He wrote on penance (*Della Penitensa*) and in praise of John the Baptist (*De laudibus Johannis Baptistae*), giving special advice to monks and religious orders, showing remarkable knowledge, for a layman, of the old classic and philosophical writers; yet he was by no means a Humanist: his one pride was to be a Christian (pp. 20, 21). His special treatise *De regimine praegnantium*, addressed to the women of Ferrara, and part of the Italian text of which is given in the first section of an appendix to this book (pp. 127-134), deals specifically with the rearing of children. Religion is to be instilled into a child at an early period in its development. He is to be taught reverence for all religious associations, to learn the Ave Maria, Pater Noster, Credo, sign of the cross, and the practice of purity (pp. 21-27).

Savonarola was born at Ferrara, Sept. 21, 1452. Professor Schnitzer places the death of the grandfather Michael about 1468, and argues that in these fifteen years of the younger Savonarola's life, impressionable and formative years in any life, the influence of the grandfather's example and teaching is a necessary conclusion (pp. 28, 29).

The exclusive burden of the second part of the book is Savonarola's struggles in Florence. The disgraceful Shrovetide hilarities of the Florentine youth are graphically pictured (pp. 40-44), in all of which they were no worse than their parents and other adults. The outstanding sins were: general lack of reverence for sacred matters, dancing, games of chance, gambling, prostitution, luxurious living, and the indecent dress of the women. Savonarola worked out a unique theory of social reform in which the child was both the goal and the means. While he addressed the most pungent admonitions to all parents, especially the lenient ones (pp. 57, 58), it was in the child that he saw the choicest instrument of ultimate moral restoration. Furthermore, he made use of the gregarious instincts of the child, and banded the Florentine children together into a "children's-police" (pp. 72-90), composed of youth between the ages of twelve and twenty, chosen mainly from the best families (p. 77). The city was divided into four sections and guards placed in charge, from among whom each week an overseer (*Aufseher, proposto*) was elected by the children, with full power to summon to judgment all disturbing cases (p. 75). Savonarola believed in praising "his young emissaries" for their efforts, on the principle that to praise virtue is to increase it (*Virtus laurata crescit*, p. 80, note 166). That they were abundantly successful, Professor Schnitzer shows from the writings of reliable chroniclers of that age.

Another interesting feature of Savonarola's reform was his thoroughly discreet way of correcting the Shrovetide extravagances by laying hold of a popular custom and directing it to higher moral purposes. This was the custom of having a procession, attended by begging in rude ruffianly ways, and ending in a bonfire; a tradition which easily became the center of the wildest excesses. Instead of doing away with it altogether (which any radical reformer would have advocated), Savonarola planned a procession of over 4,000 children in the interest of the poor. Altars and saints' figures adorned the street-corners, and here the people's gifts were laid. For the bonfire the children zealously collected the "vanities" (*Eitelkeiten*) that had led Florence into so much sin; namely, unchaste pictures, immoral books, games, dice, vain feminine adornments, masks, even musical instruments and works of Latin and Italian poets (pp. 95-97). The reform assumed only a temporary character, however. The vociferous "Hosanna!" was soon followed by the malevolent "Crucify!" After Savonarola's death it seemed as if Hell itself had been turned loose (pp. 102-106).

The famous Dominican's relation to Humanism is frequently dwelt upon. Professor Schnitzer labors to make this very clear. Savonarola believed theology to be the highest of all sciences (p. 70); he was not fundamentally opposed to scientific research ("kein grundsätzlicher Gegner wissenschaftlicher Forschung," p. 112). But he did fear the secularizing tendency of an un-Christian philosophy. He feared the peril of rationalism which Christian theology faced through the dialectical refinements of the classic philosophy (pp. 117, 118). The saints were the true philosophers, and theology was "a science obtained by prayer" (*eine erbetete Wissenschaft*, pp. 66, 67). His complaint was against the theologians of his day, who, saturated with worldly science, were not able to convert a cat! (p. 68). This attitude to Humanism Professor Schnitzer describes as not exactly hostile, yet extremely reserved (p. 108), and largely due to the influence of the rules and spirit of the Dominican order (pp. 112-118).

Something of an incipient Protestantism, if not evangelicalism, lay in Savonarola's rebuke of the worldliness of the clergy, insisting that the good priest must be a good man (pp. 60, 63); in his theory of a "correctio fraterna", demanding reprimand of a brother, even of the pope himself when he errs (pp. 73, 74. Cf. p. 107); in emphasizing the need of the simplicity of the Scripture and its too much neglected exposition (p. 69); and in his honoring the rights of the individual conscience (p. 108).

In summing up this study of Savonarola, the author says: "What, however, will always impart to Savonarola's pedagogy its peculiar note and its individual coloring, is its sharply defined dogmatic character" (p. 107). The spirit which enlivened his educational labor was "its pronouncedly dogmatic-transcendental character", its supernaturalism, leading him to do everything *sub specie aeternitatis* (p. 121). He was not original. A child of the Church, he followed the

Scriptures and the writings of the Church Fathers. He believed in transubstantiation, in infant damnation, in the authority of the papacy, yet he was no advocate of blind obedience (p. 108. Cf. pp. 55, 56, 106, 122). The world has moved on, observes Professor Schnitzer, so that the twentieth century no longer occupies the naïve position of Savonarola. Standing on *this* side of the future, it has no sense for his crude transcendentalism: it rejects both his educational goal and its means. Of what value, then, was his work? This was the moral earnestness of it, the overpowering religious impetus which his system produced, its non-Jesuitism; all of which makes his work of distinct value to the modern pedagogic (pp. 122, 123). And, best of all, what he taught he lived and sealed with his death, believing that the best teacher is a good example (pp. 125, 56).

We have two criticisms to offer. The form of the book is repeatedly marred by poor paragraphing, some of the paragraphs being five and six pages in length, and even more. For example, see pages 21-26, 29-37, 64-69, 77-80, 86-89, 90-93, 98-102, 112-118. Nor are we sure that Professor Schnitzer does full justice to what he insists is the distinguishing feature of Savonarola's system of education, namely, its supernaturalism, or transcendentalism. He believes that its permanent value lay in its ethical imperatives. But can we, dare we dissociate this "moral earnestness" from the supernatural guidance which Savonarola everywhere recognized? How can we adequately explain the former apart from the latter? Disallowing, of course, all Romanizing elements of idolatry and superstition, may we not think, and think justly, even from Professor Schnitzer's excellent account, that in Savonarola's educational struggles we have a man fundamentally led by the Divine Spirit? And thinking it, may we not say it, even in our materialistic day, that "as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God"?

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

Christ in the Social Order. By the REV. W. M. CLOW, D.D., Professor of Pastoral Theology and Christian Ethics, United Free Church College, Glasgow. Author of "The Cross in Christian Experience" and "The Day of the Cross", etc. Hodder & Stoughton. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1913. 8vo, pp. xii, 295.

"This book is an endeavor to set the sources and issues of our social unrest in the light of the ethics of Christ." "A constant watchfulness has been maintained against entering into the sphere either of economics or politics."

In these two sentences taken from the Preface of this remarkable book we discern its chief excellence and its one defect. Its excellence is that it applies the ethics of Christ to the problems of social

unrest with singular and, as it seems to us, with hitherto unequalled justice and suggestiveness. After finding these problems in "the relationship of wealth and poverty", in that of "capital and labor", and in "the work and status of woman"; and after describing the suggested solutions, from Individualism to Collectivism and Revolutionary Socialism, and exposing the futility of all these, Dr. Clow presents, as his own solution and the only adequate one, "the Social Ideal of Jesus". This is admirably set forth. We are reminded, that Christ was not "a systematic teacher"; that "we cannot say that he held the conditions of our modern world in his survey"; and that he came "not merely to reform the social order of all time, and not only to teach men righteousness, but 'to seek and to save that which was lost' ". We are reminded, too, that he "accepted and enlarged and spiritualized" the Hebrew social ideal to which he was heir. Hence, he planted himself on its "basis of an inviolable Individualism". While he insisted on "absolute equality before the law, and a perfect equality of opportunity" for all, he had no idea "of equality of gift, or of rank, or of reward". Finally, he laid special stress on "the religious sanction". He emphasized the idea of "the kingdom of God" as "the rule and realm of God in the hearts and lives of men". He made it include every agency in which society can be rightly organized. As to the method by which this ideal was to be realized, his position was peculiar in two respects. He insisted that the kingdom of heaven can be built only on "individuals who have come into a relationship of faith and obedience to God", and he "did not attend directly to the worldly condition of men". Thus at these points his ideal contrasts with those which are advocated in our time. First, Christ "fastens his thought, not on the state and its form, but on the man and his spiritual destiny". Secondly, he "tests all outward condition by its power to discipline character". Thirdly, his social ideal is "a kingdom of heaven, with the eternal life in view".

Such being our Lord's social ideal, our author proceeds next to apply it to the different phases of the three great social problems. Thus as regards wealth, he finds it to be "a Christian state", "a stewardship", "an achievement", and "a peril". With respect to the sources of poverty, he discovers them in "drinking and drunkenness", in "improvidence and waste and gambling", in "sloth and incompetence", and "in misfortune" resulting from our "industrial system". As to "the obligations of capital", he admits the difficulty arising out of the facts that "Christ declined to deal with the question of capital and labor in any form in which it came before him" and that "his teaching did not hold in its view the conditions of our modern life". At the same time, he recognizes that "the problem of Christ's day and of our own are the same at their root": and in view of his fundamental principles, he affirms that Christ would not abolish the capitalist; for that would be impossible, and, in addition, Christ had not "the least conception of making men equal in their possessions". Beyond this, he teaches that our Lord's ideal creates three obligations with respect to capital, the obligation of "honest and honorable service with it", the obligation of

"a solicitous and generous oversight of labor", and the obligation of self-sacrifice on occasion of need". "The demands of labor" he finds to be "a living wage", "some interest in the work", and "leisure". This last demand he rightly regards as unreasonable and unethical. Indeed, he shows that in most cases "the cry for leisure" is only "the cry of laziness disguising itself". In answer to the question, How is the working man to secure a larger and a sufficient share of the profits of trade? he rejects the suggestion of "a coercive equal distribution"; he sees little of promise in proposed adaptations of our present industrial order, though he regards copartnership between capital and labor as the best of them; he finds the solution in ethical taxation, in the general increase of wealth, and specially in the prevalence of Christian principles. With regard to the land problem, he finds it "impossible to draw any counsel from the Old Testament ideal or from any other fact of Christ's time", but he ventures to "set down from Christ's ethical principles, three guiding truths which all land laws should endeavor to express". These are, that "the possession of land is a trust"; that "all land must be set apart to its appropriate uses"; that "the land of a country is intended, broadly speaking, for its people". For bringing in these principles his hope is not in any form of "land nationalization", but in "progressive and sympathetic legislation". With respect to "the revolt of woman", he discovers three spheres of unrest; "the domestic", "the economic", and "the political". Before discussing these, he defines and emphasizes the family as the true unit of society and marriage as "the only basis of the family". Taking up the "domestic order", he reaffirms "the Christian conception of the sanctity and inviolability of the marriage bond"; he recognizes only one ground of divorce, unfaithfulness; and he stigmatizes "leasehold marriages". As to "the economic order", he plants himself on the position that "neither by nature, nor by Christian ethics were men and women meant to be independent of each other". Hence, "the wages of a man must be sufficient to enable him to support a family"; while the woman, because her time and strength must be largely expended in the family, cannot expect ordinarily to earn what the man does. To relieve the present abnormal situation in which many women have to support, not only themselves but also others, he suggests that certain occupations, as clerkships in banks and business houses and warehouses, be confined to women. When we enter the sphere of the political order, we touch "a concrete and imminent question", that of woman's suffrage. The argument for this our author gives fully, clearly and fairly. He, however, takes sides against it on grounds of both justice and expediency, with regard to both the state and woman herself. The paramount consideration in the problem he rightly conceives to be "the woman and the child". In considering "The Church and Social Reforms" Dr. Clow is at his best. No résumé can do him justice. His general principles are that the church should not travel out of her own sphere and that she should employ only her own methods. Hence, while the *individual members* of the Church, as

Christians and because Christians, ought to render all the social service of which they are capable, the Church courts ought to confine themselves strictly to "pronouncing upon the *ethical* import of all proposed legislation, of all civic regulations, and of the administration of the land"; and the individual minister must not use "his pulpit or his hour of public worship to discuss public social questions", he must not take up any of these questions outside of the pulpit "lest he shut men's minds against his message, and lest he lessen his time and energy for his more unique and more urgent business, and when a question has entered "the political stage of its history" he must "leave it entirely alone". In a word, he must always remember that incomparably the greatest of all social services is to preach the everlasting Gospel of the grace of God. The closing chapter, which is on "the Unconsidered Horizon", is, perhaps, the most impressive in the book. The features of the unregarded future, such as, "higher education and its results", "the increase of scientific knowledge and the mastery of the tools", "the exhaustion of the resources of nature in the older industrial centers", "the geographical changes", "the less virile people", "the whole world as the coming labor market", the "Black Peril" and the "Yellow Peril"—all these emphasize the passing of our present problems, the coming of other and incomparably more difficult ones, and especially "Christ in the social order" as the only solution. This outline, still incomplete though it is, has been prolonged, perhaps unduly; but this has been done that those who cannot read Dr. Clow's book may at least get some hint of its suggestiveness, and particularly that these hints, imperfect though they are, may prompt some to feel that they must own and study "Christ in the Social Order" for themselves.

What we have alluded to as "the one defect" in this admirable book arises out of its avowed avoidance of the "economic sphere". It is true that every economic question is also and fundamentally an ethical question, and that the ethical question, because fundamental, is the more important of the two; but it is not the case that these questions are independent of one another, or, that they can be rightly discussed in independence of one another. For example, what is labor worth in the open market? is an economic question. But it must be asked and answered, if we would settle the moral inquiry, what ought to be labor's wage? That is, the right wage of labor will depend on the worth of labor, and the worth of labor will depend on economic considerations. When work is pressing and labor is scarce the latter will often be worth much more than a "living wage", and when labor is abundant and work scarce, labor may be worth less than a "living wage". Now to ignore all this is to fail both morally and economically. It is to fail economically; for he who pays more for labor than do his competitors will soon be unable to pay even a "living wage": and it is to fail morally; for he who gives *wages* higher than the market price of labor perpetrates a lie by virtually saying that labor is worth what he knows that it is not. Dr. Clow himself, we believe, would admit this. At all events, he expressly recognizes much of it. "Were

economics alone to rule", he says, "the laborer is being paid his full share. The man who stands to lift a lever, or adjust a frame, or knock out a piece of coal with a pick, is not entitled on economic grounds, to a large reward. He does not contribute so largely as his thoughtless advisers suggest to the production of wealth" (p. 194). Elsewhere he writes: "In the increase of the annual stream of wealth there are four factors. One of these is labor. Another is capital. The third is brains. The fourth is the resources of nature. I have set these down in the reverse of their importance. . . . Last, and least important of all, is the laborer" (p. 192). So, too, we read, "We cannot juggle with economics, and ordain by statute a wage which is above the value of the work done" (p. 241). President Cleveland once remarked in substance, "Economic laws are as inflexible as the law of gravitation". But if so, it becomes immoral and impossible not to be determined by them. Though we do not reckon with them, they will reckon with us. What would be thought of the builder who in his construction ignored the force of gravity whenever it interfered with his plans? He would be both denounced and punished as a fool and a murderer. Nor would it make the least difference how noble his plans might be. In a word, economic principles and conditions cannot be disregarded. The law of supply and demand must regulate wages. To attempt to fix them on any other basis is fundamentally dishonest and eventually impossible; and while hard times and the consequent poverty of laborers demand of all with means the utmost self-denial in order to the increased exercise of Christian *charity*, not even do such times justify us in kicking against or in tampering with the principles involved in the divine constitution of things. Even love must be according to truth. This is unpopular and unfashionable doctrine, but it was never more needed.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Brothering the Boy. By W. EDWARD RAFFERTY, PH.D., Professor of Sociology and Pedagogy, Kansas City Theological Seminary. Philadelphia: The Griffith and Rowland Press. Cloth; pp. 220. Price, 75 cents net, postpaid.

This is an excellent modern and popular treatment of the problems relating to the moral, social and spiritual nurture and development of boys. It embodies "an appeal for person, not proxy, in social service". "The characteristics of boy life are given; certain principles and processes in boy's work are stated; various types of organizations are described, but the chief concern is that the boy may be personally brothered." The qualifications for this difficult work are described, and the needs and methods of specific study and preparation. The distinguishing features of the various periods of a boy's development are defined, and the social enemies by which a boy is beset. The author next deals with truancy, delinquency and reformatory methods, includ-

ing the juvenile court and probation. The last part of the book deals with "the social helpers" in brothering the boy, including the home, the public school, boys' clubs, the Christian Association, the Sunday School and the Church. There is appended to the volume a helpful list of one hundred best books for workers with boys.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Breakers! Methodism Adrift. By REV. L. W. MUNHALL, M.A., D.D.
New York: Charles C. Cook. 1913. Pp. 215.

Dr. Munhall here speaks out a vigorous note of protest and warning against the naturalism, rationalism, scepticism, and agnosticism, which have been creeping into the Methodist Church. He states that these currents of thought have affected Methodist schools, colleges, theological schools, professors, pastors and bishops, periodicals and Sunday School literature. He not only makes these statements, but he proceeds at once to give the evidence in proof of his statements. This evidence is given in the form of quotations from lectures, addresses, and articles, so that it is first hand evidence and not mere hearsay charges. Dr. Munhall speaks plainly, and does not mince matters, but one gets the impression that he has fully supported his statements.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

Things That Matter Most. By JOHN HENRY JOWETT, D.D. Fleming H. Revell Company. 12mo, cloth. \$1.25 net.

A collection of short studies on practical religious subjects. They are vigorous and thoughtful but are aglow with the spirit of the sympathetic Savior. The simplicity and good taste of the literary style of all the papers adds much to their attractiveness. It is a good book to keep within reach, and to pick up for a spare moment, and better still to read at leisure and ponder with care.

Easton, Pa.

S. A. MARTIN.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, April: GEORGE A. COE, Origin and Nature of Children's Faith in God; KARL BORNHAUSEN, Present Status of Liberal Theology in Germany; LEWIS B. PATON, Canaanite Influence on the Religion of Israel; E. F. SCOTT, Significance of Jesus for Modern Religion in View of his Eschatological Teaching; D. E. THOMAS, Psychological Approach to Prophecy; DURANT DRAKE, Widening the Church's Invitation; EDGAR J. GOODSPEED, The Freer Gospels; SATYASARAN SINHA, Will India Become Christian?

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, April: KARL F. GEISHER, Minister in Politics; EDWARD M. MERRINS, Jews and Race Survival (II); HAROLD M. WIENER, Pentateuchal Text, the Divine Appellations, and the Documentary Theory; HENRY H. BEACH, Sociological Morals; HENRY A. SANDERS, New Testament Quotation of a Twice-repeated Prophecy;

EDWIN S. CARR, *Royce's Philosophy of Religion*; HUGH POPE, *Doctrine of the Catholic Church Touching Indulgences*; JOHANNES DAHSE, *Is the Documentary Theory Tenable (II)*.

Church Quarterly Review, London, April: CHRISTOPHER TURNOR, *The Church and Rural Reform*; R. W. D. STEPHENSON, *Doctrine of the Holy Spirit*; A. A. COCK, *Francis Thompson*; C. A. H. GREEN, *History of the Tithe*; G. C. RICHARDS, *Architectural Legacy of Imperial Rome*; H. T. KAY ROBINSON, *Pensions for the Clergy-Method of Provision*; W. C. BISHOP, *Progress in Prayer-Book Revision*; P. N. WAGGETT, *Evolution and Atonement*; A. C. HEADLAM, *The Ecclesia Anglicana*.

Constructive Quarterly, New York, June: H. SCOTT HOLLAND, *Religion of a Moving Changing World*; HENRY C. KING, *Confession of Christ*; W. H. FRERE, *A Programme of Christian Conference*; FRANCIS BROWN, *Unity in Scholarship*; F. W. FULLER, *Eastern Orthodox and the Anglican Communion*; ADOLF DEISSMANN, *Jerusalem the Holy City*; AUGUSTIN LEGER, *Wesley's Place in Catholic Thought*; J. G. SIMPSON, *Anglicanism and Reunion*; RICHARD ROBERTS, *Some Reflections on the Christian Priesthood*; R. VALLERY-RADOT, *Renaissance of Catholic Lyricism*; EUGENE STOCK, *A Layman's Thoughts on the Church and the World*; C. P. S. CLARKE, *School and College Missions and Settlements in the Church of England*; PHILLIP SNOWDEN, *The Churches and the Social Problem*; EDMUND G. GARDNER, *The Poet of the Franciscan Movement*.

East & West, London, April: F. H. HAWKINS, *Christian Missions in Madagascar*; DR. HUNTINGDON, *The Chinese Revolution in Relation to Mission Work*; E. W. MASTERMAN, *Zionism and Christian Missions*; DR. BRATTON, *The Racial Episcopate*; J. R. BACON, *The Bhagavad Gita as an Aid to the Christian Missionary*; W. SINKER, *Effects of Christian Missions in Melanesia*; DR. ST. CLAIR DONALDSON, *The Idea of Bush Brotherhoods*; DR. WILLIS, *A United Church in Uganda*; SATISH CHATTERJI, *Indian Christians and National Ideals*.

Expositor, London, April: ED. KÖNIG, *Image-Worship and Idol-Worship in the Old Testament*; H. R. MACKINTOSH, *Studies in Christian Eschatology, Return of Christ*; J. RENDEL HARRIS, *New Points of View in Textual Criticism*; A. E. GARVIE, *Notes on the Fourth Gospel*; E. W. WINSTANLEY, *Conduct and the Kingdom*; T. R. GLOVER, *The Call of God*; E. H. ASKWITH, *On Two Points in I Timothy I*. *The Same*, May: A. S. PEAKE, *Professor S. R. Driver*; G. E. FRENCH, *Christianity before the Gospels*; H. R. MACKINTOSH, *Studies in Christian Eschatology, Death and the Sequel*; W. MORGAN, *Religion and Philosophy*; A. E. GARVIE, *Notes on the Fourth Gospel, Events in Galilee*; NEWPORT J. D. WHITE, *Not Peace, but a Sword*; T. H. WEIR, *Some Fresh Notes on the Text of the Old Testament*. *The Same*, June: KIRSOPP LAKE, *Critical Problems of the Epistle to the Philippians*; J. H. BERNARD, *Example of Christ in Prayer*; B. W. BACON, *'Thankworthy' Goodness*; T. V. MOORE, *The Tower-Builder and the King—A Suggested Exposition of Luke 14.25-35*; H. R. MACK-

INTOSH, Studies in Christian Eschatology, Immortality; E. H. ASKWITH, Parable of the Prodigal Son; A. E. GARVIE, Notes on the Fourth Gospel.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, April: HENRY P. SMITH, Charles Augustus Briggs; H. A. A. KENNEDY, The Composition of Mark 4:21-25; JOHN REID, Baptism of Water and Baptism of Fire; A. H. SAYCE, Archaeology of Book of Genesis; J. A. MACCULLOCH, Coptic Apocrypha; S. H. HOOKER, The Interpretation of St. Paul. *The Same*, May: G. A. COOKE, Samuel Rolles Driver; J. RENDEL HARRIS, An Important Reading in the Diatessaron; JOHN M. SHAW, Sin and the Atonement; STEPHEN H. LANGDON, Method of Theological Redactors in Babylonia; ALPHONSE MINGANA, Early Development of Mohammedanism. *The Same*, June: PRINCIPAL IVERACH, Interpretation; J. RENDEL HARRIS, An Orphic Reference in the Apology of Aristides; A. E. GARVIE, The Christ of God and the Soul of Man; THEOPHILUS G. PINCHES, Glimpses of Life in Erech.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, April: EUGENE W. LYMAN, Social Progress and Religious Faith; WILLARD L. SPERRY, Mark Ruthenford; THOMAS C. HALL, A Protestant and Social View of the Church; EPHRAIM EMERTON, Martin Luther in the Light of Recent Criticism; FREDERIC PALMER, A Crisis in the Church of England; ALBERT J. EDMUNDS, Recent Translations of Buddhist Writings.

Hibbert Journal, Boston, April: DEAN HENSON, Kikuyu; R. H. COATS, Sacraments and Unity; W. MACNEILE DIXON, Inspiration; JOHN J. CHAPMAN, Where Faith and Morality Meet; NORMAN K. SMITH, The Middle Ages, The Renaissance, and the Modern Mind; HEADMASTER OF ETON, Criticism of Public Schools; ARCHIBALD WEIR, The Anthropological Point of View; BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, The Twentieth-Century Christ; B. H. STREETER, The Suffering of God; H. W. B. JOSEPH, Mechanism, Intelligence, and Life; A. D. MARTIN, One Avenue to God; EDITH HUNTER, Order and Unrest; CHARLES F. DOLE, The Great Alternative.

Hindustan Review, Allahabad, April: Modern Europe and Modern India; R. B. G. P. VARMA, Lucknow: Past and Present; V. N. N. IYENGAR, Aviation in Ancient Hindustan; K. S. VARMA, Doctrine of Karma; S. A. BREVI, Woman in Islam; The Dowry System in Bengal; ANGUS HAMILTON, The Passing of Korea; Some Thoughts on the Situation in Ireland.

International Journal of Ethics, Philadelphia, April: C. DELISLE BURNS, What Is Religious Knowledge? CHARLES W. SUPER, Ethics as a Science; A. BARRATT BROWN, Intuition; C. D. BROAD, Doctrine of Consequence in Ethics; N. C. MUKERJI, Idealism and the Conception of Law in Morals; F. J. GOULD, An Ethical Teacher's American Tour.

Interpreter, London, April: A NAIRNE, Acts of the Apostles; ALLAN MENZIES, Sources of Acts; J. NEVILLE FIGGIS, Some Loose Stones, A Review; F. R. BARRY, The Demand for the Miraculous; T. HERBERT BINDLEY, What Ought We to Understand by the Inspiration of the Bible? CONRAD NOEL, The Survival of the Body; HENRY

C. TOWNSEND, Christ's Resurrection and Ours; V. C. MACMUNN, Problem of Cleopas; J. E. SYMES, The Christ Party at Corinth; C. T. HARLEY, Persian Influence on the Development of Biblical Religion.

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KIKUYU, CLERICAL VERACITY AND MIRACLES

Kikuyu, clerical veracity and miracles: it might seem that no three topics could bear less intrinsic relation to one another. In point of fact they are connected by very natural bonds, and it was inevitable that the controversy aroused by the publication of the Bishop of Zanzibar's open letter at the end of last year¹ should run rapidly through stages which raised successively the three issues of intercommunion, the sincerity of clerical engagements, and the supernatural origin of Christianity. The bomb-shell which Dr. Weston cast into the Anglican camp was thus like one of those fire-work bombs of Chinese concoction, which explode first into a serpent, out of which is at once extruded a noisome reptile, while from that in turn proceeds a fiery dragon. Each successive stage of the controversy cuts more deeply and uncovers more clearly the canker which lies at the root of much of our modern Church-life. The question raised in its first stage concerns only the limits of proper Christian communion; the issue in the second stage is just common honesty; while what is at stake in the third stage is the very existence of Christianity. The three issues are necessarily implicated in one another because they are only varying phases and interacting manifestations of

¹*Ecclesia Anglicana*. For what does she stand? An Open Letter to the Right Reverend Father in God, Edgar, Lord Bishop of St. Albans. By Fränk, Bishop of Zanzibar. 1914. Some curious details as to the publication of this letter may be read in the Christmas (1913) number of *The Christian Warfare* (Talbot & Co.), the organ of the Catholic Literature Association.

the fundamental conflict, underlying them all, between faithfulness to the Christian deposit and that indifferentism which is the outcome of essential unbelief.

I

The Bishop of Zanzibar was handicapped in dealing with the question of the limits of proper Christian communion by his position as a member of the Church of England, one of the numerous and not altogether unconflicting boasts of which lies in its extreme comprehensiveness. As a bishop receiving his orders from (he may himself perhaps prefer to say "through")² that Church and ruling over a section of it by its commission,³ and as a Christian who has been bred in it and still shares its life, participating of necessity in all that that life means, he is himself living in the most intimate communion with many of far less clearness of Christian faith and profession than any of those with whom the Bishops of Uganda and Mombasa communed on that now historic occasion in the Scotch Presbyterian Church at Kikuyu. In the amazing reversal of values which characterises the thought of extreme High Churchmen, he might indeed have taken refuge in the contention that episcopal organization is more fundamental to the Church's life than purity of Christian faith, so that where

² Cf. *The Case against Kikuyu*. A Study in Vital Principles. By Frank Weston, D.D., Bishop of Zanzibar, 1914, p. 40: "A Bishop sent from England to Africa goes out not as a Bishop of the English Church, but simply as a Catholic Bishop who owes his consecration to the Universal Episcopate represented to him by prelates of the Church of England": and what follows, in which he repudiates the duty of carrying into Africa the peculiarities, among the Catholic bodies, of the Church of England,—e.g. its comprehensiveness.

³ His Open Letter itself and his appeal to the Archbishop of Canterbury surely carry with them the admission of that much as to the African sees. Cf. what Bishop Tucker said on this matter: "At present the missionaries of the C. M. S. working in East Africa, and their adherents, are members of the Church of England; they form the Church of England in East Africa" (quoted in *Steps towards Reunion*, A statement for the Consultative Committee. By the Right Rev. W. G. Peel, D.D., Bishop of Mombasa, and the Right Rev. J. J. Willis, D.D., Bishop of Uganda. 1914, p. 29.)

episcopacy is everything else may be tolerated. Mr. R. A. Knox seems to give us to understand that by many of his supporters at least—and there is no reason to suppose Dr. Weston to be in substantial disaccord with them⁴—any heresy whatever might be endured better than lack of episcopal orders: truths are only “enshrined by the Church,” it seems, while “episcopacy is integral and belongs to the essence of the Church itself.”⁵ It may be supposed, however, that it is more embarrassing to contend at Zanzibar than in the Common Rooms at Oxford—at least without some counterbalancing action—that it is more important to induce Mussulmans and Fetish-worshippers to permit themselves to be episcopally organized than it is to bring them to the acceptance of the Gospel. At all events the Bishop of Zanzibar has felt compelled in protesting against what he deems the laxity of the Bishops of Uganda and Mombasa in the matter of episcopacy, to protest also against the laxity of the Church of England in tolerating within its communion men who deny fundamental elements of the Christian faith. By so doing, he has not only guarded himself to some extent against the uncomfortable *tu quoque*, but has immensely strengthened his case. He appears not merely as the zealot of untenable episcopal pretensions,⁶ but as the champion of the Christian religion.

⁴“The Church does not *accept* the Episcopate,” he remarks (*The Case against Kikuyu*, p. 56), “she cannot exist without it.”

⁵*The British Review*, February, 1914, p. 186.

⁶His own contention is expressed in the words: “So that ultimately we are compelled to admit Episcopacy to be the result of divine will and guidance; and, apart from modernist views, the purpose and wish of Christ Himself” (*The Case against Kikuyu*, p. 18). But even this is made out only (1) by confusing parochial (Presbyterian) and diocesan (Episcopalian) episcopacy, and then (2) invoking the amazing principle (p. 13): “For it is now positively agreed among Christian theologians that it is not possible to distinguish in effect between an immediate act of God, and an act performed by Him through the agency of the Christian Church”—that is to say what the Church does, God does; and hence whatever is established by the Church must be declared to have been established by God. On that principle it may be said that Episcopacy is “the purpose and wish of Christ”, for has it not been established by Christ’s Church? This mode of con-

We may regret—we do regret—that it has been left to High Churchmen in the Church of England, to come forward effectively in defense of these fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith. We may ask—we do ask—where are those Evangelicals who still boast that they constitute the core, or the larger portion, of the Church of England; and who, one would think, would have the greatest stake of all in the fundamentals of the faith and the warmest zeal of all for the preservation of them pure and whole for those who are to come after them—for what have they more than these? But it is a cause for rejoicing that in the prevailing apathy there are some who, even if it be merely because of the qualities of their very defects, raise a voice in defence of the well-nigh deserted cause of fundamental truth and demand greater faithfulness in preserving pure the deposit of the faith.⁷ There surely is no one really awake to the demands of the present situation, not only in the Church of England but in all the churches, who

ciliating the Divine Right of Episcopacy with its tardy origin in the Church is becoming quite common. An extreme instance of it,—on quite other grounds than those occupied by Dr. Weston—may be found in the argument of the Rev. J. H. Skrine, D.D., who knows that “authority derives from Church to office and not the other way”—that is to say that Bishops are the creations and representatives of the church—and who on that ground seems disposed to grant the validity of non-episcopal ministries, and yet who is able to make his own such language as this: “Briefly, we declare that the Order of Bishops is an integral part of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ” (*Eucharist and Bishop*, 1914, p. 21).

⁷We agree thoroughly with the opinion of Dean B. I. Bell (*The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1914, p. 95): “Better the bitter intolerance of those who believe too much and too strongly than the easy complaisance of those who believe too little, and hold that too lightly.” And there is truth in his remark that not only is (this so-called easy) “tolerance a destructive force” which is in danger of eradicating the very “capacity for constructive thought”, but that those who are condemned as “intolerant” are often so—as he expresses it—only because they are “seers not politicians”. Jesus Christ, he points out, certainly did not follow the methods of our modern campaigners for what they call “Church Unity”, among whom there is manifested a tremendous amount of good feeling and a clear assumption “that there is no such thing as objective religious truth”.

will not recognize the necessity of such a protestation as is embodied in the following words,⁸ or who will withhold (apart from its sacerdotal coloring) his hearty sympathy from it.

"I submit to your Lordship that it is safer for us to do and say what God has commanded, rather than, being, moved thereto by an unbalanced desire for union, to falsify our witness and tamper with the message with which we have been entrusted.

Nor has He revealed to us that by the way of modifying revealed Truth to the taste of the modern world we shall lead the souls of men to Him. Rather has He bidden us uplift our voice in solid, corporate witness to the Faith delivered to the Church, leaving it to His wisdom and love to turn the modern mind to His sacramental presence in His Church.

For Modernism does not make men Christians in the accepted sense of the word, much less does it make them sons of the Holy Church of Christ. It is a new religion, and every soul attracted thereto means a new betrayal of the witness with which we are entrusted. It is easy enough to cast away the dogmas that hinder the modern mind from professing Christ, but if so be God requires of us, for the furtherance of His plans, a faithful witness to Revelation rather than an increasing roll of not very humble disciples, to what purpose is our self-appointed task?"

When Dr. Weston speaks here of "an unbalanced desire for union", he has of course in mind, among other manifestations of it, especially the proposed scheme of federation set forth in the resolutions of the Kikuyu Conference; and he may be supposed, accordingly, to be thinking, among other betrayals of the cause of truth which he thinks have been perpetrated in the cause of union, particularly of the betrayal of the cause of episcopacy of which he considers Drs. Willis and Peel to have been guilty in assenting to that scheme of federation. We regret to be compelled to understand that these Bishops have no intention whatever of "betraying" the cause of episcopacy; whatever value they attach to the union of the churches, they attach more value to episcopacy.⁹ They stand flatly on the "Quadrilateral" of the Lambeth Conference of 1888 as the

⁸ *Ecclesia Anglicana*, p. 27.

⁹ Cf. *Steps Towards Reunion*, pp. 7 and 28 ff.

irreducible basis of union,¹⁰ and are held by it to a certain conservatism which makes the Kikuyu scheme conspicuous among such schemes for its moderation and its faithfulness to those Christian truths at least which are embodied in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds. It even goes beyond this measure of faithfulness to fundamental Christian truth, to lay as the foundation-stone of its proposed federation an emphatic assertion of two of the key-doctrines of Christianity, the deity and atoning sacrifice of Jesus Christ.¹¹ It is not merely Kikuyu, however, that Dr. Weston has in

¹⁰ They therefore themselves say truly (*Steps Towards Reunion*, p. 52): "The Kikuyu proposals represent an honest attempt to interpret what we believe to be the spirit and intention of the Lambeth Conference in regard to closer coöperation in the mission field." This is the strength and weakness of the Kikuyu scheme. Its strength, because thus a certain degree of conservatism is secured to it. Its weakness, because the fourth provision of the "Quadrilateral" makes episcopacy indispensable to reunion, and the second provision lays down an utterly inadequate doctrinal basis for a united church. The Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, though statements of certain essential elements of the Christian faith, are emphatically not "a sufficient statement of the Christian faith". The Kikuyu Conference did not find them such; and there are other elements of the Christian faith besides those it felt it necessary to add in more emphatic statement, which no Protestant should be willing to omit. If we are prepared to abandon all that has been gained by the Reformation for spiritual religion, why should we stick at the Pope?

¹¹ "The basis of Federation shall consist in (a) the loyal acceptance of the Holy Scriptures as our supreme rule of Faith and Practice; of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds as a general expression of fundamental Christian belief; and in particular belief in the absolute authority of the Holy Scripture as the Word of God: in the Deity of Jesus Christ, and in the atoning death of our Lord as the ground of our forgiveness" (*The Kikuyu Conference. A Study in Christian Unity*, by J. J. Willis, Bishop of Uganda, 1914, p. 19). Bishops Peel and Willis explain (*Steps Towards Reunion*, p. 25) that "these clauses are not inserted as additions to the historic Creeds, but as emphasizing positions which were felt by some of the members of the Conference to be peculiarly in danger." This is a defence against the imputation that they did not treat the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds as (in accordance with the Lambeth declaration) "a sufficient statement of the Christian faith". For this Dr. Headlam, for instance, calls them sharply to task: he will have nothing but these two Creeds and he will have no "interpretations" of them (*The Church Quarterly Review*, January 1914, pp. 417 f.).

mind; and no thoughtful observer can doubt that the "unbalanced desire for union" which he cites to the bar of our judgment, constitutes one of the gravest, because one of the most insidious, dangers which confront the Churches of our day whether at home or on the mission-field. The crimes which have been and are being committed in the name of union rival in number and in greatness those which are said to be committed in the name of freedom. Nor has this "unbalanced desire for union" always even the excuse of drawing its impulse from a serious purpose, so as to be chargeable only with a faulty perspective; it sometimes seems to be the outcome of little more than thoughtlessness and lack of spiritual earnestness. A recent writer,—who is much of the same general way of thinking with Dr. Weston—even correlates it with nothing deeper than the so-called "practical" genius of Americans. We read:¹²

"The American nation is ever out for results. Its triumphs are in applied science. A new experiment is its joy. We are impatient of delay, of debate, of dependence upon any one. The problem of irreligion arises; let the religious bodies get together, and get busy. The plain man wants something he can understand. Why have rival businesses, when one can accommodate the trade? Sunday is neglected; let everyone go to church once on one Sunday, it matters not where. Fix the day, and we will all wear a button and go to church. Missions are right. They help civilization. But there is waste of money and men in the same fields. Business methods demand coöperation in the Mission Fields. Organize, advertise, unify, push things through. If objection should be taken that this is a very worldly proposition for attaining spiritual results, there are certainly many who would see no great harm in that, who conceive that the twentieth century demands a new version of Christianity, who claim that problems of faith have had their day, who would change now even our Lord's own test of discipleship. It is no longer 'Whom do ye say that I am?' but 'What do ye say that I am?' The Kingdom of Heaven must find its realization on earth. Social betterment is the Gospel. There is little wonder that reunion at any price for practical purposes is the temptation of the hour. And the method is—Coöperate that you may find unity. In practice this means that convictions of faith are kept for private edification. We are forced to act, when we get

¹² H. P. Bull, *The Constructive Quarterly*, September 1914, pp. 464f. Compare A. C. Headlam below, note 19.

together in spiritual affairs, on what are common beliefs, and the wider the circle of coöperation the narrower are the borders of common faith—until the Christian Creed is too broad to be taken in."

Extremes meet. As the zealot for episcopacy may be in danger of subordinating to the conservation of mere tactical succession, or of a mere provision of order, that saving truth for the perpetuation of which in the world alone episcopacy exists, so the zealot for union is in danger of sinking the claims of the truth for the safeguarding and propagating of which alone union is valuable, in the mere abstract fact of union itself. Union for union's sake is as starved and hunger-bitten a programme as episcopacy for episcopacy's sake: each alike sacrifices for what it believes the efficiency of the machine the very cause for which alone the machine is supposed to be useful. It may sound well to bewail the reproduction in the foreign field of the "unhappy divisions" by which the Church at home is rent. But the only thing clear about this complaint is the multitude of unhappy assumptions on which it is based. Every division (like every war) is of course "unhappy" when considered with reference to those who are in the wrong in it. But equally every division (like every war) is "happy" when looked at with reference to those who maintain the right by it,—who by it, let us say for example, preserve for themselves and for the world in which they are placed as the seed of the Kingdom, that purity of faith and life, from which alone the Kingdom of God can be propagated. Where the seed is not pure, what shall the harvest be? Obviously the only justifiable way in which our "unhappy divisions" can be healed is by the abandonment of their error on the part of those whose error necessitates them. To attempt to heal them by abandoning the truth to which their existence is the outstanding witness, or to mitigate them by ceasing to insist upon this truth, or to cover them up by the suppression of at least all corporate testimony to it in some sort of an amalgam of truth and error, involves the fearful guilt of unfaithfulness to the Gospel with

which we have been put in charge, as the one saving force in the world.

The "unhappy divisions" by which Reformed Protestants for example are separated from their brethren of other communions are just the external marks and therefore the public witnesses of the purity of the Gospel in which they trust and for the preservation and propagation of which in the world they exist as organized communities. Their brethren in other communions—the existence of which bears witness to other convictions—they have no difficulty in heartily recognizing as Christian brethren, though in error,—oftentimes no doubt serious and in itself considered deadly error; and they have no difficulty in heartily co-operating with them in the whole range of Christian work, so long as thereby their own particular testimony to the purer Gospel which in God's providence they have been enabled to preserve, is neither abandoned, nor truncated, nor diluted, nor obscured. These "divisions" mean to them just the Gospel; the Gospel that has been maintained by them in this its purity only through struggle and strife, tears, and yes, blood, during two thousand years of Christian history. They cannot undo this history; nor can they in these latter days cast lightly off from them the heritage of divine truth of which through this history they have come to be the guardians in the world. This heritage they must preserve at all costs; and at all costs they must transmit it pure and whole to those, whether at home or abroad, to whom it is given to them to convey the Gospel. They owe the heathen the Gospel; the Gospel in its entirety and in its purity; not a diluted Gospel, nor a truncated Gospel, nor a distorted Gospel, as if a diluted, or a truncated, or a distorted Gospel were good enough for heathen. And they owe them this Gospel as it has been clarified, and compacted, and guarded, and given its most vital and perfect statement, after two thousand years of study and thought and experience and controversy, that the new churches growing up under their care in fresh lands may be saved from the er-

rors of the past and protected from the necessity of fighting on their own ground all the old battles over again—as they inevitably will be compelled to do, if we withhold from them the results of the controversies of the past. Being possessed of the pure Gospel, we dare not either for ourselves or for them consent to its adulteration. After all, what is required of stewards is first of all that they be found faithful.

O but, it will be said, the waste and the scandal of our “divided front” in the face of the heathen world! No doubt there is both waste and scandal in our divided front. All Christians should be one; because all Christians should hold fast in its completeness the Gospel in its purity. But the guilt of this waste and scandal must rest where it belongs,—on the shoulders of those whose attenuation or corruption of the Gospel necessitates the divisions by which alone the pure Gospel can be maintained in the world. They cannot justify the abandonment of the pure Gospel that we may present to the heathen world in undivided front a depraved and contaminated, and therefore weak and ineffective Gospel. Meanwhile we may console ourselves with the reflection that it is easy to exaggerate both the waste and the scandal of a “divided front” in the face of the heathen world. We are not referring here again to the fundamental truth—which nevertheless we are bound to bear above all things in mind—that there is a gathering which is really a scattering abroad. Our minds too are moving for the moment on the plane of good policy, and we are bringing into question the bald utility of what is called our “undivided front”. If there is something imposing in an “undivided front”, which may seem to promise results, there is something to be expected also from generous emulation and variety of appeal.¹³ It is greatly to be doubted,

¹³ Uganda is often adduced as a proof of the value of having but a single church in a field (so e.g. Eugene Stock, *The Church in the Mission Field*, p. 7). It may perhaps be worth while to note therefore Dr. Willis' testimony that in Uganda the converts of purest life are not found in the sections in which there exists no other but the Church of England and this one church has become therefore powerful and

at all events, whether such an "undivided front" as could be given to Christianity by sinking essential differences and covering over suppressed divergences of the utmost importance, in an indistinguishable mass of apparent sameness, could be more effective in winning the heathen to the common Christianity than the frank exploitation by each type of belief and organization of its own particular message. Certainly the heathen may be trusted,—none can be more fully trusted,—to feel the gulf which separates a Christian of any type from the heathen around him, and to class solidly together in their thought all Christians of all types as a people apart. The differences that divide Christians, in the heathen apprehension as truly and as spontaneously as in that of the Christians themselves, divide Christians. The essential unity is not lost in the superimposed variety, and the "front" amid all divisions remains for all spiritual ends undivided.

Those who have read with attention any considerable portion of the immense correspondence in the British newspapers, which was called out by the Kikuyu incident, will not have failed to note a number of testimonies from actual observers on the ground to both facts here adverted to—the positive value of what we may call "competition" in mission work also, and the full recognition by the heathen of the solidarity of the whole Christian body despite its more superficial divisions. We are glad to observe that the promoters of the Kikuyu Federation exhibit no tendency to minimize the reality of this solidarity or its ready recognition by the heathen. Dr. Willis himself, in defending before his Anglican brethren (that such a defence should be thought necessary betrays the real point of weakness and scandal in our "unhappy divisions"), his recognition as fellow Christians of the converts of other churches, throws the whole weight of his defence on the fact that the Mission Authorities are after all helpless in the matter—apart from

"the fashion"; but in those in which the Protestant Christians are a minority in a Roman Catholic community. (*The Church in Uganda. A Charge to Missionaries of the Uganda Mission, 1913; 1914, p. 18.*)

any decision of the Authorities, the mission converts will recognize their Christian brethren on sight. He testifies:¹⁴

"No one who has lived in direct touch with African heathenism and knows the profound gap that lies between even the primitive and often most imperfect native Christian and his heathen brother can doubt for a moment on which side of the gap the convert from another Mission is standing. And even were he himself to hesitate, his own converts, to whom the 'Communion of Saints' is still a vivid reality, would be quick to recognize through all outward differences a Christian and a brother."

Similarly the well-informed writer of that one of the "Kikuyu Tracts" which deals with the question of comity in the mission field, bears testimony at once to the ready understanding by the heathen of the essential unity of Christians of all names and the strong sense of solidarity existing among the converts themselves. He writes:¹⁵

"Non-Christians, and especially Muslims and Hindus, are quite familiar with varieties within their own borders which in no way interfere with fundamental unity, nor are ever regarded as essentially contrary to one another. . . . All outsiders probably, Chinese and Japanese as well as Muslims and Hindus, are quite able to appreciate true Unity underlying superficial variety."

And as to the insiders:¹⁶

"One of the most refreshing glimpses of real Catholicity is the way in which converts will warmly welcome as brethren all who own Christ as Lord, be they Romanists or Plymouth Brethren. They look aghast and astonished sometimes at petty ecclesiastical rules which seek to pen them off from one another."

Things being so on the mission field, we need not be in haste to deny the faith that we may abate "the weakness and scandal of our divided front." Apparently the strong impulse to ill-considered schemes of union of essentially discordant churches on mission ground flows from some other spring than concern for the purely spiritual life of the converts.

¹⁴ *The Kikuyu Conference*, p. 11.

¹⁵ *Comity on the Mission Field*. By the Rev. H. G. Grey, M.A., Principal of Wycliff Hall, Oxford, Formerly Principal of St. John's College, Lahore, India, 1914, p. 2.

¹⁶ P. 7.

We may endure with patience accordingly even those divisions of the forces operating in the mission field which have as little reason behind them as that produced by the pretensions of Anglican prelacy. Dr. Willis and Principal Grey alike being witness, these pretensions on the part of Anglican missionaries do not prevent brotherly intercourse among the converts. They do not even introduce any new factor to be reckoned with on the field. Protestant missions are in any event faced everywhere by Romanist missions making the same exclusive claims. If Protestant missions can adjust themselves to the conditions created by the presence of the Romanists, they are already adjusted to any problem raised by Romanizers: Anglicans and Romanists will only be classed in the public mind together, as over against Protestants. Should the Anglican authorities, on the appeal of the Bishop of Zanzibar, therefore,—as they possibly may under the dominating (we had almost said, domineering) influence of the High Church section of the clergy—choose “the policy of isolation” deprecated by Professor A. C. Headlam¹⁷ and close the way to such an adjustment as that which the Bishops of Uganda and Mombasa propose to make; this is to be regretted chiefly for the sake of the Church of England itself and the missions she has so splendidly sustained, which, we are given to understand, would find it difficult in such conditions permanently to retain their own converts.¹⁸ No increased difficulties would be brought to other missions which have it in their hearts only to make disciples of all the nations.

It is a pity, however, to permit the mind when engaged

¹⁷ *The Church Quarterly Review*, January 1914, p. 406.

¹⁸ Cf. Eugene Stock, *The Church in the Mission Field*, 1914, p. 8. At one point Bishops Peel and Willis postpone the loss thus (*Steps Towards Reunion*, p. 52): “There may not be an immediate danger of losing our present converts; but there will be a very great danger of losing their children.” They quote (p. 36) with strong approval the Rev. W. Chadwick’s opinion: “If we hold ourselves aloof from other Churches we shall be left in a hopeless minority,—we not only lose power for the whole cause of Christ in the face of Mohammedanism, but we shall be ignored when in the future a native Church of East Africa is formed.”

on such things, to dwell even temporarily upon questions of mere policy. It ought to be a matter of course that no considerations of policy can determine action where principles are so deeply involved. It may be intelligible that the members of native churches themselves,—and especially the leaders among native Christians—should be attracted by the alluring vision of strong national churches; it is very natural that the advantages, political, social and other, which would accrue to such relatively great bodies, should blind them for the moment to the nature of the spiritual compromises by which alone they may ordinarily be attained. It is even intelligible that many missionaries themselves, weary of the difficulties which clog the work in small, isolated communities, or worn by the frictions which unavoidably attend the divisions of interest among several separate, however cordially sympathetic, communions, may be swept along by the current setting so strongly towards consolidation. No doubt there are gains, obvious and large, which may be secured by the smelting of all the churches in an area into one. But there is a price to pay; and what is wholly unintelligible is that the Missionary Agencies at home and the churches they serve, which might be supposed to look out upon the field from a more elevated standpoint, should show themselves so frequently ready to pay the price—which not rarely includes desertion or compromising of the very Gospel for the propagation of which in the world they exist.¹⁹

¹⁹ Cf. A. C. Headlam (*Church Quarterly Review*, January 1914, p. 408) commenting on the reports printed in *The Continuation Committee Conferences in Asia, 1912-1913*, writes: "There is a danger which sometimes comes to the surface as we read these reports that a conception of religious unity might prevail which would take the form of what we might call a 'successful commercial combine'. Christianity, it is argued, is weakened by the isolation and separation of the different religious bodies: there is universal competition: let us therefore unite. Here lies a serious danger. There is as great danger in such union as there is in an insincere political combination of religious bodies. All such proposals forget that the basis of religion is truth, that any combination which is to be sincere and permanent must have a basis that is recognized as true, and that religious truth can only be gained by earnest prayer and study."

Nothing could afford a more startling revelation of the wide-spread indifference to the most central and most precious Christian verities than the disposition manifested in many quarters to look upon the slender doctrinal basis laid down in the Lambeth "Quadrilateral"—the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds—as a sufficient sum of Christian doctrine on which to found a church's confession and a church's life. This is to blot out at a stroke sixteen hundred fruitful years of the church's thinking and the church's living, and to begin afresh with the veritable *incunabula*. The entire body of saving truth, won once for all for God's saints of every clime and blood in the throes of the great controversies of a millenium and a half,—we need instance only those with the naturalism of Pelagianism and its successors, and with the sacerdotalism of Rome and its imitators (they center around the doctrines of Free-Grace and Justification by Faith)—have no place in the meagre teachings of these cradle-Creeds. And yet even these Creeds are often treated as providing too extended a doctrinal basis to be insisted upon; and unions of churches are proposed upon an even narrower foundation of doctrine than that they lay down. Certainly nothing could be more disheartening than the constant manifestation, in the negotiations for bringing the several churches in the mission field into some sort of amalgamation, that men set more store by petty points of ecclesiastical order or practice than by the most fundamental or most central truths of the Christian revelation. The Gospel will be cheerfully given up that they may "become One"—one what?—but not a peculiarity of organization or a customary method of administering a sacrament. Men will readily fraternize on equal terms with those who deny the deity of Christ, or His substitutive atonement, or justification by faith, but not with those who differ with them as to the qualifications for the ministrant of the eucharist or the proper mode of applying the water in baptism. A very good example is offered by the "South India United

Church," as it is described at least by Mr. B. M. Streeter.²⁰ The churches "founded by five British and American Missions of different denominations," we are told, have entered into this union, and "some other bodies are contemplating entering" it. "Three Churches, however, felt precluded from participation, by what they regard as points of principle." What are these "points of principle?"

"The Anglicans stand outside, because they—or at least one important section of them, whose opinions the rest cannot disregard—believe that an episcopally ordained ministry is necessary for the regular administration of the Lord's Supper. The Lutherans stand out, because they hold that a correct belief about the nature of the Elements administered, i.e., the doctrine known as Consubstantiation is equally essential. The so-called 'close' Baptists stand out, on the ground that Baptism, other than that of adults, and that by complete immersion, is invalid."

Has anyone felt precluded from participation in the union because of the exceeding defectiveness of its Confession of Faith—a Confession of Faith which knows the Trinity only as a "mystery" not expressly affirmed to be true,²¹ the Incarnation only as it might know a supreme *avatar*,²² sin only as a repeated act of man, not as a fault of nature,²³ redemption only as some vague "way of salvation" established by Christ with no affirmation either of a substitutive atonement or of justification by faith? So far as appears, not one.

Phenomena like this are not accidental. They are intrinsic to an "unbalanced desire for union", and are inevitable wherever this "unbalanced desire for union" has its way. In the very nature of the case bodies can unite only on the basis of the minimum of truth held among them. That body which confesses the least of truth held by any of the contracting bodies, necessarily sets the maxi-

²⁰ *Restatement and Reunion. A Study in First Principles.* 1914, pp. 157 ff.

²¹ "We believe in one God. . . . We acknowledge the mystery of the Holy Trinity."

²² "His only-begotten Son, who alone is the perfect incarnation of God."

²³ "We acknowledge that all have sinned."

mum of truth which can be confessed by them all. Otherwise that body would be excluded from the union. The inevitable result is that the Union-Churches being, or in danger of being, erected in the mission fields are being systematically organized on the basis of the least doctrinal profession made by any church doing work in the several missions; sometimes they even appear to seek an even lower doctrinal basis than is actually professed by any one of the contracting parties,—apparently to meet the demands of “undogmatic” individuals in the missions, to prepare the way for the “liberal” era supposed to be dawning, or to refrain from binding the “poor, ignorant natives” to too much truth. Any one who does not see that thus a great wrong is being done to the native churches; that what is really being done is to found a series of new sects in mission lands organized on the very lowest plane of profession and therefore of life—for life always follows doctrine and can no more rise above it than a stream above its source—known in Christendom, must be blind indeed. When we contemplate what we do not say may be, but, in the natural development of effects, must be, the ultimate result of this, we are tempted to address our zealous advocates in the mission fields of union at all costs, in some such words as those which Charles Kingsley places on the lips of his Raphael, as he bowed himself out from the presence of Cyril of Alexandria,—of course *mutatis mutandis*, and of course including the offensive phraseology in the final clause in the *mutanda*:—“I advise you honestly to take care lest, while you are only trying to establish God’s kingdom you forget what it is like, by shutting your eyes to those of its laws which are established already. I have no doubt that with your Highness’ great powers, you will succeed in establishing something. My only dread is, that when it is established you should discover that it is . . . not God’s Kingdom.” It is at least beyond controversy that no church can be great in the only sense of greatness which matters with churches,—great before God,—which lays its

foundations in contempt for God's truth given for the healing of the nations.²⁴

II

We have supposed that the Bishop of Zanzibar, as a member and prelate of the exceedingly "comprehensive" Church of England, must have felt some embarrassment in arraigning the Bishops of Uganda and Mombasa for their readiness to fraternize with Christians of non-prelatical communions. We must suppose him to have felt an even greater embarrassment as a "Catholic" member of the Protestant Church of England, in denying to any of his fellow-members of that church an equal right with himself to its spacious toleration. That the "Modernists" as they are more and more coming to be called—they used to be called "Liberals"—the legitimacy of whose position in the church of England he challenges, hold their position in it only by doing incredible violence to the formularies by which, as members of that church, they are bound, is obvious enough. But the attempt to deny them the privilege of doing these formularies this violence comes with little grace from the adherents of that Romanizing party which has established its own right to a place in the church—it seems to have ended by becoming the ruling place—by doing equal violence to them in another interest. You may play fast with formularies; or you may play loose with them; in the interests of ordinary honesty we think it better that you should play fast with them. But it seems particularly indecorous to undertake to play both fast and loose with them—fast with them as regards others, loose with them as regards yourself.

We are meanwhile entirely in sympathy with Dr. Weston

²⁴ It is quite clear on the face of it, and among reasonable men it is commonly recognized, that all useful coöperation presupposes real agreement in faith. We must be one before we can usefully act as one. Nothing is more hopeless than to attempt to make a false unity serve the purposes of a true one,—to agree to differ and yet to function as not differing. We might as well try to make a hive by imprisoning together in a box bees belonging to different swarms.

in his contention not only that the presence of the so-called Modernists in the Church of England gravely weakens that church as a teacher of Christianity, and that not least in the mission field;²⁵ but that their presence in it is in itself intolerable. His remedy for the evil is the direct one of calling upon the church to move in its judicial authority and cleanse itself from heresy. "*The Ecclesia Anglicana*," he declares,²⁶ "needs at once to choose between the liberty of heresy and the duty of handing on the faith as she received it. She cannot have the one while she fulfils the other. And the sooner she chooses the better for her, the heathen and the Moslem." We are in as complete sympathy with him with respect to the remedy which should be applied as with respect to the nature of the evil requiring it. The chief of Dr. Weston's supporters in the home Episcopate, Dr. Gore, however, while fully agreeing with him as to the seriousness of the evil, appears nevertheless not to be able to go the whole way with him with respect to the remedy which should be applied. If we understand Dr. Gore, he would deprecate any attempt on the part of the church to extrude the Modernists by judicial proceedings. He would be satisfied with a declaration by "the bishops, as the official guardians of the Church" repudiating all complicity with their claim to a legitimate place in the church, and the relegation of their actual separation from the church to their own consciences. "Let us continue," he says,²⁷

²⁵ Dr. Weston feels very strongly on this matter and permits himself the use of somewhat biting language in speaking of it, likening so "comprehensive" a body as the Church of England to "a Society for shirking vital issues" (*Ecclesia Anglicana*, p. 10), and expressing serious doubt whether it is not thereby rendered entirely "unfit to send missionaries to heathen or Mohammedan lands" (p. 7). "I can speak only for what I see and know," he remarks (p. 14); "and speaking for this Mohammedan land, I do not hesitate to say that a Church that has two views in its highest ranks about the trustworthiness of the Bible, the authority of the Church, and the infallibility of the Christ, has surrendered its chance of winning the Moslem."

²⁶ *Ecclesia Anglicana*, p. 15.

²⁷ *The Basis of Anglican Fellowship in Faith and Organization*. Fourth Impression. 1914, p. 26.

"to leave the individual members of our ministry to their own consciences." Of course not neglecting to prod their consciences with very distinct and strong intimations that in the opinion of many of their fellow-Churchmen, they have, like the Jesuit casuists whom Pascal scourged in the *Provincial Letters*, been "led on, in a special atmosphere, to adopt a position and maintain a claim which, looked at in the light of common morality, proves utterly unjustifiable."²⁸ For, even if we put it on this low ground, how can it be denied that "the officer of a society who finds himself unhappily brought to a conclusion the opposite of some fundamental principle of his society, is bound to resign his office?" Is not this—so far from "a violation of liberty"—just "common conscientiousness"?²⁹

This reasoning is undoubtedly sound. But it is futile to expect it to have more effect in this case than in other similar cases, as for example in the case of Dr. Gore himself and other adherents of the "Catholic" party. The Episcopal declaration which Dr. Gore asked for has, in response to numerous signed petitions, been given,³⁰ and all things

²⁸ P. 25.

²⁹ P. 16. The Bishop of Ely (Dr. Chase), in the preface which he has prepared for the reprint of his essay on *The Gospels in the Light of Historical Criticism*, 1914, joins Dr. Gore in urging the Liberal clergyman who "has been led by his studies to deny portions of the historic creed of the church", to consider "whether he is not sacrificing his intellectual honesty, whether he is acting fairly towards its members, if he seeks to maintain his position as an accredited teacher in the Church." He seems more ready than Dr. Gore, however, to have the Bishop act authoritatively in the matter "in the last resort".

³⁰ In response to several petitions (one of which contained almost 50,000 signatures) and on the motion of the Bishop of London, the Upper House of Canterbury Convocation, April 29, 30, 1914, debated and adopted certain anti-modernist resolutions (*The Guardian*, April 30, 1914, p. 569). These began by reaffirming two earlier deliverances. The former of these was a resolution passed by the same House, May 10, 1905, as follows: "That this House is resolved to maintain the Catholic Faith in the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation as contained in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, and in the *Quicumque Vult*, and regards the faith there presented, both in statements of doctrines and statements of fact, as the necessary basis on which the teaching of the Church reposes." The latter of them was a resolu-

remain as they were before. Why should men who are able to reconcile it with their consciences to accept office under the condition of assent to formularies which they do not believe, and to prosecute the functions of their office under the condition of reservations with respect to declarations which they publicly recite at every service, be driven from office by the *brutum fulmen* of an episcopal pronouncement?³¹ Not all men look upon Bishops and their deliverances with the reverence which their High-Church principles presumably impose upon Dr. Gore and his friends. And why should men subject their consciences to the instruction of moral teachers who have not seen fit to illustrate their counsels by their own example? Shall they not remember not merely *Tract Number Ninety* but *Lux Mundi*? Or if their memory is too short for that, shall they not attend to Dr. Gore's remarks in this very pamphlet on the Old Testament and recall his solemn affirmative to the question put to him when he was ordained deacon: "Do you unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament?"—a question which he tells us the Bishops have determined to qualify "if they can",³²—from which we learn that it remains as yet unqualified. Dr. Gore, it is true, challenges "any one to show at what point I fail in orthodoxy as judged by our standard, the standard which I have already endeavored to state, the standard, that is, of the ancient and undivided Church, as

tion agreed to by the Lambeth Conference of 1898, as follows: "The Conference, in view of tendencies widely shown in the writings of the present day, hereby places on record its conviction that the historical facts stated in the Creeds are an essential part of the faith of the Church." These resolutions having been reaffirmed Convocation proceeded to guard itself from the imputation that it condemns legitimate scholarship, and reasserts the Episcopal organization of the Church of England. In its leader of May 7, *The Guardian* expresses approval of this action.

³¹ It is not surprising, then, to observe Mr. J. M. Thompson writing of Dr. Gore's proposal (*Contemporary Review*, June 1914, p. 827) that such a declaration as he desires "would be futile, unless followed up by legal proceedings against recalcitrant Liberals."

³² *The Basis*, etc., p. 18.

interpreted by the message of the Bible."³³ But is there not manifested here a certain lack of a sense of humor? It would be hard if Dr. Gore could not escape the charge of heresy, were he permitted thus to adapt the standard he will be judged by to his own opinions. But by any standard hitherto in force in the Church of England—or, for the matter of that, in any of the great churches of Christendom—he could scarcely be so fortunate. Meanwhile his personal appeal to men to act conscientiously with regard to their ecclesiastical engagements suffers fatally from the inevitable *tu quoque*.

The only effect of the demand that Liberal clergymen shall voluntarily withdraw from the church in the interests of their sincerity has been accordingly to call out angry refusals which, perhaps not wholly unnaturally, manifest resentment at the imputations of dishonesty made and a disposition to maintain their position in the church at all hazards. Mr. J. M. Thompson, for example, cries:³⁴

"The Church can always withdraw the commission which it has given; why should it expect the individual voluntarily to surrender it? Why should the clergyman who is not allowed to put his own interpretation upon the formularies when he is admitted to the Ministry, be invited to do so as a ground for leaving it? For that is what is involved in the claim that he should resign. The Church will not, or cannot, make good such an interpretation of its formularies as would justify deprivation by law—it dares not proceed against the Liberal clergyman as a heretic. It therefore asks him solemnly to consider whether his interpretation of the Creed is not heretical, and, if he thinks that it is, to resign. If this is a cowardly method, it also is a cruel one, for it lays a double burden upon the individual conscience. The man in the dock may fairly say, 'If you can prove that I have committed a murder, you have every right to hang me; but you have no right whatever, when your case breaks down, to ask me to commit suicide.'"

³³ P. 21.

³⁴ *The Contemporary Review*, June 1914, p. 829. Mr. Thompson has now passed beyond Liberalism and Modernism and has become a "Post-Modernist", and he tells us that "the Post-Modernist, like the Modernist, holds with the traditional beliefs so long as he can, and stays in the society so long as it will let him" (*The Hibbert Journal*, July 1914, p. 742).

It is obviously useless to appeal to a man in this state of mind on purely ethical grounds. He entrenches himself behind bare law and refuses to admit that conscience need be sensitive to any demand which the sheriff cannot enforce. "He is happy in his work, and believes that there is room for him as well as for others within a modern and progressive Church."⁸⁵ As to the formularies,—nobody really believes them anyhow, that is, through and through; and when each disbelieves them somewhere no one has the right to assail the sincerity of another because his disbelief happens to fall at a different place from his own.

"How many of us nowadays accept the descent into Hell, the resurrection of the body, or the coming of Christ to judge the quick and the dead, in the sense in which these beliefs were held by the men who composed the Creeds, or by many subsequent generations of Christians? Do the clergy? Does the Bishop of Ely? If he does not, how does his position differ from that of the clergy whose 'sincerity of confession' he is not afraid to doubt? By what right can the bishops enforce the Apostles' or the Nicene Creed and criticise the Athanasian? By what rule other than that of private preference can they condone the non-literal interpretation of one clause, and condemn that of another? By what infallible instinct, or by what appeal to authority, can they decide that one man's re-interpretation of the Creed is an allowable latitude of doctrine, and another man's is heresy; that there is no place for A in the ministry but that B may be a bishop? These questions are not asked impatiently or with any intention to attribute dishonesty where certainly none is to be found. But they are pertinent to the present situation. And unless there is some better answer to them than has as yet been forthcoming, the Liberal clergyman may well feel that he has as much right to remain in the ministry as others whose orthodoxy is above suspicion."⁸⁶

It must be allowed that as *ad hominem* reasoning this is very effective. The retort, "You are another!", though perhaps not uncommon among a certain class of disputants, seems, however, scarcely a satisfactory proof that we are not ourselves one; it appears on the contrary to begin by admitting that we are one. The conclusion of the reasoning

⁸⁵ P. 830; cf. p. 833: "So long as they are happy in their work, and do not want to give it up, why should they sacrifice their whole ministry to an intellectual difficulty?"

⁸⁶ P. 831.

would seem to be, therefore,—if we are to take it at its face value,—not that there is no insincerity in the relation of the Liberal clergy to the formularies of the Church of England, but that there is no sincerity in the relation of any of the clergy of the Church of England to its formularies: that sincerity in clerical assent to formularies has absolutely died out in the Church of England. Worse: that there is no such thing as sincerity to be considered in the matter of assent to formularies; any man is justified in assenting to any formulary whatever and then teaching anything whatever that he happens to wish to teach—"within a modern and progressive Church." Apparently Mr. Thompson's argument proves too much: he would have done more justice to himself had he confined himself to the question raised,—namely the ethics of his own position,—and not gone off on the, perhaps not unnatural, tangent, of, My position is ethically as good as your position. It might well be that, and yet ethically bad.

The classical discussion of the ethics of clerical assent to formularies probably remains that carried on now nearly a score of years ago between the late Professor Henry Sidgwick and Mr. (now Dr.) Hastings Rashdall, the latter of whom has also given us a later summary of his views on the subject.³⁷ Dr. Gore does well pointedly to call attention

³⁷ Professor Sidgwick printed a lecture on "The Ethics of Religious Conformity" in *The International Journal of Ethics* for April, 1896. To this Dr. Rashdall replied in the number of the same *Journal* for January 1897, under the title of "Professor Sidgwick on the Ethics of Religious Conformity." Professor Sidgwick's response to this was printed as the sixth number in his volume on *Practical Ethics*, 1898, under the title of "Clerical Veracity" (his former lecture is reprinted as the fifth number in the same volume). Dr. Rashdall has also printed a discussion of "Clerical Liberalism" as the fifth number in the twenty-fourth volume of the *Crown Theological Library*, entitled "*Anglican Liberalism* by Twelve Churchmen." 1908. Cf. here also the article "Criminous Clerks" in *The Hibbert Journal* for July 1914, pp. 746 ff. by Archibald Weir: Mr. Weir thinks that Professor Sidgwick was too tender to "criminous clerks" because he took too narrow a view and thought of thier treason less as it concerned the race than as it concerned an institution. "Hence the modern mind (the expression is Sidgwick's) has no sympathy with either a lax lukewarm Church or

to Professor Sidgwick's strong argument,³⁸ as offering helpful guidance to an inquirer in this field. His opinions are particularly commended to us moreover by the circumstance that they at least are supported by his action; he resigned a Fellowship that he might not express acceptance of views which he did not really hold. He writes, however, from the Hedonistic Utilitarian point of view; though it is particularly worthy of remark that even from that low standpoint he is compelled in the name of general ethical science to condemn the practice of those who, as Dr. Rashdall expresses it, "are anxious to maintain the comprehensiveness of the Church of England by a liberal interpretation of its formulae."³⁹ What his judgment would have been had he been able to approach the matter from the standpoint of a higher ethical principle we can easily imagine; it is indeed openly suggested to us by Dr. Rashdall himself (himself a Utilitarian of less Hedonistic type) when he complains that the opinions which Professor Sidgwick announces are "almost what might have been expected from a Kantian rigorist." The question of the legitimacy of such an unnatural acceptance of formularies as is practiced by the Liberal clergy of the Church of England resolves itself thus primarily into the question of the validity of the principles of Utilitarian Ethics: to any higher ethical standpoint this practice confessedly is morally wrong.

with men who distract it by occupying positions in it while repudiating fundamental tenets. It regards them as it would regard any other defaulting officers in any other lethargic corporation. If it cared to give the delinquents a distinctive name, it would not trouble to invent a new term. It would adopt the old historical phrase which serves as our title. . . . We declare that veracity and integrity are principles whose strict interpretation and maintenance must take precedence of any convenience that laxity may be fancied to bring to a Church or a communion; and we find our moral position all the stronger. In a word, we have arrived at a stage when no conceivable advantage to religious teaching and organization can be allowed to legitimise any sort of debasement of the moral currency" (pp. 747-9). If this be really the sentiment of "the modern mind" then the modern and ancient minds have become one and Utilitarian and "Rigorist" Ethics have kissed one another.

³⁸ *The Basis*, etc., p. 11.

³⁹ *The International Journal of Ethics*, January 1897, p. 138.

To those occupying higher ethical ground than the Utilitarian, therefore, the value of Professor Sidgwick's argument is purely *ad hominem*. It shows, and we think shows solidly, that even on the low principles of Hedonistic Utilitarianism the loose practice of the Liberal clergy cannot be ethically justified. After allowing a laxity which to us seems excessive even on the ground of his own ethical principles, he is yet compelled to sum up in such words as these:⁴⁰

"My contention is simply that the widest license of variation that can be reasonably claimed must stop short of the permission to utter a hard, flat, unmistakable falsehood; and this is what a clergyman does who says solemnly—in the recital of the Apostles' Creed—'I believe in Jesus Christ . . . who was conceived of the Virgin Mary', when he really believes that Jesus was, like other human beings, the son of two human parents. He utters of course a similar falsehood in affirming the belief that Jesus 'on the third day rose from the dead' when he does not believe that Jesus had a continued life as an individual after death, and a life in some sense corporeal. . . ."

He is willing to allow to Dr. Rashdall that there are important considerations which may justly be urged against "a pedantic insistence on what he calls 'technical veracity' in dealing with formulae presented for assent or repetition," but—he continues:⁴¹

"My contention is that instead of stating and applying these considerations with the care and delicacy of distinction required for helpfulness, so as to show how the essence of veracity may be realized under peculiar and somewhat perplexing conditions, he rather uses them to suggest the despairing and demoralizing conclusion that no clergyman can possibly speak the truth in the sense in which a plain layman understands truth-speaking; so that any clergyman may lie without scruple in the cause of religious progress with a view to aiding popular education in a new theology and still feel that he is as veracious as his profession allows him to be. Or perhaps I should rather say that Mr. Rashdall's conception of substantial veracity is what grammarians call *proleptic*; the duty of truth-speaking is, he thinks, adequately performed by a Postnatalist⁴² if he may reasonably hope that

⁴⁰ *Practical Ethics*, p. 146.

⁴¹ P. 155.

⁴² This is the term Professor Sidgwick employs to express one who holds that Jesus was the Son of Joseph and Mary.

the falsehood he now utters will before long cease to deceive through the spread of a common understanding that he does not mean what he says."

He had already been led to warn his readers against the dangers of this proleptic morality. He remarks:⁴³

"It is very difficult for men in any political or social discussion to keep the ideal quite distinct from the actual and not sometimes to prescribe present conduct on grounds which would only be valid if a distant and dubious change of circumstances were really certain and imminent. It is peculiarly difficult to do this in discussing the conditions of religious union; for in theological matters an ardent believer, especially if his beliefs are self-chosen and not inherited, is peculiarly prone to think that the whole world is on the point of coming round to his opinions. And hence the religious persons who, by the divergence of their opinions from the orthodox standard of their church, have been practically led to consider the subject of this lecture, have often been firmly convinced that the limits of their church must necessarily be enlarged at least sufficiently to include themselves; and have rather considered the method of bringing about this enlargement, than what ought to be done until it is effected."

The truth of this representation and the remarkable reasoning to which the attitude described leads, are abundantly illustrated in the course of Dr. Rashdall's argument. As a whole this turns as on a hinge on two prodigious paradoxes. The first is that since "words must be understood to mean what they are generally taken to mean", so soon as all can be brought to agree to sign a formulary in a non-natural sense, that becomes its true sense—though obviously this process of change can be inaugurated only by some signing the formulary in a sense contrary to that which the words are generally taken to mean, and these must accordingly endure the reproach of insincerity for the coming good.⁴⁴ The second is that, since unscrupulous signing of a formulary is an evil, we must put aside any scruples we may feel in signing it, not believing it, that thus a new sense may gradually be given it and so unscrupulous signing of it may be prevented. We are not car-

⁴³ P. 121.

⁴⁴ Pp. 143-4.

icaturing but reporting Dr. Rashdall's reasoning. He cites at one point in illustration the Thirteenth of the Thirty-nine Articles, on works done by the unregenerate. This Article asserts that such works have the nature of sin. Nobody believes that, says Dr. Rashdall, or even thinks that he believes it. On that very account anybody can subscribe it. His subscribing it really deceives nobody; for nobody supposes he believes it. "It is," he says, only "a balance of utilities" that the subscriber has to consider. It may be bad for clergymen to have to sign such a statement when they do not believe it; it would be worse to have only such clergymen as could believe such a statement. If it be said that if everybody not believing it refused to sign it, that would secure its early correction, and no one would any longer be asked to sign it; it is to be answered that long before such a happy consummation could be reached the clergy would have come to consist only of men of such low intelligence and low scrupulosity as would sign it without believing it.⁴⁵ We must be unscrupulous, therefore, in the interests of scrupulousness. This may be good Utilitarianism but it is as absurd as it is abominable ethics. It would be a work of supererogation to refute ethical judgments based on such reasoning.

Upon one matter which was debated between Professor Sidgwick and Dr. Rashdall and which has been thrown into great prominence in recent discussion, we must adjudge Dr. Rashdall to be in the right. Professor Sidgwick laid considerable stress upon the particular obligation of the clergy to be sincere in the matter of the Creeds which they recited in public worship; and in recent discussion such stress has been laid upon this particular obligation that the like obligation really to believe other formularies assented to has been somewhat obscured in comparison. Perhaps the place given to the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds in the Lambeth "Quadrilateral" of 1888, is at once a manifestation and in part a cause of the tendency which has become

⁴⁵ Pp. 140 ff.

very marked of late,⁴⁶ to lay the whole stress of the clergy's doctrinal obligation upon them. Dr. Gore in particular has for a series of years been throwing all the emphasis on the Creeds and particularly on the circumstance that not only are they recited in public worship but that in their recitation the personal "I believe", not the general "we believe," is employed. There may be some confusion here between the nature of the obligation incurred and the effect of the increased publicity given to this obligation in its constant repetition in the face of the people. The difference in this respect can have little ethical value, however, except perhaps on Utilitarian principles. We take it that Dr. Rashdall is altogether right, therefore, when he remarks—treating it as a matter of "technical veracity"—that "the clergy do not profess their beliefs in the Creeds in any other sense or to any other degree than they assent to the whole of the Prayer-book and Articles."⁴⁷ But this cannot

⁴⁶ Dr. Rashdall says truly ("Clerical Liberalism", p. 95): "The most popular attempt to substitute another external text for the one which has been abandoned by tacit and universal consent puts the Creeds in the place of the Bible and the Articles."

⁴⁷ *The International Journal of Ethics*, January 1897, p. 148, cf. p. 159. Everything that could readily be said on the other part is said by Dr. Headlam in *The Church Quarterly Review*, April 1914, p. 151: "An attempt has been made by Dr. Rashdall to suggest that in relation to the teaching of the Church of England the Creeds stand on exactly the same level as the Thirty-nine Articles, and he has supported that view by saying that we only accept the Creeds because of the Articles. It seems to us that the position is one which is untenable. He quite forgets that whereas the Thirty-nine Articles are now only imposed on the clergy, and from them only a general assent is required, the use of the Creeds is quite different. Every single baptized member of the Church of England has been baptized on the basis of confession of faith, either by himself or by others in his behalf, in the Apostles' Creed. Every single communicant of the Church of England solemnly recites the Nicene Creed before he partakes of communion. Every clergyman when he is ordained, directly after his ordination, solemnly repeats the Nicene Creed as representing that Christian truth which he has expressed his readiness to hold and believe." This is an eloquent as well as conclusive statement of how profoundly the Church of England is committed to the Creeds, and how great an evil it is for a party among her accredited teachers to repudiate obligation to them. But it has no tendency to vacate the obligation under which the

England set forth, and as set forth, in these Articles is agreeable to the Word of God—by which is meant just the Scriptures here recognized as the Word of God: and that he assents to this doctrine thus set forth in the Thirty-nine Articles because he believes it to be agreeable to the Word of God—by which his acceptance of the Scriptures as the supreme rule of faith is notified. He who does not mean this by his “solemn declaration” cannot be acquitted of making that declaration in a non-natural sense which no appeal to an *animus imponentis* (whether specific or general) can empty of its unethical character. No greater obligation than this can arise from the repeated declaration in public worship of belief in the affirmations of the Creed; though the breach of this more constantly and more publicly repeated affirmation may produce more public scandal.

The deeper ground of the movement to substitute “the Creeds” for the legal formularies of the Church of England is twofold. It is the result on the one hand of the decay of confidence in the Scriptures and the consequent impulse to seek for some other authoritative basis for doctrinal belief. That this new basis is found in “the Creeds” is due, on the other hand, to the constantly growing power of the High Church party in which “tradition”, and especially the tradition of “the undivided Church”, takes the place of Scripture as the ground of authoritative teaching. It is in the spirit of that party that Dr. A. C. Headlam, when undertaking to state “the principles of the Church of England” declares at once: “The first is that the fundamental basis of belief is that Creed which alone can claim to be oecumenical, the Nicene Creed, and in association with it the Baptismal Creed—that of the Apostles.”⁴⁸ The primary effect of the practical substitution of “the Creeds” for the proper formularies of the Church of England is greatly to reduce the range of her doctrinal testimony. It reduces it in effect almost to the narrow circle of the Trinity, the deity of Christ and the great supernatural

⁴⁸ *The Church Quarterly Review*, April 1914, pp. 151-2.

facts of His manifestation on earth.⁴⁹ What it is of importance for us at the moment to observe, is that it is license to disbelieve and deny even this meagre body of Christian truths that is now widely claimed among the accredited teachers of the Church of England, as a right due to them on the score of "a liberal interpretation of its formulae." To bring the matter into a perfectly clear light by an illustration—an illustration which has long been thrown into such prominence and which remains so prominent in the present debate that it may well be thought to stand at its center—it is vigorously contended that it is permissible in the Church of England, and is consistent with that sincerity in accepting its formularies which should characterize so solemn an act, to disbelieve and deny the miraculous birth of Jesus from a virgin mother and the miraculous rising of His body from the grave, and, with these great constitutive miracles, also all other strictly miraculous acts which are ascribed to Him in the Biblical narrative, including His bodily Ascension,—that is to say, to put it briefly, the whole miraculous character of His manifestation.

The grounds are as numerous as they are sinuous on which the sincerity of accepting Creeds by a solemn act of

⁴⁹ Cf. Dr. Headlam's strong words (as cited, p. 153, with which January 1914, p. 41, may be compared): "And as we believe that the historic Creed sums up for us the Christian teaching which is necessary for salvation"—the proper formularies of the Church of England say this not of the Nicene Creed but of the Scriptures—"so we must be careful not to add to that tradition by putting forward as necessary any other documents or beliefs. . . . Most of the evils of Christianity have arisen through an excessive desire to add to the Christian Creed. . . . It was added to above all at the Reformation, when every separate Church felt it incumbent upon itself to define many things which it had much better left undefined." Here is a veritable glorification of the principle of minimum confession: one would almost suppose that truth was noxious and we would do well to get along with as little of it as possible. The express repudiation of all the gains of the Reformation in the acquisition of truth (including the formularies of the Church of England to which Dr. Headlam has himself assented) and the confinement of "saving doctrine" to what is set forth in the Nicene Creed are to be noted.

affirmation,⁵⁰ and constantly repeating them in the public services of the Church with at least the appearance of assenting to their statements are defended, although their declarations—in whole or in part—are not in the least believed. One of the most popular of those made prominent in the present controversy insists upon what is spoken of as the symbolical character of the language in which the declarations of the Creed, dealing as they do with matters too high for literal human speech, are necessarily couched. No one, it is said, can take this language literally; and as everyone is compelled to attach a symbolical sense to it, each—so it seems to be argued—is equally entitled with all others to use the language and to take it (symbolically) in whatever sense he chooses to attach to it. Thus, for example, Dr. Sanday seems to argue⁵¹ that, as it is agreed that “sitteth on the right hand of God” is “pure symbolism,” so it must be agreed that references to an “Ascension” are “just as much pure symbolism.” “The right hand of God” is not a particular place; and the Ascension was not a change of locality. And therefore—so it seems to be argued—since we cannot by any possibility take all the statements of the Creed literally, we are entitled to take none of them literally, and can say with a good conscience in the face of men: “Conceived of the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary”—or as the Nicene Creed has it: “Came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary and was made man,”—and: “The third day He rose from the dead”; and mean nothing more than that He was born in the ordinary fashion, like other men, of human parentage, and, like other men, still lived in His spiritual being after His body had been given to corruption in the grave.⁵² No doubt there are consider-

⁵⁰ Thirty-nine Articles, Art. viii: “The three Creeds, Nicene Creed, Athanasian Creed, and that which is commonly called the Apostles’ Creed, ought thoroughly to be received and believed: for that they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture.”

⁵¹ *Bishop Gore’s Challenge to Criticism*, etc., pp. 13 ff.

⁵² Dr. Rashdall (“Clerical Liberalism”, pp. 98-99) says: “There is no intelligible principle of interpretation according to which the belief in

ations arising from the extraordinary confidence with which this mode of argumentation is pressed in wide circles which demand that some notice should be taken of it; and Dr. Gore may be justified therefore in taking the trouble to expose its inconsequence.⁵³ We cannot profess, however, that his discussion of *The Place of Symbolism in Religion* seems to us greatly to advance the understanding of the subject in general.⁵⁴ All is said that needs to be said when it is said as he does say effectively: "It is quite one thing to recognize that all this is symbolical language and is not to be taken literally. It is quite another thing to evacuate the pictures of their moral and practical meanings and substitute a really fundamentally different idea. . . . We must recognize that the Biblical language is symbolic, but we must recognize, if we would be Christian believers, that what the symbolism teaches is true. . . . Language may be symbolic and also true."⁵⁵

To what extent the evil leaven is at work in the Church

the everlasting punishment of heretics, in the descent into Hell, in the future coming of Christ, in the Resurrection of the body, can be mitigated or spiritualized, which will not equally permit us to take the word 'Virgin' to mean a young woman, or to understand by 'He rose again from the dead' a vision of the risen and immortal Christ. . . . It is open, of course, to anyone to contend that the toleration of the one set of opinions is, in his private opinion, desirable in the best interests of the Church, while that of the other set is undesirable. What is not open to any man of common intellectual consistency or common moral honesty is to accuse the one kind of non-literal interpretation of dishonesty, while he claims for himself, or concedes to his friends, the other instances of non-literal interpretation." We are not inclined to dispute the validity of Dr. Rashdall's *tu quoque*. But even that may be pressed beyond reason; and it has no value at all against the charge of insincerity lying against both.

⁵³ *The Basis*, etc., pp. 19 ff; *The Constructive Quarterly*, March 1914, pp. 50 ff.

⁵⁴ His contention is that "Symbolism is in place when we are dealing with what we cannot express in terms of human experience; it is quite out of place when the affirmation concerns what passed within the limits of present human experience." In point of fact all language is symbolical; and yet it manages to convey true statements of both facts and truths.

⁵⁵ *The Constructive Quarterly*, March 1914, p. 56.

of England is brought home to us startlingly by the appearance of the Lady Margaret Professors of Divinity of both Universities in the lists in championship of the lax interpretation of obligation to formularies.⁵⁶ As he gives "no explicit expression" of his own position Professor

⁵⁶ *Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*. A reply to the Bishop of Oxford's Open Letter on the Basis of Anglican Fellowship. By W. Sanday, D.D., F.B.A., Lady Margaret Professor and Canon of Christ Church. 1914. *The Miracle of Christianity*. A plea for "the Critical School" in regard to the use of the Creeds. A letter to the Right Reverend Charles Gore, D.D., Lord Bishop of Oxford, from J. F. Bethune-Baker, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. 1914. We regret to be compelled to associate Dr. Gwatkin with his fellow professors so far as the advocacy of toleration of these lax views in the Church is concerned. He writes with a constant flavor of sarcasm to Dr. Gore: "You are disquieted, and not without reason, for the air is full of reckless theorizing, and some of the literary criticism is very shallow and profane. Yet I see little cause for alarm, and none at all for 'solemn repudiations' intended to make it as dishonorable for critics as for Evangelicals to remain in the ministry of the Church of England. But, say you, Mr. X rejects the Virgin Birth, denies the Resurrection, and admits no miracles. Well, this is more easily said than proved without a minute and undesirable inquisition into private beliefs. It is not a plain question of fact, as when some disloyal person forces the most solemn part of our Communion Service with extracts from the Latin Mass; it is a question, as you say, of interpretation, and I may add, is a question calling for much caution, and sometimes for more sympathy and charity than most of us possess. Take a couple of instances. Some explain the Birth from a Virgin by saying that intense Messianic longing enabled her to do what other women cannot do; while Keim's account of the Resurrection is that Jesus lives, and sent 'telegrams' to his disciples. These theories are none of mine; they seem to me seriously defective. Yet I cannot see that one who holds them necessarily means to deny the essential truths of the Incarnation and the risen Son of Man. And if he does not cut himself off from Christ, what right has the Church to cut him off? Nay, my Lord, we need to remember that the goodness of God is leading others as well as ourselves; and by the mystery of His dealing with your own soul I entreat you to reverence His dealing with another. If my neighbor walks in darkness, I will rather pray God to cast His bright beams of light upon him than help to stigmatize him in the Church and drive him out from what you hold to be the only means of grace which God has promised."—*The Bishop of Oxford's Open Letter: An Open Letter in Reply*. By H. M. Gwatkin, M.A., Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Cambridge, Hon. D.D. and formerly Gifford Lecturer, Edinburgh. 1914, pp. 3-4.

supported directly by Christian experience shall be insisted upon. "No stigma," he thinks, "should be set on a clergyman who believes in the Incarnation, yet is not able to affirm the mode of this Birth."⁶¹ He even contends that such a clergyman "is entitled to recite the words of the Apostles' Creed as his profession of faith without being exposed to any charge of breach of 'the moral principle of sincerity of profession'";⁶² and, indeed, is "morally obliged in public worship to use the Creed,"—since these words which declare a fact as to the manner of the Incarnation which he does not believe are nevertheless the only means that the Creed offers him of confessing the Incarnation which he does believe. Similarly with respect to the Resurrection. Anyone who finds the testimony inadequate for such beliefs as these,—“the Empty Tomb, the return of the spirit of life to the Body which it had left, the ‘physical’ resurrection”; “but the testimony for the reality of the Appearances convincing”,—“that our Lord after His death on the Cross was really alive again and able to convey the sense of His presence and powers and will to His disciples, through whatever *media*”: believes “the essential religious conception which the doctrine of the Resurrection expresses” and “can surely with a clear conscience use the words, ‘And the third day He rose from the dead.’”⁶³ “I do not know,” adds Professor Bethune-Baker “what other form of words he could find which would so simply and clearly state his belief.” He ventures, therefore, to plead with the Bishop of Oxford and his fellow Bishops not

“to throw the weight of their authority on the side of those who would bind belief in the Incarnation inseparably to belief in ‘the Miraculous Birth’, and belief in our Lord’s Resurrection and Ascension to belief in the reanimation of His earthly Body, and so would forbid men whose essential religious convictions are the same as their own to join with them in reciting the ancient Creed of the Church, because, in regard to the Incarnation that Creed is expressed in terms of biographical statement as to how it was effected rather than as to religious conviction as to what It is.”⁶⁴

⁶¹ P. 11.⁶² P. 11.⁶³ P. 13.⁶⁴ P. 17.

The master-key which is to unlock all scruples is to bear in mind

"the distinction between the religious convictions embodied in the doctrines and the forms in which they have been expressed in the past, or, in other words, between the reality of the spiritual experience enshrined in our Gospels and the 'historical' credibility of all the 'miraculous' narratives they contain."⁶⁶

He himself has never "felt that belief in these 'miracles' was a necessary part of the doctrine which he desired and was pledged to preach."⁶⁶ Christ is Himself the Miracle of Christianity: "the particular narratives of miracles in the Gospels" are but "convincing evidence of the unique impression which He produced in the time of His life in the world as man", and not "a scientific account of the way in which that impression was produced."⁶⁷ What Professor Bethune-Baker is pleading for, we see now clearly, is a non-miraculous Christianity, a Christianity finding its substance and warrant in present religious experience instead of in transactions of the past; and the right of the adherents of this non-miraculous, experiential Christianity to profess publicly a miraculous, transactional Christianity without derogation to their sincerity.

Dr. Sanday's pamphlet differs markedly from Professor Bethune-Baker's in the charming simplicity of the style in which it is written, in the directness with which Dr. Sanday identifies himself in it with the party of laxity which he defends, and we are afraid we ought to add in the extremity of the position assumed. If we do not find it quite possible, with Dr. Gore, wholly to dissociate Professor Bethune-Baker from the cause which he pleads, we gain a distinct impression from his argument that he himself is a believer in the Incarnation, and looks upon Jesus as the very Son of God in the sense of the Creeds. We grieve to say that we do not gain so clear an impression to this effect in the case of Dr. Sanday, and find ourselves, as we read his discussion, associating him in our thought with the class of thinkers who used to be spoken of as Speculative

⁶⁶ P. 14.

⁶⁷ P. 16.

⁶⁸ P. 16.

Theists,—men who are quite clear that God is a Person and acts as a Person in the government of the world; and who are in that sense believers in the Supernatural; but who profess it to be impossible for them to think of Him as acting in His world otherwise than in accordance with the laws He has impressed upon it in its making. These thinkers, it is needless to say are all Humanitarians in their doctrine of Christ as well as anti-supernaturalists in their view of the course and activities of His life.⁶⁸ Dr. Sanday does indeed say in the most impressive manner:⁶⁹

"The central truth which it is most important to guarantee is the true Godhead of Father, Son and Holy Ghost; that our Lord Jesus Christ is truly God and truly Lord, very God and at the same time very Man. I imagine that if we were to cross-question ourselves as to what we mean when we recite the Creeds, it would be something like that in its simplest terms. That is what we are all, educated and uneducated, trying to say, and what we each believe the other to be trying to say. We should all agree that anything really less than this would be hypocritical. The man who in his heart of hearts really believed less ought not to stay where he is."

And again:⁷⁰

"The coming of the Only-begotten into the world could not but be attended by every circumstance of holiness. Whatever the Virgin Birth can spiritually mean for us is guaranteed by the fact that the Holy Babe was Divine. Is it not enough to affirm this with all our heart and soul, and be silent as to anything beyond?"

No one could for an instant distrust the sincerity of these moving words. But the puzzled reader who finds it difficult to conciliate them with the tone of the discussion at large and its anti-supernaturalistic conclusions, and with its ex-

⁶⁸ That these things normally go together Dr. Sanday himself has taught us. "If the Son of God," says he (*The Expository Times*, xiv, 1903, p. 65a), "did assume human flesh for men's redemption, that alone is an event so unique and stupendous that we cannot wonder if its accessories were also in a manner unique."

⁶⁹ *Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*, pp. 96.

⁷⁰ P. 20. Contrast the earlier language quoted in note 68: there, it is not merely "holiness" which is guaranteed by "the coming of the Only-begotten".

to him to be really decisive"—"the argument from *the difference of times*"—cannot be accorded the validity which he ascribes to it. Even should we grant—which we by no means do—that "Creeds composed fifteen, sixteen, seventeen centuries ago cannot possibly express with literal exactitude the mind of to-day", it would not seem to follow that the "mind to-day" (which *ex hypothesi* no longer believes their statements) may with all sincerity give assent to their statements. It might be validly concluded that these outgrown Creeds should be discarded, or at least corrected into harmony with the "mind of to-day". It might be equally validly concluded, that "the mind of to-day"—which after all is not infallible—should be corrected into harmony with the Creeds. Facts, after all, remain facts after any lapse of time and after any changes which the meaning of the words in which they are stated may have undergone, or which "the mind" of men may have experienced during the years. It would be a sad commentary on the evolution of the modern mind, if the main thing it had acquired during the increasing ages were the power to assent in all sincerity to statements of facts of tremendous importance if true,—no matter in what form of words, old or new, these facts are stated—which it is thoroughly convinced are not true.

III

The real significance of Dr. Sanday's pamphlet does not lie, however, in its defence of the practice of assenting to formularies which you do not believe, but in the frankness with which it advocates a completely unmiraculous Christianity. We must be wary in our use of terms here. All the terms which naturally present themselves to express the supernatural character as well of Christianity itself as of those great events by which it was inaugurated in the world, commonly called miracles, are employed by this and that writer or coterie of writers, with different kinds of qualifications of their natural and formerly well-settled meanings. It is hardly possible to use them without a certain

Dr. Sandy is emphatic in his assertion of his belief in the reality of "the Supernatural Birth" and of "the Supernatural Resurrection" of our Lord, and in the actual occurrence during our Lord's life—and also in the early days of the Church, subsequent to His death—of numerous "Miracles." But he "cannot so easily bring" himself "to think that His Birth was (as he should regard it) unnatural."⁷⁶ And he knows that in declaring his belief in "the Supernatural Birth" of Jesus, he is not confessing "all that the Church in the past has believed."⁷⁷ What he apparently thinks about the birth of Jesus from the physical side is that it was supernatural in something of the same general sense in which the births of Isaac and Samuel and John the Baptist were supernatural—according at least to the Scriptural representations regarding them. For the rest, when his mind dwells on "the Supernatural Birth" it is satisfied with recognizing the holiness of Him who thus came into the world. Neither can he assure himself of "the actual resuscitation of the dead body of the Lord from the tomb."⁷⁸ That the Lord "was dead, and behold He is alive for evermore"—this, he thinks, is proved; and this is all that he has it in mind to affirm. Here too he knows that he is not allowing for all that the Church of the past has believed; but he cannot "as at present advised", commit himself to the resurrection "as literal fact."⁷⁹ Neither again can he quite believe that the "nature miracles" happened just as they are recorded:⁸⁰

have a very pronounced objection to "infallibility" anywhere. Dr. Sanday gives expression to this objection. He would be more willing to use the term of our Lord than of anything else: but even here it is awkward, seeing that infallibility belongs rather to absolute than to relative knowledge and our Lord's knowledge was relative. Mr. B. H. Streeter (*Restatement and Reunion*, pp. 455 ff.) thinks it an unhappy term even with reference to God. "Infallibility is the tyrant's claim," he asserts; "that we do not want; but we do want authority, the parent's right." A "sign-post", "a lantern" to help us by our own efforts to attain the truth, he is willing to confess the need of; but not the truth itself—like Lessing's apologue about seeking and finding.

⁷⁶ P. 19.

⁷⁷ P. 28.

⁷⁸ P. 20.

⁷⁹ P. 28.

⁸⁰ P. 19.

"I think that of the two hypotheses—that they were performed by our Lord exactly as they are described, and that they came to be attributed to Him in this form by the imagination of the early Church—the latter is the more probable. I believe that in most of these cases *something* happened which gave rise to the story, but that the most difficult element in it was probably due to the extension of the original fact, rather than itself original."

He can see his way, it is true, to admit the occurrence of events which may fitly be described as *supra naturam*—"exceptional, extraordinary, testifying to the presence of higher spiritual forces", but involving "no real breach in the order of nature."⁸¹ But he cannot admit the occurrence of "events or alleged events" which must be called *contra naturam*,—which "do imply such a breach", involving "some definite reversal of the natural physical order."⁸² We do not see how a position thus explained differs from the old-fashioned, common, garden variety of naturalism. We are then in Dr. Sanday's case merely faced with a return to the simple old issue, which we thought had been fought out a generation ago, of Miracles and the Supernatural.

Of late years Dr. Sanday is nothing if not autobiographical. It is natural for him therefore to incorporate in his manifesto in behalf of an unmiraculous Christianity a sketch of the processes by which he has reached the naturalistic position he now occupies.⁸³ He has been gradually brought to it, he tells us, by careful historical investigation into the evidence for miracles. Dr. Gore had said⁸⁴ that he rejected the criticism of the radical school, as the champion of which Dr. Sanday comes forward, not because it is criticism, but because it is not sound criticism. "It is based, it seems to me," he added, "on a mistaken view of natural law, and on something much less than a Christian belief in God." Looking back on the course of his own thought, Dr. Sanday repels this characterization, at least as applying to

⁸¹ P. 23.

⁸² P. 23.

⁸³ Pp. 21 ff.

⁸⁴ *The Basis*, etc., p. 9.

himself.⁸⁵ "It could not be said of me," he insists, "that my attitude was based 'on a mistaken view of natural law, and on something less than a Christian belief in God'. At least I was not disposed to put any limit to the Divine power or to ascribe any necessity to natural law as such". It is proverbial that our knowledge of ourselves leaves something to be desired; and Dr. Sanday's readers will find it difficult to understand such a declaration. However he may consciously withhold from natural law the attribute of "necessity", and ascribe to God "the power to make what exceptions He pleases", he yet unconsciously speaks currently of miracle as if it were a thing not only that we have not observed God doing⁸⁶ but that we must assume that God will not do, because it would violate laws which condition His action.

We may illustrate what we mean by a phrase taken from *The Life of Christ in Recent Research* (1907), to the discussion in which Dr. Sanday refers⁸⁷ us as "really containing all the guiding ideas he has ever had on the subject" of the supernatural activities of God. Speaking of the Christian's experience of the answer to prayer—in which, like Theodor Haering,⁸⁸ he finds the key to the idea of the miraculous,—he remarks that "it does not prove that God will violate His own laws, but I think it does prove that, within the conditions imposed by these laws, He does interest Himself in human affairs." It is to the phraseology employed here that we call attention. Precisely what is meant by such phrases as these: "God will not violate His own laws"; "God will act within the

⁸⁵ P. 22. Mr. Streeter similarly (*Restatement*, etc., p. xi) repudiates the statement for himself and his friends, one ventures to think equally mistakenly.

⁸⁶ Pp. 22-3. The negative form of statement is significant. In point of fact we are invited to exclude miracles from happenings not on the ground of a "uniform experience" but on the ground of a lack of experience: our world-view is to be based not on experience but on the absence of experience, and thus we are to found our belief on an attempt to prove a negative.

⁸⁷ P. 22.

⁸⁸ *The Christian Faith* (1906), 1913, p. 560.

conditions imposed by His laws"? What "laws" are these which "impose conditions" on God, that He "will not violate"? By a "law of nature" we ordinarily mean merely an observed uniformity of occurrence. Is it meant that God will never, or can never, act outside a single line of observed occurrence? That He will, or can, never act otherwise than as we observe Him acting ordinarily? That He has established for Himself "laws" of action which He will, or can, on no account "violate"? That His customary mode of activity imposes "conditions" on all His actions? It is difficult for the ordinary man to see what "law" God would "violate" by acting on proper occasion after a fashion different from that of His ordinary mode of action. We can hardly say that He *must* act uniformly without reducing Him from a person to a natural force: it is only a natural force which must by its very nature act uniformly. Nor can the circumstance that He has so made natural forces that they act uniformly constitute His own action in a different mode a violation of them. It would be a violation of them only if He compelled *them* to act in a mode different from the uniform mode of action which He imposed on them in their making as the law of their action. And nobody supposes that this is the way in which God works what is called a miracle. We do not see how we can avoid saying that a very crude idea both of "natural law" and of God's mode of action in working miracles underlies the forms of statement which Dr. Sanday currently employs in speaking of the subject.

It would be a pity to neglect Dr. Sanday's invitation⁸⁹ to survey in connection with the present expression of his views on miracles, what he has formerly written about them.⁹⁰ Very much is to be learned from such a survey.

⁸⁹ P. 22.

⁹⁰ The publications which chiefly come into consideration are the following: (1) "Free-thinking" in the *Oxford House Papers*, First Series, 1886; (2) Article, "Jesus Christ" in *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. ii, 1899 (reprinted in *Outlines of the Life of Christ*, 1905): cf. also *The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*, 1905; (3) Paper at the Northampton Church Congress, October 1902 (reprinted in *The Expositi-*

For example it becomes at once clear as we glance through the series of writings to which he refers us, that his naturalistic opinions, here expressed with so keen a consciousness, have not been of quite so slow a growth and have not come to their present completeness quite so recently as might be supposed from the mere letter of the sketch of their development here given.⁹¹ Dr. Sanday had already indeed more than a quarter of a century ago given them expression quite as clearly and in much the same terms as now; and it may be doubted whether the obligations under which he is inclined generously to recognize that he may stand to Professor Lake and Mr. J. M. Thompson for the formation of his opinions, may not more naturally have been the other way about. Now and then an incidental suggestion comes to us, at least, which leads us to fear that Dr. Sanday may have (like the late Dr. A. B. Davidson for example) been through all these years building worse than he knew.⁹² At all events there is certainly very little of what he has subsequently said about miracles which is not already present, in germ at least, in a passage like the following:⁹³

"Into the philosophy of these marvellous phenomena I do not enter. What is their relation to God's ordinary government of the universe I do not feel competent to say. I do not myself believe that they are in the strict sense 'breaches' of natural law. I believe that if we could see as God sees we should become

tory Times, November 1902); (4) *The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, 1907; (5) Sermon on "The meaning of Miracles" in *Miracles: Papers and Sermons contributed to the Guardian*. Edited by H. S. Holland, 1911. (6) Paper at the Middlesbrough Church Congress, October 1912.

⁹¹ P. 17.

⁹² For example we meet in Mr. H. C. Hoskier's *Codex B and its Allies*, 1914, Part I, p. 422, the following: "Many who should have raised their voices against the mischief wrought, have sat by in apathy or have wilfully fostered these heresies. Or, if not wilfully, they have assumed a faltering attitude which caused their own students to misinterpret their master's lessons. Thus we have the spectacle of Thompson and Lake saying to Sanday: 'We learned that from you', and Sanday retorting: 'I never meant to teach you that'." Only in the case of the nature of Miracles, unfortunately, there was no misinterpretation.

⁹³ No. 9 of *Oxford House Papers*, First Series, on "Free-thinking", 1886.

aware of links and connections, at present hidden from us, binding together the mighty organism of facts and processes into a mysterious, but still harmonious whole. I am also not prepared to say that if the miracles of the New Testament had been described by competent observers in the nineteenth century instead of their actual eye-witnesses in the first, there would not have been a perceptible difference in the narratives. All these concessions I should be willing to make; and I could understand others pressing them further than I should care to press them myself. But on one simple proposition I should take my stand, as a rock of certainty amidst much that is uncertain: *Miracles did actually happen.*"

Here it is already denied that "miracles" are "in the strict sense 'breaches' of natural law"; the All is already spoken of as a closed system, if only we could see it all in all; it is already suggested that observers of the nineteenth century would have described miracles differently; and the strong affirmation that "miracles did actually happen" is already made—in conjunction with the explanation that what happened was not after all "miracles". These are the characteristic features of Dr. Sanday's latest declarations.

A comparison of Dr. Sanday's earlier and later dealing with miracles reveals meanwhile many features which one would think might cause him some embarrassment. Take the Virgin Birth and its attestation, for example. It has been quite common to minimize the attestation to the Virgin Birth. Dr. Sanday has never given way to that temptation. He never could have been capable, for example, of writing such a sentence as this—it is Dr. Rashdall's:⁹⁴ "The only traces of the doctrine in the New Testament are confined to the prefaces to the first and third Gospels, neither of which seems to belong to the two early documents which modern criticism is agreed in regarding as the basis of our existing synoptics"; or of suggesting, as Dr. Rashdall does, that the assured attribution of the third Gospel to Luke lessens its claim on our belief. Such remarks betray a total misapprehension of the meaning and implications of what is called the Two Document Hypothesis of the origin of the Synoptic Gospels. The discovery that these two sources

⁹⁴ *International Journal of Ethics*, January 1897, p. 156.

existed and that they account for a very large part of the contents of the Synoptics, has no tendency to suggest that other portions of the contents of these Gospels, derived from other sources, are inferior either in age or in historical trustworthiness to the material derived from one or the other of these two. The relative originality and historical trustworthiness of this additional material are to be ascertained on their own proper evidence; and Dr. Sanday, for his part, has put himself very fully on record as estimating both the originality and the historical trustworthiness of the Infancy Chapters of Luke very highly indeed.⁹⁵ He points out many and very convincing indications in the narrative itself of its historical value; and he even permits himself (like Sir William Ramsay,⁹⁶ but as he is careful to intimate independently of him) to trace the material here recorded ultimately to Mary herself—an attribution for which he has reasons to give which he considers weighty. "Such an inference", he very justly remarks,⁹⁷ "would invest the contents of these chapters with high authority." We are not informed that Dr. Sanday has withdrawn this high estimate of the historical authority of this material.^{97a} One would

⁹⁵ E.g., Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, II, 1899, pp. 643 ff. Cf. also the Sermon on the Virgin Birth printed in *The Expository Times*, xiv, 1903, pp. 296 ff.

⁹⁶ *Was Christ Born at Bethlehem?* A Study on the Credibility of St. Luke. 1898.

⁹⁷ P. 644 and note.

^{97a} He has perhaps somewhat modified it in the sermon on "The Meaning of Miracles", printed in *Miracles*, edited by Dr. Holland, 1911, where however he still presents a rapid but telling summary of evidence for the historical trustworthiness of the Infancy chapters of both Matthew and Luke. The very cautious conclusion runs (pp. 14f.): "I would not myself deny that the imagination has been at work somewhat freely in these opening sections of both the First and Third Gospels; it would be precarious to lay great stress on more than the points that the two authorities have in common—the birth at Bethlehem, the birth before conjugal union, the name Jesus, the home at Nazareth." Here we have probably the low-water mark of his growing skepticism prior to the Paper at Middlesbrough—after which he tells us that his progress has been rapid. He still apparently affirms "the birth before conjugal union" as credibly attested. But he had not yet apparently attached himself to "the school whose watchword is 'the supernatural without miracle'" (p. 16).

them. It is not immediately apparent on what grounds he bases this opinion. Paul, for example, in his references to miracles speaks quite generally⁹⁹ and Paul is not the only first-hand witness. Dr. Sanday does not doubt, for instance, that Luke was both Paul's companion and the author of the Book of Acts: and in that case it is hard to deny to Luke recognition as a first-hand witness to miracles, Paul's and others'. On Paul's and Luke's testimony we may be sure, and Dr. Sanday is sure, that miracles happened in the early days of the Church.¹⁰⁰ The miracles to which Luke testifies, however, are not all of the sort that Dr. Sanday calls *supra naturam*. But Luke testifies not only to the miracles of the early Christians but to miracles wrought by Jesus, and though he does not pretend to have himself witnessed any of these, as Paul's companion he enjoyed excellent opportunities of informing himself on first-hand authority of what really happened (as say with respect to the resurrection of Jesus), and we can hardly doubt, on his testimony alone, that Jesus Himself as well as His followers worked miracles,—and Dr. Sanday does not doubt it. If Luke is not technically a first-hand witness that fault, to all who believe, with Dr. Sanday,¹⁰¹ that the Fourth Gospel is the work of an eye-witness, is fully cured by the testimony of John. We can moreover get behind Luke. As Dr. Sanday himself points out,¹⁰² each of the chief documents which underlie Luke, the Narrative Source, the Discourse Source, and the so-called Special Source, testifies to abounding miracles wrought by Jesus. And, as Dr. Sanday again himself points out,¹⁰³ the distinction which he draws between *supra naturam* and *contra naturam* miracles "certainly was not present to the mind of the Biblical historians, and miracles of the one class are not inferior in attestation to those of

⁹⁹ Cf. the passages; Roms. xv. 18, 19; 2 Cor. xii. 12; 1 Cor. xii. 6, 8, 10, xiv. 7, 5, 19; Gal. iii. 8, cited in *The Expository Times*, xiv. p. 62. Cf. the *Church Congress at Middlesbrough*, p. 183.

¹⁰⁰ *The Expository Times*, as cited, pp. 64 ff.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

the other". These historians, indeed, in the most trustworthy accounts of His teaching which they have transmitted to us, represent Jesus as Himself bearing witness to His own miracle-working. There are no better attested sayings of our Lord's than those in which He pronounces woes upon Bethsaida and Chorazin (Mat. xi. 21, Lk. x. 13), replies to John the Baptist's inquiry as to who He was (Mat. xi. 5, Lk. vii. 22) and speaks of a faith which can remove mountains (Mat. xvii. 20, Lk. xvii. 6). Each of these saying includes a direct claim on our Lord's part to be a miracle-worker, and the only two of them which intimate the nature of His miracles, intimate that they included "nature miracles", Dr. Sanday's *contra-naturam* miracles. If it is unreasonable to doubt that these are genuine sayings of our Lord,—and surely Dr. Sanday will not doubt that¹⁰⁴—we seem to have our Lord's own witness to the fact that He wrought "nature miracles".

Dr. Sanday is indeed so deeply committed to this conclusion that we can only wonder at the extreme embarrassment into which he has brought himself by his denial that our Lord nevertheless wrought any miracles *contra naturam*. The narrative of our Lord's Temptation and its implications Dr. Sanday has by repeated and searching critical examinations of it made peculiarly his own. This narrative, he strongly holds, presents evidence that our Lord claimed to work miracles and really did work miracles which Dr. Sanday ventures to characterize as "quite stringent", indeed "as stringent as a proposition of Euclid."¹⁰⁵ For this account of the Temptation, he argues,¹⁰⁶ is of such a kind

¹⁰⁴ See what Dr. Sanday says in the paper at the Church Congress at Middlesbrough on Mat. xi. 21; Lk. x. 13, and in *The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, p. 224, on Mat. xvii. 20; Lk. xvii. 6. Cf. also what Dr. Headlam says in his paper at the Church Congress at Middlesbrough (p. 187) on Mat. xi. 21; Lk. x. 17, and Mat. xi. 5; Lk. vii. 32.

¹⁰⁵ *The Expository Times*, xiv, p. 63 f.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*: the argument here is repeated from Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, ii. p. 624 b, where it is more expanded: cf. also pp. 612 f.

and contains features of such a character as to make it intrinsically certain that it could not have been invented, but "must have come from our Lord Himself and no other". "But the story of the Temptation," he proceeds, "all turns on the assumption of the power of working miracles. All three temptations have for their object to induce Him to work miracles for purposes other than those for which He was prepared to work them. The story would be null and void if He worked no miracles at all." That is to say our Lord Himself bears witness in the account of the Temptation which He, and no other, *must* have given and therefore actually did give, that He was conscious of the power to work miracles, and did work them on all proper occasions. Here is stringent evidence indeed, independent of all inquiry into "sources": the narrative in itself bears convincing testimony to its authenticity as a personal witness of our Lord's own; and this witness is to His miracle-working. The point now to be pressed is that this stringent witness of our Lord's own to His miracle-working concerns particularly "nature miracles", miracles *contra naturam*. The making of the stones into bread is as distinctly a nature miracle, for example, as the multiplication of the loaves and fishes which Dr. Sanday refuses to believe happened, on this precise ground. How can Dr. Sanday insist, then, that "nature miracles" did not happen and could not happen? Has he convicted our Lord of false-witness to the nature and extent of His powers—transmuted Him into an empty boaster in the accounts He gives of Himself? Or does he wish to abandon his elaborate proof of the necessary origin of the account of the Temptation in our Lord's own report? One thing stands out with great clearness. Dr. Sanday's rejection of "nature miracles" does not rest on critical grounds. His most elaborate, thorough and characteristic essays in criticism accredit them. If he refuses to believe that such miracles occurred he can ground his refusal in nothing but an *a priori* pronouncement that such miracles are impossible.

Headlam, for instance, warned him already of the untenableness of his division of miracles into two classes—he called them then “the supernatural” and “the abnormal”—in point of both nature and attestation. Dr. Strong rebuked beforehand his belittling of the issue and pointed out clearly that the real issue raised is just that between Christianity and “some form of mechanical naturalism”. He said:¹⁰⁹

“The question of miracles is not a question of detail, or one that can be neglected in the interest of practical or spiritual religion. It is one form of the question whether God made and governs the world, and to decide this negatively is to adopt some form of mechanical naturalism.”

And Canon Carnegie pronounced already the final judgment upon the whole matter:¹¹⁰

“A non-miraculous Christianity might have a future before it; on that I express no opinion; but it would have no past behind it to which it could look for guidance and encouragement. I cannot regard it as a legitimate development of the old Christianity. It is a new religion constituted on a completely different basis, and involving principles and motives of a completely different character.”

There are in point of fact unnaturally bound together in the Church of England to-day three different and necessarily antagonistic systems of religion. The Bishop of Oxford takes some account of them in his survey of the state of the Church,¹¹¹ but does not seem adequately to feel their essential opposition to one another. According to him the Church of England is brought into peril to-day by three tendencies which are driving to intolerable excesses points of view in themselves mutually tolerable: Catholic, Evangelical and Modernist need only avoid pushing things to such extremes and all will be well. It is a great mistake, however, to imagine that it is only in extreme applications of the warring principles that the strange combination of such contradictory elements in a single body becomes an intolerable evil. Sacerdotalism, Evangelicalism, Naturalism

¹⁰⁹ P. 181.

¹¹⁰ P. 194.

¹¹¹ *The Basis*, etc., p. 30.

are not complementary elements in one whole of truth but stand related as precise contradictions in their fundamental principles. No doubt there is a larger body of truth held in common between Sacerdotalism and Evangelicalism than between either and Naturalism, and these may therefore seem in their common opposition to Naturalism to draw together. Supernaturalism for instance,—which is the very breath of life of any operative religion for sinners—is common ground between them. But this agreement in certain fundamental truths does not void their contradiction at vital points, although it may explain how Dr. Headlam, for example, can argue that it is an exaggeration to speak of them as two different religious systems.¹¹² In his survey Dr. Headlam strangely omits all consideration of the Naturalism which is rampant in the Church of England—and not in the Church of England alone among the churches—and which undoubtedly is a religion in its very essence distinct from anything that can by any legitimate extension of language be called Christianity.

What is happening in the Church of England at the moment is an attempt on the part of Sacerdotalism to suppress Evangelicalism and to extrude Naturalism. In this Sacerdotalism is only showing that it is coming to ever purer consciousness of its own essential nature. That it should assert itself and endeavor to free itself from the constant irritation of contact within the same organization of contradictory systems of religion is only natural and is to be commended. It is a pity that it should have been left to it to demand the exclusion of Naturalism from a church claiming the Christian name. It is to be hoped that Evangelicalism will after a while awake to its responsibilities and to its strength, and take over the task of freeing the Church of England from such destructive error. It does not seem as if that day had yet come: Sacerdotalism appears rather to be in a position to threaten it along with Naturalism. This undoubtedly brings with it

¹¹² *The Church Quarterly Review*, April 1914, p. 156.

a great peril: for no error could be more fatal than for Evangelicalism, under the sting of the common assault made upon them both by Sacerdotalism, to make common cause with Naturalism. What is needed above everything else in the Church of England is that Evangelicals—who after all constitute the only legitimate Church of England—should recover their self-consciousness and assert themselves; no longer seeking as “good churchmen” to conciliate the Sacerdotalists or as “men of open mind” to conciliate the Liberals, but as faithful stewards of the saving gospel to please the Master. There is an application here too of the saying: “Be not unequally yoked together with unbelievers.”

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS*

Recent discussion of the beginnings of Christianity have set in clearer light the intimate relation of the death of Jesus in its redemptive significance and the resurrection of Jesus. This ought never to have been obscured since it is so plainly taught in the New Testament. But the uniqueness of the resurrection and the fundamental importance attached to it by Paul for the validity of the Gospel and of Christian faith and hope, and the manifestly causal relation which it sustained in the quickening and informing of the belief of the primitive Christian community, have given it a certain isolation as an object both of attack and defense in the course of the Christian centuries. The bond of union is primarily conceptual, but ultimately, if both are true, personal, since both are predicated of Jesus. It is this fact—their relation to Jesus—that gives them their significance. Entering thus into primitive Christian faith these two facts—the death and the resurrection of Jesus—have meaning for the early Apostolic conception not only of Jesus but also of His work.

But supposing these two elements to have formed part of the primitive Apostolic conception of Jesus—and the evidence for this can not be questioned—the origin of this conception and its validity are matters of the utmost concern since the issue involves the truthfulness of Christianity in its very inception. There is no reason to doubt and there is good evidence for believing that by this conception of Jesus, including these two facts, Christianity was constituted a religion of redemption; for Jesus was for Christian faith the Saviour in and through His death and resurrection.

Whence then came this faith? Was it grounded in experience and does it lay hold upon reality? If so, its origin and adequate cause can be no other than Jesus Himself. But if not, the origin either of the whole or of part of the

*Two lectures delivered at the Princeton Seminary Summer School of Theology in June, 1914.

conception must be sought in some idea which has transformed Jesus into the person possessed of the qualities and charged with the function ascribed to Him in primitive Christian faith.

The decision of this issue is certain if the primary historical evidence—the testimony of the New Testament writings—is trustworthy. This however is frequently questioned. It is necessary therefore to analyse the evidence and consider its implications. When these have been determined, the hypothesis of transformation must be tested. If this fails to account for the origin of Christian faith, the explanation which this faith gives of its own origin ought to be accepted and with it the character of the Christian religion which this involves.

There is of course a reason for the separation of the resurrection from the death of Jesus. The resurrection plainly implicates the supernatural and can have no place in a naturalistic interpretation of the origin of Christianity. The death of Jesus may however be accepted as a fact and fitted into such a construction. But this necessitates a modification of the New Testament representation both of Jesus' person and of the significance of His death, eliminating the divine element of His person and the redemptive meaning of His death, transferring both to the sphere of idea or belief not grounded in reality but otherwise historically occasioned, and retaining as facts only a human person and his actual death.

It is not strange therefore that even from the naturalistic point of view an interpretation of the origin of Christianity should appear which insists upon the union of the death and the resurrection in a view of Jesus in which together these two elements have significance and of which they form an essential part. Only, on this interpretation, the New Testament conception of Jesus, not in part and not in particular by the inclusion of the resurrection but in its entirety, becomes either the transformation by apotheosis of an historical individual—a man, Jesus the prophet of Nazareth—

this belief—the resurrection—since this cannot be isolated from the person of whom it is predicated. In a word, the issue concerns the truth of primitive Christian Christology and thus the truth also of Christianity as a religion of redemption.

It is generally agreed that the primitive Christian community believed in the resurrection of Jesus, or rather, in Jesus who was crucified, who rose from the dead and was exalted to the place of supreme power in the Messianic Kingdom. There is general agreement also that the belief in the resurrection—and, of course, in the precedent death of Jesus—was the characteristic and determinative element in this faith. It is admitted that this faith implicates a Messianic background of prophecy or promise and a Messianic future of expectation and hope. The Jesus of whom the resurrection was believed was believed to be the Messiah. But here also the genetic problem presses and different views give different answers. Did Jesus Himself share and inspire this belief? And whether He did or not, what is the source of the Christian conception of the Messiah? Does this have its origin in the ideas of the Old Testament, or have contributions been made to it from other sources? In particular whence came the transcendent element in the Christian conception and the equally distinctive note of suffering and the triumphant issue in the resurrection? How early did this idea in its essential features form part of the Christian faith?

These are some of the questions that are raised by an historical investigation into the origin of the early Christian belief in the resurrection of Jesus. They would not be difficult to answer if the testimony of the New Testament were accepted; but there are many objections urged against this, especially its supernatural standpoint and Christian character. It is necessary therefore to examine the evidence and test its validity.

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lier be adopted, the Epistle to the Galatians would confirm the reference to the resurrection in Luke's account of Paul's speech at Pisidian Antioch.^{5*} Even apart however from this theory of the destination and early date of the Epistle, the address and the autobiographical introduction make it impossible to suppose that this element was ever wanting in Paul's Gospel. It may therefore be traced with certainty at least to the time of Paul's activity in Antioch in the forties. Did it originate there or is it still earlier?

Pfleiderer suggests pagan influence both in the practice of the Antiochan Church, and, by conformation, also upon Paul; but he can scarcely mean origination. He says:⁶

In as much as religious practices are never made of nothing, we may well suppose that the Gentile Christians of Antioch still retained the old practices with which they had formerly celebrated the death and resurrection of their Lord Adonis and now transferred them to the new Lord Christ. Thus it happened naturally that Christ seemed the Lord who by His death and resurrection wrought the salvation of His own and became the Redeemer of the world. And now the Apostle Paul came to this new community whither he had been brought from his native city Tarsus by Barnabas. Soon he was at home there and labored with good success, so that the community rapidly increased. Thus it was certainly only natural that Paul also on his part adopted the practices and the conceptions which he found existing in the Gentile Christian community of Antioch. Otherwise, how could he have worked in it effectively? And it was the more natural since all that he found there fitted admirably with the way in which he himself had come to his faith in Christ. From a fanatical persecutor of the community of the Messiah he had been converted to an Apostle of Christ by a vision in which he had seen the heavenly Christ and Son of God, whose death therefore was not that of an offender but a sacrifice to which God had given His Son for our sins that He might redeem us from this present evil world. Of the earthly life of the prophet Jesus, Paul knew very little—as little as the Antiochan Gentile Christians. It was the more natural therefore that he should agree with them in the conviction that it was just the death and resurrection of the Son of God, even Christ, that constituted the redemptive fact and the content of the new redemptive faith.

^{5*} Acts xiii. 30.

⁶ *Religion und Religionen*, 1906, p. 223; quoted by Clemen, *Religions-geschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments*, 1909, p. 152, n. 3; *Primitive Christianity and its non-Jewish Sources*, 1912, p. 196, n. 3.

from Paul's activity there. This makes it impossible to suppose that the common faith of Paul and the Church in the resurrection of Jesus owed its origin to the belief and practices of the Adonis cult. Pfeleiderer intimates that Paul was prepared by his experience to coöperate effectively in a Christian community in which this belief existed on his arrival. Its origin therefore in both cases must be sought in antecedent conditions.

Prior to his coming to Antioch Paul spent several years in Tarsus. There also he was surrounded by a pagan culture and was in contact locally with the cult of a pagan God, Sandan. Of this cult Frazer says:⁸

Thus it would appear that at Tarsus as at Boghaz-Keui there was a pair of deities, a divine Father and a divine Son, whom the Greeks identified with Zeus and Hercules respectively. If the Baal of Tarsus was a god of fertility, as his attributes clearly imply, his identification with Zeus would be natural, since it was Zeus who, in the belief of the Greeks, sent the fertilizing rain from heaven. And the identification of Sandan with Hercules would be equally natural, since the lion and the death on the pyre were features common to both. Our conclusion then is that it was the divine Son, the lion-god, who was burned in effigy or in the person of a human representative at Tarsus and perhaps at Boghaz-Keui.

The investigations of Böhlig, in which the influence of Paul's environment in Tarsus is over- rather than underestimated, reaches this conclusion:⁹

It is not surprising that an influence of the pagan popular religion is entirely lacking. . . . The figure of the Tarsian popular god Sandan presents a striking parallel to the central feature of Paul's religious thought. Even if this has in a measure determined the terminology of Paul, still the Apostle drew the content of his message of faith from the Jewish Messianic belief which he transformed in accordance with the Damascus vision. It must be regarded as certain however that this distinctive coincidence of the Jewish and the pagan conception of a Saviour exalted to God prepared Paul's way in the pagan world of Anatolia and perhaps also caused the strict concentration of his thought upon the exalted Jesus.

⁸ *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, 1906, p. 60.

⁹ *Die Geisteskultur von Tarsos*, 1913, p. 168.

which He had suffered. This is not affected by Paul's teaching concerning the transformation of the bodies of believers and their conformation to Christ's glorious body or by his teaching that flesh and blood can not inherit the Kingdom of God;¹⁴ for a transformed and glorious body, corruption changed to incorruption, mortality having put on immortality, the natural body become a spiritual body wholly controlled by and the perfect organ of the spirit, is still a body—the body of Christ the first fruits and then the bodies of those that are His at His coming. Paul can not rightfully be appealed to in support of a spiritual resurrection and his view contrasted with an increasing materialization of the resurrection in the Gospels. There is no trace in his writings of the modern separation of the Easter faith and the Easter message. Paul believed in the resurrection just as confidently as he believed in the death of Jesus and its atoning significance. And he believed it of the Jesus who died—that it was the same Jesus who, having suffered in His human nature, triumphed over death in and through the same nature in which also He passed to His glory. Jesus Himself thus became for Paul in the Damascus experience the responsible author of a faith in which the resurrection formed an element so fundamental that without it his message of deliverance and hope lacked validity and he himself and others who bore witness to its reality became false witnesses of God.¹⁵

Familiar as we are with Paul's Christology it is difficult to realize what a cataclysmic change, what a revolution, was thus produced in the very center of the religious conviction of a deeply religious Jew, a Hebrew of the Hebrews and strictly monotheistic. To him every thought and practice of polytheism must have been an abomination, as every tendency toward the apotheosis of a human being must have been foreign and revolting to his inmost nature. Yet the Jesus to whom Paul gave with God a place in his monotheistic faith

¹⁴ 1 Cor. xv. 35 ff.

¹⁵ 1 Cor. xv. 15.

resurrection of Jesus? And if there be such indications, how was this pre-Pauline faith grounded; and is it of Christian or pre-Christian origin?

PRE-PAULINE FAITH

The difficulties of this investigation are due to the fact that we have no documents from this early time, and to the widely prevalent distrust of the later documents. This distrust, in so far as it represents a critical attitude that insists upon a thorough examination of the evidence and an exact exposition of its historical implications, is a useful and necessary instrument of investigation. Such a method however is not primarily concerned with validity but with fact. When it passes into the sphere of values it is necessarily influenced by the differences of principle which distinguish the two generic explanations of Christianity. If the critical testing of the evidence be separated from the ultimate judgment of value upon its implications, the analysis of the documents will yield definite results. When these have been attained and their nature is known, the question of their value or truth-content must be decided in the light of all the considerations that rightfully enter into this issue. With this distinction in mind our investigation will be concerned first of all with the documents and their reasonable implications.

The documents which throw light upon the pre-Pauline Christian faith and the place of the resurrection in it are composed of two groups,—the Synoptic Gospels and Acts; and the Pauline Epistles. The witness of the latter is important not only because of the inference which it justifies: there were some things that were in debate between Paul and members of the Church in Jerusalem, but upon neither his Christology nor the place of the resurrection in it is there the slightest trace of disagreement or the least indication that he was conscious of advocating a view peculiar to himself. It is important also because of Paul's explicit statement of what he had received concerning Jesus,—His death, His burial, His resurrection the third day, and His

has emphasized the importance of the Hellenistic element in the Jerusalem Church for the world-mission of Christianity. Maurenbrecher however attributes to this element not the origin—this, in agreement with the “liberal” view, he assigns to the experience of Peter—but the modification of the primitive faith in the resurrection or rather in the nature of the person of whom this was believed by both elements of the Church, the Galilean and the Jerusalem Hellenistic.²⁵ Heitmüller’s contention is valuable for its positive rather than its negative elements. Historically Hellenistic Christianity mediated between the primitive community and the Gentile Church in which Paul labored; but it is not likely that Paul’s knowledge of primitive Christian faith was limited to or seriously modified by what he received through this channel. Heitmüller however does not affirm that the belief in the resurrection of Jesus was peculiar to or originated by Hellenistic Christianity. He admits that Paul’s statement²⁶ shows that the original Apostles preached the same Gospel, including the resurrection. His claim therefore regarding Paul’s derivation of the tradition recorded in the opening verses of the fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians—although unlikely in any exclusive sense—does not affect the inference in regard to the existence of a similar faith in the primitive community. This Heitmüller admits, with a qualification only of emphasis; as compared with Hellenistic Christianity and with Paul, the primitive community, as the sources of the Synoptic Gospels show, had a larger interest in the life of Jesus than Paul’s summary of the content of the Gospel would suggest. Both things however are quite possible in the same community; for the summary statement does not deny the fuller historical background, and interest in the elements enumerated by Paul can scarcely have been lacking in the primitive community or have constituted the distinctive feature of Hellenistic Christianity. J. Weiss says:²⁷

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 55 f.

²⁶ 1 Cor. xv. 11.

²⁷ *Das Urchristentum*, 1914, p. 2.

Synoptic Gospels are earlier and were current in the Jerusalem Church in the sixties. These sources—according to the widely current “Two-Document” hypothesis—were some form of the Gospel of Mark and “Q”—a source composed chiefly of the discourse material common to the Gospel of Matthew and the Gospel of Luke. But in regard to the Gospel of Luke and especially for that section in which the passion of Jesus is recorded, this hypothesis generally posits a third source, commonly referred to by the symbol “L”. These three sources—Mk, Q, and L—had already assumed literary form in Greek prior to their embodiment in the Synoptic Gospels and in turn depend upon and reproduce an earlier oral tradition of the Jerusalem Church. There is still difference of opinion about the extent of Q. Some affirm, others deny that it included a narrative of the passion. It is not perfectly certain therefore whether on this hypothesis there are two or three sources underlying the Synoptic account of the death and resurrection of Jesus. This however does not affect the main issue; for whether of triple or of twofold derivation the Synoptic Gospels bear witness in twofold form to the belief of the early Church in the death and resurrection of Jesus. The text of the Gospel of Mark, it is true, has been transmitted in an incomplete form; but the loss concerns only the narrative of events subsequent to the resurrection and even for these a form of tradition different from that contained in the Gospel of Luke is preserved in the Gospel of Matthew.

The source used in the opening chapters of Acts bears witness to the same facts and by its account of the speeches of Peter testifies also to the conception of Jesus which obtained in the early Church as the result of the experience upon which this faith is, in this and the sources of the Synoptic Gospels, said to have rested.

But what does this represent? According to Heitmüller the sources of the Synoptic Gospels represent the view of Jesus that was current in the Jerusalem Church in the fifties

or sixties.³³ Back of this these sources do not carry us. Still, this view must have had some justification. It is given not in the form of opinion about Jesus but in the form of a narrative of His life and teaching. Moreover we can not disregard the fact that these sources had their origin in a religious community organized by a definite principle which must have served not only as a principle of differentiation but as the principle of an historical continuity which reached back certainly into the pre-Pauline period. For before his conversion Paul had made havoc of the faith and persecuted the Church of God.³⁴ This principle can have been no other than the Messiah-faith which Paul knew and attacked; and this faith from the beginning must have included the resurrection, for not only is there no trace in any of the sources that it was ever lacking; there is no indication of its subsequent introduction; and it certainly formed part of the faith to which Paul was converted within four or five years of Jesus' death. The Gospels and Acts record what was continuously believed in the Christian community to have constituted the factual basis of its organizing principle and thus to have been the cause of its faith. The implications of these documents on any reasonable view of their date fully justify the belief that the resurrection of Jesus entered into and formed part of the faith of the primitive Christian community from its inception.

But how soon was this? Certainly prior to Paul's conversion and subsequent to Jesus' death. Acts dates the first expansive movement of the Christian faith in Jerusalem from the feast of Pentecost, fifty days after the Passover at which Jesus suffered. But belief in the resurrection of Jesus had existed before this according both to Paul and to the Gospels. In both the resurrection is definitely associated with the third day after the crucifixion; and while Paul

³³ Article "Jesus Christus" in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, herausgegeben von Schiele und Zscharnack, ii (1912), pp. 356 ff; reprinted in his *Jesus*, 1913, pp. 28 ff; cf. Warfield in this REVIEW, 1914 (xii), pp. 315 ff.

³⁴ Gal. i. 13, 23; cf. Acts ix. 21.

does not indicate the exact time of the first appearances, these occurred according to the Gospels on that day. The resurrection faith thus antedated the beginnings of the Church in Jerusalem, for it was in this faith that the Church was founded. This is generally admitted. What was the cause of this faith according to the historical evidence? Are the two elements—the death and the resurrection of Jesus—closely related in the Gospels and Acts and combined with the note of transcendence as they are in Paul? What explanation does the evidence in its entirety require in the sphere of values?

ORIGIN AND VALIDITY OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

The documents are explicit in describing Jesus Himself as the cause or responsible author of the belief in His resurrection. The empty grave is a fact attested by all the Gospels and formed an element in at least two of the three principal sources underlying the Synoptic Gospels, Mk, and L. But this was not the only or the chief cause of the new faith. Still, alleged analogies do not weaken its silent testimony or invalidate its positive interpretation. Gunkel says:³⁵

The history of religion teaches us that Jesus Christ is by no means the only or the first being of a divine nature in whose resurrection from the dead men have believed. The belief in the death and rising again of gods is indeed well known to the East in many places. We know it from Egypt, where it is most of all at home, but also from Babylonia, Syria and Phoenicia. In Crete a tomb of Zeus was shown—of course an empty tomb.

Paul does not mention the empty grave and his silence is thought to have peculiar significance, indicating the later introduction of this feature in the resurrection story and showing also a more spiritual conception of the resurrection itself. The mention of the burial by Paul however makes both of these inferences unlikely. But Paul too like the Gospels grounds the resurrection-faith in an activity of

³⁵ *Zum religionsgeschichtliche Verständnis des Neuen Testaments*, 1903, p. 77; quoted by Moulton, *Religions and Religion*, 1913, p. 33.

Jesus' own thought and in the experience of His disciples. A reference to His death is introduced in a general way in the Gospel of Mark at an early period in the Galilean ministry.³⁹ The Gospel of John, which alone recounts an earlier ministry in Jerusalem and Judea, reports a saying, the reference of which to His death and resurrection was subsequently understood by the disciples.⁴⁰ In this Gospel also a saying of John the Baptist is recorded in which, with prophetic insight, the Baptist testified to the sacrificial character of the Messiah's work.⁴¹ In the midst of the Galilean ministry the two elements appear together in the sign of Jonah in the form preserved by the Gospel of Matthew.⁴² But from the time of Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi, when Jesus began to instruct His disciples explicitly about His suffering, the two are frequently associated and are so related both in the passion narratives of the Gospels and in the opening chapters of Acts.

The note of transcendence, as in Paul, is not wanting in the Gospels; on the contrary, it constitutes their distinctive feature, permeates their entire structure and is present in their earliest sources. Apart from the Fourth Gospel and the infancy sections of the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, which only increase without changing the character of the evidence, the Gospel of Mark and the material common to the Gospels of Matthew and Luke—or the sources of the Synoptic Gospels on the basis of the narrowest definition of their content—witness explicitly to a conception of Jesus' person which transcends the bounds of human nature and partakes of the divine. In the Gospel of Mark this appears not simply in the Messianic function, endowment with the Spirit, miracles in the sphere of nature and authority in the spiritual sphere, but especially in Jesus' confession before the High Priest.⁴³ When asked, "Art thou the Christ, the

³⁹Mk. ii. 20.

⁴⁰Jn. ii. 19.

⁴¹Jn. i. 29.

⁴²Mt. xii. 40.

⁴³Mk. xiv. 62.

Son of the Blessed?" Jesus said: "I am, and ye shall see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of power and coming with the clouds of heaven." In the Gospels of Matthew and Luke⁴⁴ there is another equally significant confession in which Jesus gives expression to His consciousness of an intimate, mutual and reciprocal knowledge of God, involving sameness not simply of ethical disposition but of being, and with this also a unique and exclusive function as the source of God's self-revelation. It is difficult to escape in these confessions the clear intimations of transcendence. In the presence of the latter Heitmüller⁴⁵ acknowledges that the consciousness there described passes beyond the limits of an ordinary human consciousness, as it does also that of the prophet, and reaches up to the supernormal. Its implications thus seem to him weird, verging on the pathological; but from this conclusion he is compelled to draw back by the evident tokens of Jesus' sanity in the Gospel account of His life and teaching. Loofs⁴⁶ also has recently argued that the Gospel portraiture of Jesus transcends the limits of mere humanity; and the "radical" criticism⁴⁷ is insistent that this element—the transcendent—is not only present and dominant in the Gospels but is utterly destructive of the human.

The two confessions have in common the reference by Jesus to Himself of designations filled with profound meaning. In the one the self-designation "Son of Man", frequently upon His lips in the Gospels, had been enriched in its Old Testament and pre-Christian usage with high ideas both of the nature and of the function of the person who should bear it in the future. These involved not only pre-existence but the exercise of the divine prerogative as judge of the world. In this sense and with particular reference to His future authority Jesus often—as He does here—used it of Himself. The other self-designation, the "Son", is used absolutely and appears by its relation to the designation of

⁴⁴ Mt. xi. 27; Lk. x. 22.

⁴⁵ *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, iii, p. 375; *Jesus*, p. 71.

⁴⁶ *What is the Truth about Jesus Christ?* 1913.

⁴⁷ Kalthoff, J. M. Robertson, W. B. Smith, A. Drews, P. Jensen, etc.

God as "Father"—also used absolutely—not to be a generalization from Messianic titles such as "Son of David", Son of God", or the conception of the theocratic King as the type of the Messiah, but to spring directly out of Jesus' consciousness of the immediacy and intimacy of His relation to God.

The Jesus whose resurrection was believed in by Paul and by the primitive community was thus in common believed to be a person not only charged with a certain function but particularly qualified by nature to accomplish it. The Christian Messiah-faith was of the transcendent type. Its object was Jesus, the risen Messiah, the exalted Lord. The Gospel story of the earthly life and teaching, of the death and resurrection of Jesus was written that Christians might know, in the words of Luke, the surety or factual basis of this faith. In the Gospels the historical interest is indeed more extensive but not more vital than in Paul; and the interest of value and meaning is equally central, for to each alike it is just the transcendent Jesus, the Jesus of whom not only the death but the resurrection could be truly predicated who is at once the object of Christian faith and the source of all its blessedness and hope. Both elements, the historical reality and the transcendent nature of its object, enter into Christian faith; and the elimination or modification of either is destructive of or prejudicial to it. The historical element is epitomized for Paul in its supreme moment when Jesus suffered in His human nature and rose again. Paul affirms the whole by its characteristic part; and the central place he gives to this part corresponds with the teleological trend of the Gospel narratives. Jesus' earthly life was as real for Paul as it is in the Gospels and not less intensely real because, being purposive, its end to Paul appeared realized and the whole summarized in the great and mysteriously profound experiences with which His stay upon earth terminated.

But the interests of the common Christian faith are vitally related also to the reality of the transcendent element in its apprehension and appreciation of Jesus which ex-

His power immediately be admitted, then the evidence that He has revealed Himself and manifested His power in Jesus Christ is conclusive. For the evidence shows that Christian faith was caused by Jesus Himself and that He Himself was conscious of being possessed by nature of that transcendence which is the object of the element in it that gives to this faith its distinctive quality. The truth of the Christian faith on this premise is grounded in the reality personally present in Jesus Christ as represented in the New Testament,—in His possession in Himself of a nature which it truly apprehends and which is truly portrayed in the New Testament. His person—the reality which was present in Him—is thus the final explanation of the origin of Christian faith in its fundamental and distinctive elements. The formal elements in the expression of this faith, differing with different individuals, may well have had a literary history, whether we are now able to trace it in every particular or not. In the Gospels the title “Son of Man” is frequent and by its earlier usage and associations lent itself readily to the expression of an aspect of the element of transcendence in Jesus’ consciousness. The *κύριος* title, strikingly pervasive in Paul, was possessed by antecedent usage in the Old Testament of an association which rendered it appropriate and congenial to the expression of his thought of Jesus, while to many to whom he wrote an old familiar form was charged with a new and deeper meaning. But these and other titles of Jesus, whatever their history and usage, have a meaning well indicated in the New Testament and set forth, in one or another aspect, the common object of faith in fundamental agreement. In brief, from the point of view of theism—of belief in God—from which alone there is the possibility of the supernatural in history and therefore of the reality corresponding to the element of transcendence in the Christian Messiah-faith, the New Testament evidence of its actuality centers in the person of Jesus and upon the reality of this manifestation of the supernatural grounds Christianity as a religion of redemption. In this account of the origin and

title "Son of David" and adapting to Him the Jewish apocalyptic figure of the "Son of Man".

But when and how did this occur? Bousset continues:⁵³

After Jesus' death the Messiah-faith of the community could take no other [than the transcendent] form, and its birth in this new form must be dated from the vision-experiences in the souls of the disciples by which they were convinced that Jesus lived, by which the conviction was produced that in spite of death and apparent defeat—rather indeed by means of this—He had become the transcendent Messiah in glory, who would come again to judge the world. The factors that contributed to this result were various; the determining factor was the incomparable, powerful and indestructible impression which Jesus' personality left in the souls of the disciples and which was more powerful than open shame and death, misery and destruction. This state was intensified through the experience of the blasting of all their hopes by the unexpected overthrow and sudden collapse of their Hero and Master. It is a psychological law that such a disillusionment, involving the highest expectations, under the force of brutal fact, after a time of despair usually issues in a revulsion—or can do so—in which the human soul raises itself victoriously with a courageous "but nevertheless" to a state which makes the impossible possible. But then it is furthermore of tremendous significance that a conception of the Messiah had already been formed in the contemporaneous Apocalyptic which seemed to contain the solution for the altogether dark riddle which the disciples had experienced. The disciples of Jesus saved the hopes that had inspired them during His life time by fashioning them in higher and mightier terms. They cast about their Master this ready-made royal mantle, put upon His head the most magnificent crown available and made confession of Jesus, the Son of Man, who through suffering and death had passed into glory.

And again Bousset says:⁵⁴

It was only by placing behind the Gospel [-message] of Jesus the figure of the heavenly Son of Man, the ruler and judge of the world whose glory, but half hidden and concealed, shone transparently through the story of His life,—only by placing Him in a great divine process of redemption of which He appeared as the crown and completion, that the community made effective the portraiture of Jesus of Nazareth. For the purely historical is never of itself effective but only the living symbol in which, transformed, an actual religious conviction is presented. And a

⁵³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 20 ff. The first part of the quotation is a summary and not an exact translation; but it reproduces the thought.

⁵⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 91 f.

time which was by no means animated solely by simple ethical or simple religious ideas but by all kinds of more or less fantastical eschatological expectations, by belief in miracle and prophecy, in a near, unprecedented, special intervention of God in the course of nature and history, in manifold means of salvation and Messiahs, in devil and demons, and the approaching triumph of God over hostile powers,—such a time needed just the portraiture of Jesus that the first disciples made, and received its eternal truth in the many-colored garment that formed its temporal clothing.

In agreement with Heitmüller, Bousset conceives of the Hellenistic communities of Antioch, Damascus and Tarsus as mediating between Paul and the primitive Christian community. Paul's Christology also is essentially transcendent but its form was influenced by the place and title which Jesus held in these communities. This is indicated primarily by the *κύριος* title, and the influence of Hellenism may be traced especially in Paul's Pneumatology which stands in intimate relation with his Christology. The tradition which Paul repeats in the fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians was derived from the Antiochan Church and only indirectly from the Jerusalem Church.

The sufficiency of Bousset's explanation of the origin of the Christian faith is primarily conditioned by its naturalistic principle. This underlies the whole argument and finds incidental but clear expression in the remark with which the treatment of the origin of the belief in the resurrection on the third day is introduced. Bousset says:⁵⁵

In as much as every explanation of this period of time by means of an event that happened on Easter Sunday and was known to the Apostle is excluded in a critical consideration of the tradition of the resurrection in Paul, we are confronted with the problem of its derivation from some other source.

Even Brückner, from the same naturalistic premise, points out the inconclusiveness of Bousset's psychological explanation of the origin of the new faith. Brückner says:⁵⁶

The manner of the impression of Jesus on His disciples should have been more accurately defined. In particular, the offense of

⁵⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁵⁶ *Theologische Rundschau*, 1914 (xvii), p. 173.

Jesus' death on the cross can not have been removed by such psychological experiences.

And with this reference to the death of Jesus, Brückner indicates another weakness in Bousset's theory. Brückner says:⁵⁷

It is certain that the idea of the suffering Messiah of later Judaism can not be shown to have existed at that time; and it is an unsolved enigma that the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah appears as its Scriptural proof so seldom and so late. . . . Moreover the definite dogmatic statement that the resurrection occurred on the third day or after three days can scarcely have developed, as Bousset thinks, from the common popular belief that the soul of a dead person remained near the body for three days. Certainly underlying this is the general dogmatic datum that the dying Hero rises on the third day or after three days.

Brückner in his criticism of Bousset thus approaches the view of Maurenbrecher,—or a position intermediate between the "liberal" and the "mythological" interpretations. This view has the advantage which comes from combining the real and the ideal, the personal and the dogmatic, the actual and the mythological. Maurenbrecher insists that the impression of the historical Jesus does not explain the character of the faith which followed the vision-experiences of Peter and the other disciples. These visions must have had in them the element which distinguishes the resultant faith, and this is the transcendent conception of the Messiah in which Jewish and mythological ideas were combined. The Jewish alone will not explain the resultant faith, for this involved the ideas of death and resurrection, both of which are foreign to the Jewish and characteristic of the mythological conception. And it is just this combination of ideas and their application to the historical Jesus that supplied the motive power which differentiated Christianity from other religions of the time, qualified it for its world-mission and resulted in its ultimate triumph. Maurenbrecher also adds to the psychological derivation of the resurrection by antecedent influence of this combination of ideas a historico-

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

national factor. In agreement with Bousset and Brückner he insists that the cause of this faith must have been implicit in the disciple's consciousness prior to its origin. He supplements the impressionistic memory-motive of Bousset's acting upon the Jewish apocalyptic conception of the Messiah not only by the mythological idea of the dying and rising God but also by the hypothesis of a special disposition in the mental inheritance of Jesus' disciples wrought in them through the national experiences of the people to which they belonged. Of the disciples confronted by the overwhelming fact of Jesus's death he says:⁵⁸

At this point it appears that [the mental disposition of] these men was determined by the development of the people from which they had sprung. For centuries this people had been trained in the ability to take from every disillusionment new hope and new illusions. How frequently in the last eight centuries had the great "Now" [of God's intervention] sounded in its history. The appearance of Jesus in Capernaum and the hour of exaltation on the Mount of Olives were not new in the background of its experience. They corresponded with a view which both before and afterward influenced hundreds of men. Without this discipline of their instincts, the recovery of the disciples after Jesus' death would not have happened. But since the recovery from illusion was a commonplace thing among this people, so now from the terrible catastrophe hope was quickened again and all the more exultantly. What the disciples experienced in the appearances of the risen [Lord] was thus no individual occurrence that might have happened anywhere and at any time. It was the product of the history of this people under whose influence these individuals had been formed. This century-long training of the feeling and volition characteristic of the individual constitutes the necessary condition precedent upon which the very possibility of the experience of the appearances of the risen [Lord] by the Galilean Sea was contingent.

The multiplication of causes to account for the faith of the disciples is indicative of the insufficiency of the separate elements of the theory; and their combination is neither adequately grounded nor possessed of any unifying principle in the conditions precedent to the result to be explained. Memory of Jesus there was; and the impression of His person

⁵⁸ *Von Nazareth nach Golgatha*, 1909, p. 262.

upon His disciples during His earthly life was undoubtedly profound. But this alone will not explain the triumph of their faith nor its form. Apocalyptic Messianism, which was also a condition precedent, fails equally to account for the element of suffering or explain the form of the new faith. The pagan idea of the dying and rising God is non-Messianic, anti-historical, and there is not only no evidence of its influence but rather of the absence of influence upon the thought of the disciples prior to Jesus' death. Those therefore are more consistent who seek to escape the difficulties of this explanation of the resurrection-faith by eliminating not simply the resurrection but the death, and thus the person, of Jesus from the sphere of history. But this view, like the myth which it substitutes for historical fact, is—not partially but consistently—anti-historical, and is by the evidence condemned as untrue.

But if the "liberal" impressionistic theory, with the help of the pre-Christian Jewish transcendental Messiah conception, fails to explain the element of suffering and resurrection in the Christian faith; and the intermediate theory of Maurenbrecher, with the help of a historico-national psychology and the mythological motive, fails to ground the mediation of the idea of the dying and rising God in the circles in which Christian faith arose—and Maurenbrecher offers no evidence of its influence but bases his whole contention on the possibility of its presence in the semi-pagan circles of Galilee—there are but two alternatives; the mythological or "radical" theory which eliminates the historical element in Christian faith by transforming Jesus Himself into a pre-Christian myth; and the view of the New Testament which combines the two elements, the historical and the transcendent, and grounds them in the reality which was manifest in the person of Jesus Christ. The "radical" view is disproven by substantial evidence, and serves a useful purpose by exhibiting in concrete form the *reductio ad absurdum* of the naturalistic theories. The other—the New Testament view—is frankly supernaturalistic and ex-

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

The Threshold of Religion. By R. R. MARETT, M.A., D.Sc., Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College, Oxford; University Reader in Social Anthropology; President of the Folk Lore Society. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1914. 8vo; pp. xxxii, 224. \$1.50.

We have here eight essays. They have all, or almost all, been published before. They are now issued, after but slight revision, in a single volume with an "Introduction" and an "Index." The titles of the essays are I. "Pre-Animistic Religion", II. "From Spell to Prayer", III. "Is Taboo a Negative Magic", IV. "The Conception of Mana", V. "A Sociological View of Comparative Religion", VI. "Savage Supreme Beings and The Bull-Roader", VII. "The Birth of Humility", VIII. "In a Prehistoric Sanctuary".

"The papers here brought together bear one and all on the same general topic, namely, the nature of the experience involved in rudimentary religion." "Again, all of them alike illustrate the same general thesis, namely, that much of what has hitherto been classed as magic—so far as it has been noticed at all—is really religion of an elementary kind." "As regards method, while the author's general attitude is that of an anthropologist, his special interest is psychological. He approaches the history of religion as a student of Man in evolution. But his more immediate aim is to translate a type of religious experience remote from our own into such terms of our consciousness as may best enable the nature of that which is so translated to appear for what it is in itself." In a word, "he concentrates his attention on the psychological analysis of rudimentary religion."

His analysis of rudimentary religion sets forth from the assumption that, as a form of experience, it develops mainly within a sphere of its own. It belongs, as it were, to a wonder-world, from which the workaday world is parted by a sufficiently well-marked frontier. Why there should be this discontinuity pervading the activities and affairs of savage life the writer does not seek to explain so much as to describe. His purpose is to set forth "what sort of an experience it is—how "it feels"—to live in such a wonder-world. Such are the subject, the method, and the aim of these papers. That they are well done is only what was to be expected from the author's position and reputation. It is not always, however, or often, that scientific and technical essays are written with such grace, brightness and, we may add, humility. Dr. Marett has succeeded in rendering interesting, and

all this. It is as though one were to argue, not that a protective tariff was unsound economically, but that when rightly understood it was the free trade position. Such reasoning the man of the street would stigmatize as both unsound and dishonest; and with all due respect to our distinguished author we are constrained to ask whether in his zeal for modernity he has not laid himself open to the same criticism.

Is, however, Professor Eucken right philosophically? Granted that Christianity is outrun and that we cannot fall back on it any more than we can on monism or pantheism—how about the fundamental principles of the early universal religion to which he would have us return and which, in his view, constitute the Christianity which abides? When we examine these principles we find that they constitute, not religion, but the capacity for it, the condition of it. As such, they are, of course, indispensable. They are, then, a part of Christianity, in that it presupposes them. To believe on Christ one must have a religious nature. But this does not imply that our universal religious nature can ever take the place of religion and still less that it can supplement and make good a dying Christianity. In a word, the capacity for religion presupposes the revelation of religion. Were God to speak from heaven, we could not hear without the spiritual ear, but the spiritual ear could not help us if he did not speak. Unless, therefore, religion be used in a sense quite different from that in which it is ordinarily employed, its universal principle cannot take the place of Christianity or of any other of its historic manifestations. That is, religion and revelation are bound up together, and revelation in proportion as it becomes adequately definite will be historic.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Assurance of Immortality. By HARRY EMERSON FOSDICK. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1913. Pp. 141. \$1.00.

This is a delightful book in which the author has accomplished a great thing by putting the old arguments into such attractive form. A prominent element in its attractiveness is that we find on its every page the freshness and pleasing virility of our author's public utterance. It is persuasive in every paragraph. One thing the student misses is the definite references. In this particular Mr. Fosdick has followed the instincts of public address rather than the opportunity afforded by the essay form. The chief defect of the book is its modified view of the Deity of Jesus which is to be found not so much in open statement as in fair inferences. There is also (pp. 12, 18, 109, 112, 126, 134-5) a favored use of the words "universe" and "world" where one would rather see the word God, which gives some intimation of the type of philosophy in the background.

There are three chapters dealing respectively with the "Significance", the "Possibility", and the "Assurance" of immortality. The outline is followed with fidelity throughout and the reader is seldom left in

with utter carelessness personality, her most precious treasure". An adequate definition of God would make this reasoning superfluous. On page 135 the argument is made to hang on "profoundest instincts" and that is where it must always ultimately rest philosophically. Though one would like to endorse the book in its entirety, so timely and so forceful is it, it is not quite clear that the honest moral man of the "preface" will experience any great advance toward Christlikeness, as indicated in the closing pages, by the acceptance of immortality either on merely a philosophical basis or as merely the pragmatic solution of a spiritual exigency. This fallacy is all the more significant because it is related to the deeper fallacy concerning the person of Christ. It seems assumed possible to have a divine personality without a divine person. Much is made of the "belief" of Jesus in immortality. "Jesus never stopped to argue but taking it for granted as an immediate and unquestionable intuition lived as though it were undoubtedly true." "Jesus lived immortality as one might play Mozart perfectly." There appears nowhere the recognition that Jesus lived in the full consciousness of immortality, much less in the consciousness of eternity, as when He said, "Before Abraham was I am" and as in the promised abiding Presence, and unquestionably in his high priestly prayer in the seventeenth of John. We cannot be quite satisfied to say that Jesus "believed" nor that He "assumed" and "practiced" immortality, nor to limit his knowledge to the "intuitional" nor to particularize in any other way. We can never over evaluate the teaching and example of Jesus but there is something greater than these. It is Jesus Himself. Not even in so great an interest as the assurance of immortality can we afford to neglect the Deity of Jesus nor leave it to be inferred that his deity, whatever He has, is an attained Deity, which is no Deity.

Consensus of opinion as to possibilities of immortality at most can be only confirmatory. On the other hand, consensus of desire for immortality is compelling. It is not merely an intellectual apprehension of philosophical conclusion but it is the whole soul seeking that which it *must* find. Our author (111) not only does not consider this a good line of argument but characterizes it as "utter perversion" and "caricature" and prefers to hold that it is of greater consequence that the "creative process" should not be thwarted than that the crown of creation should be crushed in the highest experience and deepest need. Furthermore if "creative process" means anything at all it is impossible that it should be thwarted. Practically Mr. Fosdick pins his faith to the intelligence in the cosmos. Though the book touches on the goodness of God, the "if" might well be changed to "since" (p. 115). The argument nowhere rises as high as the legitimate argument based on the famous verse from the Psalm, "Thou openest thy hand and satisfiest the desire of every living thing." Real assurance of immortality must rest ultimately on the goodness of God. The philosophies which do not have a conscious, good God have no immortality to offer which is worth the having. Full assurance of

hope of an individual personal immortality can be found only in faith in "Jesus Christ who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the gosepl."

Princeton.

CHARLES MCKEE CANTRALL.

Vital Problems of Religion. By THE REV. J. R. COHU, Rector of Ashton Clinton, Sometime Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford. With an Introduction by THE RIGHT REV. THE LORD BISHOP OF S. ASAPH. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. 1914. 8vo; pp. xiv, 289.

No one will be disposed to question the propriety of the title of these chapters. Evolution, evil, religion and science, personality, freedom, conscience, religion and theology, God,—all are certainly "problems" of religion, and furthermore, all are "vital". They are not *all* that is vital in our religious construction of the universe, but each one is of tremendous significance. Perhaps the best that Mr. Cohu has done, is to make us see more clearly their intellectual importance.

Under ordinary conditions, it is unfair to an author to cull scattered quotations from his book and use these as criteria for determining the ultimate character of his conclusions. But now and then a writer appears who gathers his thought up into terse statements, often semi-epigrammatic, which give him away, stylistic straws showing which way his theology is blowing. Mr. Cohu has this art. Thus: "The Bible contains God's Word, but all of it is not God's Word" (p. 23). "We must spiritualize matter, not materialize mind" (p. 44). "What enters the heart must also satisfy the head. We cannot keep our heart-beliefs in one watertight compartment of our personality and our head-beliefs in another" (p. 222). "God and humanity are essentially at one" (p. 273). "Evolution shows animals can pass into men" (p. 276). "The Fall was akin to a Rise" (p. 283).

1. In sympathy Mr. Cohu is a pronounced evolutionist of the rather positive type. His assurance here is strikingly prominent. There is not the slightest vestige of doubt. "Missing Links" and "unbridgeable gulfs" do not occur in his theory. Not that he attempts any rational vindication of evolution: it is simply accepted as a thoroughly established conclusion of modern science (p. 102). This of course has its effect on the author's treatment of other subjects; as, for example, his view of evil (pp. 68-69), of inspiration, and of revelation (pp. 131, 134), and redemption.

2. The language in places is unguardedly pantheistic. The *language*, we say; and it is *unguarded*. For Mr. Cohu does not mean to be a pantheist, however pantheizing his language may be. For instance, the statement that "Our mind is God's Mind welling up in us" (pp. 129, 198), is open to the charge of the pantheistic taint, were it not that Mr. Cohu expressly repudiates Pantheism, clearly asserting his belief in a Divine immanence that in no way absorbs or destroys human personality (pp. 248-254. Cf. p. 67).

3. Mr. Cohu has a moral influence theory of the Atonement. His championship of this view is somewhat bold. God saves us from

our sin by the appeal of the cross. He wins us back to Himself as a mother woos her wayward child. The actual forgiveness of sin was not *effected* by Christ's suffering. It was only *revealed* by Him (p. 266). The cross is not a propitiation, or a substitution, or a ransom; it is merely a revelation of a way, of the way back to the great Heart of God, a way which we may travel ourselves; that is, if we have strength to walk it. Here Mr. Cohu is forced to abandon the great soteriological conceptions of the New Testament. Moralism is ever a diluted gospel. It has an ethic but not a dynamic. Its prescription is vain because its diagnosis is false. You cannot have a true soteriology and a false anthropology. Nor can you appeal to a dead man, and even appeals to the sick are commonly regarded as poor medicine. The humanitarian atonement is not a real atonement: it is simply an exhibition. New Testament soteriology never teaches that men are saved by "all that is highest and holiest in human experience" (p. 266).

4. Going further back, Mr. Cohu has a philosophy that comes perilously close to Berkeleyan idealism. The facts of science, he says, are not objective. "The only objective facts we know are our own sensations and thoughts" (p. 120). Color and sound have no real existence apart from our mental perceptions. "It is we who manufacture the color of a dahlia and the boom of a bell. . . . Our whole idea of the Universe, from a dewdrop to the Sun, is built up of mind-manufactured sensations, etc." (p. 111). The very existence of matter as an "independent entity" is "a gratuitous hypothesis" (p. 113). All of which shows the extreme to which Mr. Cohu is willing to go in his zealous opposition to materialism. It is "spiritualizing matter" rather violently.

Despite the above extremes, Mr. Cohu's book is comparatively free from the dogmatic extravagancies which so often characterize writers who hold similar views. To be specific: he never stoops to the petty dogmatism that makes science and religion foes equally irreconcilable and equally bigoted. He insists that each is supreme in its own sphere, and both deal with universal truth (pp. 95-97, 99). He has the correct idea of human personality as being the whole man (p. 141). In this chapter (V.) the study of the subconscious self is interesting, and might with value have been prolonged (pp. 150-154). He never rants against the legacies of Patristic theology (pp. 230-231). He does not encourage the fashionable dualism between the head and the heart, our religion must have its intellectual interpretation (pp. 222, 226). The criticism of Determinism, as in fact the whole discussion of Freedom (Ch. VI), is not so conclusive.

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Der hebräische Pentateuch der Samaritaner, herausgegeben von AUGUST FREIHERRN VON GALL. Erster Teil. Prolegomena und Genesis

the circumstances and that the fact that he gives all the variants, places the reader in a position to study the text for himself and accept or reject the editor's text as he sees fit.

The arrangement of the material is very convenient. The text occupies about the upper third of the page. It is written in Hebrew characters for convenience sake, and chapters and verses are given in correspondence with Ginsburg's *Biblia Hebraica*, ed. 2. Immediately below is given a list of the signatures of the manuscripts which contain it. The critical notes follow in three groups: the first contains variants in the consonantal text, the second gives data regarding critical and vowel signs, insofar as used in the manuscripts, the third deals with the interpunction. The text itself is purely consonantal. The only interpunction which is retained is the division into the *ῥִצְּ* or sections, which correspond with the 'open' and 'closed sections' of the Massoretic Text and which are carefully noted in the Samaritan manuscripts.

One has but to glance at the Plates, which contain facsimile reproductions of parts of six different manuscripts to realize what an arduous labor the collation of such material must have been and we may be thankful to the Freiherr von Gall that he was willing to devote ten years of his life to so difficult and at the same time so necessary a task.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

Root-Determinatives in Semitic Speech. A contribution to Semitic Philology. By SOLOMON THEODORE HALÉVY HURWITZ, PH.D. [Contributions to Oriental History and Philology, No. vi.] New York: Columbia University Press. 1913. 8vo; cloth, pp. xxii + 113. \$1.50 net.

This monograph is an amplification of a thesis submitted in 1910 to the Faculty of Columbia University. In it Dr. Hurwitz discusses an important aspect of the 'biliteral theory' of the origin of Semitic roots.

Dr. Hurwitz accepts the view that "the triliteral root was developed from the biliteral in a manner analogous to that by which the pluriliteral was evolved from the triliteral" (p. 37) viz. by the addition of a determinative, i.e. of a pre-, in-, or sufformative, and consequently devotes a considerable part of the monograph (Chap. 2) to a consideration of the function of this determinative in the formation of pluriliterals. As a result of this investigation he concludes that "the consonants most active as formatives were the liquids, the gutturals, and the semi-vowels *y* or *w*, any one of which occurs either as a prefix or a suffix to the root, or as an infix after either of the first two radicals. The labials *b* and *p*, the dental *d*, and the occasional palatal *q* are found only as sufformatives to the triliteral stem. The sibilants *s* and *š* are constantly used as preformatives or sufformatives. The dental *t* is also used commonly as a preformative and occasionally as an infix; while in the later language it became also a sufformative, this use being developed from the former sub-

conservative than much which has been written upon it. This is shown in several ways. Thus he disregards "Indo-Germanic phenomena in the main body of the discussion" with a view to avoiding errors into which earlier advocates of the theory have frequently fallen, believing that a kinship between these languages "though often postulated and theoretically possible is yet entirely unproved" (p. 7). He also narrows the scope of the discussion by carefully distinguishing between "root-determination" and "root-differentiation" two processes which are and should be treated as distinct and confines himself almost solely to a discussion of the former. With reference to the latter he lays down the principle "that in the process of root-differentiation at most, only two consonants of the first root can shift to form a new root, while the third remains constant; and this principle affords an additional proof of an original biliteral element" (pp. 33-4). Still more indicative of his conservative viewpoint is his contention that "when the proto-Semites were divided into the stocks known in history, the verb-roots had already become wholly or partly triliteralized, while at least some roots had even then been made pluriliteral" (p. 4). He does not believe that in the so-called 'weak stems' we have survivals of the original biliteral stem, holding rather with Lambert "that *סב* and *מת* are later than **sababa* and **maut* and their biliteral character is, biologically speaking a reversion to type" (p. 17). This position is as he points out the reverse of that held by the 'biliteral school'.

Such considerations as these will tend to induce the thoughtful reader to give a careful scrutiny to Dr. Hurwitz' theory of the 'sub-conscious biliteral root'. "Briefly to summarize the situation", he argues "it can scarcely be denied that a comparison of such kindred forms as: *רָכַךְ*, *רָכָא*, *רָכָה*, 'to beat down, trample', *רוּם*, *רוּם*, *רוּם*, 'to be turbulent, roar', *רוּם*, *רוּם*, 'to be silent', and *רוּם*, *רוּם*, and *רוּם*, 'to be hot', legitimately leads to the postulation of a common biliteral base for these various inter-related forms" (p. 13). The further fact that in some forms of the weak verb the weak element is dropped e.g. *רוּם* (perf.), *רוּם*, *רוּם*, and that this also takes place in the formation of denominatives from weak verbs (p. 19 f.) indicates according to the writer that the weak element was regarded as subordinate and as an addition to the primitive biliterate.

Whether we are ready to accept the statement of Dr. Hurwitz that 'the existence of such a prehistoric biliteral can no longer be doubted' or not, it must be admitted, as Professor Gottheil remarks at the conclusion of his brief introductory note that Dr. Hurwitz "has offered a solution that deserves the careful attention and scrutiny of his fellow-workers in the same field".

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

Babylonian Records in the Library of J. Pierpont Morgan, edited by ALBERT T. CLAY. New York: Privately printed. 1912.

copies. The Seminary Library has received them as the gift of Mr. Morgan, an addition to its library treasures which is very welcome.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

Hebräische Poesie. Ein Beitrag zur Rhythmologie, Kritik und Exegese des Alten Testaments von J. W. ROTHSTEIN. Breslau, Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1914. 8vo; viii + 110 S. 3.75 Marks. Bound in cloth 4.75. [Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten Testament, herausgegeben von Rudolf Kittel, Heft 18.]

In this book we have a further defense of the position taken by the author in his "Grundzüge des hebräischen Rhythmus" (1909) that uniform and not so-called 'mixed' metres i.e. measures of varying length, are the rule in lyric poetry. It is directed especially at Professor Staerk of Jena, who takes the other side of the question and in so doing has attacked Professor Rothstein. Staerk in "Ein Hauptproblem der hebräischen Metrik" (B W A T. 13) contends that a number of "good old specimens" of Hebrew poetry, e.g. the Lamech-song, Gen. 4, 23 f., the Oracle to Rebecca, Gen. xxv. 23, the Blessings pronounced by Isaac upon Jacob and Esau Gen. 27, 28 f., v. 39 f. etc., as also the closing verses of the Song of Deborah, Judg. 5. 19 f. prove that mixed metres were employed in lyric poetry. Rothstein in this volume examines the passage cited by Staerk and also brings forward several others and seeks to prove that they support his side of the argument. He does this usually in one or other of two ways, either by textual emendation or though less frequently by denying that the passage under discussion is a lyric one.

The author's fondness for textual emendation appears on practically every page. Where the passage is in his opinion lyric and the metre is not or can not be regarded as uniform he does not hesitate to question the correctness of the text and has recourse to the familiar methods of the "higher critic" to bring about its restoration. Again and again he calls attention to what he considers Staerk's culpable readiness to accept the M.T., despite all the objections which have been raised against it, a readiness which he considers unworthy of a thorough scholar, and he proceeds therefore as a thorough scholar to say all that can be said to its discredit when it serves his purpose to do so, which at the same time seeking to avoid the charge of prejudice and bias in favor of his theory of metrics, a task which is exceedingly difficult under the circumstances.

The question whether the passages under discussion are lyric or not, is of course an important one. Rothstein agrees in the main with Staerk that the Prophets, for example, were not necessarily governed by the strict rules of lyric poetry even in utterances which are clearly of a highly poetic character and he recognizes a rhythmical prose, as it might be called. At the same time he contends that there was a strong tendency to uniformity even in utterances which could not be regarded as strictly lyric. The difficulty here is of course in deciding

whether the passage in question is lyric and as such subject to the alleged laws of lyric poetry or not. When he tells us for example that "it would of course never occur to an intelligent man to require strict formal uniformity of the sentences in Isa. 1, 2-4, which clearly move upon a high rhythmic level and to force them into a definite rhythmic structure by critical alterations" (p. 50)—these verses constitute, be it observed, a good example of mixed metric à la Staerk—we agree at once and are merely surprised at *his* willingness to accept this to us obvious truth. But this does not prevent his asserting that vs. 21 f. of this chapter are lyric—a Lina poem or dirge—and applying to them his principle of metrical uniformity, which application involves textual emendation. We fail to see a difference between these passages sufficient to justify such a procedure. The chief difference as far as we can see is that the one passage can be fairly easily reduced to uniformity, while the other cannot. And when he calls Gen. 2, 23: This is now bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man, a marriage song and proceeds to apply to it as a lyric his law of uniformity, we are obliged to confess that it is difficult for us to gather just what lyric poetry is according to Rothstein. We are a little inclined to the view that it is, practically speaking, anything which is in or can be forced into lyric form i.e. into uniform metre. But to state this conclusion thus baldly would be perhaps to do him an injustice.

It seems clear that Rothstein is first a "critic" and then a "metricist". With him as with Grimme, for example, metrics is of interest primarily because of the help which it gives to the textual and higher critic. The following is therefore significant since it clearly indicates one reason and what is we believe the main reason for his opposition to Staerk's view. "On the fundamental assumption that on occasion the Hebrew Lyric made use of mixed metres, either of choice or of necessity, the science of rhythm certainly loses its importance in textual criticism, because in the same song all rhythmical forms may be brought together and intermingled" (p. 25). In other words, admit that in the Hebrew Lyric mixed metres were used and it then becomes impossible to rely on metrics in textual criticism because irregularity of verse form does not then necessarily point to textual corruption. But this tends to make metrics in the hands of a Rothstein largely a tool of the textual critic and the theory of uniform metres a kind of Procrustean bed on which many a Hebrew measure can be mangled after the approved method of the radical critic. Herein lies the weakness of Rothstein's method. For we are convinced that the theory of Hebrew versification which will most readily commend itself to the unbiased reader is the one which is most in accord with the Massoretic Text.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

Essay I. *A Research into the Origin of the Third Personal Pronoun*
 77א *Epicene in Pentateuch and its connection with Semitic and*

Indo-European Languages. A Contribution to Philological Science by J. IVERACH MUNRO, M.A., United Free Church Minister, Canisbay, formerly Hebrew Tutor, Bala Theological College, North Wales, Author of "The Samaritan Pentateuch and Modern Criticism". Printed by aid of the Earl of Moray Endowment for the promotion of original research, University of Edinburgh. London: Henry Frowde. Oxford Univ. Press. 1912. Pamph., pp. 32. 1s. 6d. net.

This essay is the realization of the hope expressed by Mr. Munro in his "Samaritan Pentateuch" (1911) that he would soon be able to furnish scholars with a full statement of his views regarding the etymology of the epicene pronoun **הוא** and the significance of this etymology. In view of the fact that he claims so much for his investigations, asserting that they furnish not only conclusive proof of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch—"better evidence of its Mosaic authorship than if Moses had signed his name at the foot of every page"—but also no less conclusive proof of the original identity of the Semitic and Indo-European families of languages, it is necessary that his investigations be submitted to a very careful scrutiny. This "hitherto despised pronoun" must be indeed, as he claims, a "rare and precious jewel" if it can furnish us with the key to two of the most mooted questions of criticism and philology. We regret to say that although we heartily approve and commend the desire of the writer to defend the Pentateuch and would gladly welcome any proof, which he can offer of its Mosaic origin, we are unable to feel that he has brought forward in this philological study evidence which can be regarded as in any sense conclusive, but are rather of the opinion that his philological method is so unsound and unscientific as to reflect unfavorably upon his theological conservatism and to do more harm than good to the cause, which he is advocating.

The theory advanced by Mr. Munro is, in so far as we are able to summarize it briefly, as follows. **הוא** for the feminine is a more archaic form than **היא**. The masculine and feminine forms of the pronoun were written in the same way at the time of Moses but were pronounced differently. These pronouns were originally verbal nouns. In the feminine the *waw* has been changed to *yodh* under the influence of a preceding *i*-sound. The earlier form was therefore **היwa'**. But in view of the fact that many primitive nouns have *ai* between the root-letters *hiwa'* may stand for *hai-wa'*. The *'* may be rejected as merely the bearer of the *a*-vowel and if to this form we add the *t* of the feminine ending, the case-ending and the mimation, we obtain the primitive form *hai-wa-tum*. The first syllable of this word contains the original passive-vowel *ai* > *i*. The original active-vowel was *au* > *u*. **הוא** the masculine form goes back therefore to *hau-wum*. *Hauw* is also found in Old-Persian. These diphthongs *au* and *ai*, the *t* of the feminine ending, and the *m* and *n* of the mimation or nunation figured prominently in Indo-European, the *t* of the feminine being used for the neuter. Speaking of the relation existing

he defends with great ardor in this essay, a thesis, which is accepted as proved by Professor Sayce, is to the effect that the vowel *i(ai)* is originally passive and the vowel *u(au)* originally active in the Semitic languages. And as it would seem that one of the strongest arguments which he could find in support of this contention would lie in the use of these vowels in the personal pronoun of the third person singular, it is all the more surprising that he should insist on appending the feminine ending of the noun to a form of the pronoun, which according to his own theory is feminine already by virtue of its vowel. This primitive form *haiwatum* consequently not only does not exist in Semitic, but is built up upon a false theory of the origin of the pronouns. Its existence in proto Indo-European is even more doubtful, if possible. His *alvaθ* is clearly merely a graecizing of *haiwath* and its existence is inferred because it can be split up into *al=ḥ* and *τδ*, a most remarkable demonstration! But since this *θ* is merely the feminine ending in Semitic which as we have seen has no place here, the argument rests solely on the identity of *haiw* (Munro's form!) and Old Persian *hawv*, from which *al=ḥ* would be derived, an identification, which is to say the least very problematical, especially as *haiw* is a hypothetical form (see above) and *hawv* seems to be a demonstrative and not a personal pronoun.

Mr. Munro's argument for the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is given in his "Samaritan Pentateuch", although he has furnished a few additional data in this "Essay". It is essentially the argument from archaisms, which was advanced by Keil a number of years ago. The great difficulty with it is our inadequate acquaintance with the essential facts. It may be that in early times the words for *he* and *she* were pronounced so much alike, viz. *hu* and *hū*, that they could be properly and as a matter of fact were written in the same way, viz. **הוּ**—this view has been ably advocated by König. And it may be that soon after the time of Moses the pronunciation of *hū* was modified to *hī* (written **הִי**)—according to Mr. Munro, this change took place under the influence of the new Canaanite environment. If this is actually the case, the argument for the early date of the Pentateuch is undoubtedly a strong one. But unfortunately we are not in a position to affirm definitely the truth of either of these contentions and consequently cannot afford to make unguarded and unwarranted statements. Despite his great erudition, Mr. Munro unfortunately does not sufficiently distinguish between possibility, probability and proof and with the very best of intentions comes perilously near making the conservative view of the Pentateuch appear ridiculous.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

Reden und Aufsätze. Von D. HERMANN GUNKEL. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1913. Pp. vii, 192. Mk. 4, 80, geb. Mk. 5.00.

Eleven essays are collected in this volume which is dedicated to the

Collegium Academicum of the University of Christiania in acknowledgment of the degree of Doctor of Theology conferred upon the author. Like everything that comes from Dr. Gunkel's pen, they are uniformly interesting and suggestive, some of them brilliant pieces of writing. All of them were published before in various periodicals such as the *Deutsche Rundschau*, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, *Christliche Welt* and other more technical journals. Dr. Gunkel's standpoint as a foremost exponent of the *religionsgeschichtliche* school is too well-known to need description here. It colors every page of this book. In the preface he seeks to correct the sense which has come to be widely attached to the term *religionsgeschichtlich*, as if it meant a method which dealt with the history of religions, whereas, he assures us, in its original intent it merely meant to emphasize the history of religion as an ideal development over against the excess of literary criticism, which had unduly forced the chief end of biblical science into the background. This note of protest against overdoing the critical side, especially in its analytical aspect, recurs in several of the essays. We are told that, while agreement in the main results has been attained, it ceases to exist, when an analysis is carried into the region of detail, the uncertainty increasing at each successive step. This is one of the points in which the school to which Gunkel belongs happens to coincide with the conservative opposition to the Graf-Wellhausen methods. That there are others will appear from the following brief survey of the main import of the eleven papers. The first is devoted to the memory of Bernhard Stade. It describes his eminence within the Wellhausen school, and characteristics as a scholar. It is pointed out that the interdependence along the whole line in his work between the view taken of the development of religious ideas and reconstructive literary criticism at times exposed his results and those of the Wellhausenians in general to reasoning in a circle. Stade's non-receptive attitude toward the recognition of extensive Babylonian and Egyptian influence is also remarked upon. Some of the "universally accepted" conclusions of the Wellhausen school are admitted to be on the point of supersedure, but this is coupled with the confident assertion that the basic structure will stand.

The second paper deals with the Aims and Methods of the Exposition of the Old Testament. It takes a noble view of what the work of the Old Testament exegete at its best ought to be. The disconnectedness of the old method ought to give way to an organic attempt to penetrate beyond linguistic, textual, archaeological detail into the personality of the author. The exegete must, of course, be scholarly equipped, but his greatest requirement is that he shall be a creative or at least re-creative artist. These are golden words, but it is a pity that the whole procedure recommended is meant to stop short with the subjective personality of the biblical writers. For ascertaining through this the mind of the Spirit as auctor primarius Dr. Gunkel has no thought, for, as is once and again stated in these essays, the old theory of inspiration is hopelessly discredited. All that the ideal

exegete can hope to attain by his labors is a History of Biblical Religion not a Biblical Theology of the old-fashioned kind.

The third essay unfolds the principles underlying the author's article on Israelitish Literature in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*. The ideal held up here is that of a *Literaturgeschichte*. It seems to us that the purely accidental view taken of the origin of the Biblical writings precludes not merely the attainment but even the projection of such an ideal. Such a history of literature is impossible not merely because of our ignorance in the most important matters, but also because of the limited material. A recognition of the factor of inspiration affords the only possibility of organic treatment. Dr. Gunkel has to content himself with the distinction between certain *Literaturgattungen* and the tracing of the history of the same, so far as that is possible.

In the next paper entitled Simson the theory that the Old Testament hero was originally a mythological figure, or Sun-God, is combatted. The stories are legendary in character and reflect the ancient hostility between Danites and Philistines.

The fifth contribution gives a popular exposition of the story of Ruth. It is held that the connection between Boaz and the Davidic family was not original to the narrative but subsequently introduced.

The sixth essay deals with the Psalms. A comparison with Babylonian and Egyptian Psalms yields the result that the production of Psalms in Israel antedates the exile. A comparison with the Psalms in the Apocrypha shows that there is no Maccabean element in the Psalter. The oldest Psalms are collective, not individual, for the Psalms ultimately derive from the cultus. None the less in the Psalms we possess the ego is very frequently individual not collective. But whereas the collective Psalm is pre-prophetic in origin, the individualizing spiritualizing Psalm (*geistliche Psalmdichtung*) stands under the influence of prophetism.

There follows a paper dealing with the Eschatology of the Psalmists. This too was learned from the prophets. But post-prophetic, we are warned, should not without more be confounded with post-exilic.

The two next essays deal with Egyptian parallels to the Old Testament, the eighth more in general, the ninth with special reference to the Egyptian *Danklieder* published in 1911 by Erman from memorial stones in the Theban city of graves. The similarity of the latter to certain Old Testament Psalms is pointed out, but the author is very reserved as to offering a theory for its explanation. A direct dependence on Egyptian models is not favored. It is held to be more likely that this type of songs was already known to the Orient in general from the period of 2000-1000 B.C., and so reached Israel through the mediation of the Canaanites. Whether the origin of the type was in Babylon and passed from there to Egypt is left an open question.

Paper ten deals with Jensen's "The Gilgamesch-Epic in the Literature of the World". The phantastic, unscientific character of Jensen's comparisons is strikingly exhibited.

The concluding article deals with The Odes of Solomon. As in the previously published article in the *ZNTW* Gunkel here takes the view that the Odes are the work of a Jewish-Christian Gnostic about 150 A.D. Harnack's hypothesis of a composite origin, partly Jewish, partly Christian, is rejected. New translations of some of the Odes are given with several important conjectural readings. Two, defects in the Odes, from a Christian point of view, are emphasized: the consciousness of sin and of the need of deliverance from guilt is lacking, and the sacred history of the Old and the New Testament has almost entirely passed into oblivion. The singer of the Odes lives far from every thought of historical happenings in a world of spiritual concepts and transcendental processes. Hence the Church rightly cast off his work, "for the prophets and Jesus are more than the Odes of Solomon."

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

Kyrios Christos. Geschichte des Christusglaubens von den Anfängen des Christenthums bis Irenaeus. Von D. WILHELM BOUSSET, Professor der Theologie an der Universität Göttingen. Göttingen Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1913. Pp. xxiv, 474.

A treatise on the term *κύριος* as applied to Jesus would seem to deal with a sufficiently specialized subject. But, as the sub-title of Dr. Bousset's work informs us, we receive in it no less than a History of Christological Faith from the Beginnings down to Irenaeus. And even this scarcely covers what the book actually offers, for in reality it approaches to being a sketch of the earliest history of Christian belief in general, including some aspects that are not technically Christological, although the author in the preface disavows this wider purpose on the ground that the time is not ripe as yet for describing the origin of Christianity in the milieu of the Hellenistic-Roman civilization. The value of the book—and it is great irrespective of one's agreement or disagreement with its conclusions—is due largely to this breadth of outlook proceeding from a point that by common consent was of central importance and of propelling force in the earliest development of Christianity, the view taken of and the relation sustained toward Christ as Lord. As might be expected Dr. Bousset writes as a consistent "*religionsgeschichtler*". He repudiates the distinction between Biblical Theology and History of Doctrine not merely, but is eager to obliterate the lines of demarcation between the Christian religion and the surrounding spheres of faith and practice in the midst of which it grew up. He further brings to the front more seriously than has been attempted by anybody before, at least in such a comprehensive way, the principle that the forms of religious belief to a large extent took their rise and shape from the cultus, in other words that doctrine grew out of worship, rather than the reverse, as is usually assumed to have been the case. If to this be added the fact, that the general principles just stated are applied on the basis of a thorough belief that Hellenistic syncretism (the mystery-

religions, Hermeticism, early Gnosticism) most powerfully influenced the young Christian religion in several important aspects of its expanding life, and that thus for the first time the theory of the large indebtedness of Christianity to Hellenistic sources is here consistently worked out and placed in due correlation with the preceding historical development, enough will have been said to explain the uncommon interest attaching to the work under review. The book is bound to make for progress in the discussion of the themes it handles, first of all through bringing to greater clearness the implications and bearings of this most recent form of explaining the origin of many characteristic New Testament doctrines, and not less in the second place by rendering possible a mere intelligent criticism of a hypothesis which is fast becoming fashionable and in liberal circles will hold the ascendancy for some time to come.

In a history of Christology *from the beginnings* one not unnaturally looks for at least some discussion of the consciousness and teaching of Jesus in regard to Himself. But this beginning of the beginnings is deliberately slighted in Dr. Bousset's scheme of treatment. The belief of the early-Palestinian church with reference to Jesus forms the point of departure of the discussion and it is dealt with entirely as a given fact without any attempt to connect it with antecedent facts or convictions pertaining to the life-time of Jesus. To be sure this procedure is formally justified since in Bousset's opinion the *κύριος*-title was first conferred upon Jesus after the church had passed over from its purely Palestinian to a Hellenistic environment, and therefore does not play a rôle either in the life of Jesus or in the earliest Apostolic belief. But on that very ground the first and second chapters dealing with the mother-church might have been omitted. And in a book which in other respects does not care to keep within the strict limits prescribed by the title, some digression at this all-important point might well have been permitted. A Christological history without some positive account of the life and mind of Him from whom the whole Christ-movement sprang, resembles a torso. Probably other than purely formal considerations have contributed to this. By scholars of the type of Bousset so much is declared unauthentic in the Gospels and put to the account of later dogmatizing that scarcely enough remains to reconstruct the original figure of the Saviour. Bousset, to be sure, continues to believe in the historicity of Jesus. But in the present work he does not use the Gospels to obtain information on that subject. They are simply treated as sources for the belief of those who as the oldest bearers of the tradition stand back of them, and in their later elements as sources of the subsequent dogmatic development. Even in regard to so fundamental a point as Jesus' own attitude towards the Messianic question, the author does not care to commit himself. There is so much Messianizing tendency in the Gospels that the problem how much of a nucleus there originally was for this later incrustation to attach itself into becomes difficult of

mother-church. It was not *κύριος* but Son-of-Man. The instances of *κύριος* in the Gospels are all explained as anachronistic reflections of later usage, and this applies not merely to the objective *ὁ κύριος* in the third person, as found e.g. in Mk. xiv. 14, but also to the more numerous instances where it occurs in the vocative of address to Jesus. Bousset will not admit the possibility of such a *κύριε* being the equivalent of an Aramaic *רִבִּי* as an honorific title given to Rabbis. Such a usage did not exist and consequently the later higher sense of *κύριος* cannot have arisen out of it. Nor can it be explained from the transfer to Jesus of the Septuagint *κύριος* for Jehovah. That *רִבִּי* or *κύριος* were ever designations of the Messiah does not appear. The true explanation is sought in this that in the cults of Asia-Minor, Egypt and Syria the god or cult-heros frequently bore this name. It was in analogy with this that the Syrian Christians spoke of Jesus, their cult-heros, as *ὁ κύριος*. He was for them what the Dea Syria, Atargatis and Dionysos Dusares and other gods or demi-gods were for their worshippers. His elevation to this rank took place not as a conscious deliberate act, but as the result of an unconscious process in the collective psyche of the church. Paul found it as an existing custom, made it his own and further developed it in harmony with his own peculiar pneumatic Christology.

For this hypothesis there is no other basis than the mere parallelism only partially established of the religious nomenclature between the pagan cults and Christianity. Dr. Bousset places great reliance upon the observation that in both circles *κύριος* was specifically a cult-name. So far as the pagan religions are concerned this may be true, for these were little else but cults, the religion being coextensive with its communal expression. But Christianity from the beginning was far more than a cultus, and it cannot be proven that *κύριος* with Paul or anywhere else in the New Testament has any exclusive or even preferential connection with the cultus. Of course it is easy for Dr. Bousset to prove that it entered into the public worship of the church and had its place in the sacramental language, but this at best only shows that the title was a common all-around designation of Christ and decides nothing as to its specific provenience. Nor are we quite so sure as Dr. Bousset that the title formed no part of the Messianic terminology of Judaism before the Christian period. The transcendental conception of the Messiah which prevailed in Apocalyptic circles would favor its use; the argument about lordship and sonship of the Messiah with reference to David as recorded by the Synoptics seems to imply it, for lordship over David, even as a mere inference from the Psalm, is not something that could be conceived otherwise than on the basis of a general lordship: he who is Lord over David a fortiori is Lord over all. It is only fair to mention that Bousset regards this gospel-episode unhistorical and finds the later controversies between Jews and Christians as to the status of the Messiah reflected in it. There is further a difficulty in conceiving how the Syrian Christians could even in unconscious assimilation place

ment, whether the source of the recognition of his super-human dignity will not have to be pushed back into the yet earlier period of the earthly life. Is not after all the theory of the self-revelation of Himself as God by Jesus a more simple solution of the problem than any other that has so far been offered in the line of a production of the idea out of the subjective consciousness of the disciples?

A word may be said about the prominence ascribed by our author to the title Son-of-Man in the early period. If we take into connection with this his obvious scepticism in regard to its authenticity upon the lips of Jesus, it will be seen that this theory reverses the representation given of the matter by the New Testament documents. Here the title is at home in the speech of Jesus, it is well-nigh absent from the speech of the church. Bousset reaches this curious standpoint by not permitting either the Gospels or the Acts to testify for the period with which they respectively deal and then utilizing the Gospels as indirect witnesses for the time in which the tradition embodied in them was in process of formation and for which others would consult the Acts. But, whatever one may think of this attitude towards the Gospels, the theory does not explain how the title Son-of-Man, if it played such a prominent rôle in the belief of the mother-Church, came to be dropped immediately afterwards, leaving hardly a trace of its use either in Paul or in the other New Testament documents, except in the Fourth Gospel. Nor does it explain how a title that was freely used of Jesus in the third person by His followers and from there carried back into the story of His life on earth, came here to be restricted to a self-designation never employed about Jesus by others.

Coming to Paul there is one feature of the author's presentation of the subject that has strongly impressed us. This is the recognition in several places that Paul feels himself not the creator, but the receiver from an earlier source of many important elements of Christian belief and practice. This recognition loses none of its value by being coupled in the writer's mind with the theory already reviewed of a Hellenistic intermediate stage of development as having produced some of these elements. The observation of the fact is independent of the explanation given it. Much of the Pauline faith in its richness is thus carried back into the pre-Pauline stage. For those who believe that such elements, were of supernatural provenience and originated from the person of Jesus, this recognition is a valuable asset. The line between the earlier church and Paul is much less sharply drawn according to Bousset than it frequently has been drawn in earlier representations. And with this is connected still another feature. In the interpretation of the Gospels the author approaches at many points more closely to the received orthodox exegesis than the average liberal exegete used to do. As an instance we may mention the interpretation of the trial of Jesus in which it is recognized as the plain import of the Gospel-version, that Jesus was condemned on the ground of claiming divine sonship in the sense of

lute supernaturalism which finds expression in the antithesis between *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα*. The Christian state is said to destroy the continuity in the life of man, because in making him *pneuma* it does not restore or develop what was originally given in his nature, but supplants the latter by something altogether new. The second concerns the mythical soteriology which the Apostle is believed to have first introduced into the new religion, by grafting upon the original interpretation of the death and resurrection of Christ the widely-spread pagan ideas concerning the dying and rising deity which while at first nature-myths had received in the mystery-religions a more spiritual significance, thus imparting to Christian experience the character of a joint-dying and joint-resurrection with Christ. In regard to the former of these points Bousset thinks that it constitutes one of the aspects of Paulinism in which the latter opened the door for the later Gnostic inroads into the Christian Church. Gnosticism is only the consistent carrying out of the doctrine of a metaphysical schism between nature and grace. In answer to this it may be observed that the author has one-sidedly interpreted the Pauline statements about the *σάρξ*. It is not true that the *σάρξ* in its technical sense represents the original natural condition of man. Insofar as it is synonymous with sin it is not the product of creation. Paul nowhere affirms it to be so, and to charge this monstrous doctrine to him even by implication, for the sole reason that he does not explicitly repudiate it, or says in so many words that the *σάρξ* was produced in man through sin, is hardly fair. In Rom. v. the conception of the rise of death, and consequently of the *σάρξ* from which death is inseparable, out of the one deliberate *παράπτωμα* of Adam forms clearly the background of the Apostle's argumentation. When this is allowed it can no longer be claimed that the Pauline soteriology breaks the continuity between nature and grace, for Christ restores precisely what the entrance of the *σάρξ* destroyed. Of course it is quite true that the Apostle's doctrine of salvation contains side by side with this another strand. It represents the *pneuma* as doing more than neutralizing the influence of sin. It lifts man to the higher stage of the supernatural life, which the first Adam even before he sinned did not possess. Insofar there is a *novum*, something superimposed in the Christian state. Still it would be incorrect to find in this a suspension of the continuity or identity of life. Bousset in adopting Reitzenstein's interpretation of the term *πνευματικός* in contrast to *ψυχικός* is more cautious than the latter for he makes it to mean only no longer *mere* man (p. 132), whereas according to Reitzenstein it would actually mean no longer man, the *ψυχή* having ceased to exist and the pneumatic man having become deified.¹ It is worth observation that the distinction between the two strands that enter into the Pauline doctrine of the work of the Spirit is clearly marked by the twofold antithesis *σαρκικός*—*πνευματικός* and *ψυχικός* *πνευματικός*. The psychic man is the natural man as such. The sarkic man is the

¹ *Cfr.* however p. 203 of Bousset's book, where the term "deification" is used in connection with Paul's words in 2 Cor. iv., 6.

from the joint-influence of the mystery-religions which culminated in an *ἐποπτεία* of the godhead, and the astronomical-astrological form of piety widely prevalent in that age and also traceable in Philo, with whom it passes over into a less rational, mystical apprehension of the divine. The author, to be sure, is compelled to admit that, apart from 1 Jno. iii. 2, and here the statement is eschatological, the Gospel never speaks of "deification" and there is no warrant to read this meaning, after the manner of the later Greek theology, into the conception of the obtaining of eternal life. Nor is it necessary to interpret the efficiency ascribed to the word of Christ in the light of the magical function exercised by the word in the mysteries. For whatever analogies to the Logos-conception may exist elsewhere, in that connection the word is never personified as it is in John. As for the prominence of "light" and "life", this the Gospel has in common, it is true, with Gnosticism, particularly with the Hermetic literature, but here the question of date is yet far from settled and a dependence on the Fourth Gospel by no means excluded, although Bousset eagerly adopts the early dating of the Hermetic ideas by Reitzenstein. That the representation of eternal life as a present possession as distinguished from an eschatological outlook proves the dependence of the Gospel on Hellenistic mysticism can be maintained only by striking out as unauthentic the eschatological utterances in Chap. v, 28-29, vi, 39-54, and minimizing on the other hand the presence of the same idea in Paul, thus placing the Johannine theology at a greater distance from the Pauline teaching on this point than actually exists.

We have contented ourselves with touching on the way in which the author deals with the great epochs in the New Testament developments of truth. There is much in the other chapters, dealing with extra-canonical material, that is exceedingly interesting and instructive, especially in the chapters on Gnosticism and Irenaeus. The whole book bears witness on almost every page to the rich learning and great constructive power of the writer. There are not many pages in it which an orthodox reader will be able to read without dissent, but there are a great many from which in spite of this, and perhaps for this very reason, he will be able to learn.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

The Christology of St. Paul. Hulsean Prize Essay with an Additional Chapter by the REV. G. NOWELL ROSTRON, M.A., Vicar of St. Lawrence, Kirkdale, Late Principal of St. John's Hall, Durham; Late Scholar of St. John's College, Cambridge. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1912. Pp. xv, 249. (Library of Historic Theology.)

Rostron's book offers a good survey of the problems of Paulinism so far as these are viewed in relation to the orthodox faith of the church. It does not deal with the Christology alone, as the title might lead to expect, but, on the principle that the Person and the work are inseparable and react and cast light one on the other, it draws within the purview of the discussion the whole range of

to grant that the *ἐξ οὐράνου* of 1 Cor. xv. 47 may have an implied reference to the preëxistent heavenly state, and yet to controvert the view that the preëxistent Christ possessed a human element in His make-up. For the reference in the passage is distinctly and pointedly to the "*Second Man*", and there is no logical escape from Dr. Edwards' conclusions, except by insisting upon it, that the Apostle here speaks of the genesis of the glorified Christ through the resurrection, and that the preëxistence does not come into view at all, a position which is exegetically also the most plausible, and to which Rostron himself a little later on seems to incline. In discussing the famous Christological passage Phil. ii., 5 ff. the author makes the hazardous statement that "so far as Christ by the necessities of His life on earth was obliged to limit the exercise of His cosmical functions, so far did God the Father directly and mediate take them upon Himself" (p. 128), and thus would seem to fall in with a certain type of Kenoticism with reference to which in the preceding discussion on the whole his attitude is rather reserved than otherwise. In his revulsion from the neo-Apollinarianism of Sanday, who would make the Deity fill the place of the subliminal consciousness of the human Christ, the author seems to go too far in discrediting the subconscious as an integral element in the religious nature. We would hesitate to subscribe to the statement that "the subconscious . . . has no moral character in itself." On other points, we are glad to notice modern vogues in the interpretation of Paul are resisted e.g. the shifting of the emphasis from the crucifixion to the incarnation, which Westcott has done so much to popularize.

The book can render excellent service to all students of the Apostle's teaching who feel in need of reassuring themselves of the substantial agreement of Paulinism with the historic faith of the Protestant church. In the discussion about the continuity between Jesus and Paul the other charge so frequently made, that Protestantism is a quasi-Paulinism and not a genuine reproduction of the great Apostle's teaching, should not be lost out of view. That we are in accord with Paul is as important a principle to maintain as that Paul was in accord with the Master.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

The Balkans: A Laboratory of History. By WILLIAM M. SLOANE, Member of the American Academy; Professor of History in Columbia University; Author of *The French War and the Revolution*; *Napoleon Bonaparte: A History*; *French Revolution and Religious Reform*, etc. New York: Eaton and Mains. 1914. 8vo; pp. viii, 322. \$1.50 net.

Between the years 1903 and 1910, we are informed in the Preface, "the author made three fairly extended journeys in lands which had once been a part of the Turkish empire. What he was able as a mere

century" (p. 274), and that the "Balkan fires are likely to be banked for an age to come" (p. 292); nevertheless, on the other hand, the historian cannot forbear recording as with prophetic instinct (p. 288): "The Dual Monarchy, in spite of the isolation of Albania, is dissatisfied with the settlement made at Bucharest and seems determined to prevent the solidification of existing conditions. It is afraid of the new and larger Servia. It is accused of secretly supporting Albanian disturbers on one of the Servian frontiers, while on the other the quarantine regulations and their enforcements are made as exasperating as possible. . . . What is worst of all, it seems likely to demand a protectorate over Roman Catholics dwelling in Servia similar to that which it claims to exercise over Roman Catholics within the Albanian frontiers." The book is furnished with three maps to illustrate the changes, due to the War, in the boundary lines of the Balkan States.

An Appendix contains the treaties and military conventions made in 1912 between Bulgaria and Servia, and between Bulgaria and France.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Schleiermacher: A Critical and Historical Study. By W. B. SELBIE, M.A., D.D., Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1913. 8vo; pp. ix, 272. \$2.25.

The publication of a substantial book in English on Schleiermacher must needs still be considered quite an event in the theological world. In a sense, indeed, it is doubtless true that even in his native land this epoch-making preacher, professor and writer has had to wait until quite recent years to come into his own. Not that his fellow-countrymen have been either able or willing to ignore him. On the contrary each passing decade has found them striving with ever-increasing zeal and thoroughness to understand him. But such was his intellectual versatility, his philosophic acumen, his theological creativeness, so subtle, so profound, so varied has been his influence upon thought and life, that practically a century has had to elapse before the titanic proportions of his figure could be seen in the true perspective of history. But the English and American literature on Schleiermacher has been scant in amount and quite unsatisfactory in quality. It is, indeed, rather anomalous, considering how many classes of writers have had to pay their respects to him, whether as friend or foe, that even to this day so few of his works have been done into English, and that the critical and really valuable studies of him by British or American authors may be counted upon the fingers of one hand. We have, therefore, been eager to welcome this new member in Clark's series of "The Great Christian Theologies", and a perusal of the work makes it a pleasure to recommend it for what it professes to be, "a critical and historical study" of Schleiermacher.

The author begins with a brief account of Schleiermacher's life, especially of his religious and intellectual development. A preliminary attempt is here made to assess the various formative influences that

treatment either of the person or of the work of Christ. There cannot but be an unstable equilibrium between this supernaturalism that must posit a sinless Christ, and this naturalism that has no place for his resurrection, ascension or return to judgment, and that finds a miracle wherever anything finite is construed as a religious sign or symbol. Dr. Selbie duly appreciates what Schleiermacher has done for modern theology by his emphasis upon the necessity of an experience of the saving grace of Christ as a condition for any satisfactory knowledge of God. On the other hand, he clearly sets forth the defects, especially on their historical side, of Schleiermacher's Christology and soteriology. On the whole, however, we cannot but feel that his judgment is too favorable, as regards both Schleiermacher's negative attitude toward confessional Christianity and his influence upon Christian doctrine during the last century. For is it not after all to Schleiermacher that the overwhelming evils, as well as the real but minor and incidental blessings, of modern subjective empiricism are chiefly due? Great as was his service in trying to bring the whole of theology into a unity, and in vindicating the primordial authority of natural theology, both absolutely, and, with respect to his own day, relatively, as against a onesided supernaturalistic dogmatism, still his failure to do justice to the special revelation of historic Christianity has made him sacrifice truly scientific theology to religious phenomenology with its inevitable trend to naturalism.

We shall not pursue the interpretation and critique into the remaining sections of the treatise, which deal with Schleiermacher's views of the Christian life from the more individual and experiential side of the work of Christ, and with his doctrine of the Church. Enough has been said to indicate the method, scope and spirit of the book as a whole. The last chapter is a balanced estimate of Schleiermacher's place in modern theology.

Dr. Selbie may fairly be said to have introduced Schleiermacher and his theology to English readers in a fuller and more satisfactory form than has hitherto been attempted. We are not unmindful in this connection of the excellent analysis of the *Glaubenslehre* recently published, with an historical introduction, by Prof. George Cross, of the Newton Theological Institute, Mass. But the work under review covers a larger and more difficult field. Our only regret is that considerations of space have put such severe restrictions upon the author's treatment. For one thing the great name that gives this volume its title deserves an ampler historical setting than that here given it. Then, too, even taking "theology" in a rather narrow sense, it is somewhat disappointing to find so few allusions to those other two works of Schleiermacher's which in their way were quite as influential as his *Glaubenslehre* and the *Reden*: we refer to his *Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums* and his *Ethik*. It must be said, moreover, that the author leans more heavily, if not longer or more frequently, than is pleasant to behold, upon some of the German students of Schleiermacher (Lichtenberg, Pfleiderer, Ritschl, the Dorners). Indeed, many of the best paragraphs are those in quotation-marks.

Doubtless, this has some compensations for the reader of a book on such a subject: it makes him feel that his guide is taking him the right way. But it is hardly just to the guide whose own knowledge of the way is quite sufficient to inspire the needed confidence in himself.

There is a good index and a two-page bibliography containing the more recent literature on Schleiermacher.

We note a few typographical and other errors: p. 39, "his" for "is"; p. 41, "whom" for "who"; p. 41, "them" for "they"; p. 44, "same" for "name"; p. 55, "try and" for "try to"; p. 144 "whom" for "who".

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Religious Life of the Anglo-Saxon Race. By M. V. B. KNOX, Author of "A Summer's Saunterings", "A Legend of Schroon Lake", "A Winter in India and Malaysia", etc. Boston: Sherman, French and Company. 1913. Large 8vo; pp. 536. \$2.00 net.

Much interesting information has been gathered together in this volume—according to an advertising circular the author spent ten years in the task—but it is somewhat difficult to ascertain the principle upon which the materials have been selected. The title seems to be too broad and too narrow to suit the heterogeneous contents: too broad, for much that is ordinarily considered as belonging to religious life is altogether omitted or only casually referred to; and too narrow, for large portions of the work are devoted to things which are in no sense peculiar either to religious life as such or to the religious life of the Anglo-Saxon race in particular. The author states his purpose to be that of tracing "the forces of the religious life that have aided the English-speaking race to become so mighty and successful"—an aim, surely, that ought to make no historical investigator feel himself unduly restricted, especially when, as in this instance, he considers it his duty to follow this "English-speaking race" whithersoever it has gone over the face of the earth. It is but natural, therefore, that in trying to cover so vast an area within the compass of a single volume the author can give us only hasty glimpses of many things, no impressive views of anything. Nor is our bewilderment relieved by the presence of any table of contents or chapter-headings. The best part of the book is the first fifth of it, which presents, with concrete detail, the religious life of the early, the pure Anglo-Saxons. As for the rest of the work, it offers little that is distinctive in the treatment of the Norman conquest and all that came thereafter in the civil or ecclesiastical history of the British Isles and their colonies.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Heidelberg Catechism: Historical and Doctrinal Studies. By GEORGE W. RICHARDS, Professor of Church History in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church at Lancaster, Pa. Philadelphia: Publication and Sunday School Board of the Reformed Church in the United States. 1913. 8vo; pp. xiii, 363.

These scholarly and stimulating discussions concerning the history and worth of the Heidelberg Catechism are one of the most important fruits of the Three Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary Celebration, in 1913, of the publication of this document. The work is issued as the 1911 volume in the series of the Swander Memorial Lectures before the Faculty and students of the Seminary at Lancaster.

The book is divided into three parts. Of these the last—making up about one half of the volume (pp. 171 to 358)—consists of a reprint, with an English translation, of the original German edition of the Catechism published by John Mayer at Heidelberg in 1563. No copy of this edition could be found for republication at the time of the Tercentenary Celebration in 1863, but the very next year a copy was discovered in Bremen, in the possession of Pastor Treviranus, and reprinted in that year by Albrecht Wolters at Bonn. Professor Richards has made use of a copy of this reprint which has been in the possession of the Seminary Library at Lancaster since 1901, and which is here given to the world as the first reprint of the original edition made in the United States. The English translation annexed on the opposite pages is that of the Tercentenary edition of the Catechism (1863), in the margin of which the author has suggested a considerable number of corrections and improvements.

Part I is historical, consisting of five chapters: A Sketch of the Catechumenate Before the Reformation; Evangelical Catechisms Before the Heidelberg Catechism; The Reformation in the Palatinate and the Conversion of Frederick III to Calvinism; Preparation and Publication of the Heidelberg Catechism; The Reception of the Heidelberg Catechism. The work is abreast of the latest special investigations in this field, and gives a clear and accurate account of the successive stages in the process that yielded the Heidelberg Catechism as one of its noblest products. The story of the formation and spread of this confessional standard is placed in a luminous historical setting. We cannot, however, pass without challenge the statement (p. 26 f.): "One of the definite and permanent results of the catechetical development in the Reformed Churches was the distinction made between religion and theology, between faith and dogma; a catechism having to do with the former and not with the latter." In the light of Dr. Richard's theological manifesto in Part II, this assertion will occasion no surprise; the wish seems to be father to the thought. But on the whole, the treatment of this historical material is most admirable.

Part II is doctrinal. The author first sets forth the distinctive features of the Catechism by a series of comparisons with the teachings of Catholicism, Socinianism, Lutheranism, and "high" Calvinism. In the main he agrees with Professor Lange that the Catechism, while true to the Calvinistic type, is in spirit moderately Calvinistic, preserving, besides manifold influences from Calvin, Bullinger, and all the earlier Reformed makers of catechisms, a considerable remnant of Melancthonism and other elements from the German Lutheran Reformation: "Calvinism modified by the German genius". The

Indulgences. The theology of the subject never till this day has been definitely formulated by the Roman Catholic theologians, as has been clearly stated by Dr. Henry C. Vedder in his recent work "The Reformation in Germany." And yet it has been clearly traced in its evolutionary process by various writers. But its theological status remains nebulous, even after the fact of the authorization by the Church itself of the work of P. A. Maurel "Die Ablässe, ihr Wesen und ihr Gebrauch" Paderborn 1860.

Of the true inwardness of the history of Indulgences, of the secrets of their manipulation we knew comparatively little.

The study before me, an academic thesis for the degree of Doctor of Theology in the University of Leyden, covers 108 pages, to which are added as appendices a number of wonderfully illuminating original documents, filling a larger space than the text itself; and therefore it constitutes a valuable contribution to the history of the subject.

The material here published was till now practically unknown. It consists of a mass of ancient parchments, buried for centuries under a thick layer of dust in the episcopal archives at Utrecht. The author spent about three years in the study of this material and only those who have occupied themselves with palaeography can estimate the labor involved. The most valuable of these papers, as stated, have been reprinted in the appendix.

In the Middle Ages Indulgences stood close to the very center of the religious life. The Council of Trent decided (Sess. xxv. Dec. 4, 1563) "that the power of Indulgences was given by Christ himself to the Church and that this power was used by her from the most ancient times". Cardinal Cajetan said in 1517 "that before the beginning of the thirteenth century no mention is made of the subject". But Cajetan was evidently wrong for our author (p. 5) goes back to the tenth century and Urban II in 1095, when preaching the first Crusade, promised an Indulgence to the crusaders, as a well known thing. True Indulgences therefore were authorized before the eleventh century. The development of the theological question we find in Halosius, Albert Magnus and especially in Thomas Aquino. The fundamental principles involved are the "treasure of merits" of Christ and of the saints and the power of the Church to apply these merits. With the application of the principle of "compensation", civilly applied to end blood-feuds, to the doctrine of purgatorial suffering, Indulgences entered upon a new phase of development and ultimately became the cause of the Reformation.

The Church suffered from a perennial shortage of funds and the sale of Indulgences formed an admirable and easy source of revenue. The spoils were systematically divided. For the "Jubilee Indulgences" the following scale prevailed—one third for the Pope, one third for the political power, one third for the war against the Turks. This scale was changed according to circumstances. The accounts of the Utrecht archives are very suggestive in this direction. Indulgences were sold for private purposes as well as general, for building new churches, and restoring old ones, for building dikes, for ringing bells during a

Utrecht cathedral. The bones of this saint, buried in the abbey, have disappeared but some sacred relics remain viz. his stole, comb, staff and horn. The cure of rabies was apparently his specialty and in the treatment of the disease a thread of this stole of St. Hubert was placed in a small incision, made in the forehead of the victim, and with certain added ceremonies a cure was always effected. This "quest" was known as early as 1330 and the sale of indulgences founded on it was condemned as late as the sixteenth century.

Another celebrated "quest" was that of St. Martin of Tours, whose relics greatly stimulated the sale of Indulgences and were leased to the see of Utrecht. A third "quest" was that of St. Anthony, the father of monasticism, the romantic tale of whose relics is here told in graphic terms. Discovered by a miracle they were carried to Alexandria, thence to Constantinople and finally by Duke Jocellinus of Flanders, in 1059, to his native country, where they reposed in the monastery of Belle, in the diocese of Vienne. The St. Anthony relics were deemed specially efficacious in epidemics of the plague and of "ignis sacer". Their popularity was offset by the fact that some hogs, dedicated to him as their patron-saint and belonging to the clergy, had the freedom of the road in the Middle Ages. No one dared to interfere with them or molest them and they caused great damage to farmers and gardeners, and yet no "quest" was more profitable or more widely patronized than that of St. Anthony. The privileges of the quaestuarii of this saint lasted till the close of the 15th century and the "quest" itself was prosecuted as late as 1555, well in the reformatory period. Besides these three, numerous other "quests" are mentioned by the author (pp. 66-67). Small wonder that the common people ultimately lost faith in a process of sanctification, which became an economic menace as "quest" after "quest" drained their resources to the last farthing. The study of this thesis will convince one that Dr. Vedder is right when he maintains that economic conditions not less than religious convictions led to the Reformation. The arrival of the quaestuarii was announced beforehand, the local clergy were compelled to meet them and to conduct them to the church. The day was a holyday and all labor was forbidden, and after a sermon by one of the visitors the sale of indulgences began. One can therefore readily see how burdensome the sale of indulgences must have been to the common people. The knife cut both ways. They were forbidden to work on the day of the sale and they were stripped of their money. Remember in this connection the injunction "that no two quests were to be prosecuted in a given place in the same week".

Soon these quaestuarii became a distinct fraternity, which received men and women alike as members, at a fixed entrance fee. All members wore a medallion, which belonged to the order and was to be returned at death. A formal oath was sworn at initiation. In the late middle ages the quaestuarii were usually at the same time occupied with the dissemination of antiheretical literature. But the author tells a somber story of the slow but steady degenerating process of

Protestants and Catholics alike. Nor are things better in France. In Paris, in Notre Dame de Clignancourt, a parish of 121,000 souls, with one priest and seven chaplains, only 21,000 people attend church. The state of things is naturally more encouraging in the large Dutch cities, for the Dutch are by nature a religious people, as are the Scotch. And yet even there statistics are far from satisfactory.

The author points out another danger, which stands closely connected with the growth of the cities and that is that this growth has displaced the churches as centers of the communal life, and that the population has moved away from them. Rome alone tries to keep pace with this extension by building new churches. Thus the Reformed Church in Amsterdam has only thirteen churches for its 200,000 members and has built since the 18th century only two new churches. Rome on the contrary has thirty-seven churches and 110 clergymen for its 125,000 members and is steadily building.

The author then takes up the problem of church-attendance by the masses and by the members of the church. In Germany Dibelius places this attendance in the smaller cities at 6 per cent of the church membership, which naturally makes the general percentage negligible. In the larger cities he places the figures at 1 per cent or even less. R. J. Campbell places the attendance at the churches in England at 25 per cent, which I believe is altogether too high. If he refers to church membership maybe the figures will stand, but if they refer to the population they are far too high. France and Austria tell the same story. The Dutch with all their innate religious sense, can boast for Amsterdam only from 37 per cent to 27 per cent of the church membership (mind you not of the population) and Rotterdam only from 33 per cent to 27 per cent. Our own so frequently lamented ecclesiastical conditions will bear, I trust, a comforting comparison with these figures.

The author then discusses the problem of the restoration of the city churches to greater efficiency. With admirable fullness he traces all that has been done in Germany, in this direction. The attempts of Wichern and Sulze are minutely described, the first with his "Christian Association", independent from the Church as an organization, the latter connecting himself closely with it. Men like Stock and Ruckteschell, Holström and Ussing build on their foundations, with individualistic modifications of the general plan, and yet the results of all their efforts are in the main disappointing.

Next in order the author takes up the discussion of the Parochial system of Church-work. The study of the word itself (pp. 49, 50) is especially interesting. Rome found in its "parochy" the local revelation of the body of Christ. The bishop as the head of this local ecclesiastical institution controlled all its operations. And from Rome the Reformed Churches have borrowed the term. The author therefore rejects this term and would rather speak of the "splitting of the city-church"—"de splitsing der stadskerk". This may be done in various ways—1 by dividing the Church according to wards, 2 by forming independent churches. These again may be what he calls

form of government, the conciliar bond of union lies between individual churches and the "Classis" or "Presbytery". Dr. A. Kuyper, who in his "Tractaat van de Reformatie", was an ardent defender of this local unity of the Church, with one "consistory" or "session", later on in his "Pro Rege" abandoned this position. And as we see it, here lies the immediate solution of the problem of the city church, which has been so minutely and laboriously discussed in the pages before us. It is a pity that the author could not have fully familiarized himself with the status of this problem in England but especially in America, the land of full fledged sectarian development. What he calls "preachers churches" are not quite as loosely organized as he seems to imagine (p. 76), even though their membership ranges over a whole city, which by the way is rarely the case. These organizations are quite generally "neighborhood churches". But the Church in Holland has no more power than we have in America to prescribe to a man definitely what church he is to attend. An artificial solution of the problem, like he proposes, would after all only be a partial solution.

And yet whether we agree with the author or not one is forced to admire the patience and thoroughness, the scholarship and study of details, which enable a man to handle a subject like this as it is handled here.

Louisville, Ky.

HENRY E. DOSKER.

De Pro Acta der Dordtsche Synode in 1618. Academisch Proefschrift, ter verkryging van den graad van Doctor in de Heilige Godgeleerdheid. T. DE VRIES Dz. Rotterdam: MCMXIV.

Before me lies a third academic thesis for the degree of Doctor of Divinity, like the former in the Free University of Amsterdam. This interesting study is the more remarkable since the author, having already entered the active ministry, found time for these exhaustive investigations during a busy pastorate.

The Synod of Dordt is the only Protestant ecclesiastical assembly of its kind which to some extent at least can lay claim to the title "Oecumenical". It was a most interesting assembly of divines and concentrated its attention on the Remonstrant or Arminian question. But it did many things besides and yet of all that transpired in it only the Arminian question has been treated with anything like exhaustive historical fidelity. The rest has received only superficial attention. Of the Post-Acta, i.e. the proceedings of the Synod, after the foreign delegates had returned home, the very text of the minutes is a matter of debate till this day. And of the Pro-Acta, i.e. the proceedings preceding the Arminian debate, little or nothing was ever accurately published. And it is not too much to say that our author has succeeded in filling this gap, by digging up a wealth of hitherto practically unknown historical material of the utmost value. The bibliography of the subject is remarkably full, consisting not only of printed Acta of provincial and national Synods, but also of matter preserved in archives, annotations, unprinted MSS and other sources.

The text fills 335 pages, to which 53 pages of Appendices are added. Of surpassing interest are the numerous footnotes of the author, mostly quotations in Latin, French, German and Dutch.

The author's style is remarkably vivid and he succeeds in holding the attention of his readers to the very last.

The subjects here considered are: 1. The composition and *modus operandi* of the Synod. 2. The translation of the Scriptures. 3. Catechetical instruction. 4. The baptism of heathen children received in Christian families. 5. The preparation of candidates for the ministry, and 6. Book-censorship.

The reception of the delegates of foreign countries, the entertainment of these foreigners, the hospitality of the city of Dordt, the little sideshows, for the special delectation of the commissioners so well known to our modern conventicles, the appearance of a grewsome comet, the eminent satisfaction of the commissioners—all these things are vividly portrayed by the author, who certainly wields a facile pen. All in all a most realistic picture of 17th century life is here presented.

The most minute regulations were made in regard to the seating of the delegates, according to ironclad rules of precedence and among all the foreigners, the English commissioners, headed by the bishop of Llandaff, received the greatest honors. After them came the Palatines, the Brandenburgers, the Hessians, the Swiss, the Genevese, the Bremers and the men of Embden, Nassau and Wetterau. The Dutch universities were separately represented, but neither the foreign delegates nor the university men were permitted to vote for the organization of the Synod (19), whilst on all subsequent occasions they voted with the rest (20). On Nov 13, 1618, they all went in solemn procession to the Doelen, a large building, where the Synod convened. Desks covered with green baize were provided for all the delegates, the hall was well lighted and warmed by huge fires in open grates, whilst to the amusement of the foreign delegates "footstoves" were provided to keep their extremities from chilling. Large galleries were open to the public, except when the Synod met in committee, which happened very rarely. At the start the questions were raised whether absentees could be considered in the election of the officers of the Synod; whether it would not be better to elect a moderator from one of the provinces, where the religious question had not been specially agitated or even from the foreign delegates; and whether both Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants were eligible. Martinus replied for the States-General that the election was wholly free. The second question was answered by the election of Bogerman of Friesland, a province where the religious question had been but little in evidence. The entire moderamen of the Synod however was Contra-Remonstrant, but their opponents were not excluded from membership, since Utrecht had a mixed delegation. Notwithstanding this the Remonstrants spoke of a "pro-Synod" (34). The plan of action of the body was laborious and diffuse, which led to the wasting of time, to the great chagrin of the foreign delegates (43). For the

sake of the foreigners all the deliberations were conducted in Latin. The attitude of the British commissioners to the Arminians caused some friction (53), and this may explain the fact that Arminianism made tremendous inroads on Anglicanism, after 1619. The reading and approval of the minutes were marked by irregularity and lack of system (55).

On page 60 the author begins the discussion of the so-called Pro-Acta, and first of all comes the consideration of the new Bible translation, to which 98 pages are devoted. It is not necessary to enter into the details of this discussion, which began on Nov. 19 and occupied the attention of the Synod till Nov. 27. The results are familiar to our readers. When the Synod adjourned in 1619 it was hoped to have the new translation finished in five years, but this hope was not realized till 1636-37. The author has furnished, in these pages, the fullest available data for an intimate knowledge of this remarkable Bible translation, the more remarkable since of the translators finally elected only 2 of the 12 were professional scholars; of the revisers only 4 out of 14, and of the names proposed for the latter office only 6 out of 37. An eloquent testimony to the average scholarship of the Dutch ministry in the early years of the 17th century. Of special interest is the discussion of the question of the Apocrypha of the O. T. (88 pp.), which showed a remarkable division of opinion. Especially the English delegates plead for their retention in the printed Bible, whilst many advocated a classification of these books, rejecting some in toto and ascribing to others considerable merit, e.g. Baruch, Wisdom, Macc I etc. (102). A curious proof of the polyglot condition of the Dutch tongue, in this period, is found in the fact that the revisers of Drenthe begged to be excused from their participation in the task "because they had few men who were skilled in the use of the Dutch tongue". As everywhere else the Dutch Bible of 1636 refined and unified the national language. The Apocrypha were finally ordered printed, though in a distinct place and with a different type and thus they appeared in the earlier editions of the Staten-Bybel, but they were soon dropped from the smaller popular editions. In this connection it is well to remember that the directors of the British Bible society eliminated them from the English Bible only in 1825, "after a long discussion".

The second question discussed by our author viz. that of preaching regularly on the Heidelberg catechism is of less vital interest to us since the regular exposition of the catechism, in the public ministry of the word, was largely confined to the Dutch churches, although training in the truths of the various catechisms, especially with an eye to prepare young communicants for an intelligent confession of their faith, was a common characteristic of the churches of Germany, Switzerland, and Scotland. The minutes of the Synod are a mute witness to the great unpopularity of this kind of ministration, on the part of both pastor and people (158, 162, 208). Ministers were admonished to continue these ministrations "even if only their own families attend them". The discussion and legislation of the Synod

in regard to this matter bore little or no immediate fruit, although in the end the practice triumphed in the Dutch Church and strange to say finally became quite popular among those who had the truth at heart. An interesting fact was brought to light in this discussion viz. that of the pernicious activity of Rome and especially of the Jesuits to control, wherever possible, the religious teaching in the schools, by introducing their own little textbooks (184, 196, 208). Especially the Walloons and the provinces of Gelderland and Drenthe complained of this evil. Of greater interest is the third point under discussion viz. the question of the baptism of heathen children, adopted or living in Christian families. This question came before the Synod from the directors of the East India Company and the author devotes to it 39 pages.

Two queries were laid before the Synod: 1 Whether baptism, administered by merchants, submerchants and assistants (all officials of the Company) or other persons, not authorized by the Church, may be recognized?

The author makes no mention of the fact that we have here unquestionable evidence of the hold, which Roman Catholic Sacramentarianism still had on the common mind in the Protestant Church at this period. A fact which is further elucidated by the advice of the Bremers (233). "In mortal peril they must be baptized by their masters." "Since they must care as well for their eternal as for their temporal welfare." The Swiss deny the need of such baptism, "since the question proceeds from the old error, by which greater stress is laid on the external ordinance than is proper and less on the ordinance as instituted by Christ". The Synod wholly ignored this first question. But the discussion waxed hot on the second question: "Whether the children in East India, who have wholly entered into the families of Christians and who have a Christian protector, who promises to train them in the Christian faith, shall be baptized"?

Here the advices of the foreign and domestic delegates are intensely interesting. Many desire to distinguish between small and larger children. In favor of the baptism of the former were the delegates of England and Hessa. All the others advised even against their baptism. Of the domestic advisers the professors were in favor of baptizing adopted infants, as were also the delegates of Zeeland and Frisia and the Walloons. All the rest, even the Remonstrants of Utrecht, laid stress on the fact that they were born *outside of the covenant and therefore could not be the recipients of its seal*, but must be trained in the Christian faith before they could be baptized. Towards the close of the debate the fact was brought out that many of these children were the illegitimate offspring of the officials of the East India Company and of native women; also that many of them were slaves, who later on might be sold again and that not a few were children taken from their parents by force and without their consent. The Synod therefore refused to give the approbation asked for.

The East India Company officials then invented a compromise.

Since such children could not be baptized, they "laid their hands upon them with prayer after the example of Christ, Mat. 19, and thus commended them to the gracious care and guidance of God" (256). It took some years before the consistory of Batavia saw its error and abolished this dangerous innovation (p. 257).

We need but briefly consider the remaining two points viz. that of the preparation for the ministry and that of the license or rather censorship of the press.

The discussion of the first point permits us to visualize the chaotic conditions prevailing and the lack of concert between the various provinces. Then as now but few men, and those usually poor, sought the ministry (pp. 261, 269). One cannot but wonder how such preparation furnished the churches with the able ministry, of which it could justly boast.

Complaints were made of the licentiousness prevailing in the universities, even in the special "seminaria" erected in these universities. The question of "student preaching, then as now, was a burning one. The practice spoiled the students and made them vain, and yet without it they had no practical preparation for their life work. In some provinces they were even allowed to administer the sacraments and to solemnize marriages (271). The advices of the foreign delegates proved that the evils complained of were universal, and those of the home delegates but emphasized the fact of the utter lack of a universal practice. Thus the Utrecht Remonstrants claimed for a student for the ministry all that an ordained man could do; but practically all the provinces bitterly attacked this position (282) and the Synod utterly rejected it (294, 295). But when we look for a final decision, looking to uniformity of action, the author has to admit that such action was never taken (293). The Synod regulated neither the academic nor the practical preparation for the ministry. "The liberty of the churches and the different customs in the different provinces" stood in the way of any such action. The only fruit of all the discussions was this that more serious thought was given to the matter and that the way was thus prepared for the uniform practice of a much later date.

As to book-censorship Chapter VI makes a serio-comic impression on the reader. Both foreign and domestic voices were raised in a dismal chorus of complaint about the unrestrained liberty of the press. The feathers of some of these fathers must have been ruffled by some keen lampoon, if we can read between the lines. Lampoons, gibes, caricatures, anonymous and abusive tracts are everywhere in evidence. Godless and heretical books appear without the name of the authors or even printers. Such are the complaints. What was to be done in the matter?

Earlier synods had advocated a "censura librorum" and warnings against such literature from the pulpit (306), but these remedies had apparently only stimulated the trade. All the foreign delegates poured out their vials of wrath, it was evidently a universal evil. The only voice raised for the liberty of the press was that of Deo-

The influence alleged does not necessarily denote identity of thought or expression, though such identity is frequently found in the citations given. It does mean a pronounced similarity in the idea and this same similarity often extends to the form of expression. There are, of course, important differences. Alcuin, for instance, makes use of Augustinian formulae on space and time without understanding them in the Augustinian sense (pp. 62-65). He uses the expression *Homo in deum transiuit*, which is quite un-Augustinian (p. 105, note 1). They also diverge on the idea of the *proprietas* in the doctrine of the persons of the Trinity (p. 128). Scotus Erigena simply reproduced the Neo-Platonic elements of the Augustinian theology (p. 12). His Trinity was Greek (Alexandrian, Origenistic) rather than Augustinian (p. 74; cf. p. 84). His theory of creation totters between Augustinian and Neoplatonic influences, and is emanistic (pp. 77-79). Alcuin as well as his contemporaries, following Augustine, held to a verbal as distinguished from a real *communicatio idiomatum* (pp. 147-149, 156-7), and in this the theologians of the ninth century agreed with them (pp. 163-166). In the discussion of the absolute Being of God (pp. 9-20), we would have given more attention to Gottschalk.

In the preface (p. 3) the author observes that to the question: In what way Augustine's Theology, Trinitarianism, and Christology influenced the early mediaeval theologians? no satisfactory answer has yet been given, owing to the fact that there is as yet no sufficiently exhaustive (erschöpfend) material for such an investigation; and though, consequently, his study may seem premature, nevertheless he is convinced that the attempt should be made, and may be of use for a more accurate knowledge of the theological labors of that time. Any student of Augustine or of the *opera theologica* of the eighth and ninth centuries will be grateful for this penetrating research, and many will doubtless accept its conclusions (pp. 188-191) that both as to problems and methods the leading dogmaticians of the eighth and ninth centuries were the pupils of Augustine.

A few suggestions may be added by way of corrigenda. Is not *semper ternus* for "sempiternus" (p. 37, note 1)? Put "n" for "u" in "und" (p. vii., sec. 2a); in "augustinischen" (p. 84, line 16); in "pertinebant" (p. 95, line 3 in note). Read "gleicher" for "gleichber" (p. 88, l. 11); "Fleischwerdung" for "Eleischwerdung" (p. 93, l. 6); "non" for "mon" (p. 132, note 4); "stattgefunden" for "stttatgefunden" (p. 163, l. 7); "columna" for "columna" (p. 171, note 4, line 7). Omit the second "ad" (p. 165, note 2, line 4).

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BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

The Christian Faith: A System of Dogmatics. By THEODORE HAERING, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Tuebingen.

Translated from the second revised and enlarged German edition, 1912, by John Dickie, M.A., Professor of Systematic Theology in Knox College, Dunedin, and George Ferries, D.D., author of "The Growth of Christian Faith." Two volumes, 8vo; pp. xii + xii, 952. Bibliography and Index. London and New York: Hodder and Stoughton. 1913.

Haering's *Der Christliche Glaube* was published in the autumn of 1906, and was briefly but sufficiently noticed in this REVIEW for January 1908 (pp. 166-7) by Dr. C. W. Hodge. The appearance of an English translation of its second edition—which was published in 1912—would in itself call for nothing more than an intimation of that fact, with some remarks, perhaps, upon the nature and extent of the changes introduced into the second edition, and the quality of the English rendering. On the former matter there is no need to enter into detail: the changes made are rather of the nature of expansions than of alterations. Of the latter matter we cannot speak with entire satisfaction. The sense of the original is doubtless conveyed in the translation. But the clearness with which the original was credited by its German readers ("marvellously perspicuous" is Titius' characterization of it) is certainly conspicuously absent from the translation; and all the charm which they also attribute to the book as a popular religious discussion is dissipated. We have found the reading of the English version somewhat heavy going.

An adventitious importance has been given to the English translation, however, by the unmeasured (and let us say at once, gravely misleading) praise which has, on the occasion of its appearance, been lavished on the treatise. An influential journal, widely circulated in both hemispheres, for example, announces it as "theology at its best". Had the proper qualification been inserted, and the book announced merely as Ritschlian theology at its best, little exception would need to be taken to the characterization. Haering's theology is exceptionally good Ritschlian theology. But no Ritschlian theology can be really good theology. Ritschlianism would not be unfairly described as the form taken in the later years of the nineteenth century by Socinianism, squeezed into the molds of Neo-Kantian philosophizing. And in the nature of the case, Socinian theology is bad theology, no matter in what philosophical garb—and, we may add, no matter with what religious fervor—it may be set forth. Haering brought to the exposition of Ritschlianism a warm religious nature, deeply steeped in Swabian Pietism, and, from the publication of his maiden-book (*Ueber das Bleibende im Glauben an Christus*, 1881), in the first days of "the movement" (the first literary symptom of the existence of "the school", was the publication in 1876 of Herrmann's *Der Metaphysik in der Theologie*), he has been diligently engaged in pouring the new wine into these old bottles. The wine has in the process no doubt taken on some of the flavor of the bottles, but the bottles have certainly burst. Despite the many modifications it has received at his hands,—all of them, happily, in the direction of a fuller recognition of essential Christian truth,—and despite the profoundly re-

ligious tone which he has cast over the whole exposition, what Haering gives us remains just Ritschlianism, and that is to say just Socinianism—Ritschlianism, Socinianism in the richest religious expression possible to them, perhaps, but Ritschlianism, Socinianism still.

When we say Ritschlianism, however, we say not only Socinianism but Socinianism in a decadent form. A quarter of a century has elapsed since Albrecht Ritschl died (1889), and the stir which his theological teaching began to make during the last decade of his life has already quieted down, and the movement which he inaugurated has largely merged in the general course of unevangelical thought. Perhaps it would be too much to say that his system has been already "relegated to the ineffectual past", for there still remain with us men of mark,—among whom Haering holds a conspicuous place—who have drawn a great part of their inspiration from it. But these are mostly men somewhat advanced in life; and it is not without its pathetic side to witness the publication by them, in their declining years, of system after system of a dogmatics, which, to put it brusquely, has had its day. There may not be wanting, indeed, some indications that the true state of the case is not altogether concealed from themselves, and that, in presenting their several transcripts of the Ritschlian system, they write consciously as much as historians of thought as they do as religious teachers. Haering, for example, not only makes no pretence of writing "definitive dogmatics", but even asserts roundly that there cannot be any such thing: "the dogmatics of any one generation", he repeatedly declares, "comes in the next to belong only to the history of dogma" (e.g. p. 31). He has even erected what he calls "the mutability of dogmatics" itself into a dogma, and finds for it crisp gnomic expression. "Theologies," he remarks (*Z ThK*, xx, 1910, p. 166). "change as doth a garment, and only the gospel abides."

In utterances like this there is obviously betrayed, however, much more than mere distrust of the permanence of one's own system in act of being expounded. What is uncovered is a veritable despair of dogmatics as such; or, to put it in its true light, a profound disbelief in the real—or "universal" as it is fashionable to phrase it—validity of what is yet somewhat oddly called religious knowledge. It is the same point of view which finds expression in the rampant individualism of Haeblerlin's declaration that the results of dogmatics "can never be the same for all theologians, just because and so long as the forms of piety which are described are not the same" (*Schw. Th. Z.* xxiii, pp. 17 ff.); or in Herrmann's even more disintegrating representation, which not only gives to each man his own necessarily peculiar dogmatics but will not permit any man to have a self-consistent dogmatics even for himself, since each several one of his "ideas (*Gedanken*) of faith" will necessarily bear traces of the peculiar occasion out of which it individually arose (*Kultur der Gegenwart*, I, 4, pp. 625, 615). The root of these disturbing deliverances is pointed out by Herrmann himself when he warns his brother Ritschlians off from the notion that a universally valid expression of

faith is possible, on the ground of the inseparable correlation of that assumption with that conception of revelation which sees in it a supernatural communication of truth (*Z Th K*, xvii, 1907, p. 29). Only an objective revelation of truth can supply a basis for an objectively valid dogmatics. And as the Ritschlians will not have an objective revelation of truth, they are in no position to give us anything better than individualistic, which is to say, subjective dogmatics.

Haering, of course, as a good Ritschlian points to revelation as the source of all religious knowledge. But to Haering, of course, as to his fellow Ritschlians, revelation is not "propositional" but purely "personal". To Christians at least (p. 144), it is summed up in the "personal life" of Christ (p. 293). Nothing can exceed the emphasis with which Haering insists upon this. "The revelation of God in Christ," he tells us (p. 262), "is the source, norm and basis of all Christian religious knowledge." Again (p. 317), "The revelation of God in Christ is the ground and norm of all religious knowledge." Further (p. 317), "As revelation is the ground, so is it the norm of Christian knowledge of God as regards its content and compass, as well as its nature." As regards its content, God is what He reveals Himself to faith in Christ as being. As regards its compass, God is nothing except what He is according to His revelation of Himself in Christ. The Christian *Glaubenserkenntnis* is, in a word, as is repeatedly asserted, *ganz und gar* the knowledge of the revelation of God in the "personal life" of Christ. No mode of statement is omitted which could emphasize the exclusiveness of the personal revelation in Christ as the source of Christian religious knowledge. But as this revelation is "personal" and not "propositional" it requires to be interpreted. The instrument by which the personal revelation of God in Christ is received and translated into religious knowledge is described as "faith". Sometimes, indeed, Haering speaks of the revelation in Christ as if it directly produced "faith": "the revelation of God in our religion," he says (p. 201), "is a revelation which produces faith, i.e. trust." But this is at once varied to the somewhat different form of statement, that God's "revelation consists in a self-attestation capable of producing faith". What is meant is apparently that God's manifestation of Himself in Christ is of such a sort that faith may find a basis for the knowledge of God in it—if it will. For Haering is very jealous of what he looks upon as the "freedom" of faith, and will not have the knowledge of God thrust upon any man by sheer revelation. In his view there are therefore two factors which must coöperate in the production of religious knowledge,—Revelation and Faith: and only in their conjunction can religious knowledge arise. "It is a revelation which faith has to interpret, and it is faith which has to interpret the revelation" (p. 421). Revelation alone cannot give religious knowledge; and, though neither can faith alone give it, yet it is faith which works up into knowledge what in revelation is only the raw materials for it. If without revelation there is no object of knowledge, without faith there is not only no

subject able to assimilate this knowledge, but no "knowledge" as yet to be assimilated. Religious "knowledge" is the product of a voluntary "faith" working upon a "revelation" which at the most is a mere "manifestation". On the face of it, here is a purely subjective theory of religious knowledge.

Haering, it is true, makes some effort to escape from this subjectivity; to avoid making faith, in effect, the creator of its own object. We find him, for example, vigorously asserting that "judgments of value", in the sense in which that concept is employed by him and his fellows, include in themselves "judgments of being". He strongly protests, indeed, against the representation that a value-judgment leaves the reality of the object of it undetermined (pp. 65 ff.). He protests further against the representation that the reality of its object is affirmed only on the ground of its value; that it is, in other words, an assumption or postulate resting on subjective experience. This appears to mean that a judgment of value presupposes the recognition of the reality of the object whose value is affirmed, and the recognition of it on some other ground than its value. Nevertheless, when an instance in point comes under discussion, and we are told dutifully (p. 67) that "the validity of judgments of faith"—here the judgment of value concerning God—"depends on the living conviction that the supreme reality in question"—that is, God—"manifests itself"—it is at once added, "but only to one who consents to recognize its reality as of value for him personally, not in the irresistible way in which the laws of logic demand recognition". The fat is obviously again in the fire. The will is brought in as the decisive factor in conviction: such a conviction is distinctively a voluntary conviction, and in this differs from the conviction wrought by logical reasoning, which, in contrast with it, is a compulsory conviction. This surely implies that the conviction in question is purely personal,—that is to say "subjective"—and cannot impose itself on another,—that is to say is not of universal validity. On what grounds could we impose on others convictions which even with ourselves we recognize as not imposed but as voluntary? Another, obviously, shares such convictions, if he shares them at all, also only voluntarily; that is by a purely personal, subjective act. The process by which the individual obtains a religious conviction, then, it would seem, is that by a voluntary act he recognizes value for himself in the object before his mind; and when it thus, by this voluntary act on his part, acquires value to him, it becomes "real" to him in a "living conviction". On the face of it, this is an extraordinary thing for it to do. But in any case, have we not here a purely subjective process? The ground adduced for the alleged reality of the object certainly appears to be its recognized value to the subject. And that value surely to all appearance is attributed to the object, not because of any compulsion of recognized fact, but by a voluntary act of the subject's own. That a "living conviction" of "reality" can arise in this fashion is sheerly incredible. All convictions, of whatever kind, are the product of course of evidence, and are not producible at will; and each con-

viction naturally rests on evidence fitted to produce that particular conviction. Judgments of being must rest, therefore, on evidence of reality, not on "recognition of value"; as indeed we have seen Haering himself compelled to allow—in words.

These remarks have brought us to the center of Haering's doctrine of Faith. It is not easy, to be sure, to determine precisely what he means by faith, despite the fundamental place held by this conception in his system. One reads the inordinately long Apologetical Introduction to his treatise with suspended mind, looking, and ever looking in vain, for some clear definition of the exact sense in which the ever-recurring "faith" is employed; and the want is not supplied even in the section of the Dogmatic part of the volume which expressly treats of Faith. It emerges, however, with sufficient clearness that faith is with Haering distinctively "voluntary conviction". It is without significance for our present point that he sometimes broadens his definition so as to include feeling as well as volition in the source of faith; as in the (for the elucidation of Haering's view) pregnant sentence: "Faith, on the ground of determinations (*Entscheidungen*) of the volitional and emotional spirit, in coöperation with the historical self-revelation of God, is sure of a reality which is inaccessible to theoretic understanding (*Erkennen*), compulsory knowledge (*zwingendes Wissen*)" (p. 257). As "voluntary conviction", he is never weary (as in the sentence just quoted) of setting "faith" over against "compulsory knowledge", a thoroughly misleading opposition (*cf.* the, no doubt insufficient, strictures of Titius, *Theologische Rundschau*, 1907, p. 378), which nevertheless forms the hinge of his whole treatment. According to this distinction, convictions which we cannot choose but have are knowledge; convictions which we have or not as we choose are faith. He even occasionally falls into the unhappy habit of setting "knowledge" and "faith" unqualifiedly in contradiction to one another, as if either we could believe what we know to be false, or that need not be true which we know. Thus in speaking of reservation in prayer with respect to earthly things, he remarks (p. 536), "It does not spring from faith, but from fear of the power of knowledge"; and again he tells us (p. 540) that certain reservations in defining miracles result from a feeling that "a decision on this point has already been pronounced from another quarter, from the side of knowledge." In such contrasts "faith" is in danger of appearing purely arbitrary. In any event Haering makes its complete voluntariness so of its essence that he exhibits an almost morbid fear lest its "freedom" should be curtailed. "Compulsion", he declares (p. 209) "is the greatest enemy of all faith." God can propound faith to us, but He cannot produce it in us: He can only ask, "whether we bestow our faith on Him in Jesus", "whether we are willing to let ourselves be laid hold of by His love revealed in Jesus". So alien is compulsion to faith, indeed, that it is laid down as axiomatic, that "in the interest of faith", there cannot be any revelation which "compels assent on grounds of logical necessity"; and even that "there cannot be any testimony to" a revelation, "so homogeneous in itself

and so uniformly authoritative, that it is not left to the believing community to fix the grade of authority which shall belong to each part of the record". The very nature of the divine revelation with which faith deals is thus accommodated to the nature of faith as necessarily voluntary: God Himself cannot "rush" the jealously guarded defences of its voluntariness. In the sphere of knowledge, in a word, compulsion may rule—we must accept what presents itself to us as true: throughout the whole realm of faith, freedom reigns—what we accept here we accept at our own option. Faith thus comes forward in Haering's system as a contribution which we ourselves bring to the production of religious knowledge. There can be no religious knowledge without faith, and faith lies in our own power. Whatever religious knowledge we have we work up at our own option out of non-compulsory materials. The function of faith in the production of religious knowledge is, indeed, so magnified that it almost seems at times as if it were supposed to bring something to its objects which lends them a reality not possessed by them in themselves.

This is not to be obscured by representing what is meant as merely that it is only to religious susceptibility that religious data appeal. It has become quite common nowadays to say that the whole object of Ritschl and his followers in their doctrine of "value-judgments" and "faith" is to maintain that only one with religious susceptibility is competent to form a judgment in religious matters. If this were the case, certainly no writers could write more misleadingly or indeed more trivially. No one has ever doubted that only a religious being can apprehend religious truth, as no one has ever doubted that only a moral being can apprehend moral truth; or—to push the matter to its conclusion—that only a rational being can apprehend truth at all. It requires as special an endowment to know that two and two make four as it does to apprehend the excellence of virtue or to perceive the beauty of holiness. But that it is not this truism which Ritschl and his followers wish to express by their doctrines of "value-judgments" and "faith" is plain from the circumstance that it does not cover the ground claimed by their contentions. We do not need to go further here than to ask what becomes then of this immense emphasis on the voluntariness of faith? Our religious susceptibility is not subject to the control of will. Does the susceptibility which responds to the moral quality of a virtuous act, or which, say, is sensitive to the music of a sonata of Beethoven, either exist or not, only at our option? By virtue of the presence of the susceptibility in the subject the object is apprehended more adequately than otherwise it would be—that is all. Nothing is apprehended which is not "there" independently of its apprehension, and no increase of reality is brought to the object by its more complete apprehension. Value judgments, judgments of appreciation, in other words, are not substitutes for judgments of being but supplements to them: they are superinduced on them and make only for more adequate knowledge of what is already less adequately known on other grounds.

The blight of Haering's conception of faith as an essentially voluntary act affects his whole system, and vitiates even his most promising concessions to an objectively valid Christianity. The function he assigns to revelation, for example, as a factor in the production of religious knowledge carries with it necessarily a strong assertion of the actual historical existence of Jesus Christ, the personal revelation of God; and an equally strong assertion of the historical trustworthiness of our records of Him. Haering therefore explicitly recognizes that, since Jesus Christ is the source and basis of Christian faith, "for all others than those contemporary with that historical revelation which produces faith, there must be historical primary sources of information (*geschichtliche Urkunden*, 'historical records') regarding it" (p. 279). Though he does not go the length of Kähler's "whole Biblical Christ", in positing the object of faith, he cannot satisfy himself with Herrmann's meagre and vague "inner life of Jesus". He argues that we must be historically assured of much about Jesus before He can serve as a revelation of God to us. To Kähler's astonishing declaration that there is not a single fact concerning the historical Jesus of which we can be historically sure, he opposes the recognition that "a certain measure of historical credibility (*Glaubwürdigkeit*) is indispensable, and its place can be taken by no amount (*Gewalt*) of religious value" (p. 281). That Jesus may work upon us as a revelation of the love of God we must know Him; and to know Him—seeing that He is a historical figure—we must have trustworthy historical accounts of Him. Haering even goes so far as to include in the trustworthy historical knowledge that we must have of Him, the knowledge of Him as the conqueror of death. He therefore makes the trustworthiness of the accounts of the "resurrection" of Jesus—as to the "fact" of it only, however, not as to its "mode", as he too explains in the customary effort to deny the resurrection while seeming to allow it—necessary to the creation of Christian trust in the complete sense. Indeed, he seems almost inclined to throw his circle out more widely still, and to bring (contrary to his fundamental principle) the preparatory "revelation" of the Old Testament itself into the compass of the grounds of faith, and even the march of God's providence in the world, and nature itself,—when viewed from "the storm-free center of the revelation of Jesus". But no sooner do we begin to congratulate ourselves on such apparently notable concessions than we are rudely called back to the qualifications which eviscerate them all.

If Haering is willing to say flatly that "it is all over with faith" if it can be shown that "Jesus is only a creature of faith" (p. 217), he will not say that faith cannot exist unless it can be shown that Jesus is not a creature of faith: he will allow that "knowledge" can destroy "faith", he will not allow that "faith" needs the aid of "knowledge", or indeed can profit by "knowledge". No sooner does he declare, then, that faith requires the historicity of Jesus for its validity than he begins to qualify. We must ask after the measure of historical trustworthiness which history can supply, and which

faith may demand. And Haering's contention is that history can neither supply nor faith ask certainty,—but only probability. No doubt, he sometimes speaks as if he were only denying that history can supply or faith demand precise "demonstration", in the strict sense of that word as the designation of a mode (not degree) of proof. But his real meaning goes further than that. "If the tradition concerning Jesus possessed compelling credibility (*zwingende Glaubwürdigkeit*)" he argues (p. 217), "we should have what we have elsewhere had to renounce in the name of faith, on account of faith's very nature,—that intelligent men would be compelled to believe, or rather, not to believe, but to recognize as indisputable fact. On the contrary, there is no such compulsion in the sphere of history, so soon as we pass beyond the establishment of external facts and simple connections". The statement is, perhaps, not perfectly clear in all its suggestions; but this much seems plain—history does not yield facts which intelligent persons, conversant with the historical evidence, are compelled to accept as facts—beyond at least certain external facts in their external connection. History presents to us (beyond this) only data which we may (however intelligent and however well-informed historically) accept or reject with good conscience—at our option.

History does not make, for example, the reality of Jesus Christ,—such a Jesus Christ as may be recognized as a revelation of the love of God—so certain that every intelligent man, conversant with the historical evidence, must assent to it as indisputable. All that history can bring us, as Haering goes on to explain (p. 218), is a sufficiently high probability (*Wahrscheinlichkeit*) to enable the "religiously susceptible" "to surrender themselves to the impression of this person" "with a good conscience". If the religiously susceptible man makes this venture of faith, he may indeed attain through this to a certainty of the existence of this Jesus. But assuredly, then, the certainty he thus attains is the product of his faith, not of the historical evidence,—since, says Haering, this certainty "but for that surrender would be unattainable" (p. 218). We seem here perilously near to making Jesus—the Jesus in whom we find the revelation of the love of God—"only the creation of faith": and, in that case, Haering himself being witness, "it is all over with faith". Haering does, indeed, go on to say that the purely historical evidence of the existence of this Jesus must be sufficient to compel the man who will not accept it "to admit, in order to maintain his good historical conscience, that he is kept from giving his assent, not by compelling grounds of a historical character, but by a theory of the universe opposed to the Christian" (p. 218). Apparently this means that though there cannot be compelling grounds in history for affirming that Jesus existed—the Jesus in which faith sees the revelation of the love of God—neither must there be compelling grounds discoverable in history for affirming that He did not exist. History is not to say the decisive word as to the fact, one way or the other. All that can be asked of history—all that history can give—is room for believing in Jesus, on other grounds,—grounds apparently of "religious susceptibility". Historical evidence cannot

except by revelation, and this revelation is for Christians (for non-Christians there are hints that a substitute may be found) wholly included in the personal life of Christ. Not in what Christ teaches, nor in the details of what He did; but in the general drift of His life as historically transmitted to us (in a probable record) and received in a religiously susceptible soul. But how can this general drift of Jesus' life, even though transmitted to us with entire trustworthiness in history, reveal even to the religiously susceptible that God is love? On Evangelical ground the revelation of the love of God in Christ is clear enough; for herein in love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins; for God commendeth His own love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners Christ died for us. But on Haering's ground? On Haering's ground we have no other reason for believing that God is love, except that Jesus Christ lived and wrought in that firm belief—if indeed we can assure ourselves, amid the uncertainties of historical testimony, that He did so live and work. It is as subject of faith,—Himself exercising perfect trust in God—that He becomes the producer of faith in us. We believe that God is love for no other reason than that Jesus believed that God is love. Is it more than a case of spiritual contagion? And is such spiritual contagion enough to base our whole hope in life and death upon? Haering is perfectly right when he declares that we can postulate "pardoning love" to the Righteous God as a fact, only on the basis of an actual revelation. But he will admit no revelation in word. Where, on his ground—without any Divine Son of God and without any Atonement wrought in His blood—do we get any actual revelation in fact of the pardoning love of God? In his view Jesus was sinless: how, in his "personal life"—not in His teaching—does He manifest to us specifically "the pardoning love" of God?

Obviously we are at the center of Haering's Christology when we raise such questions. Like all good Ritschlians it is the work of Christ which chiefly interests Haering and he accordingly (like all the rest) begins with it, and only infers from what he supposes Christ to do, what he is willing to allow that Christ is. The work of God is all included for him in this—that He reveals God to us as holy love, though, as we have seen, it puts him on his metal to make out that He does this. Of course, every body knows that from the beginning Haering has stood out among the Ritschlians as the one among them all who was striving to formulate the most adequate doctrine of Atonement. Gustave Ecke, pointing out the shortcomings of the teaching of Ritschl and Gottschick (the most completely Ritschlian of the Ritschlians) feels able to speak of "the surmounting of these shortcomings by Haering". And indeed Haering must be given the credit of having made effort after effort to find some "objective aspect" for Christ's work on Ritschlian assumptions (*Ueber das Bleibende im Glauben*, 1880; *Zu Ritschls Versöhnungslehre*, 1888, *Zur Versöhnungslehre*, 1893). What he has put forward with this end in view, however, he has had steadily to retract (a fair

brief account of the course of his thought here may be read in Bensow, *Die Lehre von der Versöhnung*, 1904, pp. 106 ff.), until in the present volumes not a vestige—or perhaps we may say literally just a vestige—of it remains. He still divides the work of Christ, viewed as regards its content, into His prophetic and His priestly work; and describes the former as wrought by Christ “as God’s personal Revelation of Himself for us”, and the latter as wrought by Him as “our Representative before God”. He thus appears as still fain to discover some Godward side to Christ’s work. But he discovers none. The best he can do is to represent that God is pleased with the perfection of Christ’s revelation of His holy love to men. How this redounds to our credit remains meanwhile, as Wendt points out (*Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1907, 23, coll. 646-7), unexplained; and we may add inexplicable.

As Haering still speaks thus of a “priestly” work of Christ, in which He “represents” us before God, so, continuing his careful use of old categories which have lost all their content to him (he actually orders his treatise on the Trinitarian categories of “Faith in God the Father”, “Faith in Jesus Christ, the Son of God,” “Faith in the Holy Spirit of God and Christ”, though he does not in the least believe in the Trinity), he still speaks also of a “kingly” work of Christ. His exposition of the work of Christ is thus cast in the familiar molds of His office-work as Prophet, Priest and King, while yet there is assigned to Him none other than His “prophetic” work. The Kingly work of Christ is the work of the exalted Christ, and that Haering throws stress on this work of the exalted Christ stamps him at once as belonging to the Ritschlian “Right”. Though he thus asserts his belief in a continued saving work for the exalted Christ, however, Haering is careful not to let it be supposed that he considers such a belief an essential element of the Christian religion: he thus preserves a place among good Christians for his fellow Ritschlians of the “Left”, who will not hear of any saving work for the “hidden” exalted Christ (p. 660). And in his own Ritschlian fear of mysticism (no “Christ Mysticism” for him) he is careful to confine this work of the exalted Christ within very narrow limits and not to permit it to add anything of importance to His work on earth—not advancing here in substance of teaching beyond what he had already taught in his earliest work (1881). When he describes “the work of the exalted Lord” as consisting solely “in the fact that He makes His historical work on earth operative” (it is meanwhile not made clear *how* He does this), he is only remaining true to the necessary implications of Christ’s saving work as he conceives it, which he makes to consist wholly in the revelation of the love of God to us through His trustful life in complete recognition of that love.

When we think of the exalted Christ we naturally think of that Resurrection by which, according to the Scriptures, He entered upon His glory. Haering’s dealing with the Resurrection is very characteristic. He adverts to it twice (pp. 211 ff. 627 ff.), and then leaves us not quite certain what he believes with respect to it. He allows that

it is essential to complete Christian faith to hold that, when the disciples "saw the Lord, they were not self-deceived, that He actually showed Himself to them as the Living One" (p. 211). All theories of merely "subjective vision" must then be rejected (p. 629). Beyond this, however, he will not go. He too wishes to draw a distinction between "the fact" and "the mode" of the resurrection; and thus to cover up the actual denial of all "resurrection" by those who talk of an "objective vision"—or, as Haering prefers to phrase it, "a vision which has an objective basis". His chief concern is that all should agree that it is unimportant what we think became of the dead body, so only we understand that the person Jesus did not at death pass wholly out of existence—as if we could talk of a "resurrection" of what never died, or as if Jesus' disciples required assurance that He, like other men, still lived after that experience which we call death. We may infer that Haering attaches great importance to this attitude towards the question of our Lord's resurrection from the circumstance that he repeats it in his booklet, called *Persönlich-Practisches aus der christlichen Glaubenslehre* (1911), and there expresses his thanks to his theological friend Max Reischle for "well-considered and pious words" on "the mode and manner" of the resurrection of Christ, to which "nothing essentially new has been added since" (p. 108). What Reischle has to say on the matter, however, whether in his articles in the seventh and eighth volumes of the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* or in his later *Christliche Glaubenslehre in Leitsätzen* (edition 2, 1902) is merely that while the resurrection experiences of the disciples cannot be scientifically proved not to have been a delusion, yet they are assured facts of faith, though even to faith "the question as to the *how*" of them remains unanswerable. That is to say we can be sure only "that the crucified One really lives as the Lord of His kingdom and revealed Himself to His disciples as the Living One". What Haering thinks so fine in Reischle, therefore, is only, his teaching that we cannot be sure that Christ ever rose from the dead, but we need not concern ourselves about that—all that is important is that His spirit did not die with the body and has entered into His glory.

With the idea of the exalted Christ there is associated the thought of prayer to Him, and Haering is accordingly led at this point to face this question (p. 665). He treats it with the chary caution with which he deals with all such matters. He permits us to pray to Christ; but he adds: "All invocation of Jesus is adoration of God who is revealed to us in Him." That is to say, we do not invoke Jesus as He is Himself God, but only as an intermediary through whom God reaches us and we Him. The notion has its affinities with Karl Thieme's insistence that Christ deserves our adoration because of His "representative unity" with God.

With this introduction Haering proceeds formally to discuss the "Divinity of Christ" (pp. 667 ff.). He is willing for Himself to employ the term, "Divinity" of Christ,—but only as an indication that "saving faith" embraces God and Jesus in one act of confidence; and

posits something to thought without being able to define it qualitatively, positively". For himself, Eisler broadly defines limitative-conceptions (*Grenzbegriffe*) as "conceptions which contain as content the existence of a transcendent object, without embracing (adequately) along with that its qualities; or conceptions which lead to the confines of the knowledge whose contents are valid at once for the subjective and for the objective reality". If we are to be governed by these definitions, it would seem that we must understand Haering, in representing the preëxistence of Christ as a limitative-notion, to be declaring it something which we must declare to be real, while yet we renounce all claim to comprehend what it is.

But if we will turn to the discussion of the same matter by Otto Kirn (*Grundriss der Evangelischen Dogmatik*, ed. 1, 1905, p. 92; ed. 2, 1906, p. 99; ed. 3, 1910, p. 107),—with whom in general Haering shows strong affinities—we will discover that the representation of the preëxistence of Christ as a limitative-conception (*Grenzbegriff*) is consistent, among Ritschlian theologians, with denial of, not its comprehensibility merely, but its reality as well. The passage is instructive enough to justify giving it in its entirety. "The Logos idea" says Kirn, "contains thus the ultimate explanation of the historical manifestation of Christ; but it gives us no knowledge of *His pre-historic being*. Logos means revelation, and the revelation of God to us belongs to history. The attempt to speculate upon the hypostatic distinction of the Logos from the Father, leads inevitably to subordinationistic ideas which do not do justice to the Christian faith. For only communion through Jesus Christ with God—in the most unlimited sense of the word—preserves to the Christian revelation its absoluteness and to the Christian salvation its certainty. The *Sonship of Christ* to God also enables us to illuminate the life-connection of the historical Jesus with God, but not the eternal, intradivine life-process which forms the basis of the historical redemptive revelation. The attempt to pass beyond these limits, such as is made by means of the notion of the eternal generation of the Son yields nothing further, but only reduplicates the faith-knowledge oriented to history. The idea of *preëxistence* forms therefore a limitative conception (*Grenzbegriff*) of our theological thought. It declares that the historical Christ has eternally His central and universal place in God's will of salvation, and that the content of His life, His redemptive holy love, comes from God and is an eternal content of the supernatural life of God. We would, therefore, more correctly speak of the *super-historical* character of the revelation of God in Christ than of the *pre-historical* existence of Christ with the Father." Here the preëxistence of Christ is represented as a "limitative-conception" and yet explained as only "ideal", as the phrase goes. An elaborate argument is devoted to showing precisely that Christ did not exist "really" before His earthly career began. It does not follow, therefore, that Haering intends to represent the preëxistence as real, from the mere fact that he calls it a "limitative-notion".

Nor are all our hesitations at once dissipated by the circumstance

that Haering explicitly speaks of it as "real". The Ritschlians (perhaps Haering conspicuously among them) are so accustomed to employ phraseology consecrated by long usage in novel senses or in new applications, that it behoves us to scrutinize their language closely before accepting it in what may seem to us its obvious meaning. Not to go beyond this very matter of the preëxistence of Christ, H. H. Wendt, on the low ground of his frankly acknowledged Dynamistic Monarchianism, can still find an element of truth in the doctrine of the preëxistence of Christ, and can still speak of this preëxistence as "real" not "ideal". "We have," he remarks, "merely not to refer the idea of real, eternal preëxistence to the historical man Jesus Christ as a whole, but to that which was divine in Him, to the Holy Spirit which He bore in Himself. And this eternal preëxistence of the Holy Spirit is not a *personal* preëxistence, like that of the Logos in the Athanasian conception. *Real* preëxistence, was not possessed by the 'Son'. For 'Son' of God is not the Holy Spirit but the personal man Jesus in which the Holy Spirit showed Himself operative. Of this man we can only affirm *ideal* preëxistence; that He as mediator of the redemptive revelation, which was to lead to the establishment of the Kingdom of God, belonged to the eternal redemptive plan of God and was the object of God's loving prevision and provision" (*System der Christlichen Lehre* II, 1907, p. 579). It is no doubt sufficiently bizarre to speak of the eternity of the God who employed the man Jesus as His organ as, in any sense, a "real preëxistence" of Jesus Himself. But this is the way the Ritschlians employ language.

Coming nearer home to Haering, we may profitably observe how the question of our Lord's preëxistence is dealt with by his life-long theological friend, his fellow-Swabian, Max Reischle. Reischle feels able to speak of "an eternal Being of Jesus Christ" after a fashion wholly incomprehensible to us, and is able to connect this with the idea of the Logos, thought of, however, not as a distinct hypostasis in the Godhead but only as "an aspect, tendency, mode of operation of the Divine Being Itself". "If, however, we raise the question," he proceeds, "whether we are to carry into the eternal Being of the *θεὸς λόγος*, also the personal life of the historical and exalted Christ, distinct from that of the Father" (for it is only to the historical and exalted Christ that a distinct hypostasis is allowed, p. 62), "only so much as this can be said: Since the action of the Logos is intelligible to us only with respect to and in the person of Jesus Christ, we can never in our faith think away this personality from the conception of the Logos; but we must always think, as of the eternal God as Father of Jesus Christ, so also of the eternal Logos or of that eternal self-determination in God, as related to Jesus Christ. But what the nature of this relation is, we are, as finite beings, incapable of penetrating, and still more of making it the starting point in an explanation of the incarnation of Jesus." "Thus," he adds, "we are in the question of the eternal origin of Jesus Christ, ever again brought back to this—the believing recognition, not only *back of*, but

in His earthly personal life, and in the activities of the exalted one, of the eternal Divine Being determining the time-course" (*Christliche Glaubenslehre in Leitsätzen*,² 1902, pp. 199-120). There is a distinct refusal here to allow to Christ any personal preëxistence, and the reduction of His preëxistence to that of the impersonal Logos inseparably connected with Him in our thought, while the meagreness of this result is partially covered up by a suggestion that we are, as finite creatures, incapable of understanding such relationships, and a reference to the manifest presence of the eternal God with Jesus Christ. If our necessary thinking of God as Father of Jesus Christ, he intimates, does not carry with it the consequence that God was always the Father of Jesus Christ, neither does our necessary thinking of the Logos in connection with the person, Jesus, carry with it the consequence that the Logos was always connected with that person.

The impulse to suspect that Haering's doctrine of the preëxistence of Jesus may also evaporate under our gaze into some such mist as this, arises not only generally from its astonishing incongruity with the scheme of his teaching as a whole, but more particularly from the immense difficulty of taking it literally in the face of his decisive rejection of the doctrines of the Trinity on the one hand and of the Two Natures of our Lord on the other. With him God is a monadic Divine person and Jesus is a monadic human person, and on those postulates it seems impossible to construe to thought a real personally preëxistent Christ. He cannot be thought of as a personal distinction in the Godhead; for there are no personal distinctions in the Godhead. He equally cannot be thought of as some sort of a "middle-being": whatever else Jesus is to Haering, He is a genuine man, a human being with all the qualities of humanity. Will he then project Him back into eternity as some kind of a "heavenly man", despite His strong asseveration that He "belongs to us"? The monstrosity of these notions in the general context of Haering's thought bids us pause before we take his words at their face value. Is it not more probable that like his fellow Ritschlians here he has some subtle meaning in mind, which does not appear on the surface of his words, especially since he tells us that his advocacy of the preëxistence of Christ will commend itself in proportion as we accept the notion strictly as a "limitative-notion", that is to say as something quite incomprehensible to us? Meanwhile, it must be admitted that he seems to ascribe to Christ as a fact, whatever we are to say of the mode, a real personal preëxistence. "This *limitative-notion*," he says, "may be formulated" ("by those who accept it" seems to be added in the later text), "as follows: the love of God, effective to us in Christ as the Son, is so truly love of God, effective self-revelation of His nature, that it is eternally directed to Him, the vehicle of this eternal love, not only in the sense of ideal preëxistence,—to Him as the temporal-historical correlate of the eternal love of God,—but also apart from His earthly existence, as love of the Father for the Son, in the mystery of the eternal life of God, or then, accordingly, because no other word stands at our disposal, in real preëxistence; and—this

the other side of the same notion—this Son, eternally loved by God, is, as sent by the Father into the world, so come into the world by an act of love of His own" (p. 704). It certainly seems to be said here not only that God's love for the Son is eternal, but that the Son whom God loves is eternal; not only that the Son was sent into the world by God, but that He came into the world by an act of His own. All things considered it does not appear strange that Haering's confidence in such a "limitative notion" should not seem quite complete. He speaks of its "advocates", to be sure, as "convinced". But he agrees that they must not "make assent to it an essential element of saving faith itself"—that is to say of the necessary content of the Christian religion—"but", he adds in the later revision of his text, "shall rather leave open the possibility that, in the progress of knowledge with regard to the Christian salvation, it may be superseded" (p. 707).

We have been interested to observe how Haering's critics, sharing his general Ritschlian point of view, understand him on this matter. A. Titius (*Theologische Rundschau* x, 1907, p. 460) seems merely to record the fact that Haering holds such an opinion. "The doctrine of Christ's real preëxistence," he writes, "is accepted" by Haering, "with respect to its kernel indeed as a 'providentially supplied limitative-notion' (p. 449), but along with that also not as an 'essential element of saving faith itself.'" H. H. Wendt (*Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1907, 23, col. 647) seems to drop a sly suggestion that Haering's recognition of a real preëxistence for Christ may possibly be classed in Haering's view along with that knowledge which passes away. "With circumspect reserve," he writes, "Haering permits the New Testament ideas of the real preëxistence of Christ, to pass as limitative-notions, which the Christian community may retain, 'so as to lose nothing of the mystery of God's revelation of love in Christ, until in other conditions of existence a more perfect knowledge of it discloses itself' (p. 499)". E. Günther (*Die Entwicklung der Lehre von d. Person Christi im xix Jahrhundert*, 1911, pp. 330-1) deals with the matter at more length, but also, it seems, with a slight undertone of sarcasm. "Perhaps the most difficult point in Haering's Christology," he says, "is his doctrine of *preëxistence* as a 'limitative-notion'. If he advances beyond the so-called ideal preëxistence this is wholly from motives derived from religion and the New Testament. The ideas of the love of the Father who gives the Son and of the humble self-surrender of the Son who came into the world by an act of love of His own, are to him too valuable to be relinquished. The origin of the Pauline and Johannine Christology is also a problem for Haering, which however, is not capable of being solved—or perhaps is already solved—from analogies and connections derived from Comparative Religion (pp. 443-448). But he who will not abandon the notion of the real preëxistence should give it expression on the one side only as the ultimate culmination of the immediate conceptions of faith, and on the other with the conscious reservation that there can exist for us in this region no knowledge (p. 450). We may con-

jecture that in this reference many will rather be disposed to speak of the limits of thought than of 'limitative-thoughts' (*die Gedanken-grenze als Grenzgedanken*). They will, however, be gladly ready with Haering 'without curtailment of their particular gift, encouraged rather by a noble rivalry, weary of mere negations, to unite in a real affirmation' (p. 452)." Whatever they may think of the procedure, neither Titius, Wendt, nor Günther appears to doubt that Haering intends to teach a real personal preëxistence for Christ.

We shall not follow the details of Haering's system further. With his reduction of the person of Christ to the dimensions of a mere man (despite that "rock in the sky" of a problematical incomprehensible preëxistence), and of the work of Christ to merely impressing men with the conviction that God is "holy love" (despite the ineffective efforts to discover in this some value to God); with his reduction of God Himself to mere Love—whatever that may mean—(despite the incongruous insistence against his master, Ritschl, that "righteousness" and "wrath" have a place in the Divine nature): it is easy to understand what a "reduced Christianity" he sets forth. The fundamental difficulty lies of course in the lack of "external authority". It is not to be wondered at that one, who, having discarded the authority of the revelation of God embodied in the Scriptures, finds his task as a theologian only in "giving expression to the religious interpretation of the gospel which is attainable at the period" at which he writes—that is, who seeks his guidance not in a sure word of God but in shifting public opinion—should be able to set forth only a meagre and lowpitched system of doctrine. Or that he should sit rather loosely to what he does give us. Certainly there is observable in the teachings of such writers, and not least in Haering, a certain "elasticity" as it has been euphemistically phrased. He has his own faith-judgments; but so also have others: why should he demand exclusive recognition for his own? So, to take examples only from matters which have come before us, Haering will not "dogmatize" on the "mode" of the resurrection of Jesus; on the saving activity of the exalted Christ; on the employment of the term "divinity" with reference to Christ; on even his poverty-stricken notion of some sort of preëxistence for Christ. In his hands Christianity takes on the appearance of a highly elastic cord in rapid vibration; there may be a solid cord somewhere, but all that appears to sight is a vague and tenuous lozenge of unstable and unsubstantial material. Despite the parade of Apologetical substructure a sense of unreality gradually grows upon the reader as he proceeds through the volumes, and he closes them with the feeling that he has not been given a solid system of Christian doctrine; not even a "gospel"—a body of glad-tidings—which Haering would no doubt prefer that it should be; but only a collection of the more or less plausible religious opinions of a good man conscious of lacking any firm ground for his feet.

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trine, Jones has difficulties. Concessions are in order: it will not do to estrange Jones' "modern mind"! Mr. Knox is outraged by such an attitude. "The great argument used now against any theological proposition," he breaks out, "is not, that it is untrue, or unthinkable, or unedifying, or unscriptural, or unorthodox; but simply, that the modern mind cannot accept it. It is the modern mind that accepts this, and rejects that, that expresses itself in terms of A rather than in terms of B, that thinks along these lines rather than along those, that shrinks, or ratifies, or demands. And after reading a few paragraphs of such ostensibly psychological discussion, I find myself sorely tempted to exclaim in an equally psychological spirit: 'If the modern mind has really got all these peculiar kinks about it, then, in Heaven's name, let us trepan it!'"

Even this however, is, according to Mr. Knox, not the worst of the matter in the case of the authors of *Foundations*. The Jones to whom they are so assiduous in adjusting their teaching is a "back number". "In a word, our objection is, not that Jones is unreal, or unimportant, or unrepresentative, but that he is sixty." It was forty years ago that Jones went to College: and the strenuous efforts which the authors of *Foundations* are making "to convert our great uncles" must strike the really "modern mind" as a sad anachronism. The world has moved in this generation: *tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis*. This "modern mind" to fit it into the queer corners of which the authors of *Foundations* are so busy whittling down Christianity, always an impertinence, has become fairly non-existent. Jones has receded into the background; and his grandchildren are of a very different temper. They wish no "accommodations" of doctrine made for them. "I have never met (outside of Senior Common Rooms) any demand from questioners for re-statement or accommodation of my beliefs to theirs; they want rather to know what the Church does say, in order to see whether they can accommodate their beliefs to mine". "Against all this complicated process I am convinced that the cry of the average man is, 'Tell me what you do believe and always have believed . . . and then I will see about it.'" "The modern mind does not want pulp. It wants something that it can close its teeth on." "More dogma is wanted, pulpitufuls of it." The actual mind of the day demands not quieting compromises but clearly-cut differentiations and consequent consistency of convictions.

The fundamental difficulty of the Modern Theologian leading him to sit loosely to Christian truths lies, Mr. Knox thinks, in his method of approach to them. He approaches them by way of hypothesis instead of by way of presupposition, or *a posteriori* rather than *a priori*. Looking at them only as so many propositions proposed for consideration, and approaching them (professedly) wholly without prepossessions, he sets to work framing hypotheses, on the ground of which they may be accounted for. Obviously any number of conflicting hypotheses may be framed: there are few bodies of alleged facts which may not find some kind of explanation on any one of a score or of a hundred hypotheses. And at the last resort, there

always remains the simple explanation of the amazing report brought by the child: "the little boy lied" (more or less). There is no limit to the number of hypotheses which may be suggested to account for any body of alleged facts, except the limits of the fertility of the imagination. And there are no final grounds of discrimination between the several hypotheses proposed. More than one will account for the facts on the assumption that it is true. And each man becomes enamoured of his own hypothesis and twists the facts to make them accord with it. We soon find ourselves in the midst not merely of a confused mass of hypotheses but also of a confused mass of doubted facts; and we seek in vain for a firm footing. Everything however is different if we approach a body of truths presented for our acceptance with presuppositions rather than hypotheses in our hands. Presuppositions are solid things, on which we can take our stand. We already believe, say, in God, and in a personal God who acts purposively; and in a God of love who intervenes in a sinful and miserable world for its salvation. We bring these things with us as facts of which we are assured, not as hypotheses which we are testing; and what a different aspect is taken on by the body of Christian doctrine! Now everything is clear, and solid and sure. And the difference hangs, says Mr. Knox in effect, wholly on the difference in standpoint.

Mr. Knox, it will be seen, is an "authoritarian". And that is well. We cannot get along in this world of fact without authority. Without authority we may assure ourselves, it may be, of what must be; we cannot be assured of a single thing that merely is. And Christianity, as a historical religion, is a religion of facts and is therefore built up, in all that makes it that specific religion which we call Christianity, on authority. We may be theists without authority but not Christians. The blows which Mr. Knox strikes in the name of authority are without doubt fatal and he does especially good service when he exposes the inconsequence of the attempt to substitute religious experience for authority as the foundation of conviction. "As a matter of modernist psychology," he writes, "this appeal to experience is very interesting. The modernist will not allow himself to be regarded as in any way prejudiced in favor of one particular theological system. He therefore collects together the testimony of innumerable other people, principally Bishops, mediaeval nuns, and contemporary charcoal-burners, who were and are, beyond any shadow of dispute, prejudiced theologians—prejudiced by what they believed upon a basis of purely traditional authority. And the result of this appeal is summed up as if it were the most modern of all critical investigations, an essay in psychology. But if *a priori* assumptions are to play no part in modern theology, spiritual experience must play no part in modern theology, for spiritual experience is based on *a priori* assumptions" (pp. 193-4). "The whole argument from experience," he comments, "seems to rest on the assumption that you can first make people believe, on the strength of Bible documents or inherited tradition, certain clearly defined dogmas; and then, when they have got

accustomed to this way of thinking, you can come and knock away the supports on which the belief rests, Biblical and traditional, and say, 'We have now proved the truth of these doctrines, because we have reared on them so splendid an edifice of faith'" (p. 190).

Valid, however, as is Mr. Knox's appeal to authority; and sound as is his contention that authority lies at the basis of all Christian faith; it must be confessed that he gives no adequate account either of the ground or the nature of the authority to which he makes appeal. His argument thus hangs in the air, and the impression is created that the authority on which Christianity rests is accepted by its votaries by a purely arbitrary act of will. This is indeed, to all appearance, true in Mr. Knox's own case; otherwise, we surely would catch in his numerous allusions to it some hint of a rational basis of his acceptance of authority. He is, it would seem, just a "traditional" Christian and is inclined to give validity to the traditional Christianity which he accepts, chiefly one would imagine, despite his solid refutation of that ground of faith, because of the beneficent results of his acceptance of it. He would scarcely expect us to take literally "the crude metaphor" by which he attempts to illustrate his attitude to Scripture and tradition (p. 33): "You have a motor-car with two headlights, each throwing out its rays obliquely in either direction. The hedge on each side is illuminated by one lamp only, but in the center of the road the two lights converge, and mark out a triangular area of brilliant clearness. The two lights of Scripture and Tradition (if we may pursue this crude metaphor) may be said in the same way to provide sufficient guidance for our course only when they overlap. Beyond this area, speculation is at liberty to botanize in the hedge-rows." If we were really to "pursue this crude metaphor" Mr. Knox would have left himself no authority at all. If neither Scripture nor Tradition has any authority by itself—and he apparently deprives each severally of authority—they cannot have any authority when combined—on the principle at least in which Mr. Knox tells us he was brought up (p. 190), viz. that $O + Q$ yields still O . Authority is not a thing of degrees: it is either absolute or non-existent. He must therefore look upon either Scripture or Tradition as by itself authoritative if their combination is to be authoritative. And it is quite clear that it is to Tradition, not to Scripture that Mr. Knox really accords authority. When he says therefore: "It is only at the point where Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition combine to form a defined doctrine, that he"—he who thinks with Mr. Knox—"pretends to stand on sure ground in virtue of a presupposition" (p. 33), we can but understand him to mean that his faith rests not on Scripture *simpliciter*, but on Scripture, as interpreted by Tradition—that is to say that he finds his authority not in Scripture at all but in tradition; in other words that he is a traditionalist in the sense of the Church of Rome. Authority to him thus spells tradition, and tradition spells "Church", and "Church" spells practically Rome. Mr. Knox in a word is a High Anglican, indistinguishable in his theory of authority from the general doctrine

on this subject of the Roman Church, except, perhaps, for a little drawing back when the place of the Pope in the definition of dogma comes into consideration (*cf.* p. 193). His pleading for a commanding place for authority in religion is largely vitiated, therefore, by the circumstance that his own view of the nature, seat, and ground of authority in religion is baseless and untenable.

This fundamental inconsequence in his own point of view does not prevent Mr. Knox, however, from exposing the inconsequences of the "Modernist" point of view, as illustrated in the authors of *Foundations*, in a very trenchant manner. In successive chapters he traverses the greater number of the essays in *Foundations* and points out in them tendencies of method and treatment which annul their conclusions. He speaks himself of having dealt only very cursorily with Mr. Moberley's essay on the Atonement. But we are not sure that the strictures on this essay do not constitute the best piece of criticism in the volume. The notion that our Lord offered for us a "vicarious penitence" is very properly scored. Can there be such a thing as "vicarious penitence"? If there can be, can it take away sin? And if it can take away sin, must it not be because it, as suffering, is "*actually allowed to count* in the eye of divine justice as satisfaction for sins which we have committed"; and if this is so, how does it avoid the criticism that "it is immoral that the sufferings of one man should be accepted as satisfaction for the sins of another"? The essence of the matter is touched in a passage like the following. "But this surely is clear, that if we are to hold the full traditional view of the Atonement, we must suppose that the brand left by our sins is not twofold, but threefold. They leave a mark on our own souls—true. They leave a mark on the lives of men around us—true. But over and above all this, they leave a mark in the book of life, a black mark on our records, which no human penitence can efface. There is an objective disturbance in the moral order which our sins have created, and only one thing could right it, the Sacrifice of Christ, to which we have contributed not a jot or a tittle on our own part. And there can be neither Catholicism nor Evangelicism where this fact is not realized" (p. 171). Some of the remarks on the deity of our Lord and the Incarnation are equally pungent, and that whether the attempt to substitute the category of will for that of substance in construing the one doctrine or the notion of kenosis in construing the other, is under discussion. To be "of the same mind" with one another is not to have numerically only one "mind" among us; and when two beings will the same thing it is not clear that they are therefore but one. And if anything such as the Kenotists assert happened at the Incarnation we certainly cannot say that Jesus was God, but only that He was a man who once had been God. The Virgin Birth and the Empty Tomb (though Mr. Knox stumbles sadly with reference to our Lord's resurrection-body) and the Ascension are all dealt with in adequate fashion. Mr. Knox is willing even to become aggressive here. "Mr. Streeter says he knows of no living theologian who would maintain a physical Ascen-

sion in this crude form. I have no claim to be a theologian. I can only say that as a person of ordinary education I believe, as I hope for salvation, in this literal doctrine: I believe, that whatever change may have glorified the Risen Body when it passed beyond the cloud into a new mode or sphere of existence the earth has ever since the Ascension been lighter by so many pounds' weight, and the sum of matter in the world the less by so many cubic inches of volume" (p. 85). Such "materialism" may shock some ears: but the issue ultimately comes to just that.

There are, of course, other passages with which we feel less satisfaction. We do not quite go with Mr. Knox in his dealing with miracles; especially in his inability to separate between Biblical and Ecclesiastical Miracles. We certainly do not go with him in his treatment of Scripture: especially in his discussion of the eschatological utterances of our Lord. His Romeward tendencies—which are numerous and decisive—are an offence to us. His obsession of "freedom" is equally regrettable. Even here, however, he shows his characteristic courage and in the interests of "free-will" cheerfully denies that we have any solid ground for anticipating the conversion of the world. Enough: there is much in Mr. Knox's book which is crude and unconsidered. But this cannot destroy its general value as an exposure of the weaknesses of "modernism"; and it is in this that its significance lies. It is an earnest and successful plea to reasonable men to draw back from these shifting shoals where "we have to be reassured by a yearly statement from Dr. Sanday, comparable to the weather report, as to 'what we may still believe,'" and to plant our feet firmly on the rock. The fine air of conviction which suffuses it, and the brightness of the style, should give the book a wide circulation and, we trust, will give it, in its main message, large acceptance.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Zukunft und Hoffnung. Grundzüge einer Lehre von der Christlichen Hoffnung. von DR. W. HADORN; Professor und Pfarrer in Bern. Beiträge zur Förderung Christlicher Theologie, Achzehnter Jahrgang. Heft I. C. Bertelsmann; Gütersloh. 1914. Pp. 147.

This is an outline of Christian Eschatology. Its aim, as the author tells us in the Preface, is practical. Dr. Hadorn intends to give an outline of the subject, which will be of help to ministers of the Gospel and to laymen who may have become doubtful as to the nature or the validity of the Christian hope.

Dr. Hadorn, therefore, says that he does not intend to enter into a thorough philosophical discussion of the question of Immortality, nor to discuss all of the detailed problems which arise in reference to Christian Eschatology and its relation to Jewish Eschatology. This practical purpose of the author must be kept in mind in estimating the value of the book. Otherwise the reader might be inclined to criticise the volume on account of the omission of many questions which are either not touched upon at all, or only with the greatest brevity.

have a chance to hear and accept it in the future, but that all who have not heard the Gospel and also all who, having heard it, have died undecided whether or not to accept Christ, have a chance to accept Jesus and the offers of the Gospel in the future life. As regards the rest of mankind, Dr. Hadorn argues in favor of the idea that they will at last be annihilated, and he criticises both the doctrines of Restorationism and of eternal future Punishment. He affirms, however, that our knowledge of this subject must always remain uncertain.

It is in these closing sections that Dr. Hadorn's book is most unsatisfactory. The argument in favor of annihilationism rests almost wholly upon *a priori* reasoning or upon what he terms "moral" and "religious" grounds, which are not anything more than the author's own sentiments on the subject.

The argument for future probation is equally weak. The two or three passages of Scripture to which appeal is made, will not support the doctrine at all. For example, when our Lord said that if anyone should speak a word against the Holy Spirit, it should not be forgiven him, neither in this age nor in the coming age (Matt. xii. 32). He evidently did not mean that in the future life every sin, which was not the sin against the Holy Spirit, would be forgiven or might be forgiven. This is neither said nor implied. What Jesus evidently intended to say was that the sin against the Holy Spirit could never be forgiven at all, which is precisely the meaning of the parallel passage in Mark iii. 29. To get the doctrine of future probation out of this saying of Jesus is logic chopping rather than exegesis. The words "the coming age" (*αἶον μέλλον*), moreover, denote, not the future life of each individual between his death and the Judgment, but the age following the *Parousia* and the Final Judgment, i.e., the age of the final consummation of the Kingdom of God.

Furthermore, the difficult passage 1 Peter iii. 19, 20, even if it meant that Jesus went, after His death, to the world of departed spirits and preached the Gospel, would afford no support to the doctrine of future probation, and in addition to this, the above interpretation of the passage seems an impossible one for a number of cogent exegetical reasons which we cannot stop to enumerate.

It is not, after all, this hopelessly weak basis on which Dr. Hadorn rests his belief in the doctrine of future probation, in the face of the explicit teaching of the Scripture to the contrary. His belief in this doctrine is based rather upon a number of presuppositions which are not expressly stated, but which nevertheless are seen to underlie his argument, and which are not only without support in Scripture, but are contrary to the teaching of the Bible. These presuppositions are—that God intends to save all men, and that man's salvation depends on his hearing the Gospel and not resisting it; that man's attitude for or against the Gospel as foreseen by God, is the determining cause of God's election of men to salvation; that this stands wholly in the choice of man; that original sin and actual sins are not sufficient to condemn men, but that only the sin of rejecting the Gospel offer is

a sufficient ground of condemnation. All of these ideas are in direct conflict with the gracious character of salvation, and with the express teaching of the Scripture.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

The Holy Spirit of God. By W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, D.D., Professor of Old Testament Literature and Exegesis, Wyckliffe College, Toronto. Formerly Principal of Wyckliffe Hall, Oxford. London, New York, Bombay, and Calcutta: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1913. Pp. 303.

This volume contains an expansion of the lectures on the L. P. Stone Foundation in Princeton Theological Seminary, which were delivered by Dr. Thomas during the session of 1912-13. In the Preface Dr. Thomas informs his readers of the purpose and scope of his book. His object, he says, was to provide a Monograph on the Holy Spirit for students, and to include references to literature and a bibliography on the subject.

The book is divided into four parts—1. The Biblical revelation concerning the Holy Spirit. 2. The historical interpretation of the doctrine in the history of the Church. 3. The theological formulation of the doctrine. 4. The modern application of the doctrine to various questions of the day.

In beginning the exposition of the Biblical teaching, Dr. Thomas first sets forth the Old Testament doctrine of the Spirit of God under three heads dealing respectively with the Spirit of God in His cosmical relations or relations to the world; in His "theocratic" or "redemptive" relations; and in His individual or personal relations.

After a brief chapter on the Apochrypha, the New Testament teaching is expounded. Dr. Thomas begins with Paul's doctrine of the Holy Spirit, not because he doubts the historicity of the Synoptic account of the teaching of Jesus, but because of the early date of Paul's Epistles. His method, accordingly, is to work backward, and show how the developed doctrine is rooted in the teaching of Jesus. In dealing with Paul's doctrine, Dr. Thomas shows how in the Apostle's thought and teaching the Holy Spirit is represented as the "Source", "Principle" and "Support" of the spiritual life. He then passes from the Work of the Spirit to set forth briefly Paul's view of the Personality and Deity of the Holy Spirit. The Apostle's idea of "flesh" and "Spirit", and of the relation of the Spirit to the exalted Christ are only briefly touched upon, and there is no treatment of the eschatological aspect of the work of the Spirit, which Schweitzer has recently emphasized as one of the distinctive features of Paul's doctrine in contrast with Greek thought.

After setting forth the Pauline doctrine, the teaching of the book of Acts is given, and Gunkel's view is briefly examined. This is followed by a chapter on the teaching of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels and a chapter on our Lord's teaching in the Gospel of John. Dr. Thomas points out how the Synoptic teaching is largely concerned with the official work of the Holy Spirit, as was the case in

the Old Testament, whereas the Gospel of John sets forth richly and fully the teaching of Jesus concerning the Person and Work of the Holy Spirit. This first part concludes with a chapter on the doctrine in the other New Testament books, and a chapter which gives a summary of the Biblical doctrine.

The second or historical part contains seven chapters tracing the development of the doctrine from the close of the Apostolic age through the nineteenth century. In the closing chapter of this part, in giving a summary review of the history of the doctrine, it is pointed out that five special dangers have always beset the purity of this doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The dangers are—Intellectualism, Pelagianism, Ecclesiasticism, Individualism, and Idealism.

The third part, which aims to formulate the doctrine, begins by stating and proving the Personality and Deity of the Holy Spirit. After this follow five chapters discussing respectively the relation of the Spirit to Christ, to the Bible, to the individual Christian, to the Church, and to the world.

The fourth part seeks to point out the application of the doctrine to various modern problems. The doctrine of the presence of the Spirit is distinguished from the doctrine of the Divine Immanence, and this is followed by several chapters which seek to show how the Biblical doctrine of the Holy Spirit is a corrective for various modern errors such as Modernism, Mysticism and Intellectualism. A concluding chapter deals with the bearing of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit on certain Church problems.

The bibliography at the end of the volume will prove helpful to students though it is by no means exhaustive.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

The Saviour of the World. Sermons preached in the Chapel of Princeton Theological Seminary. By BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, a Professor in the Seminary. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1914. 12mo; pp. 270.

There are nine sermons included in this volume, designed to throw into emphasis, even at the cost of some repetition, the particular fact that Jesus Christ is the Saviour not only of individuals but of the world. The titles and texts of the successive sermons are as follows: The Prodigal Son (Lk. xv. 11-32), Jesus Only (Acts iv. 12), The Lamb of God (John i. 29), God's Immeasurable Love (John iii. 16), The Gospel of Paul (2 Cor. v. 14-15, 18-19, 21), The Glorified Christ (Heb. ii. 9), The Risen Jesus (2 Tim. ii. 8), The Gospel of the Covenant (John vi. 38-39), Imitating the Incarnation (Phil ii. 5-8). The first of these sermons endeavors to make plain the universal need of salvation; the second the sole provision of Salvation in Christ; the third the world-wide reach of His salvation; while the subsequent

than ever how much of the success of their enterprise was due to the help of their worthy companions in service, Samuel Newell, Harriet Newell, Gordon Hall, Samuel Mott and Luther Rice. Not a little of the interest centers around Salem, and the old Tabernacle Church, where Judson was ordained, and around those scenes and characters which the recent Judson celebration brought into prominence. The book will be of interest to all who love biography and missions.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Seed Thoughts for Right Living. By ALVAH SABIN HOBART, D.D.

Professor of New Testament Interpretation in Crozer Theological Seminary. Philadelphia: The Griffith and Rowland Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 303. 50 cents.

The author does not attempt to suggest new morals but "to apply new methods to the teaching of old morals." He begins on a level with all men who are seeking to do right, and leads by logical processes to the heights of Christian living, cheered by a Christian hope. Starting with the belief that there must be a science of right living, he seeks first of all to discover its general principles, regarding as his sources "history, experience, reason, conscience, the Bible, religion, human nature."

He next considers the Christian principles of right living, and the certain helps to such living. The fourth part of the book he devotes to "Suggestions to Special Classes", including parents, children, husbands, wives, church-members, ministers, travelers, business men, customers, employers, employees, and voters. He closes the volume with certain "Apostolic Suggestions", as to the progressiveness, the fruit, the defenses, and the dynamic of right living.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Vie En Christ. A lui, en lui, pour lui, comme lui. Conseils et Expériences. Par FRANK THOMAS. 2e édition revue. Genève: J. H. Jeheber, Libraire-Éditeur, 28, rue du Marché. Paris, Libraire Fischbacher, 33, rue de Seine (VIe). 1914. 8vo; pp. 136.

A devotional exhortation in four chapters exhibiting the Christian career as life belonging to Christ (1 Cor. 6:19, 3:23), to be lived in Christ (John 15:4), for Christ (Rom. 12:11), and like Christ (2 Cor. 3:18). According to M. Thomas the Christian Church of to-day is feeble and abortive against the world because it has in it too many who believe in Christ only after a fashion, who have a sort of aesthetic admiration for Him without any vital attachment to Him (pp. 20-25). They have come to Him, but they are not His: "*ils sont venus à lui, ils ne sont pas à lui*" (p. 21). Those who have abandoned public worship and have drifted into doubt and incredulity, he believes, will come back only when the Church shows to the world that she is a society of active laborers, zealous in the service of their Master (pp. 77-78).

The book is passionately devotional, almost recalling a Count Zinzendorf in its religious fervor. Its appeals are beautifully illustrated.

Its theological background is that of the Anselmian orthodoxy (*cf.*, *e.g.*, pp. 17-18, 22-23). Free from all show of superficial emotion, its every page glows with the warmth of a life that has had the rich experiences of Christian fellowship.

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

GENERAL LITERATURE

English Literary Miscellany. By THEODORE W. HUNT. Oberlin, Ohio: Bibliotheca Sacra Company. 1914.

This volume consists of papers originally contributed to *Bibliotheca Sacra*, *The Methodist Review*, *The Presbyterian Review*, and *The Book-Lover*. It is the second in a series. The contents include general discussions of such subjects as The Elizabethan Age of English Letters, The Historical Antecedents of the English Drama, The Transition to Modern British Poetry, and English Criticism; and special discussions, on Shakespeare, Milton, Keats, Arnold, the Brownings, and Swinburne. Kindliness of tone, in marked contrast with the ambitious cleverness and pride of accuracy that spice many books of a similar intention, disarms the reader and carries him back to a time when literary topics were discussed for pleasure, not for scientific ends or for a philosophic purpose. There may be, however, some theological idea in the author's remark that "There is a providence in history and in literary history and a human agency as well, to each of which elements due regard is to be given by the student of letters lest either be pushed to a dangerous extreme". The human, he adds, is sometimes prominent in literature and again the divine. Fortunately he refrains from the tempting task of discriminating between the two in English literature, as some critics have done with preposterous results. Exception must be made, however, for Swinburne, in whom he finds very much less of the divine than in Mrs. Browning. By far the most elaborate of the general discussions is that on English Literary Criticism, which contains much information and many judgments.

Princeton.

G. M. HARPER.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, July: DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH, The New Christianity and the World-Conversion; EUGENE W. LYMAN, Must Dogmatics Forego Ontology?; DAVID S. SCHAFF, Formulation of Fundamental Articles of Faith; ERNEST D. BURTON, Spirit, Soul, and Flesh in Greek Writers from Epicurus to Arius Didymus.

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, July: JOHN F. GENUNG, The Irreducible Minimum; GEORGE M. CUMMINGS, Paul's Doctrine of the Logos; G. CH. AALDERS, The Wellhausen Theory of the Pentateuch, and Textual

Criticism; EDWARD G. LANE, Psychology of Conversion; HOWARD A. BRIDGMAN, Leadership of the Church in Modern Life; EDWARD M. MERRINS, Jews and Race Survival; WILLIAM W. SWEET, Civilizing Influence of the Medieval Church; HAROLD M. WIENER, Stray Notes on Deuteronomy.

Church Quarterly Review, London, July: ELIZABETH WORDSWORTH, Florence Nightingale; W. K. L. CLARKE, Christian and Greek Miracle Stories; WILBERFORCE JENKINSON, Old St. Paul's in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Literature; ROBERT VAUGHAN, Influence of Man upon Nature; S. A. McDOWALL, Evolution and Atonement: the Problem of Continuity; E. M. SPEARING, John Donne and his Theology; C. F. ROGERS, Affusion or Immersion; A. NAIRNE, Versions of Holy Scripture.

Constructive Quarterly, New York, September: H. P. BULL, Spiritual Factors of Unity; ALFRED E. GARVIE, Nonconformity: Its Ideals and History; JEAN RIVIÈRE, Outside the Church no Salvation; S. M. ZWEMER, A United Christendom and Islam; LEONID TURKEVICH, Orthodox Ritual in the Divine Service of the West; GERMAIN MORIN, The Spirit and the Future of Catholic Liturgy; CHARLES JOHNSTON, The Departure of Archbishop Platon; W. R. THOMSON, Votaries of Personality; DAVID H. GREER, A Study in Anthropomorphism; JOHN H. RITSON, The Scriptures as a Bond of Co-operation; W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, Church of England in Relation to Other Reformed Churches; J. E. SYMES, Broad Churchmanship; W. F. LOFTHOUSE, An Experiment in Co-operation; W. CLASSEN, Decay and Growth of Ethical and Religious Ideas among Industrial Workers in Germany; LÉONCE DE GRANDMAISON, Lucie Felix-Faure Goyau.

East and West, London, July: LORD SYDENHAM, Medical Missions in India; S. G. WILSON, Claims of Bahaism; SUSAN BALLARD, Suicide in Japan; BISHOP MONTGOMERY, India; JAMES L. BARTON, Education and Evangelism; ELEANOR McDUGALL, Present Situation in Education of Indian Women; CANON MERCER, Separation of Black and White in the Church; T. C. COLLETT, A Layman's Visit to Zululand; D. S. BATTEY, Opium in the Villages of Bengal.

Expositor, London, August: ED. KÖNIG, Old Testament and Babylonian Language; JOHN A. HUTTON, Sense of Sin in Great Literature, 2 "Peer Gynt"; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Studies in Christian Eschatology, 7 Universal Restoration; GERARD BALL, Epistle to Philippians: a Reply; A. E. GARVIE, Notes on the Fourth Gospel. 7 The Upper Room; H. T. ANDREWS, Structure of Prologue to Fourth Gospel; C. F. RUSSELL, The Second Commandment; E. B. REDLICH, Aristarchus. *The Same*, September: ED. KÖNIG, Old Testament and Babylonian Language; ARTHUR CARR, Boldness in the Day of Judgment; NEWPORT J. D. WHITE, The Creed and Dr. Sanday; ALPHONSE MINGANA, A New Document on Clement of Rome, his Relations and his Interview with Simon Peter; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Studies in Christian Eschatology, 8 Conditionalism; JOHN A. HUTTON, Sense of Sin in Great Literature, 3 "La Morte"; C. VAN GELDEREN, Who was Nimrod?; A. A. DAUNCEY, The Two Great Refusals.

Expository Times, Edinburgh July: C. ANDERSON SCOTT, Church's Interpretation of the Historic Christ; A. H. SAYCE, Recent Biblical and Oriental Archaeology; J. RENDEL HARRIS, Gnosis and Agape; WILLIAM WATSON, The New Jerusalem. *The Same*, August: ADOLF DEISSMANN, Study-Travel in New Testament Lands; FREDERICK J. RAE, The Christian Message about Prayer; D. R. MACKENZIE, Christianity and the African Mind; A. R. GORDON, Pioneers in the Study of Old Testament Poetry; A. H. SAYCE, Recent Biblical and Oriental Archaeology; H. NORTHCOTE, The Song of Habakkuk. *The Same*, September: ADOLF DEISSMANN, Study-Travel in New Testament Lands; EDWARD SHILLITO, Prayer in the Epistle to the Hebrews; J. E. SOMERVILLE, Gadarene Demoniac; GEORGE MARGOLIOUTH, The Marriage Law in the Geniza-Zadokite Documents; A. H. SAYCE, Archaeology of Genesis.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, April: ERNST VON DOBSCHÜTZ, The Lord's Prayer; ANNA G. SPENCER, Marriage and Social Control; ALBERT R. VAIL, Bahaism—A Study of a Contemporary Movement; WILLIAM W. ROCKWELL, The Jesuits as Portrayed by non-Catholic Historians; RALPH B. PERRY, Contemporary Philosophies of Religion; ALBERT LEO, Churches of France and their Separation from the State.

Hibbert Journal, Boston, July: A. D. McLAREN, Creeds, Heresy-Hunting, and Secession in German Protestantism To-day; J. M. THOMPSON, Post-Modernism; ARCHIBALD WEIR, Criminous Clerks; CANON ADDERLEY, "Sacraments and Unity"; W. R. INGE, Institutionalism and Mysticism; BERTRAND RUSSELL, Mysticism and Logic; L. T. FARNELL, The Presence of Savage Elements in the Religion of Cultured Races; FRANCIS H. JOHNSON, The Higher Anthropology; J. AGAR BEET, The Hereafter in the Bible and in Modern Thought; W. MONTGOMERY, Schweitzer as a Missionary; CASSIUS J. KEYSER, Significance of Death.

Hindustan Review, Allahabad, August: J. STANARD, The Bahai Movement of Persia; P. A. V. AIYAR, Agricultural Labour: A Lesson from Austria; C. I. VARUGHISE, Ancient Public Libraries; SVED A. HAKIM, Sultana Raziyya.

International Journal of Ethics, Philadelphia, July: H. L. STEWART, Need for a Modern Casuistry; G. A. JOHNSTON, Casuistry and Ethics; E. W. HIRST, Absolutism and the Ethical Problem; S. RADHAKRISHNAN, Vedanta Philosophy and the Doctrine of Maya.

Interpreter, London, July: ARTHUR WRIGHT, Catchwords in the Gospels; R. H. KENNETT, Our Lord's Interpretation of Prophecy; WILLOUGHBY C. ALLEN, Criticism of Two Document Theory of the Synoptic Gospels; A. W. F. BLUNT, After Death; H. H. B. AYLES, Sanguis Jesu Christi; T. H. WEIR, Did Jesus Speak Greek or Aramaic?; JAMES JONES, Did Lazarus Write the Fourth Gospel?; J. C. HARDWICK, Religion in France; H. E. MADDOX, The Hundred and Twenty-first Psalm; G. W. OTTON, "That Rock was Christ."

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin, July: JOSEPH MACRORY, Present Chaos in the Church of England; DAVID BARRY, Ethics of Horse-

rating; PETER DAHMEN, Islam in India—Its External Influence; M. H. MACINERNEY, Alan O'Sullivan, Bishop of Cloyne and Lismore; GEORGE S. HITCHCOCK, Symbolism of the Apocalypse; F. J. GHELLINCK, Medieval Theology in Verse.

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, July: ISRAEL FRIEDLÄNDER, A New Responsum of Maimonides concerning the Repetition of the SHMONEH ESREH; ISAAC HERZOG, The Last Two Chapters of Samuel Ben Hofni's *ספר ארצות* שרע ארצות. B. HALPER, Volume of the Book of Precepts by Hefes B. Yasiah IV-VIII.

Jewish Review, London, July: ISRAEL COHEN, Modern Jewry in Bondage; L. G. MONTEFIORE, Anglo-Jewry at the Cross-roads; ROBERT B. SOLOMON, Gerasa; H. C. FRANKLIN, Jerusalem and Zionism; SALIS DAICHES, Salomon Maimon and his Relations to Judaism.

Journal of Biblical Literature, Boston, June: JOHN P. PETERS, Wind of God; J. DYNELEY PRINCE, Note on Vashti; HENRY A. SANDERS, New Collation of Ms. 22 of the Gospels; GEORGE A. BARTON, Exegesis of *ἐναντίας* in Galatians 4:10 and its bearing on the Date of the Epistle; WALDO S. PRATT, Studies in the Diction of the Psalter III; JOHN P. PETERS, The Cock in the Old Testament.

Journal of Theological Studies, London, July: T. W. CRAFER, Work of Porphyry against the Christians, and its Reconstruction II; J. M. CREED, The Hermetic Writings; MARTIN RULE, The Queen of Sweden's 'Gelasian Sacramentary' III; R. H. CONNOLLY and EDMUND BISHOP, Work of Menezes on the Malabar Liturgy II; C. R. NORCOCK, St. Gaudentius of Brescia and the *Tome* of St. Leo.

London Quarterly Review, London, July: P. T. FORSYTH, Effectiveness of the Ministry; ELSÉ CARRIER, Notables of Nantes; GEORGE JACKSON, Lord Morley and the Christian Faith; R. G. W. HUNTER, Milton and the Liberties of England; CHARLES BONE, Confucianism: China's Established Religion; W. T. BALMER, Bergson and Eucken in Mutual Relation; F. W. ORDE WARD, The Coming Christocracy; The Christian Faith for To-day.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, July: H. E. JACOBS, The Ideals of Theological Education; C. E. LINDBERG, Problem of Comity Between Theological Seminaries; C. M. JACOBS, Can We Agree on a Standard Theological Curriculum?; JOHN W. HORINE, Board of Education of the General Council of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in North America; JOHN W. HORINE, Can we Agree on a Course of Religious Instruction in Our Colleges?; H. DOUGLASS SPAETH, Cooperation of Church and State in Religious Education; E. T. HORN, The Industrial Revolution; H. E. JACOBS, The Philadelphia Seminary; JOHN C. MATTES, The Dying Church of Hamburg; M. S. WATERS, Protestantism and Its Present Day Task; FREDERICK A. REITER, Christian Baptism II; W. WALTHER, Obligatory Confessional Subscription of Ministers II.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, July: HERBERT C. ALLEMAN, Justification by Faith; M. COOVER, Attitude of the Christian Minister to the Life of To-day; J. A. SINGMASTER, The General Synod; WILLIAM H.

in American Periodicals; HIRAM BINGHAM, Latin America and the Monroe Doctrine; LINCOLN HUTCHINSON, New Opportunities in the Pacific; FREDERICK S. DICKSON, High Prices and High Living; A. F. POLLARD, Liberty: Medieval and Modern; WILLIAM L. PHELPS, Conversations with Paul Heyse; THEODORE S. WOOLSEY, The American Vasari; H. DE FOREST SMITH, The Recovery of Lost Greek Literature.

Bilychnis, Roma, Luglio: MARIO PUCCINI, Un paladino dell' idea Cristiana: Raffaele Mariano; UGO JANNI, Il metodo di ricerca dell' Essenza della Religiosità; CALOGERO VITANZA, I precedenti classici del dogma della grazia; CARLO WAGNER, Tre cose fondamentali; WILFRED MONOD, Il Cristo spirituale; WILLIAM E. BARTON, La capella dell' Assunzione.

Bulletin d'ancienne littérature et d'archéologie chrétiennes, Paris, Juillet: PIERRE DE LABRIOLLE, Comment on fait aujourd'hui un dictionnaire. Le Thesaurus linguae latinae; ANDRÉ WILMART, Benedictiones Bobienses; LECLERCQ, Les certificats de sacrifice païen sous Dèce; P. BATIFFOL, M. Babut sur l'authenticité des canons de Sardique; GOUGAUD, Trois anciennes fêtes de N.-S.; P. DE LABRIOLLE, Tertullien a-t-il connu une version latine de la Bible?

La Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Julio-Agosto: NORBERTO DEL PRADO, Escoto y Santo Tomás; J. G. ARINTERO, Cuestiones místicas; EMILIO COLUNG, Intelectualistas y místicos en la teología española del siglo XVI; JOSÉ D. GAGO, De cuestiones sociales; MIGUEL MENÉNDEZ, De lógica y criteriología; E. COLUNGA, De Derecho eclesiástico.


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